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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Why are we so rich and they so poor?” (Landes, 1990, p. 1), or “Why are some
countries so much more productive than others?” (Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 84). These
questions stand at the core of research on the long-run determinants and processes
of socioeconomic development. In their attempts to answer these questions, seminal
contributions identified several fundamental and proximate factors as key determinants
for macroeconomic performance and development in the long run. Specifically, these
determinants include geography (Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1999),
institutional quality (North, 1990, 1991; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001, 2005; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004), education (Benhabib and
Spiegel, 1994; Glaeser et al., 2004), health (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2004; Weil, 2007),
the demographic transition (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Cervellati and
Sunde, 2005) and the demographic dividend (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2003; Bloom,
Canning, and Fink, 2010), as well as preferences (Dohmen et al., 2015; Falk et al., 2017).
Using state-of-the-art empirical techniques, this dissertation extends and complements
this literature along several dimensions: First of all, this research sheds new light on the
non-monotonic effects of population aging on macroeconomic performance and identifies
education as a powerful force in compensating the negative consequences of demographic
change. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates the pivotal role of health improvements
for subsequent economic performance in terms of growth, aggregate wages, educational
attainment, and income inequality. In particular, I establish a causal link between health
in terms of adult life expectancy and aggregate wages as well as income inequality. Finally,
this dissertation uncovers important interactions between economic performance, inequality,
and political institutions in shaping institutional quality, which have gone largely unnoticed
by the empirical literature. The analysis proceeds in six chapters which are self-contained
and can be read independently. Nonetheless, they all share a common theme: the long-
run interdependence of demographic change, economic performance, and institutional
quality. The final chapter provides some brief personal thoughts regarding the research on
population aging, macroeconomic performance, and institutional quality.
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In the first part of this dissertation, which comprises Chapters 2 to 5, I examine how
population aging, health improvements, and demographic change affect macroeconomic
performance as measured by output levels, economic growth, aggregate wages, and—from a
broader perspective—income inequality. This focus is motivated by the powerful effects of
transformations of the demographic structure on economic development, which can occur
along several dimensions: First of all, individuals become healthier and grow older thanks to
medical advancement and improved living standards. Consequently, workers tend to exhibit
a higher productivity resulting from raised physical capacity and cognitive functioning
(Bloom and Canning, 2000; Feyrer, Politi, and Weil, 2017). Moreover, individuals invest
more in educational attainment, if health improvements take place at a sufficiently young
age (Ben-Porath, 1967; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013). This increase in investment in
schooling transforms the life-cycle earnings trajectory of the average worker: On the one
hand, individuals start to work later, thereby reducing their life-time labor supply; on the
other hand, they gain a higher return for every additional year of work experience, more
than compensating them for the foregone income. In addition, higher education better
protects workers at older ages from income shocks, because they can select into occupations
that are less physically demanding but require more human capital. Consequently, life-cycle
earnings profiles increase more steeply at younger ages and flatten out more slowly at
higher ages, thereby raising life-cycle income inequality (see Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1999,
as well as Chapters 4 and 5 for details). Furthermore, a longer prospective life span
creates a greater need for retirement savings (Bloom and Canning, 2000; De Nardi, French,
and Jones, 2009). Finally, individuals usually reduce their fertility as a result of higher
opportunity costs for child rearing (Becker, 1960) and better access to family planning
(Pritchett, 1994). On the aggregate level, this fertility adjustment causes a change in the
demographic structure to a transitory state with few young and few old people. This
transformation creates the opportunity for a demographic dividend in terms of substantial
gains in income per capita (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2003). Further shifts in the age
composition of the population after the demographic dividend may also considerably slow
down prospective economic growth as a result of dissaving, increased need for transfers, or
life-cycle productivity patterns (Chapter 2). Hence, health gains, population aging, and
demographic change constitute important determinants of macroeconomic performance in
the long term, motivating the empirical investigations in this dissertation.
First, Chapter 2 focuses on the effects of aging on macroeconomic performance. This
chapter is joint work with Uwe Sunde and presents our paper “Can Education Compensate
the Effect of Population Aging on Macroeconomic Performance? Evidence from Panel
Data.” This chapter addresses three questions that have remained open in light of the
existing literature: How do population aging and contemporaneous changes in aggregate
human capital affect macroeconomic performance? Can investment in education offset the
(potentially negative) effects of population aging? And, finally, what are the corresponding
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prospects of future economic development? In order to answer these questions, we proceed
in three steps.
In a first step, we conduct an empirical development accounting exercise based on a
model that encompasses the empirical frameworks used in the existing literature. Based on
a cross-country panel of more than 130 countries for the period 1950 to 2010, we estimate
how changes in either the age structure of the workforce or in the distribution of human
capital affect macroeconomic performance in terms of GDP levels and growth rates.
In a further step, we explicitly consider the interactions between aging and changes
in the skill composition. This analysis complements and extends the existing literature,
which, with few exceptions, focused either on population aging or changes in the human
capital endowment in isolation. Our results reveal that population aging has substantial
consequences for economic performance, even when accounting for changes in the education
composition, and that the demographic structure of the workforce and education both
jointly affect economic performance. Moreover, the demographic structure affects economic
performance non-monotonically, implying heterogeneous prospective development paths
conditional on the extent of demographic change.
In a final step, we use our estimates to conduct quantitative exercises that shed light
on the relative importance of the changes in the age and in the skill composition of the
workforce that occur as consequence of the ongoing process of population aging. In partic-
ular, we project the macroeconomic performance in terms of GDP for several alternative
scenarios that use the projected changes in age composition and education until 2050.
We compare these projections to counterfactual scenarios that fix the age composition
or human capital at current levels. According to these quantitative exercises, advanc-
ing population aging and a slowdown in educational attainment will dampen economic
performance, particularly in developed economies where aging is especially pronounced
and the population has already attained fairly high levels of education throughout all age
cohorts. Investment in education constitutes a powerful force in compensating the negative
consequences of population aging; however, our results also suggest that even enhanced
investments in education are unlikely to completely offset the effects of population aging in
the countries that face the greatest pressure of population aging. In contrast, for economies
with a relatively stable demographic structure, aging is projected to have rather neutral
effects on macroeconomic performance, while the projected increase in human capital
implies a positive prospective performance.
Chapter 3 analyzes the association between population health and economic perfor-
mance at the macro level. This chapter is joint work with David Bloom, David Canning,
Klaus Prettner, and Johannes Schünemann and presents our paper “Health and Economic
Growth: Reconciling the Micro and Macro Evidence.” In particular, the evidence presented
in this chapter aims at reconciling the micro-based with the macro-based approach of
estimating the effect of health on economic growth.
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On the one hand, the micro-based approach adds up the microeconomic effects of health
to infer the implications for aggregate income. For example, Weil (2007) models output
using an aggregate production function that includes the stock of health as measured by
the adult survival rate in conjunction with micro-based returns to health. His calibration
exercise suggests that health is a vitally important form of human capital deserving central
attention in the development process.
On the other hand, the macro-based approach relies on growth regressions (see, for
example, Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple, 2005). Strong cross-country
correlations between measures of aggregate health and per capita income are well established
(Preston, 1975; World Bank, 1993). Correspondingly, higher incomes promote access to
many of the goods and services, such as a nutritious diet, safe water, sanitation, and good
health care, which, in turn, improve health and longevity.
Our paper compares the size of micro-based estimates of the effect of health on wages
with the macro-based estimates of the return to health on worker productivity. To this end,
we estimate a production function model of economic growth, keeping our specification as
close as possible to that of Weil (2007), thereby permitting a direct comparison between
our estimates and his calibration. Estimating an aggregate production function using cross-
country data is difficult, because reverse causality, omitted variables, and measurement
error may bias the parameter estimates. We try to address these issues adequately.
According to our estimates, an increase in adult survival rates of ten percentage points is
associated with a 9.1-percent increase in labor productivity. The corresponding 95-percent
confidence interval includes the estimate derived by Weil (2007). Hence, our macro-based
results conform with his micro-based results, thereby reconciling both approaches of
estimating the effect of health on economic growth. Overall, our results suggest that public
health measures might be an important lever for fostering economic development. As this
work is still preliminary, however, we do not provide extensive robustness checks.
Importantly, reconciling the micro-based and the macro-based approach would imply
that the return to health on the macro level could be derived from estimates based on
micro-level data. This finding would be of practical importance for two reasons: First, low-
and middle-income countries, which would profit most from health improvements, often lack
reliable macro data on health outcomes and even economic performance. In this context,
micro-level data—for example, based on surveys—might allow to gauge the potential
benefits of health interventions. Second, micro-based econometric identification strategies
might provide more reliable estimates of the causal effect of health on economic performance
compared to macro-based strategies that require strong identification assumptions.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the effects of population aging induced by medical advance-
ment on economic performance in terms of aggregate wages. This chapter is based on
my paper “Life Expectancy and Life-Cycle Wages: Evidence from the Cardiovascular
Revolution in U.S. States.” I confine my perspective to the United States, which provide
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quasi-experimental variation for the econometric identification of a causal link from adult
life expectancy to aggregate wages. In particular, the number of older but also healthier
workers increased substantially following the introduction of novel treatment procedures
for cardiovascular diseases. In this context, my research addresses three questions that
complement and extend the existing literature. First, do improved health conditions, as
measured by adult life expectancy, lead to more productive workers? Moreover, do health
shocks affect the population homogeneously? And, finally, what are potential channels for
a causal link?
In order to answer these questions, I exploit variation in the unexpected sharp decline
in mortality rates from cardiovascular diseases among U.S. states beginning in the 1960s.
This decline is used as an instrument for adult life expectancy in a balanced ten-year
panel from 1940 to 2000 for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The identification strategy
exploits initial differences in mortality from cardiovascular diseases across U.S. states in
1960 when there existed little treatment possibilities for cardiovascular diseases. Between
1960 and 1970, a number of path-breaking innovations in the treatment of cardiovascular
diseases were introduced and behavioral risk factors identified. The availability of these
novel treatments as well as follow-up inventions and public education about risks helped
to considerably reduce mortality from cardiovascular diseases between 1970 and 2000. The
decline in mortality entailed a substantial increase in adult life expectancy, which varied
across states, depending on the initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases. Therefore, this
quasi-experimental source of variation allows the estimation of a differences-in-differences
model, where all states are treated but with varying treatment intensities. Economic
performance as the main outcome is proxied by aggregate wages on the state level for
different age cohorts and the workforce in total.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the empirical results
establish a positive causal link between adult life expectancy and aggregate wages. In
particular, the decline of mortality from cardiovascular diseases in the U.S. from 1968
onward led to an increase in life expectancy at 50 of approximately 3.16 years. According
to the main results, this rise in life expectancy caused a wage increase for the 45- to
54-year-olds of roughly 9,762$. This wage hike corresponded to 47 percent of the wage
change observed in the same time window. Furthermore, the results reveal that wage gains
accrued to workers in the prime-age group between 25 and 54 as well as to old-age workers
above 65. Compared to earlier generations, the life-cycle earnings profile of an average
worker thus increases more steeply at younger ages, while it flattens out more slowly at
higher ages. Overall, this pattern is consistent with a workforce that over time becomes
healthier at any given age, and at higher ages in particular. An optimistic interpretation
of this result suggests that health gains for prime-age and old-age workers might boost
economic performance for aging societies and thus confine (some of the) potentially adverse
effects of demographic change described in Chapter 2.
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Another contribution is the focus on measurement of health conditions in the context
of age-specific outcomes. Specifically, life expectancy as a proxy for average health may
over- or understate the true health status of the population if measured at the wrong
age. For example, consider the substantial increase of life expectancy at birth following
the invention of vaccines and antibiotics. As important as this health shock was, it
may grossly overstate the average health improvement of the median American who is
around age 30 at this time. Overall, the findings suggest that mismeasurement leads
to downward-biased estimates, if the change in average population health is overstated.
Therefore, age-specific heterogeneity in the effect of health shocks and mismeasurement
might be a reason for null results of life expectancy at birth on GDP per capita found
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007, 2014), Hansen (2014), and Bloom, Canning, and Fink
(2014). This measurement problem cannot be mended by the instrumentation strategy
employed in these papers, because the instrument itself suffers from the same conceptual
shortcoming as the endogenous variable. Hence, the published estimates can be considered
a lower bound for the causal effect of life expectancy on growth.
Lastly, this study makes progress in analyzing potential channels through which adult
life expectancy affects aggregate wages. Specifically, the timing of wage hikes suggests
that potential channels are direct health improvements, especially in the short run, and
higher educational attainment as well as changes in individual behavior toward a more
healthy lifestyle in the long run. In contrast, adjustments in labor supply cannot explain
the wage increase, because labor force participation rates as well as usual working hours
and weeks either declined or remained unchanged during the treatment period.
Chapter 5 examines the effect of population aging on income inequality. The chapter is
based on my paper “Population Aging and Income Inequality: Evidence from the Cardio-
vascular Revolution in U.S. States” and refers to the setting of Chapter 4. In particular,
medical advancement and demographic change led to substantial population aging in
the United States during the twentieth century. This fundamental transformation of the
demographic structure was accompanied by a substantial rise of investment in educational
attainment, increased saving, better population health, a temporary preponderance of the
working-age relative to the dependent population, and ultimately resulted in a (second)
demographic dividend in terms of economic growth. While a plethora of work analyzed the
beneficial effects of the demographic dividend on economic performance in terms of growth,
little research examined the quantitative link between population aging and economic
inequality. Hence, this chapter extends and complements the literature by providing a
more rigorous empirical investigation of this link.
Based on the identification strategy from Chapter 4, this study quantifies the con-
tribution of population aging to income inequality in the United States between 1940
and 2000. From a theoretical viewpoint, this interrelation is mechanical, though the
direction and size of its effect are a priori ambiguous. As individuals age, income inequality
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evolves within age cohorts: Life-cycle earnings profiles suggest that income inequality
rises between ages 25 and 64, when the return to educational attainment unfolds, while
the income gap contracts again during retirement. Moreover, within-cohort inequalities
tend to accumulate over the life-cycle with inequality being most pronounced among
the 55- to 64-year-olds (OECD, 2017). Therefore, changes in the demographic structure
cause a composition effect that may intensify or depress income inequality conditional
on the relative size of age cohorts. For example, income inequality may first increase
and later fall as large baby boomer cohorts work their way through the demographic
structure. Moreover, population aging may contribute to transformations of life-cycle
earnings profiles, which become steeper for young ages and flatten out more slowly at
higher ages, thereby further reinforcing income dispersion over the life-cycle.
The empirical results in this chapter confirm a positive causal link from population
aging to income inequality for a balanced panel of the 48 contiguous U.S. states between
1940 and 2000. In particular, the baseline estimate indicates that, at the margin, a one-
percent increase in adult life expectancy, measured at the age of 30, leads to an increase in
inequality of 0.9 Gini points, measured on a scale from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect
inequality). The first-stage estimate implies that the decline in mortality rates from
cardiovascular diseases between 1960 and 2000 led to an increase in life expectancy at 30 of
7.2 percent compared to 1960. Taken at face value, higher adult life expectancy thus raised
pre-tax income inequality overall by 6.48 Gini points. Hence, population aging contributed
considerably to the observed rise of pre-tax earnings inequality in the United States.
Furthermore, an age-specific analysis reveals that the effect of population aging on income
reaches its maximum when measured for young age groups between 20 and 30. In contrast,
the effect becomes small and even vanishes for higher ages. Correspondingly, increased
income dispersion results from health improvements and higher prospective longevity
during working ages rather than from population aging per se. In particular, this finding is
consistent with increasing income dispersion over the life-cycle due to increased investment
into educational attainment (Cervellati and Sunde, 2013), life-cycle earnings profiles that
flatten out more slowly at higher ages (Chapter 4), and wage polarization resulting from
skill-biased technical change (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013).
In the second part of this dissertation, which encompasses Chapters 6 and 7, I examine
the role of economic performance in shaping institutional quality in the political as well as
in the economic domain. This focus is motivated by the crucial role of institutions granting
economic freedom and liberties for socioeconomic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2005). In the long run, however, institutional quality is not exogenously given
but endogenously determined. In particular, potential determinants of stability and
quality of democratic institutions comprise economic performance in terms of income
shocks and distribution (Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Brückner, Ciccone, and Tesei, 2012;
Dorsch and Maarek, 2014) as well as demographic pressure in terms of a youth bulge
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(Urdal, 2006). Moreover, the empirical literature has identified two key determinants of
institutional quality: democratic institutions in terms of constraints on those in power
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu, 2008) and
(re-)distributive pressure in terms of economic inequality that might erode institutional
quality through influence activities and informality (Chong and Calderon, 2000; Chong
and Gradstein, 2007a, 2007b). Chapters 6 and 7 extend and complement this literature
by investing important interactions between economic performance and inequality, on
the one hand, and political institutions and economic inequality, on the other hand, in
shaping institutional quality. Even though these interactions seem to have been present in
works by De Tocqueville (1835) and Lipset (1959), they have largely gone unnoticed in
the empirical literature.
Chapter 6 investigates how economic performance in terms of income shocks and
inequality affects democratic quality. This chapter is joint work with Uwe Sunde and
presents our paper “Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democracy.” Specifically, we test the
hypothesis that income shocks trigger major changes in institutional quality, as reflected by
transitions between autocracy and democracy, and that the corresponding effect depends
crucially on the social environment, as reflected by economic inequality.
This hypothesis is rooted in the theoretical literature of democratic transitions under
threats of revolutions (see, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2005) and the
alternative of elite-driven transitions to democracy (see, for example, Lizzeri and Persico,
2004). Accordingly, negative economic shocks might provide an opportunity to overcome
autocratic institutions, especially in an environment with high inequality. Conversely,
democracy might emerge for economic reasons in environments of low inequality and, thus,
low redistributive conflict. In light of these predictions, we hypothesize that an appropriate
empirical analysis of the income-democracy nexus should focus on economic shocks and
non-marginal changes in democratic quality instead of exploiting continuous variation in
income and institutional quality. Moreover, the theory suggests that the effects of income
shocks crucially differ by the cohesiveness of society, as reflected by economic inequality. In
economically highly unequal societies, negative income shocks are likely to trigger revolts
and, thereby, open a window of opportunity for democratization, whereas positive income
shocks tend to stabilize oligarchic structures. In economically equal societies, by contrast,
positive income shocks do not generate much redistributive pressure, thereby helping to
consolidate and improve democratic quality, whereas negative income shocks might erode
democracy by creating tensions within the society.
Our results provide support for this hypothesis and document the crucial role of
inequality for the effects of economic shocks on the quality and stability of political
institutions. In particular, our findings show that negative income shocks unfold a negative
effect on democracy in countries with low economic inequality but a positive effect in
countries with high inequality. Therefore, our findings reconcile results for positive
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effects of income on democracy (for example, Benhabib, Corvalan, and Spiegel, 2013;
Che et al., 2013) with evidence that negative income shocks have a positive effect on
democratic improvements (for example, Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Aidt and Franck,
2015). In particular, we document an important role of major income fluctuations and a
significant asymmetry in interaction with economic inequality. Moreover, this finding also
complements evidence from other contributions, suggesting that income unfolds vastly
heterogeneous effects on democratic institutions (for example, Moral-Benito and Bartolucci,
2012, for heterogeneity across low and high income countries, and Cervellati et al., 2014,
for heterogeneity with respect to colonial history). Finally, our empirical analysis provides
some evidence for demographic pressure as another potential determinant of democratic
transitions which, however, is too weak to be considered as conclusive.
Finally, Chapter 7 further investigates the determinants of institutional quality. This
chapter is joint work with Uwe Sunde and is based on our paper “Democracy, Inequality,
and Institutional Quality.” Specifically, we test the hypothesis that political institutions
in conjunction with economic (in-)equality shape institutional quality in the economic
domain. This hypothesis implies a non-monotonic effect of democratic institutions on
institutional quality conditional on economic inequality, which has not been documented
in the empirical literature.
The starting point of our empirical analysis is the conceptual distinction between
political and economic institutions: On the one hand, political institutions describe to
what extent individuals can engage and participate in the political process via elections
and referendums. On the other hand, economic institutions comprise aspects of de facto
economic freedom as well as institutional features that directly affect the incentives for
entrepreneurial activities and investment, such as bureaucratic efficiency and impartiality
of the judiciary. There are important conceptual differences, which relate to the nature
of institutions and their perception. Economic institutions are mostly implemented
by laws, which have been passed by the government, and reflect de facto liberties of
individual citizens in the economic domain. In contrast, political institutions, in terms of
democracy, the constraints on the executive, or the ability to vote, reflect legally codified,
constitutional rules. In this sense, political institutions can be seen as determinants
of economic institutions but not vice versa (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2005). Likewise, these types of institutions differ inherently in their nature:
Political institutions serve as constraints for politicians and the government, whereas
economic institutions enable private actors to interact and achieve their goals (see, for
example, Voigt, 2013).
The main contribution of our study is the identification of a robust empirical interaction
between democracy and equality in shaping the quality of the economic institutions. Our
empirical strategy exploits variation in democratic quality and income equality within
countries over the period 1970 to 2010, thereby conditioning on country-specific and time-
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specific unobserved heterogeneity that might influence institutional quality, and on controls
for institutional quality in the past. We employ different estimation methods to account
for the well-known problems in dynamic panels. Irrespective of the estimation method and
the underlying identification assumptions, the results reveal a robust, negative direct effect
of democracy but a significant positive interaction between democracy and equality in
shaping the quality of economic institutions. In terms of size, this interaction term is large
enough to render the marginal effect of democracy on institutional quality negative for
high levels of inequality in the data set. Hence, our empirical model predicts institutional
quality to be highest in democracies with low inequality. At the same time, however, our
results imply that the beneficial effect of democracy on the quality of economic institutions
may be eroded by excessive inequality, which constitutes a novel result in the literature.
Finally, we also contribute to an ongoing debate about how institutions should be
measured, and what is comprised by different measures that are frequently used in the
literature. In particular, while there is a common perception that different measures
capture similar underlying institutional features, our findings document that there is
substantial variation across measures of political and economic institutions, and that the
correlation is lower than commonly thought, complementing the conceptual arguments
by Voigt (2013). To our knowledge, our analysis is among the first to open this black
box and test a theoretical prediction using a variety of different measures of political and
economic institutions. The results indicate a very robust interaction between political
institutions and (in-)equality within and across countries that has gone largely unnoticed
in the existing literature and that holds across combinations of various measures.
Chapter 2
Can Education Compensate the
Effect of Population Aging on
Macroeconomic Performance?
Evidence from Panel Data1
2.1 Introduction
Population aging is one of the most important economic and social challenges in the
twenty-first century. With increasing life expectancy and falling fertility, the populations
of most countries grow older, resulting in substantial shifts in the age composition of
workforce and population at large. At the same time, the demographic transition and the
associated shift in the age distribution imply substantial changes in the aggregate stock
of human capital as well as its age distribution, as relatively large cohorts with low or
moderate levels of formal education are replaced by relatively small cohorts with high
levels of formal education.
This can be illustrated by the changes in the age structure of populations over long
period. Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 plots the age structure in the world and in high-income
(OECD) countries in 1950 and 2010. Evidently, not only the size of the world population
has changed over this period but, in particular, also the age composition. Whereas in
a global perspective the population has increased rather uniformly across all ages, with
a slowdown only visible for the youngest cohorts below 20 years of age, aging is much
more pronounced among the high-income countries. However, even within the group of
high-income countries, there are substantial differences in the demographic dynamics.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.1 plots the corresponding patterns for Germany, the United Kingdom,
1A revised version of this paper is accepted for publication in Economic Policy and available online at
http://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiy011. Please refer to the published version.
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and France in 1950 and 2010. In Germany, the age composition of the population is most
uneven, with the consequence of a stronger aging momentum than in the UK and, in
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Figure 2.2: Dynamics of Educational Attainment
particular, in France, where the age composition is fairly uniform at ages below 65.
These demographic changes have important consequences for productivity and human
capital. The shift in the age composition has implications for the informal, experience-
related human capital embodied in the population. This follows from the empirically
well-documented age-experience profile from life-cycle models of human capital (Ben-
Porath, 1967). At the same time, populations differ greatly in their formal education
attainment, both across age groups and across countries. Younger cohorts typically exhibit
much higher levels of schooling and formal training. Figure 2.2 documents the secular
increase in the share of high skilled over the period 1950 to 2010 for high-income (OECD)
and non-OECD countries in Panel (a), as well as for three developed countries, Germany,
the UK, and France, in Panel (b).
Although these forceful demographic dynamics can be expected to have major im-
plications for macroeconomic performance, the joint effects of population aging and of
changes in the human capital endowment for macroeconomic performance are still not
well understood. Whereas the economic consequences of aging and of changes in human
capital have been investigated in isolation, their interactions have been largely neglected
in the existing literature.
This paper addresses three questions that remain open in light of the existing literature:
How do population aging and the contemporaneous changes in aggregate human capital
affect macroeconomic performance? Can investment in education offset the (potentially
negative) effects of population aging? And, finally, what are the corresponding prospects
of future economic development?
Using data from a cross-country panel of more than 130 countries for the period 1950 to
2010, we investigate empirically how changes in the age structure of the workforce and in
the distribution of human capital affect macroeconomic performance in terms of levels and
growth rates. The investigation is based on an extended empirical development accounting
model that encompasses the empirical frameworks used in the existing literature and that
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allows estimating the distinct effects of aging and human capital. These estimates can
be used for a detailed analysis of the relative importance of aging and human capital
dynamics for the projected development paths of countries around the world until 2050,
and for a quantitative assessment of different scenarios of aging and education acquisition.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. The first step sets the stage by restricting
the analysis to the effects of population aging and of changes in the aggregate human
capital endowment for macroeconomic performance in isolation from each other, thereby
replicating the existing evidence in the literature. The estimation results reveal that
changes in the age composition of the work force significantly affect economic performance.
The estimates mirror the well-known hump-shaped individual productivity patterns from
micro studies, with the largest positive effects being associated with prime working ages and
smaller effects for young and old population segments. Likewise, the levels and dynamics
in aggregate human capital are shown to affect economic performance independently from
the demographic structure.
In the second step, the empirical analysis explicitly considers the interactions between
aging and changes in the skill composition. This analysis complements and extends the
existing literature, which, with few exceptions, has largely been restricted to focusing
either on population aging or changes in the human capital endowment in isolation. The
results reveal that population aging has substantial implications on economic performance
even when accounting for changes in the education composition, and that the demographic
structure of the workforce and education both jointly affect economic performance. More-
over, the demographic structure affects economic performance non-monotonically, implying
heterogeneous prospective development paths conditional on the extent of demographic
change. At the same time, there is little evidence for eroding productivity of human capital
attained in terms of formal education in older cohorts.
In the third and final step of the analysis, the estimation results are used to conduct
quantitative exercises that shed light on the relative importance of the changes in the
age and in the skill composition of the workforce that occur as consequence of the
ongoing process of population aging. In particular, based on the empirical estimates,
macroeconomic performance is projected under several alternative scenarios that use the
projected changes in age composition and education. These projections are compared to
counterfactual scenarios that fix the age composition or human capital at current levels.
According to these quantitative exercises, aging and a slowdown in education attainment
will dampen economic performance particularly in developed economies, where aging
is especially pronounced and the population has already attained fairly high levels of
education throughout all age cohorts. Investment in education turns out to be a powerful
force in compensating the negative consequences of population aging. However, the results
also suggest that even enhanced investments in education are unlikely to completely offset
the effects of population aging in the countries that face the greatest pressure of population
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aging. In contrast, for economies with a relatively stable demographic structure, aging is
projected to have rather neutral effects on macroeconomic performance, while the projected
increase in human capital implies a positive prospective performance.
Furthermore, the results provide an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
the age composition and the human capital endowment of a country. This elasticity
provides new insights into the change in the distribution of human capital that is needed
in order to offset the effects of changes in the age composition of the workforce. The
quantitative estimate for this elasticity suggests that aging-related shifts in the composition
of the population require substantial increases in the education of young cohorts.
This paper contributes to the literature in multiple ways. Several contributions in macro-
development have focused on the consequences of aging by focusing on the implications of
variation in the young- and old-age dependency ratio for the demographic dividend (Bloom
and Williamson, 1998; Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003), and, more recently, Aiyar,
Ebeke, and Shao (2016), and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) for productivity and technical
change. Other contributions have analyzed the effects of aging and skills on growth. Feyrer
(2007) finds that the age composition of the workforce affects macroeconomic performance,
mainly through total factor productivity. Maestas, Mullen, and Powell (2016) use variation
in aging across US states over the period 1980-2010 to estimate the growth effect of aging
and find a substantial negative effect. However, these studies only indirectly account for
the changes in human capital and its age composition. In contrast, Cuaresma, Lutz, and
Sanderson (2014) investigate the joint effect of skills and aging. Instead of conducting
a cohort-based analysis that accounts for the distribution of skills and aging as we do
in this paper, they look at the role of labor force participation and dependency ratios.
In contrast, Sunde and Vischer (2015) show that human capital affects output growth
through the productivity of production factors and the potential to innovate (Lucas,
1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), or to adopt and diffuse new technologies (Nelson and
Phelps, 1966). The approach taken in this paper incorporates these different contributions
into a single coherent framework. This allows investigating the relative importance of
changes in the age composition and in the skill composition of the population, shedding
light on the robustness of earlier results. Thereby, we provide a systematic investigation
and decomposition of aging effects through shifts in the demographic composition and
changes in the human capital distribution which is missing in the existing literature. The
findings indeed point to interactions between population aging and changes in the human
capital composition, suggesting that restricting attention to only one dimension delivers
an incomplete picture.
To our knowledge, the only two papers that go in a similar direction are by Lindh
and Malmberg (1999) and Cuaresma, Loichinger, and Vincelette (2016). However, the
analysis by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) is confined to using cross-country data for
OECD countries, whereas Cuaresma, Loichinger, and Vincelette (2016) focus on European
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countries. Our analysis is based on a theoretically founded empirical framework that
encompasses frameworks used previously and presents estimation and projection results for
a long panel data set for more than 130 countries. Moreover, the estimates presented below
contribute by allowing to conduct counterfactual simulations of economic performance
under alternative scenarios of aging, human capital dynamics, labor force participation, and
productivity. Another novelty are the estimates for an upper bound of the semi-elasticity
between changes in the age structure and changes in human capital—and of changes in
labor force participation and productivity improvements—which are required to offset the
macroeconomic consequences of changes in the age composition in the most favorable case.
The analysis is also related to, and complementing, microeconometric work on age-
education decompositions of labor earnings. Work by Card and Lemieux (2001) has
used models with imperfect substitution between similarly educated workers in different
age groups to study the dynamics of the college wage premium. More recent work by
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) shows for census data and tasks
how skill-biased technological progress and changes in the supply of skill levels across
cohorts has led to wage polarization in the United States. Vandenberghe (2017) investigates
whether a better educated and more experienced workforce contributes to the recent rise
in total factor productivity (TFP). Our estimation and projection results complement
these studies by providing novel insights into the consequences of population aging and
demographic change. In analogy to the approach popularized by Card and Lemieux
(2001) and applied by Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006), we develop a decomposition that
allows estimating elasticities of substitution between demographic aging and changes in
the education structure. Our empirical findings also complement recent evidence for the
effect of aging on productivity and wages. For instance, Göbel and Zwick (2013) find
that productivity among employees is highest around 50 and only find modest declines in
the productivity at older ages, while Börsch-Supan and Weiss (2016) find that there are
(almost) no negative aging effects on productivity for production line workers before age
60. Complementing this, Mahlberg et al. (2013) find little evidence between productivity
or wages at the firm level and the share of older employees in that firm. The findings for
the aggregate level presented in this paper deliver macroeconomic age profiles that are
consistent with these findings.
The quantitative analysis sheds new light on the potential implications of aging
and education dynamics for growth. Recent work by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017)
suggests that directed technical change and a rapid adoption of automation technologies
might provide a countervailing force to the negative growth effects of population aging,
particularly in countries that undergo more pronounced demographic changes. Our findings
allow quantifying how large, ceteris paribus, the productivity improvements of directed
technical change would have to be in different countries in order to fully offset the effects
of population aging and the associated education dynamics.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents our method-
ology and empirical framework. A data description is provided in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
provides estimation results and Section 2.5 presents the implications of these estimation
results for future economic performance, using different scenarios of aging and education
projections. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
The analysis is based on an aggregate production framework that underlies the standard
development accounting model as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Hall and Jones
(1999). Output Y is produced as a function of total factor productivity A, physical capital
K, and human capital H of the form:
Yit = AitK
α
itH
1−α
it (2.1)
Subscripts i and t denote cross-sectional units (countries) and time units (five-year inter-
vals), respectively. Dividing by the labor force (working-age population) Lit delivers the
output per worker in intensive form
yit =
Yit
Lit
= Aitk
α
it
(
Hit
Lit
)1−α
with kit =
Kit
Lit
being capital per worker.
The aggregate stock of human capital Hit is a function of human capital per worker hit
and the overall quality of the labor force Qit as a function of the demographic structure of
the workforce and cohort-specific productivity parameters. Quality of the labor force is
assumed to be a simple size-weighted average
Hit := hitQit = hit
[
π1L
1
it + · · ·+ πkLJit
]
, (2.2)
where L1it, . . . , L
J
it denote the labor force of each age cohort in the workforce and π1, . . . , πJ
the respective productivity of each group.2 Age-related productivity differences can be
related to differences in physical strength, or, more likely, correspond to differences in
2Alternatively, one could model the quality of the labor force more flexibly using a general constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) form as in similar settings applied to different contexts, see, for example,
Sato (1967), Hellerstein and Neumark (1995), Card and Lemieux (2001) or, more recently, Vandenberghe
(2017). The CES specification would provide an even more flexible framework that allows for different
productivity parameters across age groups and flexible substitution patterns between age groups and,
potentially, with varying quality of human capital across age groups. Analyzing the simple case with
substitution elasticity of one between physical and human capital and perfect substitution across age
cohorts has the advantage of a straightforward derivation of a linear estimation framework. This assumption
is inessential, however, and could be relaxed by working with a CES specification and conducting estimates
using a non-linear estimation model.
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human capital that is acquired on the job in terms of experience. This is consistent with
standard models of human capital acquisition over the life-cycle (Ben-Porath, 1967). The
aggregate human capital stock per worker is thus given by
Hit
Lit
= hit
[(
1
Lit
) J∑
j=1
πjL
j
it
]
= hit
[ J∑
j=1
πj
Ljit
Lit
]
= hit
[ J∑
j=1
πjS
j
it
]
with Sj denoting the share of each age cohort in the total labor force such that
∑J
j=1 S
j
it = 1.
In order to avoid multicollinearity in the empirical model, a reference category Srit is chosen
such that
Hit
Lit
= hitπr
[
Srit +
∑
j 6=r
πj
πr
Sjit
]
= hitπr
[
(1−
∑
j 6=r
Sjit) +
∑
j 6=r
πj
πr
Sjit
]
.
The aggregate human capital stock per worker is then given by
Hit
Lit
= hitπr
[
1 +
∑
j 6=r
λjSjit
]
, (2.3)
with λj :=
πj
πr
− 1 denoting the difference in relative productivity between an age cohort
j and the reference category. Inserting the expression for the human capital stock per
worker in (2.3) into the production function in (2.1) and taking logs yields
ln(yit) = ln(Ait) + α ln(kit) + (1− α) ln
(
Hit
Lit
)
= ln(Ait) + α ln(kit) + (1− α)
[
ln(hit) + ln(πr)
]
+ (1− α) ln
(
1 +
∑
j 6=r
λjSjit
)
.
The last term in parentheses can be expected to be close to unity, since the term for
productivity ratios λj and the share of each age cohort in the total workforce is close to
zero for a sufficiently large number of age groups, and correspondingly also their product.
Hence, the last term in logarithms can be approximated by
ln
(
1 +
∑
j 6=r
λjSjit
)
≈
∑
j 6=r
λjSjit. (2.4)
Human capital per worker hit is assumed to be a function of an individual worker’s
skills which can either be high or low. Correspondingly, each skill group is assigned a
skill-specific productivity {πh, πl}. Averaging over the entire economy, human capital
per worker is thus the weighted average of the shares of each skill group {Shit, 1 − Shit}
multiplied by the respective productivity, or formally
hit = πhS
h
it + πl(1− Shit). (2.5)
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Taking logs and choosing the low-skill group as reference category, this expression can be
rearranged to
ln(hit) = ln
[
πl
(
1 +
(
πh
πl
− 1
)
Shit
)]
,
which, using the same arguments as before, can be approximated by
ln(hit) = ln(πl) + ln
(
1 + λhShit
)
≈ ln(πl) + λhShit (2.6)
with λh := πh
πl
− 1 denoting the difference in relative productivity between high-skilled and
low-skilled workers. Log output is thus given by
ln(yit) ≈ c+ ln(Ait) + α ln(kit) + (1− α)λhShit + (1− α)
∑
j 6=r
λjSjit, (2.7)
where c = (1− α)
[
ln(πl) + ln(πr)
]
is a constant. By taking first differences, the model is
expressed in terms of growth rates:
∆ ln(yit) ≈ ∆ ln(Ait) + α∆ ln(kit) + (1− α)λh∆Shit + (1− α)
[∑
j 6=r
λj∆Sjit
]
. (2.8)
Because, in practice, total factor productivity is not observed, we model a country’s
total factor productivity as being determined by three components: An exogenous time
trend ζt, which represents freely available technology from the world technological frontier
in a given period t, allowing for a technology diffusion process across countries; the past
level of output, which, by definition, comprises past TFP; and an idiosyncratic error
component εit, which serves as the error term for the empirical framework. This modeling
assumption for TFP is motivated by the strong correlation between initial productivity,
reflected by output per worker, and subsequent growth rates (see, for example, Baumol,
1986).3 Lagged output per worker therefore introduces persistence in the availability of
technology within countries into the levels specification. This persistence may for example
reflect capital-embodied technology that has been accumulated over time. Consequently,
we posit
ln(Ait) = ζt + γ ln(yit−1) + εit. (2.9)
Moreover, this specification implies a further straightforward extension of our estimation
framework to long-run productivity differences across countries along other dimensions
that might enter equation (2.9) as additional variables (for example, institutions).
Therefore, the empirical model which is used to estimate the effect of the demographic
3In an earlier version of this paper, we also included lagged skills in the levels equation. However, the
respective variable was always insignificant in the empirical application and did not quantitatively change
the overall effect of skills on output. Hence, the variable has been dropped from the specification.
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structure of the workforce and the distribution of skills on output is given by
ln(yit) = γ ln(yit−1) + α ln(kit) + (1− α)λhShit + (1− α)
[∑
j 6=r
λjSjit
]
+ ci + ζt + εit, (2.10)
where ci allows for country-specific intercepts. This model is estimated with the within-
transformation, removing the constant c and accounting for country-specific fixed effects.
In terms of dynamics, we assume that total factor productivity growth of a country is
determined by four components: An exogenous time trend τt, which represents growth
of freely available technology at the world technological frontier in a given period t,
allowing for a technology diffusion process across countries; the economy’s share of high
skills in period t− 1, which may facilitate the diffusion and adoption of already existing
technologies (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) or foster novel innovation (Romer, 1990; Aghion
and Howitt, 1992); the past level of output, which, by definition, comprises past TFP; and
an idiosyncratic error component uit serving as the error term for the empirical framework.
Consequently, the growth rate of total factor productivity is assumed to take the form
∆ ln(Ait) = τt + θS
h
it−1 + ψ ln(yit−1) + uit. (2.11)
This modeling of technological progress again accommodates for the strong correlation
between initial productivity and subsequent growth (Baumol, 1986) and has been widely
applied in models that study economic growth in general or the demographic dividend
in particular (Fagerberg, 1994; Dowrick and Rogers, 2002; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla,
2004; Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson, 2014). Specifically, this modeling assumption
implies conditional convergence in productivity across countries. In contrast to other
models of conditional convergence such as Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), however,
this modeling of TFP growth allows for long-run differences in productivity even after the
diffusion process is complete. Such differences may enter the estimation model through
other variables in equation (2.11). Correspondingly, the estimation equation in growth
rates is given by
∆ ln(yit) = ψ ln(yit−1) + α∆ ln(kit)
+(1− α)λh∆Shit + θShit−1 + (1− α)
[∑
j 6=r
λj∆Sjit
]
+ τt + uit. (2.12)
Estimating the model in terms of growth rates also accommodates for the possibility of
a unit root in the error term, if income follows a random-walk. Correspondingly, the
series will be stationary. As will become clear below, coefficient estimates do not differ
substantially between both models, but, unsurprisingly, the levels model is more efficient
and explains a larger fraction of the variation. Results for both versions of the model are
reported in Section 2.4.
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This specification of the estimation framework is very flexible and can be adjusted
to obtain the regression models of important other contributions of the literature. For
example, the estimation model of Feyrer (2007) is obtained by assuming human capital to
be the exponential of a piece-wise linear function of human capital savings and imposing
no further assumptions on the structure of TFP growth apart from a common time trend
across. Given this set of assumptions, the effect of the demographic structure is contained
by total factor productivity.
The specification of Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson (2014) can be obtained under the
following assumptions: human capital per worker takes an exponential form as described
above, GDP is expressed in terms of per capita instead of per worker terms, and the
demographic structure of the workforce is neglected. In this case, the demographic structure
enters output through the labor force participation rate and the share of the working-age
population in the total population.
Finally, the specification of Sunde and Vischer (2015) is derived by assuming that
human capital enters both, productivity and output, in logarithms instead of shares.
Further control variables can be included by extending either the TFP residual by lagged
level controls or the output by additional terms as a multiplicative or exponential function.
2.3 Data
Data for output and physical capital are from Penn World Tables (PWT) by Feenstra,
Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). The main dependent variables are log output per worker
and the corresponding growth rate. In robustness analysis, we also use output per capita.
Data for the demographic structure are taken from different sources. The primary source
of information about the working-age population for age cohorts in five-year intervals from
15 to 69 as well as for human capital and the corresponding projections is the IIASA-VID
database by Lutz et al. (2007).4 We define age cohorts of the workforce as cohort shares
of the total working-age population in brackets 15–19 (below 20), 20–24, 25–29, 30–34,
35–39, 40–44, 45–49, 55–59, 60–64, 65–69 (65+). This reflects the potential workforce of
a cohort in a given period in the estimation; that is, we refrain from an adjustment for
hours worked or employment shares to avoid endogeneity problems that might bias the
estimates. In some specifications, the cohorts are collapsed to ten-year intervals in order
to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. The microeconometric evidence on
age-productivity profiles discussed in the introduction indicates that the cohort 50–54
represents the most productive cohort. In light of this, we take this cohort as the reference
group. Different classifications do not affect the results qualitatively. An alternative
data source for population counts and human capital by age is Barro and Lee (2013).
4The IIASA-VID projection data are available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/
researchPrograms/WorldPopulation/Projections 2014.html.
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For this data set, no population projections are available, which is the reason for using
the IIASA-VID data as baseline. Alternative population counts and projections as well
as young- and old-age dependency ratios are obtained from the United Nations World
Population Prospects.5 Data on life expectancy are obtained from the World Development
Indicators provided by the World Bank.6
Human capital per worker is proxied by the share of high- and low-skilled individuals in
the working-age population. The share of low-skilled workers is defined as the sum of the
respective shares of individuals with either no formal education, or primary or secondary
schooling only. Correspondingly, the share of high-skilled corresponds to those workers
who have received formal tertiary education or equivalent vocational skills. The respective
shares are taken from the IIASA-VID database by Lutz et al. (2007). As described in
Section 2.2, the share of high-skilled human capital is chosen as reference category. Data
are available for up to 139 countries in five-year intervals from 1960 to 2010 (13 time
periods in total). Table A.1 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics.
In the projection analysis, we also make use of data for hours and labor market
participation provided by the International Labor Organization (International Labour Or-
ganization, 2011).7 In addition, we use projections for hours and labor market participation
for 26 European countries that have been constructed recently by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz,
Hammer, and Loichinger (2016).
2.4 Estimation Results
This section reports the estimation results regarding the effect of the age structure and the
distribution of skills on economic performance. In a first step, both effects are investigated
in isolation, thereby reproducing the analysis conducted in the existing literature. In a
second step, we provide evidence for a model that combines both dimensions. The section
ends with results from robustness checks and alternative estimation frameworks.
The empirical models are estimated either in levels as in equation (2.10) or first
differences as proposed in equation (2.12). Lagged levels of output per worker and the
share of high-skilled workers in the population enter all estimation models in levels to
control for convergence dynamics of output and technological diffusion, respectively. If
not stated otherwise, specifications are estimated for a baseline panel of 120 countries in
five-year intervals for the time period 1950–2010.8
5Data from United Nations World Population Prospects are from the 2015 Revision and available at
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.
6The data can be retrieved at databank.worldbank.org/wdi.
7The data can be obtained online at http://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
8The robustness material contains results for 139 countries when using alternative data sources.
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2.4.1 Demographic Structure
Estimation results for the effect of the age structure of the workforce on output are reported
in Column (1) of Table 2.1 for the model in levels. The reference age group in the levels
model is the cohort aged 50–54 years. The results are obtained from a specification of
the estimation framework with country fixed effects, period fixed effects, and controls for
lagged output per worker and capital per worker.
The results reveal that all coefficients for the cohort-specific workforce shares are
negative and significant. Therefore, shifting population mass out of the reference cohort
50–54 into another cohort has a negative impact on output. This effect is particularly
pronounced for a relative increase of the population group aged 60–64, revealing a negative
effect due to population aging. An increase in the population share of this cohort by
one-percentage point at the cost of the reference group of age 50–54 implies a decrease in
output per worker of roughly 5.5 percent. Population shifts of such size are no exception
in the data. Across all workforce shares, around 25 percent of all out-shifts of a cohort are
roughly equal to a unit percentage point shift or even larger. The same pattern holds for 25
percent of all in-shifts into a cohort. Furthermore, the estimated negative point estimates
are largest for the age cohorts that are either at the very beginning or at the end of their
work lives. These patterns are consistent with estimates from disaggregate data mentioned
in the Introduction, which suggest that productivity is highest for individuals around
age 50, when they have acquired sufficient work experience and on-the-job training. In
particular, the results are also in line with a hump-shaped pattern as predicted by standard
human capital theory over the life-cycle (Ben-Porath, 1967): For middle-aged cohorts
additional productivity gains become smaller as the marginal return from more experience
decreases and ultimately declines to zero as the benefits of additional education investments
deteriorate with the lower amortization period. At some point, the depreciation rate of
human capital outweighs additional gains by experience such that individual productivity
decreases in many cases toward the end of the work life. Taken together, the results largely
confirm earlier micro-level findings on the effects of population aging (for example, Göbel
and Zwick, 2013). Moreover, the joint Wald test on the coefficients of all workforce shares
confirms that the overall demographic structure has a significant impact on output.
Column (1) of Table 2.2 contains the corresponding results for the model in (log)
differences. To be consistent with the levels model, the differences model uses the change
in the age cohort aged 50–54 as reference category. The results essentially replicate those
obtained for the levels model qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, the age
pattern and the importance of heterogeneity in the effect of changes in the age composition
of the workforce on output growth is very similar. The results also show that the estimated
coefficient for lagged output per worker is positive and smaller than one in the levels model,
and negative in the model in differences, providing evidence for the usual conditional
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Table 2.1: Effects of Aging and Education on Economic Performance: Levels Model
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.84*** -3.06** -3.05** -3.64*** -2.09* -2.53**
(1.22) (1.21) (1.40) (1.21) (1.20) (1.18)
Share 20–24 -2.37** -1.84* -1.82 -3.23** -1.16 -2.58*
(1.10) (1.10) (1.38) (1.37) (1.11) (1.36)
Share 25–29 -3.56** -3.12** -3.18* -2.77* -2.58* -2.30
(1.42) (1.39) (1.89) (1.47) (1.32) (1.41)
Share 30–34 -3.06** -2.74** -2.74* -3.96*** -2.33* -3.61**
(1.27) (1.25) (1.54) (1.43) (1.21) (1.41)
Share 35–39 -4.01*** -3.71** -3.63** -2.97* -3.33** -2.49*
(1.44) (1.43) (1.74) (1.57) (1.39) (1.51)
Share 40–44 -1.53 -1.35 -1.37 -1.87 -1.12 -1.81
(1.32) (1.29) (1.62) (1.41) (1.26) (1.39)
Share 45–49 -3.19** -3.07** -3.31* -3.98** -2.92** -3.89**
(1.43) (1.41) (1.95) (1.55) (1.37) (1.51)
Share 55–59 -4.66** -4.37** -4.76** -4.40** -4.00** -4.16**
(1.85) (1.81) (2.18) (1.82) (1.74) (1.77)
Share 60–64 -5.48*** -5.50*** -5.96*** -6.06*** -5.53*** -6.33***
(1.37) (1.34) (1.76) (1.50) (1.30) (1.48)
Share 65+ -3.06* -3.24** -3.35* -4.21*** -3.47** -4.22**
(1.58) (1.55) (1.80) (1.62) (1.56) (1.68)
Share high-skill 0.97*** 1.08*** 0.85*** 0.84** 2.45*** 2.35***
(0.34) (0.40) (0.32) (0.41) (0.76) (0.77)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.59*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.46***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 13.3 27.9 4.5
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.25 0.28
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,053 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable is log
output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w., measured in logarithms,
are included as controls in all specifications. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value
for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from
zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age
population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
convergence patterns.9 The estimated values for the capital income share α are 0.32 and
0.40 for the specifications in Column (1) of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, respectively.
The results in the differences specification closely resemble the empirical specifications
estimated by Feyrer (2007) and reproduce his results for a different data set.10
9The bias in coefficient estimates in specifications with lagged dependent variable and fixed effects
should be moderate in a relatively long panel with 13 time periods, see Nickell (1981) and Judson and
Owen (1999); see also the discussion in Section 2.4.4.
10In particular, Feyrer (2007) also finds point estimates that are negative relative to the relatively most
productive age cohort. The point estimates are qualitatively very similar to the results for empirical
specification proposed in this paper and quantitatively slightly smaller.
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Table 2.2: Effects of Aging and Education on Economic Performance: Differences Model
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ Share < 20 -3.68*** -2.83** -1.24 -4.23*** -3.35*** -5.22***
(1.16) (1.19) (1.13) (1.36) (1.26) (1.81)
∆ Share 20–24 -3.03*** -2.05** -1.35 -4.03*** -2.54** -4.91***
(1.01) (1.02) (0.98) (1.27) (1.12) (1.48)
∆ Share 25–29 -3.47*** -2.78** -1.70 -4.34*** -3.12*** -4.91***
(1.15) (1.15) (1.13) (1.51) (1.20) (1.74)
∆ Share 30–34 -3.92*** -3.41*** -2.48** -4.10** -3.15*** -4.20**
(1.13) (1.14) (1.15) (1.76) (1.11) (1.89)
∆ Share 35–39 -4.97*** -4.58*** -3.75*** -4.44*** -4.89*** -4.29***
(1.22) (1.23) (1.20) (1.50) (1.37) (1.56)
∆ Share 40–44 -2.56** -2.33** -1.12 -2.70** -2.36** -2.60**
(1.10) (1.06) (0.94) (1.16) (1.11) (1.21)
∆ Share 45–49 -3.08*** -2.93*** -1.60* -4.09*** -2.92*** -4.21***
(1.12) (1.09) (0.94) (1.19) (1.09) (1.24)
∆ Share 55–59 -2.35** -2.17** -1.01 -2.65*** -2.28** -3.13***
(0.96) (0.95) (0.97) (1.01) (1.00) (1.12)
∆ Share 60–64 -5.26*** -5.14*** -3.08*** -5.63*** -5.29*** -6.25***
(1.20) (1.20) (1.06) (1.41) (1.29) (1.57)
∆ Share 65+ -6.61*** -6.22*** -1.71 -6.32*** -6.49*** -6.93***
(1.67) (1.64) (1.43) (1.80) (1.70) (1.99)
∆ Share high-skill 2.68** 3.30*** 1.21 1.87 0.64 -3.09
(1.07) (1.15) (0.87) (1.16) (4.23) (4.75)
Share high-skill (t–1) 0.67*** 0.55** 0.42*** 0.55* 0.71* 0.83**
(0.24) (0.25) (0.15) (0.33) (0.37) (0.41)
Output p.w. (t–1) -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.02*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.23***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ Capital p.w. 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.40***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skills shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.11
First-stage F–statistic 8.5 52.1 5.9
AR(2) test (p–value) 0.65
Hansen test (p–value) 0.33 — 0.45 0.50
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 978 1,053 1,053 1,053
R2 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.40
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable is the
log difference in output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w.,
measured in logarithms, are included as controls in all specifications. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the system GMM
estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares
(proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts
in Column (5), the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both
in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen
test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. For system GMM, also the p–values of the AR(2) test are reported. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
2.4.2 Human Capital and Distribution of Skills
As a next step, the analysis focuses on the role of the effect of human capital and the
distribution of skills on economic performance. Column (2) of Table 2.1 presents the
corresponding estimates for a specification that only includes the share of high-skilled
in addition to lagged output and capital per worker. The point estimate of the share
of individuals with high-skilled human capital is positive and highly significant. A one-
percentage point increase in the share of high skilled of in an economy is accompanied by
an increase in output of 0.97 percent.
Column (2) of Table 2.2 presents the corresponding results for a specification in
differences. This specification also accounts for the possibility that, conceptually, human
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capital influences output (growth) through two channels. First, changes in the share of
skills account for composition effects of productions factors, which can be accrued to the
complementarity of human and physical capital in standard growth models (Solow, 1956;
Lucas, 1988). Second, the accumulation of human capital may alleviate the diffusion and
adoption of already existing technologies (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) or spur innovation
as in the endogenous growth literature (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Not
accounting for both channels might lead to a potential bias in the estimates due to the
omission of one relevant channel from the estimation, as indicated by the results of Sunde
and Vischer (2015). The results provide evidence supporting the specification with both
levels and changes of human capital, as suggested by the work of Sunde and Vischer (2015).
Both point estimates of levels and changes in the share of high-skilled human capital are
positive and individually and jointly significant.11
Quantitatively, the results imply that a one-percentage point larger share of skilled
workers in the economy is accompanied by an 0.67-percent increase in growth of output
per worker over a five-year period. In light of the literature, this effect works through
innovation as well as diffusion and adoption of new technologies. Growth of one-percentage
point in the share of high-skilled implies an increase in the growth rate of 2.68 percent
over five years. The coefficient for lagged output per worker takes negative values for the
differences model, indicating conditional convergence, and the coefficient of the capital
income share is similar to the earlier results.
2.4.3 Considering Demographics and Skills in Combination
While the results so far have successfully reproduced the findings in the existing literature,
the specifications have considered the demographic structure and the influence of human
capital in isolation. However, in view of the possibility that the age structure and the human
capital composition of the population are correlated and both influence macroeconomic
performance, the estimates might suffer from omitted variable bias. In order to investigate
this possibility and potential interactions, we now proceed to estimate more comprehensive
models that accounts for both the demographic structure of the workforce and the
distribution of skills in the population.
11The specification of the model in levels, which follows from equation (2.10), does not contain a term
involving the change in the share of high-skilled in the population, because this term emerges from the
dynamics of TFP. In unreported estimations, we nevertheless included changes in the share of high-skilled
individuals in the specification of the empirical model of the levels estimation to estimate a symmetric
empirical specification in both levels and differences and obtain directly comparable estimates of the
coefficients of interest. Moreover, this specification provides a natural specification test, because the
coefficient of the change in the skill share is hypothesized to be zero in light of the theoretical model (2.10).
The findings suggest that the coefficient is indeed not significantly different from zero in an extended
version of the specification in Column (2) of Table 2.1, which indirectly supports the empirical model. The
estimation results are qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical when estimating a specification of
the levels model that does additionally include the change in the share high-skilled, see Table A.2 in the
Appendix for details.
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(a) Five-year cohorts (Table 2.1, Column 3)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
S
iz
e 
of
 e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t (
95
%
-C
I)
 
<2
0
20
-24
25
-29
30
-34
35
-39
40
-44
45
-49
50
-54
55
-59
60
-64
65
-69
 
Age cohort
Differences Model
 
(b) Five-year cohorts (Table 2.2, Column 3)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
S
iz
e 
of
 e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t (
95
%
-C
I)
 
<20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69
 
Age cohort
Levels Model
 
(c) Ten-year cohorts (Table A.7, Column 3)
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(d) Ten-year cohorts (Table A.8, Column 3)
Figure 2.3: Macro Productivity Profiles
Columns (3) of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the estimation results for such an extended
specification. The coefficient estimates for the age structure and human capital are
qualitatively similar, indicating that both dimensions affect macroeconomic performance.
In the levels model, the skill pattern appears to exhibit slightly smaller coefficient estimates
than in the specification without human capital, while the human capital effect is slightly
larger than in the specification without controlling for the age structure. The same is
true for the differences model, with the exception of the effect of the share of high-skilled
individuals in levels, whose coefficient is also slightly smaller than in Column (2).
Figure 2.3 provides a graphical representation of the estimates of the coefficients
for the different age shares obtained with (a) the levels model and (b) the model in
differences. Panels (c) and (d) reproduce the respective productivity profiles for an
alternative specification using ten-year instead of five-year age cohorts. The graphs
illustrate that the age-related coefficients are somewhat smaller in absolute terms for
the differences model but otherwise very comparable. Hence, an increase in the share of
a specific age cohort relative to the 50- to 54-year-olds leads to a reduction in output.
Moreover, the skill distribution positively affects macroeconomic performance through
both, the innovation and adoption of technology channel and the composition of production
factors. Most importantly, demographic structure of the workforce and human capital both
jointly affect output. Therefore, both channels are conceptually relevant for themselves
even if they interact substantially.
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2.4.4 Alternative Estimation and Identification Strategies
The estimation results presented so far, in particular in the levels specification, were based
on a two-way fixed effects estimator with a lagged dependent variable (log output per
worker) as additional regressor. Consequently, the coefficient estimates, in particular
for the lagged dependent variable might be biased, see Nickell (1981). To investigate
whether this might be an issue for the coefficients of interest, Columns (4) of Tables
2.1 and 2.2 present the corresponding results obtained with an estimator that corrects
for the potential bias in dynamic panels.12 The estimation results are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar for the levels model, whereas they reflect some quantitative
differences in the differences specification. Alternative estimation results obtained with a
levels model without lagged dependent variable also deliver qualitatively similar results.13
The simulation results shown below will be based mainly on the levels model.
Another potential concern is identification and endogeneity. The identification of the
coefficients for aging and human capital so far was based on the implicit assumption that
the current workforce (in terms of age structure and skill composition) is the result of
fertility and education decisions in the past. Controlling for past income, capital, and
country-specific intercepts related to productivity and other time-invariant factors account
for country-specific differences in economic performance that might influence, or correlate
with, the age and skill composition. Additionally, the results implicitly correspond to an
intention-to-treat interpretation, where population shares reflect the potential size of the
workforce of each age cohort, instead of accounting for the actual workforce, which might
be affected by endogenous labor supply decisions at the extensive or intensive margin, and
thus give rise to endogeneity concerns. The estimates thus implicitly assume changes in
the workforce be arguably exogenous given the lagged dependent variable, country-fixed
effects, and period-fixed effects. The finding of similar results in the levels and differences
models is reassuring in this regard, because similar estimates for the respective coefficients
are obtained despite the use of alternative variation for identification.
Nonetheless, in order to probe further into potential identification problems caused
by unobserved variables that correlate with the factors of production and thus lead to
problems of endogeneity bias, we present the results from three alternative identification
approaches based on instrumental variables (IV).
12In the levels model the bias correction is implemented via the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator of
Bruno (2005). To be internally consistent with the theoretical model outlined in Section 2.2, the bias
correction in the differences model is performed using the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
13See Table A.3 in the Appendix. Due to the omission of the lagged dependent variable, the human
capital variable picks up some of the persistence, with the consequence of slightly larger coefficient
estimates for human capital obtained with this specification. In the following, we restrict attention to the
model with lagged dependent variable, which delivers results for the role of human capital that are more
conservative in this respect.
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A first alternative way to obtain identification is to exploit the fact that the demographic
structure of the working-age population follows very stable and predictable dynamics.
Concretely, a cohort of individuals aged 40 years at a particular point in time will be of age
50 years ten years later. The same is approximately true for the age composition, because
the relative sizes of cohorts of different ages are unlikely to change over time and thus
provide valuable predictors over long periods of time. Simultaneously, however, lagged age
shares satisfy the exclusion restriction of an instrument, which stipulates that they must
be unrelated to unobserved factors driving macroeconomic performance some decades into
the future. Hence, demographic dynamics lend themselves naturally to an instrumental
variables approach in the present setting of panel data.
On the basis of these considerations, the IV strategy exploits the fact that the relative
size of particular cohorts at some point in time predicts the size of these cohorts in the
future. At the same time, it is unaffected by economic performance in the future and,
thus, exogenous for the purpose of the estimation framework applied here. For a given
country-period-cohort cell, this is plausibly the case, in particular, once conditioning on
the lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects. The share of the working-age
population of a particular cohort—for instance, the share of the 25- to 29-year-olds in
1990—is instrumented using the respective share of this cohort in the previous period—that
is, using the share of the cohort of 20- to 24-year-olds in 1985. Additional identification
is obtained by exploiting that the shares of the youngest cohorts of working-age adults
are instrumented by shares of cohorts that were not even in the labor force, and by using
cohorts that have already left the labor force when the outcome variables are realized.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure A.3 in the Appendix illustrate this identification strategy.14
Columns (5) of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the second stage results from two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimations using this instrumentation strategy for the age shares
in the corresponding specifications (in levels or differences). The first stage is sufficiently
strong, as indicated by the respective F-statistics. The coefficients in the outcome equation
closely resemble those obtained from standard panel estimation techniques, however. In
particular, the overall patterns remain unchanged.
A similar identification strategy can be applied to the share of high-skilled individuals
(or its change). The logic here is that the formal (tertiary or vocational) education attained
by a given cohort is unlikely to change over the range of five or ten years. At the same
time, using the lagged shares provides variation that is less likely to be affected by (or
correlated with) contemporaneous macroeconomic performance, conditional on the full
set of controls. The variation in the share of high-skilled over the course of five or ten
years primarily depends on the education of young individuals entering the labor force
and of the old individuals leaving the labor force. We therefore use the lagged skill shares
14Moreover, the figure illustrates that this IV approach can be applied regardless of whether the data
are coded in five-year or than ten-year cohorts.
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in these respective age cohorts as instruments. The logic of this identification approach
is illustrated in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure A.3.15 Columns (6) of Tables 2.1 and 2.2
present the corresponding results for the second stage of the 2SLS framework applied
to human capital. Again, the first stage is strong as expected. The estimates for the
outcome equation are qualitatively identical and quantitatively somewhat larger for human
capital than those obtained with the baseline estimation approach, whereas the coefficient
estimates for the age shares are somewhat smaller.16 Again, this suggests that endogeneity
bias appears not to be a serious concern for the qualitative patterns and, if anything,
biases the coefficients of the share high-skilled toward zero in the conventional estimates.
Columns (7) of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the corresponding results for the second
stage of the 2SLS framework applied to both the age structure and human capital. Again,
the overall pattern is very similar.
2.4.5 Robustness and Further Results
We conducted several additional checks to investigate the robustness of these results.
A first robustness check concerns the estimation of the same model using an alternative
data set for the age composition and human capital endowment provided by Barro and
Lee (2013). The corresponding results reveal very similar estimation results.17
A second robustness check concerns the possibility of overfitting and multicollinearity
by using data at the level of five-year age cohorts. Estimation results obtained with data
for ten-year age cohorts deliver qualitatively and quantitatively similar results for the
effects of the age structure of the population, and even slightly larger coefficient estimates
for human capital.18 The same holds when restricting the specification to only four or
three age cohorts.19
As third robustness check, we considered an alternative coding of the human capital
composition by considering the average years of schooling, while allowing for a more flexible
specification. The results confirm the earlier findings regarding both, the age profile as well
as the relevance of the share of high-skilled individuals with at least secondary education.20
15Notice that this additional instrumentation strategy provides the possibility of conducting overidenti-
fication tests, as there are more instruments than instrumented variables.
16One potential caveat with the instrumentation approach of human capital could be that the education
composition of the share of the young entering the labor force might reflect anticipated macroeconomic
performance, and thus pose a potential problem of endogeneity, while this is unlikely for the cohort leaving
the labor force. In additional robustness checks, we therefore applied an alternative identification that
only uses the education composition of the cohort that exits the labor force, paralleling the approach
popularized by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) by implicitly assuming that all newly entering cohorts are
high-skilled. The results are qualitatively similar, see Table A.4 in the Appendix.
17See Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix for detailed estimation results and Figure A.4 for the
corresponding estimated age-productivity profiles.
18Detailed results are reported in Tables A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.3
show the corresponding productivity profiles obtained with ten-year panel data.
19See Figure A.5 in the Appendix.
20Detailed results can be found in Table A.9 in the Appendix.
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Another robustness check refers to the use of income (output) per capita instead of
output per worker as variable of main interest. While output per worker captures the notion
of productivity and macroeconomic performance from the perspective of the production
process, income per capita might be seen as more relevant from a policy perspective. The
results are essentially the same for income per capita.21
Results obtained with an extended specification that also accounts for the age-related
change in skills by incorporating cohort-specific information on the share of skilled in-
dividuals are also similar. In particular, these estimates only provide weak evidence for
differences in the effect of the share of high-skilled individuals across different age cohorts
when controlling for cohort-specific skill shares. Moreover, the qualitative and quantitative
results for the effects of the demographic age structure as such remain largely unaffected.22
To some extent, these findings shed new light on the results of Cuaresma, Lutz, and
Sanderson (2014), who conclude, based on an analysis that uses a comparable data set,
that the demographic dividend is mostly the byproduct of increases in education. Whereas
Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson (2014) do not specifically control for the cohort-based
demographic structure, but instead for labor force participation and the relative size of
the working-age population to total population (that is, the inverse of the dependency
ratio), the findings here suggest that the age structure might have an independent effect
from the human capital endowment.23
Instead of considering the age composition of the workforce, the previous literature
has focused on the old-age dependency ratio. Additional results suggest that adding the
dependency ratio as well as the size of the working-age population (in logs or in absolute
numbers) as further control variables leaves the results essentially unaffected.24 This
suggests that the role of aging for macroeconomic performance does not predominantly
work through population size or the share of elderly, but through the age composition of
the workforce. Consequently, a main economic implication of low fertility in the aftermath
of the demographic transition appears to be population aging rather than a shrinking (or
reduced growth) of the population at large. This issue will be discussed in more detail in
the simulations below.
21Notice that the estimation equation for income per capita can also be directly derived from the
conceptual framework. This requires defining the sizes of the age groups as shares of the total population
(rather than of the working-age population) and controlling for the (young- and old-age) dependency
ratio. The respective results are displayed in Table A.10 in the Appendix. The corresponding productivity
profiles are displayed in Figure A.6 in the Appendix.
22See the results in Tables A.11 and A.12 in the Appendix for details.
23Moreover, the analysis of Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson (2014) accounts for variation in labor
force participation rates, which might be driven partly by cyclical phenomena instead of long-run trends,
thus imposing problems for identification. As indicated before, the effects of the demographic structure
presented here correspond to intention-to-treat effects, which are likely to provide a lower bound of the
actual effect under the assumption of relatively stable participation patterns.
24See Appendix Tables A.13, A.14, and A.15 for detailed results.
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Controlling for life expectancy also leaves the main results unaffected.25 Using average
years of schooling instead of the population share with a high-skilled education delivers
similar results for the role of the age structure, but no significant effect for human capital
in terms of average years of schooling.26 This result potentially reflects the fact that skill
shares provide a more appropriate measure of the skill endowment than the use of average
years of schooling.27
Note that controlling for the dependency ratio, the size of the working-age population,
and life expectancy at birth accounts for variation in fertility, health, and longevity
across countries and over time, respectively. Controlling for these variables might lead to
endogeneity concerns, if economic development unfolds a feedback mechanism on either
of these dimensions in the long run and, at the same time, the corresponding variables
correlate with the age structure or with education. If selection on observables is informative
for selection on unobservables, the stability of parameter estimates across specifications
with additional controls suggests that the bias is limited.28 Hence, it is reassuring that
including further control variables does not considerably affect the quantitative and
qualitative results compared to our baseline specification.
2.4.6 Education to Counteract the Effects of Aging?
Instead of relying on qualitative assessments of the implications of population aging and
education dynamics, the estimation framework and the corresponding estimates also allow
to go one step further in the quantification of the increase in education that is needed to
offset the effects of population on economic performance. In particular, the framework
provides the possibility to estimate an elasticity of substitution between changes in the
age structure and changes in the human capital structure of the economy that is needed
to keep output per worker constant. An upper bound for this skills-aging elasticity in the
levels model is given by
ηjmax =
(1− α̂)λ̂j
(1− α̂)λ̂h
=
λ̂j
λ̂h
< 0. (2.13)
In the differences model, the elasticity takes the form
ηjmax =
(1− α̂)λ̂j
(1− α̂)λ̂h + θ̂
< 0. (2.14)
The corresponding parameters are the structural estimates of the empirical model in
(2.10) or (2.12). Because the elasticity depends on the level of schooling in the previous
25See Table A.16 in the Appendix for details.
26See Table A.17 in the Appendix for details.
27See, for example, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012).
28Moreover, the coefficient estimates across the different specifications are very similar, while the
variation explained is fairly comparable, indicating that selection and endogeneity concerns should be
limited, following arguments in the spirit of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and Oster (2017).
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period and changes in the current skill distribution, an increase in the share of skills in
the same period can only work through the composition channel (that is, the denominator
is (1 − α̂)λ̂h in this case). In the following period, the skills-aging elasticity is given
by the expression in (2.13) corrected for additional changes in the distribution of skills,
which are again weighted by (1− α̂)λ̂h. Since the denominator is positive and the cohort
effects of the demographic structure are negative as long as the most productive cohort
is chosen as reference group, the elasticity will always exhibit a negative sign. Hence,
the elasticity is largest, when the denominator is maximized. This is the case when the
share of high-skilled workers in the population increases over at least two consecutive
periods and no human capital is lost due to retirement or emigration in the working-age
population. Consequently, ηj cannot be greater than the expression stated in (2.13). In
fact, it is lower whenever the gains in human capital are lost to some extent. Thus, ηjmax
represents an upper bound for the skills-aging elasticity. Moreover, this upper bound has
a natural interpretation in that it is the most favorable scenario under which negative
feedback from changes in the demographic structure on output can be compensated.
The elasticity can be computed for each age group. For example, suppose an aging
society, where a large fraction of the workforce (the baby boomer cohorts) shift out of
the most productive group of the 50- to 54-year-olds into the less productive group of
the 60- to 64-year-olds. Columns (3) of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 then provide upper bounds
for the skills-aging elasticity of η60−64max = −5.501.08 ≈ −5.09 and η
60−64
max = − 5.143.30+0.55 ≈ −1.34.
Assuming constant returns to schooling, the share of high-skilled workers would thus
have to increase by 1.34 to 5.09 percentage points in order to offset a one-percentage
point shift out of the cohort 50–54 into the cohort 60–64. Because schooling takes place
mostly at a young age, it is, however, unrealistic to increase the human capital of older
workers by more than a small extent. Changes in the skill distribution must therefore
come mostly through young cohorts. This is particularly problematic if young cohorts are
small in size relative to the cohorts approaching retirement, such as in the case of the baby
boomer generation. Therefore, even in the presence of large human capital increases, the
demographic structure unfolds a forceful effect on macroeconomic performance. This may
also be one of the reasons why large-scale extensions of schooling in developing countries in
the context of the demographic transition (and the decline in fertility) were not associated
by a strong development boost.29
However, as discussed in Section 2.4.5, a richer specification that considers the education
composition of different age cohorts of the working-age population (age 15 to 69) delivers
little evidence for a strong and systematic role of the skill distribution across age groups
for output. The corresponding estimates are insignificant in most cases. Also the Wald
test for joint significance of the estimated parameter sets fails to reject that estimates
29Another reason may be that schooling quality is generally low. For more information see, for example,
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008).
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are jointly different from zero in many cases.30 Hence, we find little evidence for the
obsolescence of high-skilled education embodied in older generations.
2.5 Implications for Future Economic Performance
By and large, the estimation results reveal a relevant role of demographic dynamics in
terms of aging as well as in terms of changes in the human capital embodied in the
working population, for economic development. At the same time, the heterogeneity
across subsamples indicates that aging might not affect all countries in the same way. In
particular, countries with a relatively old population, and with an ongoing aging process,
appear to be affected most by the adverse effects of aging.
In order to obtain a more coherent picture of these patterns, and gain some under-
standing of the relative importance of human capital in offsetting the effects of population
aging, this section presents the results of simulations of economic performance based on
the baseline estimates of the previous section, and several alternative scenarios regarding
aging and human capital dynamics.
2.5.1 Projecting the Effects of Aging and Education on Future
Performance
While aging appears to be a process that is hard, if not impossible, to influence in the
short and medium run, the skill composition of the population is a possible dimension
through which policy might try to influence the economic prospects of a country. This
raises the question about the relative importance of population aging and changes in the
skill composition, and about the likely scenarios faced by countries with different age and
skill compositions of their populations.
To illustrate the usefulness of the methodology developed in this paper for addressing
these questions, consider Figure 2.4, which contrasts the coefficient estimates for the age
structure obtained with specifications for five-year and ten-year age cohorts, with the
projected change in the age structure for Germany, the UK, and France. Taking the
age-profile of coefficients as a stable world average, the predicted economic performance
will differ only because of heterogeneous aging patterns across countries. This is illustrated
by the different age structures in Germany, the UK, and France. Similarly, one can use
projections of the human capital composition for these countries to compute the predicted
performance due to the changes in this dimension.
30In order to further test whether there might be an interplay between the demographic structure of the
workforce and the distribution of skills, interacted models can be estimated. This allows to test the null
hypothesis whether the effect of the demographic structure is stronger (or weaker) the larger the share
of high-skilled workers in the population is. However, there is only weak evidence that this is the case
(results not shown).
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(a) Germany (five-years cohorts)
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(b) Germany (ten-year cohorts)
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(c) United Kingdom (five-years cohorts)
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(d) United Kingdom (ten-year cohorts)
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(e) France (five-years cohorts)
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(f) France (ten-year cohorts)
Figure 2.4: Macro Productivity Profiles and Demographic Change for Selected Countries
In the following, we use the estimates to conduct counterfactual experiments to infer
the relative importance of aging and changes in the skill composition of the population for
future economic development. To this end, we use available projections of the prospective
age and skill composition of the population. These projections can be conducted under
several scenarios. The baseline scenario is to use the estimates to obtain an estimate of
output per worker by inserting population projections in terms of age and skill structure
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and compute output as in equation (2.10) over the period over which projections for age
structure and skill composition are available. This scenario uses all information about the
evolution of the economy and, thus, provides a best practice projection.
As a consistency check for this methodology, we use the estimates obtained from
the sample 1950–2000 to project economic performance until 2010, based on the actual
observations for the changes in the age structure and in the skill share between 2000 and
2010. The results suggest that the model is able to track development rather well, with
the exception that unpredictable events such as the global financial crisis of 2007/2008
imply deviations of the model projections from the actual data.31
As a first alternative scenario, we use only the projection for the human capital
structure, but keep the age composition of the population constant. In other words, this
corresponds to a simulation that stops the aging process and keeps the population at its
current status quo in terms of age composition. Conceptually, this corresponds to the
(deliberately extreme and unrealistic) counterfactual assumption of a stable population
(“constant demographic structure”).
As a second alternative scenario, we simulate the model using the available population
projections for the dynamics of the age structure, but keep the composition of human
capital in the population constant at the present levels. This corresponds to a scenario
that evaluates the consequences of aging in isolation while keeping human capital constant
(“constant human capital”). The reference year for both counterfactual exercises is 2010.
In the following, we use Germany, the UK, and France as prime examples of developed
economies that differ in terms of the speed of population aging. All three countries
have comparable income levels and experienced roughly comparable patterns of economic
development in the past. As Figure 2.1 shows, however, the three countries have different
age structures of their population and correspondingly face different dynamics of population
aging in the future. Moreover, the trajectories of educational attainment differ across these
countries as shown in Figure 2.2.32 Using the same set of coefficient estimates from the
empirical analysis for these countries, we can therefore provide comparable simulations that
allow us to identify the implications of the projected aging and human capital dynamics
for future development.
Figure 2.5 presents the corresponding projection results for the different scenarios
for Germany, the UK, and France. For all three countries, the simulated performance
using the available projections for aging and human capital suggest a dampened economic
performance in the decades to come. The predicted slow-down is more pronounced for
Germany than for the UK and France. Obviously, these projections are based on strong
assumptions and should not be confused with forecasts of output growth, because important
31See Figure A.7 in the Appendix, where the economic performance of non-OECD countries is matched
well, whereas the projection of economic performance is too benevolent for OECD countries, which have
been affected more by the global financial crisis up to 2010.
32The same applies for education projections, see Figure A.8 in the Appendix.
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(a) Selected Countries: Germany, United Kingdom, and France
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Figure 2.5: Projections Under Different Scenarios
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components like capital accumulation, depreciation, etc., are not adequately modeled in
these simulations but held constant at their 2010 levels.33 Nevertheless, they are useful as
a benchmark for comparing the projections to the counterfactual simulations that freeze
the demographic structure or the human capital distribution at their respective current
shapes. When considering a constant age structure (“constant demographic structure”),
the projection of the economic performance in the three countries is more positive than
in the baseline projection, implying a negative effect of population aging. However, the
difference between the best projection and this counterfactual projection is substantially
more different in the case of Germany, which faces more pronounced population aging
than the UK and France. Alternatively, keeping the human capital structure unchanged
(“constant human capital”) implies a moderately dampened economic development in
Germany, whereas the development in the UK and France is affected more negatively by
this scenario. While in Germany, freezing the skill share at its current level has relatively
minor implications, in particular in the near future, a continued upskilling of the population
in the UK and France seems to be a major factor for future development. Taken together,
the results predict that in Germany population aging is a powerful dampening force for
economic performance, which is likely to unfold its effects in the future, whereas the
effect of changes in the education composition have rather limited power, because the
population is already very skilled and young cohorts are small in size. In contrast, in
the UK, and even more so in France, aging poses less of a problem, whereas a failure to
keep pace with the projected education attainment might impose substantial negative
effects on development. Panel (b) of Figure 2.5 illustrates this relative difference between
aging and education: The figure contrasts the predicted dynamics of output per worker
using the projections for demography and human capital to the counterfactual with both
distributions frozen at their current shapes: Germany is predicted to exhibit a lower
performance than under the counterfactual status quo, whereas the UK and France will
develop faster. Part of this is due to the greater leverage for human capital implied by the
different demographic structure. Greater aging pressure also limits the scope for human
capital, which is embodied in the small young cohorts, to compensate direct effects of
aging. Similarly heterogeneous results obtain for other developed economies, such as the
USA and Japan.34
One noteworthy aspect in this context is that specifications without a control for the
lagged development deliver somewhat larger effects for human capital. Correspondingly,
projections obtained with these specifications deliver a somewhat more benign scenario,
with greater scope for human capital in compensating the effects of population aging for
countries that face substantial population aging but have a rather skilled population.35
33Below, we turn to alternative simulation scenarios that also incorporate capital projections and
alternative scenarios for education attainment.
34See Figure A.9 in the Appendix.
35See Figure A.10 in the Appendix for details.
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(a) Developed vs. Developing Economies
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Figure 2.6: Projections Under Different Scenarios
Figure 2.6 presents the corresponding results for OECD and non-OECD countries.
Again, the benchmark projections deliver a rather pessimistic outlook about economic
performance in both samples. Freezing the age structure at its current level implies faster
development in the OECD countries, suggesting that aging will be a major impediment
for economic performance in the future. A potentially more surprising result is that
aging appears to have a similar negative effect on economic development in non-OECD
countries, as evidenced by the simulation that keeps the age structure constant (“constant
demographic structure”). The positive trajectory is mainly due to improvements in the
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skill composition of the population. Conducting the alternative scenario with constant skill
structure but incorporating the demographic aging process reveals a worse performance
for OECD and non-OECD countries compared to the baseline scenario.36 This result
highlights the importance of increasing human capital in the process of the demographic
transition and the corresponding aging of the population in developing countries. The
results are striking in showing the potential of human capital to counteract negative
implications of aging, particularly when there is substantial scope for improvements in the
education attainment of the population, as in less developed countries.
In countries with high fertility rates and a relatively young population, as it is the case
in many African countries, population aging might even exert a positive effect: Because
aging allows for the acquisition of more experience, it implies greater incentives to acquire
more formal human capital. The key impediment for development in these countries
appears to be a slow-down in the accumulation of human capital. Simulations illustrate
this for Niger, Nigeria, Uganda and Mali.37
2.5.2 Sensitivity and Alternative Scenarios
The projection results are robust to changes in the specification of the estimation equation
or the use of income per capita rather than income per worker.38 Moreover, if based on
the empirical results of the instrumental variables approach (Table 2.1, Column 7), the
projection results remain qualitatively unchanged with education showing a slightly more
promising quantitative role for future development.39
Obviously the quantitative dimension of the projections obtained with the different
simulation scenarios are subject to a number of potentially restrictive and unrealistic
assumptions. First, the alternative scenarios, in particular the assumption of a constant
age structure as if the population were stable in its current form (“constant demographic
structure”), were deliberately extreme. It should be clear that such a scenario is not
only unrealistic but also inconsistent in terms of the implied demographic dynamics of
non-stable populations. It should therefore be seen as an illustrative thought experiment,
rather than a realistic (or even in some way implementable) possibility with normative
character. A less extreme way to construct counterfactual scenarios in this context is
to make alternative assumptions about vital rates. Such scenarios would fix fertility,
or mortality, or both, at their 2010 levels—instead of fixing the age shares—and then
36Figure A.8 in the Appendix illustrates the education projections that are neglected in this scenario.
Alternative scenarios comprise constant enrollment rates, see the discussion below.
37See Figure A.11 in the Appendix.
38Figures A.12, A.13, and A.14 in the Appendix present the corresponding projections for a coarser
specification of age groups as well as for income per capita instead for selected countries and county
groups. Moreover, Figures A.15 and A.16 show the corresponding projections when accounting for the
size of the working-age population.
39Figure A.17 in the Appendix depicts the corresponding projections for Germany, France, and OECD
and non-OECD countries.
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compare the implied aging dynamics with the actually projected ones. The problem
with these scenarios is that the resulting patterns of population aging differ only very
mildly compared to the available projections.40 This reflects the well-known difficulty
for any policy aiming at vital rates to change the momentum of population aging. On
the contrary, such scenarios camouflage the true extent of the consequences of aging for
economic performance, as they imply differences in the age structure that are too minor
to provide substantially new insights. We therefore view the alternative scenarios studied
here as more illustrative.
Second, the simulations are based on the assumption of physical capital following the
average growth trend over the period 1950–2010. This assumption is clearly counterfactual,
but it allows us to focus on the demographic aspects while remaining agnostic about
the implications for savings and capital accumulation. An alternative is to specify an
auxiliary equation for the accumulation of physical capital per worker as a function of
past output, past levels of physical and human capital, and the age structure of the
population, along the line of the estimation framework for output. Such an auxiliary
equation can be estimated and the coefficient estimates can be used to project physical
capital under alternative scenarios, and in a second step output. The results from such a
refined methodology leave the main results, in particular related to the relative importance
of aging and human capital dynamics in different countries unaffected.41
Third, the simulations are obtained under the assumption of stable coefficients over
time and across countries, as well as a constant growth trend. These assumptions allow for
a comparable simulation across all countries, thereby providing the possibility to identify
differences in economic performance that are due to projections in the demographic
domain (the age structure) and projections in the domain of human capital. This delivers
qualitative results that are internally consistent. To investigate the robustness of the
findings with respect to less restrictive assumptions about parameter stability, we also
conducted the same counterfactual projections based on estimation results obtained for
the sample period 1990–2010 instead of the entire sample period 1950–2010. The results
of these projections are qualitatively very similar.42
Overall, these projection results suggest that the implications of population aging on
economic performance differ across countries with different age compositions and human
capital projections. We therefore proceed by investigating this issue in more detail.
40This result is illustrated in Figure A.18 in the Appendix.
41Figure A.19 in the Appendix compares the projection scenarios for exogenous and endogenous capital.
The simulation results suggest that capital accumulation is reduced in developed countries as consequence
of aging, whereas the differences are less pronounced in low-income countries. This is consistent with the
results from computable general equilibrium models that predict a negative effect of aging populations
on capital formation, see, for example, Sánchez-Romero (2013). However, these estimates are based on
the implicit and counterfactual assumption of closed economies without access to international capital
markets. See Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006) and Domeij and Floden (2006) for quantitative
and empirical studies on the implications of population aging for international capital flows.
42See Figures A.20 and A.21 in the Appendix.
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2.5.3 The Role of the Contemporaneous Age Composition
After having established how population aging and the contemporaneous changes in
aggregate human capital affect macroeconomic performance and how this influences the
prospects of future economic development, we return to the question whether investment
in education can potentially offset the effects of population aging. Using the simulation
methodology, we focus on which countries are predicted to suffer most from population
aging, measured in terms of economic performance. We then contrast the positive impact
of human capital acquisition to the predicted negative effect of aging, allowing us to
quantify whether the former is large enough to offset the latter.
Using similar counterfactual experiments as in the previous section, one can simulate the
effect of projected changes in the age and human capital structure of a country and compare
it to a counterfactual scenario where both the age and human capital structures are fixed
at their current (2010) levels. Figure 2.7 provides a plot of the predicted performance of
OECD and non-OECD countries relative to the counterfactual status quo. Countries with
a young population that are projected to further increase their share of skilled individuals,
such as France, are predicted to exhibit a substantially better performance than they would
absent population aging and continued skill acquisition. On the other end of the spectrum,
countries like Germany but also Austria, Spain, Estonia, or Slovakia, that face substantial
population aging with populations that do not have much scope for further upskilling,
are likely to do worse than under the counterfactual status quo. Similar patterns can be
observed for non-OECD countries.
These predicted effects are mainly due to the differences in the scope for further
acquisition of human capital at the aggregate level. This is illustrated by a decomposition,
in which the contribution of the projected aging of the population to predicted economic
performance is isolated from the contribution of the projected change in human capital.43
Returning to the estimation framework, additional results confirm these insights by
revealing heterogeneity in the effects when splitting the sample into subsamples with
different levels of economic or demographic development. In particular, the results reveal
stronger effects of changes in the age structure on economic performance in non-OECD
than in OECD countries.44 This finding could indicate that the aging process is less
pronounced once the demographic transition is completed. Alternatively, this finding could
indicate that the adoption of technologies allows rich economies to insulate themselves
from the negative effects of aging on average, as suggested by Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017). In contrast, poorer countries in which the process of population aging sets in with
force might experience particularly adverse effects on their economic performance. This
finding is also consistent with the finding that population aging has a more pronounced
effect on societies with a large share of young people when considering a sample split.
43See Figures A.22 and A.23 in the Appendix for the respective graphs.
44See Table A.18 in the Appendix for details.
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Figure 2.7: Projected Performance Relative to the Counterfactual Status Quo
A more direct way of testing this conjecture is by investigating the stability of coefficients
for samples split in terms of the observation period, or in terms of the relative age of the
population. When considering estimates separately for the period before and after 1990,
the results reveal that the importance of population aging appears to have increased in
recent decades. Concretely, the effects are stronger when considering a subsample for the
period after 1990.45 When splitting the sample into countries with old populations and
countries with young populations (relative to the median of the young-age dependency
ratio), one obtains large and negative effects of the age structure in the “old” countries but
large and positive effects of the age structure for the group of “young” countries.46 This
45See Tables A.19 and A.20 in the Appendix for details.
46See Table A.21 in the Appendix.
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is consistent with the patterns obtained from the simulation shown in Figure 2.7. Aging
is predominantly a problem for economic development in countries with an unfavorable
age composition (such as Germany, and many Eastern European and Asian countries),
whereas countries with a young population are standing to gain from the projected aging
and education patterns (such as France, or many countries in Africa).47
2.5.4 The Scope for Adjustment
We conclude the analysis by investigating several alternative margins besides additional
investments in education along which the aging effect might be counteracted. A key
dimension in this respect is the intensity with which human capital, and labor in general,
is supplied. To explore whether the decline in the relative supply of labor by young cohorts
due to population aging could be neutralized by an increased labor force participation,
in particular by women, or by longer work weeks, we proceed in three steps. First, we
provide an assessment of the scope of adjustment along this dimension by comparing the
effective labor supply of the different age groups in 2010 to the projected levels in 2050.
The effective labor supply in 2010 is computed by using the same information about the
age structure of the workforce as in the estimates and combining it with data about the
absolute size of the workforce and information about age-specific labor force participation
at the extensive and intensive margin provided by the International Labour Organization
(2011).48 For 2050, we use the IIASA-VID projection for the working-age population and
assume that age-specific labor force participation and hours worked by women attain
the same level as for men in the 2010 ILO data. This allows us to construct several
alternative scenarios compared to the (implicit) assumption of constant female labor force
participation and hours worked in the results presented so far. In particular, we compare
the baseline projection as before, which assumes constant labor force participation at
the extensive and intensive margin, to three alternative scenarios: a projection that also
accounts for changes in female labor force participation, for changes in hours, and for
changes in both, until 2050. When comparing the magnitudes relative to the projected
effects of aging for the size of the workforce of each age group, these increases appear
rather moderate. In particular, these projections indicate that the overall patterns of
aging will at most be moderated but not completely neutralized.49
47Interestingly, also countries with a rather old and well educated population, such as Japan, are
projected to gain from the future dynamics. This is partly due to the fact that they already underwent
substantial shifts in the age distribution in the past and stand to face a “pause” in the coming decades. For
this reason, we report also a scenario Japan* where the demographic structure has been fixed in the year
2000 instead of 2010. In other countries, the development is projected to be positive due to considerable
immigration that is projected to stabilize the age distribution, as, for example, in Switzerland.
48The data are available at http://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
49This is illustrated in Figures A.24 and A.25 in the Appendix, where we plot the labor supply in terms
of the total weekly hours worked by the different age groups as of 2010 and the projected change under the
different scenarios until 2050, for Germany and France, and OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively.
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In a second step, we make use of novel age projections of labor force participation
constructed by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, Hammer, and Loichinger (2016) for 26 European
countries to project the macroeconomic performance of these countries using the baseline
estimates obtained from the age structure of the working-age population. In particular,
using the 2010 data on labor force participation, we construct an index for the labor
force participation that takes a value of 100 for each age group in 2010, and compute the
relative change up to 2050 using the projection data by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, Hammer,
and Loichinger (2016). The projection results document that aging remains a substantial
impediment for economic development for most countries.50 A drawback of this analysis
is that it relies on estimates that do not incorporate information about labor force
participation but that only rely on the age structure of the working-age population.
This reduced-form approach helps avoiding endogeneity problems related to labor force
participation, but it introduces a slight methodological inconsistency.
In a third step, we therefore re-estimate the model using information on the effective
labor force and, hence, effective human capital supply, by incorporating age-specific differ-
ences in the intensive margin, for the period 1980–2010 for which respective age-structured
data are available from the ILO (International Labour Organization, 2011). Based on these
estimates, we then project macroeconomic performance using the workforce projections by
Lutz et al. (2007) and by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, Hammer, and Loichinger (2016). The
descriptive statistics indicate that the age structure of the working-age population and
of the workforce are rather similar.51 Consistently, the estimation results do not differ
substantially from the baseline estimates and deliver the same qualitative results.52 Corre-
spondingly, the projections incorporating age-specific labor force participation patterns do
not deliver substantially different results. In particular, aging remains to exert a major
negative effect on macroeconomic performance, whereas human capital is only able to
offset this effect partially.53 Overall, the results from these three exercises suggest that the
incorporation of age-specific projections for labor force participation and hours worked
does not greatly affect the conclusions regarding the effects of aging and skills for future
macroeconomic performance.
Another margin of adjustment is a potential shift in the age-profile of productivity.
Whether in the future the productivity will peak at younger or older ages is an open
question. Given the ongoing improvements of health status and labor force attachment of
older cohorts in the workforce, and the observation of a stable experience premium that
Notice that the data and projections average over men and women.
50See Figure A.26 in the Appendix.
51In particular for age groups above 20 years of age, see Table A.1 in the Appendix for details.
52Table A.22 in the Appendix contains the corresponding estimation results.
53Figure A.27 in the Appendix compares projections obtained with the baseline methodology with
projections based on estimates that incorporate variation in labor force participation for the 26 EU
countries for which labor force projections are available. Figure A.28 plots the respective projections for
Germany and France.
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has led to the conjecture of experience-biased technical change (Caselli, 2015), one might
expect that the most productive age range might shift from ages 50–54 to older ages.54
To account for this possibility, we replicated the projections by shifting the estimated
productivity profile by one age group (that is, considering ages 55–59 years as the most
productive group instead of ages 50–54 years). The corresponding results reveal a modified
projection of the consequences of population aging compared to the baseline in the sense
that the negative effects of population aging in countries like Germany are delayed.55
Finally, the methodology allows us to address the question regarding the scope for
technical change or productivity improvements to offset the effects of aging. Recent work
has suggested that directed technical change might provide a countervailing force to the
negative growth effects of population aging (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017). Likewise,
improvements in the quality of human capital have been shown to affect macroeconomic
performance across states (Hanushek, Ruhose, and Woessmann, 2017). To investigate
this issue, we conduct another counterfactual exercise and compute the extent of skill-
biased technical change or quality improvement, in the form of an increase in the relative
productivity of high-skilled to low-skilled workers λh that is needed to offset the effect of
population aging until 2050. The results of this exercise replicate the earlier findings about
which countries are expected to suffer or gain from population aging, but this time the
estimates provide a quantitative interpretation in terms of productivity. In particular, the
relative productivity of high-skilled workers would have to increase by more than two-fold
to counteract the effects of population aging in countries that are affected negatively by
population aging, such as Germany.56
2.6 Conclusion
This study presents novel evidence regarding the role of the demographic structure of the
workforce and the distribution of skills for aggregate economic performance. On the basis
of an extended development accounting model, we derive a flexible empirical framework
that can accommodate empirical models previously used in the literature. In particular,
assuming that the quality of the labor force depends on the demographic structure allows
incorporating workforce demographics into the production function and provides a coherent
framework to evaluate the implications of population aging and education dynamics for
54For example, work by Kotschy (2018) described in Chapter 4 shows for the United States that over
time life-cycle earnings profiles became slightly flatter at higher ages, thus potentially confining some of
the negative effects of aging; see Chapter 4. Complementing this, research productivity as measured by
scientific breakthroughs has shifted to older ages (Jones and Weinberg, 2011). However, there is also
evidence that suggests that new technologies such as ICT might shift the productivity peak to younger
years (Falck, Heimisch, and Wiederhold, 2016). In the present context, a shift to younger years would
reinforce the effects of aging.
55See Figures A.29, A.30, and A.31 in the Appendix for details.
56See Figure A.32 in the Appendix for details.
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future economic development.
The estimation results show that changes in the age structure of the working-age
population have a strong effect on output, even when controlling for human capital. At
the same time, the evidence suggests that the stock of human capital embodied in the
population has a positive effect on economic performance, conditional on the age structure
of the population. The effects of aging in terms of changing relative sizes of the different
age cohorts mirror productivity profiles that have been found earlier in terms of hump-
shaped productivity patterns over the age dimension. Consequently, the results show
that population aging in old societies reduces the future growth potential. The estimates
suggest that human capital can help to compensate for these aging pressures and deliver an
upper bound for the elasticity between the age structure and the distribution of skills. This
elasticity allows gauging the change in the distribution of skills that is required to offset
the negative effects of aging of the workforce. The quantitative estimates of this elasticity
predict that shifts out of the most productive age cohort into older and less productive age
groups can be offset by higher investment in schooling. However, these offsetting effects
might not be sufficient to fully compensate for aging, particularly in developed countries.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that a continued expansion of education is crucial for
future macroeconomic performance.
The results are also useful to infer the relative importance of aging and human capital
accumulation for macroeconomic performance by ways of projections on the basis of
different scenarios of population aging and human capital dynamics. Projections of future
economic development predict that aging will play an important role by slowing down
economic development in developed and less developed countries. Aging is, hence, not a
problem of the developed world only. There is substantial heterogeneity in the projected
macroeconomic performance as result of differential population aging patterns across
countries. This heterogeneity emerges through the heterogeneous productivity but also
as consequence of the implications for the scope of human capital in compensating this
effect. The projections reveal a central role of human capital in ameliorating the negative
consequences of aging. This is particularly the case in countries that are yet underdeveloped
in terms of human capital endowments and that have considerable potential for an increase
in the human capital endowment of the still largely low-skilled population. The scope
of human capital improvements for compensating the consequences of population aging
appears more limited in economies that age faster. However, the findings make clear that
without further improvements in the skill composition of the workforce in these countries,
the consequences of population aging will be much more dramatic. Additional projections
suggest that increased female labor force participation or longer work hours will be unlikely
to neutralize these effects or replace human capital. Moreover, skill-biased technical change
will have to be substantial to counteract these developments.
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Overall, the results are consistent with an important role of long-run demographic
dynamics for future economic development, pointing toward the possibility of more
stagnant development in the future. In this sense, the results complement recent findings
by Cervellati, Sunde, and Zimmermann (2017).
Chapter 3
Health and Economic Growth:
Reconciling the Micro and Macro
Evidence
3.1 Introduction
Health is an essential component of human capital, supporting worker productivity by
enhancing physical capacity and mental capabilities. Health improvements influence
the pace of income growth through many pathways: Better health directly increases
labor market participation and worker productivity (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Bloom
and Canning, 2000; Schultz, 2002; Bloom, Canning, and Graham, 2003); increasing life
expectancy creates incentives to invest in education, innovation, and physical capital
(Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2003; Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom, Canning, and Moore, 2014;
Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Prettner, 2013); and better health, particularly of women,
reduces fertility and spurs an economic transition from a state of stagnating incomes
toward sustained income growth (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011; Cervellati and
Sunde, 2005, 2011; Bloom, Kuhn, and Prettner, 2015). Hence, health and development
correlate positively at the macroeconomic level, as the unconditional correlation between
the survival probability from age 15 to 60 and (log) gross domestic product (GDP) per
worker illustrates in Figure 3.1.
In general, two prominent methods are used to assess the effect of health on economic
growth. The first aggregates the results of Mincerian wage regressions of the return on
individual health to derive the macroeconomic effects of population health. The second
relies on the estimation of a generalized aggregate production function that decomposes
human capital into its components, including population health. While the overwhelming
majority of studies based on both methods indicate a positive effect of health on economic
growth, the size of the effect remains subject to intense debate. The micro-based approach
49
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Figure 3.1: Unconditional Correlation: Health and Development
Data sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) and United Nations (2017).
tends to find smaller effects than the macro-based approach, thus presenting a micro-macro
puzzle of the economic return to health.
This paper aims to reconcile both approaches by showing that the estimates based
on microeconomic results are compatible with the effects derived from a well-specified
macroeconomic analysis. To this end, we develop a production function model of economic
growth, keeping our specification as close as possible to a generalized Mincerian wage
equation as in Weil (2007). This permits us to compare our macro-level estimates and
his micro-level calibration directly. We account for reverse causality, omitted variable
bias, and measurement errors in the explanatory variables using a large cross-country
panel and exploiting the demographic structure for an instrumental variables approach
(see the work by Kotschy and Sunde, 2018, described in Chapter 2, which uses this
procedure to examine the implications of population aging and educational investment
for macroeconomic performance). Our results show that the micro-based and macro-
based estimates of the effects of health on economic development are consistent with each
other. Thus, we provide a macro-based justification for using the micro-based approach to
estimate the direct economic benefits of specific health interventions.
According to Weil (2007), a 10-percentage-point increase in adult survival rates trans-
lates into a 6.7-percent increase in labor productivity. Consequently, health differentials
account for about 9.9 percent of the variation in output per worker across countries. Our
analysis shows that a 10-percentage-point increase in adult survival rates is associated
with a 9.1-percent increase in labor productivity. Weil’s (2007) estimate falls well within
the 95-percent confidence interval of our estimate, suggesting that the two models’ results
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are compatible with each other. Accordingly, the micro-based and macro-based approaches
to estimating the effect of health on income growth are reconcilable. Because we include
physical capital and education in our empirical framework, the resulting estimate is a
measure of the direct productivity benefits of health as in Weil (2007). Thus, the estimated
effect excludes the role of better health in increasing the incentives for investment, saving,
and education, and its role in reducing fertility and spurring a takeoff toward sustained
growth. As such, the productivity benefits of health presented in this paper should be
considered conservative.
Our results suggest that public health measures might be a lever for fostering economic
development. These types of investments could include vaccination programs, antibiotic
distribution programs, and iodine supplementation schemes, which lead to large improve-
ments in health outcomes for relatively low expenditures (World Bank, 1993; Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Field, Robles, and Torero, 2009; Luca et al., 2014).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews various
approaches to measure the effect of health on economic performance. In Section 3.3, we
derive the theoretical effect of health on output per worker from a human capital–augmented
aggregate production function. In Section 3.4, we use these results to derive an empirical
specification for estimating the influence of changes in the health stock of the population
on output growth. Section 3.5 describes the data, while Section 3.6 presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
A common early empirical approach to examining the effect of health on economic growth
involves regressing income per capita growth against initial level of health for a cross-
sectional sample of countries, controlling for initial income and other factors believed to
influence steady-state income (see, for example, Barro, 1991, 1997; Durlauf, Johnson, and
Temple, 2005). Nearly all studies investigating economic growth that use this approach find
a positive, significant, and sizable influence of initial population health on the subsequent
pace of economic growth (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Sachs et al., 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Bhargava et al., 2001; Bloom,
Canning, and Sevilla, 2004). While the results of empirical growth equations for most other
explanatory variables are not robust with respect to different specifications, Levine and
Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find
that initial population health (for example, as measured by life expectancy) is positively
associated with subsequent growth in almost all permutations of explanatory variables
they analyze. Hence, initial population health is one of the most robust predictors of
subsequent economic growth.
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More recent work analyzes the effects of health on economic growth via dynamic panel
data regressions in the vein of Islam (1995), using the lagged dependent variable as one of
the regressors to control for the convergence processes.1 These studies typically employ
an exogenous instrument for health to isolate the causal channel running from better
health to income growth (see, for example, Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg, 2008;
Aghion, Howitt, and Murtin, 2011; Cervellati and Sunde, 2011; Bloom, Canning, and Fink,
2014). Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) is one of the few studies finding no evidence for
a causal positive effect of health improvements on economic growth. The authors argue
that increasing life expectancy raises population growth, which, in turn, increases capital
dilution in the neoclassical growth model and, therefore, reduces income growth during the
convergence process. They support this theory empirically using the global epidemiological
revolution as an instrument for life expectancy. Aghion, Howitt, and Murtin (2011) and
Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014), however, show that this result fails to hold when initial
life expectancy is included in the regression. In addition, Cervellati and Sunde (2011)
argue that Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2007) results only hold for less-developed countries
that have not yet undergone the demographic transition. In these countries, increasing
life expectancy indeed raises population growth and reduces income growth. For post-
demographic transition countries, however, fertility declines with mortality. As a result,
health improvements do not lead to an increase in population growth and capital dilution
does not intensify. Splitting the sample into pre- and post-demographic transition countries,
Cervellati and Sunde (2011) find that the effect of life expectancy on growth is positive for
post-demographic transition countries and negative but insignificant for pre-demographic
transition countries (see Hansen and Lønstrup, 2015, for a recent discussion).
Another way to assess the size of the macroeconomic effect is by aggregating the
microeconomic effects of health to infer the implications for aggregate income. For example,
Fogel (1994, 1997) argues that much of British economic growth during 1780–1980 (about
0.33 percent per year) was due to increases in effective labor inputs that resulted from
workers’ better nutrition and improved health. More recently, the seminal works of Shastry
and Weil (2003) and Weil (2007) employ an aggregate production function, in which the
effects of health on productivity are calibrated from microeconomic wage regressions. In
the microeconomic regressions, these studies explain income by means of various measures
for health such as anemia, height, age at menarche, and the adult survival rate. The
results of Shastry and Weil (2003) and Weil (2007) suggest that health is an important
form of human capital, but that its effect on growth is smaller than that derived from
macroeconomic cross-country regressions.
1By construction, the fixed effects in such regressions correlate with the error term. Thus, generalized
method of moments (GMM) techniques are usually employed for estimation (see, for example, Arellano
and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Judson and Owen, 1999).
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
Assume that time t = 1, 2 . . . evolves discretely, and consider an aggregate production
function of the form
Yt = AtK
α
t H
1−α
t , (3.1)
where Yt denotes aggregate output, At represents total factor productivity (TFP), Kt is the
physical capital stock, Ht describes the aggregate human capital stock, and α constitutes
the elasticity of final output with respect to physical capital. The aggregate human capital
stock is the sum over the individual human capital levels νj,t of workers j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,J }
in the economy; that is, Ht =
∑J
j νj,t. Expressing output in per worker units yields
yt = Atk
α
t ν
1−α
t (3.2)
with yt = Yt/Lt, kt = Kt/Lt, and νt = Ht/Lt. Alternatively, output can be expressed in
per capita units as
ỹt =
Yt
Nt
=
Lt
Nt
Atk
α
t ν
1−α
t , (3.3)
where Nt refers to the total population size.
In a competitive labor market, one unit of composite labor νt earns the wage wt, which
is equal to its marginal product:2
wt =
∂yt
∂νt
= (1− α)yt
νt
. (3.4)
Furthermore, we assume individual human capital follows a generalized Mincerian wage
equation along the lines of Hall and Jones (1999), Bils and Klenow (2000), and Weil (2007).
Hence, we assume individual human capital νj,t follows the exponential function
νj,t = exp
(
φhhj,t + φssj,t + φa,1aj,t + φa,2a
2
j,t
)
, (3.5)
where hj,t denotes the state of health, sj,t refers to educational attainment, aj,t describes
worker’s experience, φh is the semi-elasticity of human capital with respect to health, φs
is the semi-elasticity of human capital with respect to educational attainment, and φa,1
and φa,2 refer to the semi-elasticities of human capital with respect to experience and
experience squared. We include the latter to capture the diminishing marginal contribution
of experience to productivity.3
2This holds under the assumption that a marginal change of individual human capital does not change
the distribution of wages such that the marginal product of individual human capital and that of average
human capital coincide.
3Conceptually, hj,t, sj,t, and aj,t need not represent all aspects of health, educational attainment, and
experience—only those that are relevant for the production of final output.
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Accordingly, a worker j with νj units of human capital earns a wage of
wj,t = wt · νj,t = wt · exp
(
φhhj,t + φssj,t + φa,1aj,t + φa,2a
2
j,t
)
. (3.6)
This notation normalizes the effective labor input of a hypothetical worker without any
health capital, education, or experience to unity. Meanwhile, workers with better health,
higher education, or more experience are equivalent in productivity terms to a larger
number of such baseline workers. Logarithmic wages at the individual level thus take the
well-known Mincerian form:
ln (wj,t) = ln(wt) + ln(νj,t) = ln(wt) + φhhj,t + φssj,t + φa,1aj,t + φa,2a
2
j,t. (3.7)
Hence, the aggregate production function in (3.1) with our measure for human capital in
(3.5) is consistent with wage equations used in the microeconomic literature.
The Mincerian wage form implies that the aggregate human capital stock is given by
Ht =
J∑
j
νj =
J∑
j
exp
(
φhhj,t + φssj,t + φa,1aj,t + φa,2a
2
j,t
)
. (3.8)
Accordingly, aggregating human capital requires raising individuals’ educational attainment
and health to the exponential power. This complication in the aggregation process vanishes,
if human capital and, thus, wages follow a log-normal distribution. In this case, the log of
the average wage corresponds to the log of the median wage plus one-half of the variance of
log wages σ2t . As the log of median wages equals the average of log wages for a lognormal
distribution, the aggregate human capital stock simplifies to
ln
(
Ht
Lt
)
= ln
(∑J
j νj,t
Lt
)
=
[∑J
j ln(νj,t)
]
Lt
+
σ2t
2
=
∑J
j φhhj,t + φssj,t + φa,1aj,t + φa,2a
2
j,t
Lt
+
σ2t
2
= φhht + φsst + φa,1at + φa,2a
2
t +
σ2t
2
. (3.9)
Intuitively, a marginally better health status (for example, an increase in the adult
survival rate by one percentage point) raises a worker’s productivity and wages by 100 · φh
percent. Analogously, additional marginal investment in education (for example, one year
of schooling) raises a worker’s productivity and wages by 100 · φs percent. This effect’s
absolute size is larger for highly educated high-wage earners than it is for poorly educated
low-wage workers. Moreover, an extra year of education for a highly educated worker also
represents a greater investment, because the worker must forgo a higher wage to undergo
the extra schooling.
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3.4 Empirical Framework
Suppose the production function in (3.2) applies to i = 1, . . . , I different countries. Taking
the logarithm of the production function and using the result from Equation (3.9), the log
of production per worker is given by
ln(yi,t) = ln(Ai,t) +α ln(ki,t) + (1−α)
(
φhhi,t + φssi,t + φa,1ai,t + φa,2a
2
i,t +
σ2i,t
2
)
. (3.10)
Using rates of return to calibrate the coefficient on education, φs, suggests a parameter
value of 0.09 to 0.10 (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos, 2004). Regarding the elasticity of output with respect to capital, α, economists
generally agree on values of around one-third (see, for example, Hall and Jones, 1999).
Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) take a similar approach,
deriving a formula that estimates the macroeconomic effects of schooling using an aggre-
gated version of a Mincer wage equation. The major difference between these formulations
is that education level’s effect on output in their formulation is expressed as φs, whereas in
our approach the effect of schooling is (1−α)φs. This difference arises, because they assume
the cross-country differences and changes in the intercepts in (3.7) to be random and
assign them to the error term in the regression. With our production function, increases
in schooling increase the aggregate level of human capital and labor equivalent inputs in
the economy and depress the wage paid per equivalent worker.
Equation (3.10) describes aggregate production as an identity that could be estimated
directly, if all right-hand-side variables were available. In practice, however, the level of
total factor productivity in country i at time t, ln(Ai,t), is not observed. Several approaches
can address this problem. We follow Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004) and model total
factor productivity as a diffusion process across countries, which allows for the possibility
of long-run differences in TFP even after the diffusion is complete. Specifically, let the
change in TFP be given by
∆ ln(Ait) = λ
[
ln(A∗i,t)− ln(Ai,t−1)
]
+ εi,t, (3.11)
where εi,t constitutes an idiosyncratic shock. Each country has a period-specific upper
bound, given by ln(A∗i,t). A country’s total factor productivity adjusts toward this bound
at rate λ. We assume this upper bound depends on country characteristics xi,t and on the
worldwide technology frontier µt. Moreover, schooling in previous periods may facilitate
the diffusion and adoption of existing technologies (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) or spur novel
innovation (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Strulik, Prettner, and Prskawetz, 2013).
Hence, lagged schooling si,t−1 constitutes another determinant of potential TFP (see also
Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson, 2014). Neglecting one of these channels might bias the
empirical estimates, as Sunde and Vischer’s (2015) results indicate. Because technological
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gaps are not directly observed, we follow Baumol (1986) and use lagged output per worker
as a proxy (see also Fagerberg, 1994; Dowrick and Rogers, 2002). Hence, growth of total
factor productivity reads
∆ ln(Ait) = λ
[
µt + x
′
i,tΘ + ρsi,t−1 − ln(yi,t−1)
]
+ εi,t. (3.12)
Alternatively, a richer model derives lagged total factor productivity ln(Ai,t−1) directly
from the production function such that
∆ ln(Ait) = λ
[
µt + x
′
i,tΘ + ρsi,t−1 − ln(yi,t−1) + α ln(ki,t−1)
]
(3.13)
+λ(1− α)
(
φhhi,t−1 + φssi,t−1 + φa,1ai,t−1 + φa,2a
2
i,t−1 +
σ2i,t−1
2
)
+ εi,t.
This slightly more comprehensive modeling approach, however, suffers from the disadvan-
tage that including additional highly correlated explanatory variables inflates the estimated
standard errors without providing additional insights into the parameters of interest. As
such, we provide estimates for both models and show that they are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar.
Related research suggests several variables xi,t, which may affect the TFP level in
the long run. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that institutions and “social
infrastructure” affect productivity, while Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) emphasize
the role of geography. Our empirical work experiments with several potential variables to
control for these influences.
First-differencing (3.10) and inserting (3.12) provides the empirical estimation equation:
∆ ln(yi,t) = λ
[
µt + x
′
i,tΘ + ρsi,t−1 − ln(yi,t−1)
]
+ α∆ ln(ki,t) (3.14)
+(1− α)
(
φh∆hi,t + φs∆si,t + φa,1∆ai,t + φa,2∆a
2
i,t +
∆σ2i,t
2
)
+ εi,t.
De la Fuente and Domenech (2001) and Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004) use this
approach to model TFP diffusion in cross-country production function studies. It is
formally equivalent to the autoregressive TFP model that Griliches and Mairesse (1998)
and Blundell and Bond (2000) use in their studies of the production function based on
firm-level data.
According to the specification in (3.14), output growth can be decomposed into three
components. The first is growth of the input factors capital, health, schooling, and
experience. The second is a catch-up term capturing the reduction of the technological
gap to the leading countries in each time period such that the country converges to its
TFP upper bound at the rate λ. The third component is an idiosyncratic shock to the
country’s total factor productivity εi,t.
4
4We could allow the shock to grow over time to have a common component across countries, such
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Equation (3.14) represents a model of conditional convergence, in which the speed of
convergence λ describes the rate at which gaps in total factor productivity close. Therefore,
this approach stands in contrast to models that take TFP differentials across countries to
be fixed, such as those of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995). The speed
of convergence in these models depends on the time that capital stocks take to reach their
steady-state levels given fixed investment rates. By including the growth rates of factor
inputs directly in Equation (3.14), we can identify the catch-up term—that is, the effect of
the gap between actual and steady-state output, given current input levels—as the impact
of a TFP gap.
In the special case of no technological diffusion (λ = 0), the lagged level terms in (3.14)
disappear. Hence, our approach encompasses the estimation of a production function
in first differences, as advocated by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Pritchett (2001).
Moreover, we can test if this restriction holds. Taking first differences nets out any fixed
effects on TFP. Therefore, testing whether λ = 0 examines the plausibility that TFP
differentials remain constant or, alternatively, narrow over time because of technological
diffusion. Our model also encompasses the special case in which technological diffusion
occurs, but the steady-state level of TFP is the same in every country. We can test this
by examining whether the country-specific variables xi,t have zero coefficients.
When estimating Equation (3.14), we face the possibility that contemporaneous growth
rates of factor inputs are endogenous and responsive to the current TFP shock εi,t. For
health and education inputs, which are the objects of interest, we overcome this problem by
exploiting the demographic structure to obtain plausibly exogenous instrumental variables
(see Chapter 2 and Kotschy and Sunde, 2018). Specifically, inflows from young-age cohorts
at the lower end and outflows from old-age cohorts at the upper end of the working-age
population determine changes in overall health status and educational attainment of the
working-age population. Hence, one can use the lagged level of health and the lagged
level of educational attainment for the age cohorts that will enter or leave the working-age
population in the next period as an instrumental variable for the contemporaneous growth
rate of the corresponding factor input. This instrument is plausibly exogenous given the
approximation of TFP growth rates, which controls for productivity gains that are due to
past changes in input factors, past technology shocks, and convergence to the technological
frontier. This approach is compatible with lagged TFP levels and expected TFP growth—
the catch-up term in Equation (3.14)—affecting previous input decisions (for example,
Bils and Klenow, 2000, suggest that schooling decisions depend on expected economic
growth). The argument that lagged input levels are uncorrelated with future shocks to
TFP is the rationale for estimating Equation (3.14) instead of the level relationship in
Equation (3.10).
as worldwide oil or interest rate shocks. Such a shock, however, would be collinear to changes in the
worldwide productivity frontier captured by the time effects and would thus not affect any of our results.
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Finally, including fixed effects in a comprehensive specification also allows for the
possibility of country-specific growth trends driven by unobserved heterogeneity with
a persistent effect on TFP. We refrain, however, from using dynamic panel estimators
based on generalized method of moments, which produce estimates with large standard
errors and no statistical significance. In addition, we take the view that over the five-year
intervals all the inputs potentially correlate with contemporaneous productivity shocks.
Therefore, we would have to instrument all our regressors by lagged values, as opposed
to firm-level studies, in which current inputs are treated as exogenous. Both of these
factors imply a loss of precision in the estimates and make drawing inferences based on a
fixed-effects approach difficult.
3.5 Data
We construct an unbalanced panel of 116 countries observed every five years from 1960 to
2010. Data on real output and physical capital, both in per worker units, are obtained
from the Penn World Tables by Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015).
Health inputs are proxied using adult survival rates derived from United Nations (2017).
This variable measures the probability of surviving from age 15 to 60. Conceptually,
this measure may relate more closely to adult health and worker productivity than life
expectancy—a measure that is sensitive to infant mortality rates. Adult survival rates,
however, act only as a proxy for the health of the workforce, because they measure
mortality rates rather than morbidity. Our main reason for using adult survival rates is
that it allows us to compare our results directly with those of Shastry and Weil (2003)
and Weil (2007).
Following the Mincerian approach, educational input is proxied by years of schooling
in the working-age population. To this end, we exploit measures on secondary and total
schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) for the population above age 15. We combine age-
specific years of schooling with population shares to construct average years of schooling
for the working-age population, which we define from age 15 to 60 to match our measure
of aggregate health.
We construct aggregate experience as the median age of the population obtained
from United Nations (2017), net of an intercept of six years corresponding to early
childhood. Moreover, we deduct compulsory schooling years, taken from UNESCO (1997)
and UNESCO (2017), to account for differences in the age of workforce entry across
countries. This correction is necessary, because countries with higher life expectancy
and older populations tend to have later workforce entry due to longer schooling. As
experience enters the regression framework in differences, this measure takes up variation
from changes in median age and compulsory schooling following educational reforms.5
5For certain countries, the statistical yearbooks report values for specific regions. Moreover, the
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To control for the effect of wage inequality, we use the disposable income Gini coefficient
after taxation and transfers by Solt (2016a). These data provide standardized Gini
coefficients that are comparable across countries and over time.
Finally, we include some country-specific variables that may affect long-run TFP levels.
These include an indicator for the quality of economic institutions from Gwartney, Lawson,
and Hall (2017), a measure for the value added by the agricultural sector from World
Bank (2017) to control for structural change, the percentage of land area in the tropics by
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) to control for geographical factors that may affect
productivity and trading opportunities, and a set of regional dummies.6
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.1 presents the main estimation results. We proxy education by average years of
secondary schooling, which provides the most precise estimates for the return to education.
Column (1) reports coefficient estimates of a parsimonious specification of our empirical
model in Equation (3.14), including lagged educational attainment but omitting any
additional controls. The point estimates show the sign expected from theory. Lagged per
capita GDP is negative, implying conditional convergence as predicted by the neoclassical
growth literature (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Diamond, 1965) and as established empirically.7
Capital accumulation positively relates to economic growth, which again conforms to
the growth literature’s results. Changes in the aggregate human capital stock positively
affect productivity per worker: The coefficients for changes in average health and mean
years of schooling both show a positive sign and differ significantly from zero at the
one-percent level. Hence, health and education both constitute important dimensions
of human capital. The opposing signs for φ̂a,1 and φ̂a,2 suggest a hump-shaped effect of
average experience on growth of output per worker, which is consistent with the standard
Mincerian framework; though only the coefficient of squared experience is (marginally)
educational systems of some countries allow for different categorizations such that alternative figures are
conceivable. We correct for these fluctuations and code flatter, that is, less varying, values in the case of
doubt. This procedure tends to render the measure for experience less informative and thus increases the
corresponding standard errors. Table B.2 in the Appendix contains a complete list of coding decisions.
Because we use only changes in experience over time, measurement error in compulsory schooling levels
poses no threat to our identification.
6We also experimented with further indicators for landlocked countries by Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger
(1999) and controls for ethnic fractionalization and polarization by Alesina et al. (2003) and Reynal-Querol
and Montalvo (2005). Given the set of other controls, however, these variables did not explain much of
the remaining variation.
7See, for example, Barro (1991, 1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) in cross-section regressions, and Islam (1995), Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), and Brückner
(2013) in panel data settings. For interesting surveys and critical remarks on the literature, see Durlauf,
Johnson, and Temple (2005) and Eberhardt and Teal (2011).
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Table 3.1: Return of Health and Education to Productivity
No Adding Fixed Adding Lagged IV IV IV
Controls Controls Effects Gini Controls ∆(hi,t) ∆(si,t) ∆(hi,t), ∆(si,t)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(yi,t−1) -0.045*** -0.15*** -0.34*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14***
(0.0097) (0.017) (0.052) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
∆ ln(ki,t) 0.52*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.48*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35***
(0.054) (0.063) (0.10) (0.067) (0.075) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064)
∆(hi,t) 1.12*** 0.59** 0.64** 0.74** 0.68** 0.91 0.61** 0.80
(0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.35) (0.28) (0.94) (0.28) (0.90)
∆(si,t) 0.099*** 0.075** 0.091** 0.063** 0.063** 0.078*** 0.049 0.046
(0.032) (0.031) (0.046) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.096) (0.093)
∆(ai,t) 0.011 0.0075 -0.0100 0.0089 0.0090 0.0070 0.0078 0.0073
(0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.010) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0084)
∆(a2i,t) -0.00069* -0.00057 0.00024 -0.00058 -0.00064* -0.00056* -0.00057 -0.00055
(0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00039) (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00034)
∆(σ2i,t) — — — -0.60 — — — —
— — — (0.45) — — — —
R2 0.29 0.38 0.38 — 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.37
First-stage F — — — — — 26.7 30.2 17.8
Countries 116 116 116 109 116 116 116 116
Observations 613 613 613 461 613 613 613 613
Controls — X X X X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of log output per worker ∆ ln(yt). All specifications include lagged schooling si,t−1 and a
full set of time effects. Columns (2) to (8) add further controls xi,t for the quality of economic institutions, the value added by the agricultural
sector, the percentage of land area in the tropics, and a full set of regional dummies. First-stage F refers to the Kleibergen-Paap first-stage
F -statistic. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
significant in this specification. Because experience varies strongly across individuals but
very little across countries, however, obtaining a precise estimate of the effect of worker
experience in macroeconomic models is difficult (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2004).
The specification used in Column (2) includes controls for the quality of economic
institutions, the value added by the agricultural sector (as a proxy for structural change),
the percentage of land area in the tropics, and the set of regional dummies. Adding
these controls increases the model’s explanatory power as reflected by an increase in R2
and slightly improves the precision of the point estimates. Quantitatively, the computed
parameters reduce in magnitude compared with the parsimonious specification, but the
qualitative results remain unchanged. In particular, the estimates still indicate a positive
and significant effect of changes in average health and education on output per worker.
Interestingly, the reduction in magnitude of the return to health is almost entirely due
to the inclusion of institutional quality. This confirms recent evidence by Weil (2014,
2017), who finds that institutional differences account for a considerable portion of the
cross-country correlation between income and health. Nevertheless, our results also show
that even after controlling for institutional differences, significant scope exists for a positive
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causal effect of health on output per worker.
In Column (3), we include country fixed effects to allow for country-specific growth
trends. Again, the qualitative effects remain unchanged. Quantitatively, the estimated
return to health does not change considerably, while the return to education slightly
increases. Our result of a positive and significant return to health is therefore not driven
by country-fixed unobservables. This specification substantially restricts the potential of
omitted variables to bias our main outcome of interest and thus serves as a specification
test for the model without fixed effects. In Column (4), we augment the specification
in Column (2) by adding the Gini coefficient to approximate the variance of log wages.
For reasons of data availability, the estimation sample shrinks to 461 observations.8 The
qualitative results again remain unchanged, while the estimated parameters do not change
considerably in magnitude. The computed parameter for the disposable income Gini
coefficient is negative and insignificant. Finally, Column (5) presents the results for the
comprehensive model with lagged controls, which derives lagged TFP directly from the
production function according to Equation (3.13). The results conform quantitatively and
qualitatively to those in Columns (2) to (4).
Table 3.2 compares the results of the baseline specification in Column (2) with those of
the literature. According to Weil (2007), an increase in adult survival rates of 0.1—or 10
percentage points—raises labor productivity by 6.7 percent. In comparison, our estimates
indicate that an increase in adult survival rates of 0.1 translates into a 9.1-percent increase
in labor productivity.9 The slightly larger point estimate from the macro-based approach
might be due to spillover effects that the micro-based approach omits by design. The
95-percent confidence interval of our estimate ranges from 0.47 to 17.7 percent and hence
includes Weil’s (2007) estimate. Consequently, our macro results are consistent with the
micro results, reconciling the micro-based and macro-based approaches to estimating the
effect of health on income growth.
Our coefficient estimate for changes in physical capital α is 0.35. This is in line with
empirical estimates of output elasticity with respect to physical capital, which fall around
0.3 to 0.4 (Hall and Jones, 1999). Moreover, dividing our estimate of education by (1− α)
yields a return to secondary schooling φs of 11.4 percent. This effect is consistent with
the estimates obtained by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), who report a 13.1-percent
return on secondary schooling. Finally, the signs of our coefficient estimates on the lagged
dependent variable γ and our experience measures φa,1 and φa,2 accord with previous
findings on conditional convergence and positive but diminishing returns to experience.
8To increase data availability, Solt (2016a) uses imputation procedures to reduce the number of missing
values in the data set. As this procedure may understate the uncertainty in the data and thus lead to
downward-biased standard errors, we conduct a standard error adjustment as suggested by Solt (2016b). In
particular, we estimate the specification in Column (4) for 100 potential realizations of the Gini coefficient
and compute the final estimates as the average over all individual results. For details, see Solt (2016b).
9To obtain the figures for φh and φs in Equation (3.14), divide the estimates in Table 3.1 by (1− α).
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Table 3.2: Comparison Between Our Estimates and the Literature
Variable Point Estimate Confidence Interval Target
γ < 0 < 0
α 0.35 (0.23–0.47) 0.3–0.4
φh 9.1% (0.47%–17.72%) 6.7%
φs 11.4% (2.6%–20.26%) 13.1%
φa,1 > 0 > 0
φa,2 < 0 < 0
3.6.2 Instrumental Variables Approach
To address concerns about the endogeneity of health and education in our empirical model,
we present instrumental variable regressions for the two human capital variables health
and education in Columns (6) to (8) of Table 3.1. To this end, changes in health and
education are explained by in- and outflows of young- and old-age cohorts at the lower
and upper ends of the working-age population (see Chapter 2 and Kotschy and Sunde,
2018). Hence, we can use lagged levels for the youngest and oldest age cohorts to predict
contemporaneous changes in aggregate health and education of the working-age population.
Given the strong persistence in demographic patterns, these in- and outflows are plausibly
exogenous in an empirical specification that controls for past levels of per capita output
and time-specific fixed effects. Moreover, migration is less of a concern for these age groups
in contrast to prime-age workers. In Column (6), we apply this identification strategy
to instrument changes in health. In particular, contemporaneous changes in health are
instrumented by the health status of the cohort aged 10–14 in the last period, measured
in terms of infant mortality at time of birth. Optimally, we would also like to capture the
outflow of aggregate health by using lagged health of the cohort aged 55–59; however, a
lack of data on child mortality rates from before the world wars prohibits us from doing so.
In Column (7), contemporaneous changes in education are instrumented by average years
of secondary schooling of the cohort aged 55–59 years in the last period. We refrain from
using the inflow of schooling for young-age cohorts, because individuals might anticipate
future economic growth and thus increase educational attainment. Finally, Column (8)
reports results for a specification, in which both health and education are instrumented.
While the sign of each coefficient remains stable compared with the other regressions, the
instrumented variables become insignificant. However, this loss of significance is of less
concern, because the size of the estimated coefficients does not change considerably. Weak
instruments are no concern, as sufficiently high values of the first-stage F-statistic indicate.
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3.6.3 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, Table B.1 in the Appendix contains the estimation results of
an empirical model that proxies education by average years of total schooling instead
of average years of secondary schooling. Again, we observe that the expected signs of
the coefficients remain stable throughout all specifications. In particular, the estimated
effect of health on output per worker is quantitatively almost identical compared with the
baseline results. Therefore, we confirm our main result that micro-based and macro-based
estimates of the return to health are consistent with each other.
The estimated return to average years of schooling loses its significance; however, the
variation in this regressor may be less informative than the variation in average years of
secondary education, because primary education does not change appreciably over the
time period examined in most countries. In any case, this discrepancy is not a major
concern, because the return of health, which is the main parameter of interest, remains
relatively stable throughout the specifications.
3.7 Conclusion
Much of the economic growth literature has been devoted to studying the impact of
education on aggregate economic performance and comparing the results with the rate of
return to education identified by the Mincer (1974) wage equation. We believe our study
is the first to show that the macroeconomic estimates of the effect of health on output are
compatible with the microeconomic estimates of the effect of health on wages. According
to our estimates, an increase in adult survival rates of 0.1, or 10 percent, increases labor
productivity by about 9.1 percent, which is somewhat higher than, but still consistent with,
Weil’s (2007) calibrated value of around 6.7 percent. The slightly larger point estimate
from the macro-based approach might be due to spillover effects that the micro-based
approach omits by design. Altogether, our results support Weil’s (2007) conclusion that
health plays a role in explaining cross-country differences in the level of income per worker.
Given that we find no evidence of substantial externalities, this result, moreover, suggests
that calibration based on microeconomic data can serve as a reasonable means to estimate
the macroeconomic impact of health changes.
As far as policy implications are concerned, public health measures might be an im-
portant lever for fostering economic development. Potential policies along these lines
include vaccination programs, antibiotic distribution programs, and iodine supplemen-
tation schemes, which lead to large improvements in health outcomes for relatively low
expenditures (World Bank, 1993; Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Field,
Robles, and Torero, 2009; Luca et al., 2014).
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Chapter 4
Life Expectancy and Life-Cycle
Wages: Evidence from the
Cardiovascular Revolution in
U.S. States
4.1 Introduction
Medical advancement in the twentieth century has spurred a substantial increase in
longevity in the United States. As a consequence, the number of older but also healthier
workers increased substantially. This development raises several questions. Do improved
health conditions as measured by adult life expectancy lead to more productive workers?
Moreover, do health shocks affect the population homogeneously? And, finally, what are
potential channels for a causal link?
In order to answer these questions, I exploit variation in the unexpected sharp decline
in mortality rates from cardiovascular diseases among U.S. states beginning in the 1960s.
This decline, also referred to as cardiovascular revolution (for example, Foege, 1987), is
used as an instrument for adult life expectancy in a balanced ten-year panel from 1940
to 2000 for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The identification strategy exploits initial
differences in mortality from cardiovascular diseases across U.S. states in 1960, when there
existed little treatment possibilities for these diseases. Between 1960 and 1970, a number of
path-breaking innovations in the treatment of cardiovascular diseases were introduced and
behavioral risk factors identified. The availability of these treatments as well as follow-up
inventions and public education about risks helped reduce mortality from cardiovascular
diseases by roughly 50 percent between 1970 and 2000 (CDC, 1999b; National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute, 2012a). The decline in cardiovascular mortality entailed a
substantial increase in adult life expectancy, which varied across states, depending on the
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Figure 4.1: Life-Cycle Wage Profiles by Birth Cohort
Data source: IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2015).
initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases. Therefore, this quasi-experimental source of
variation allows the estimation of a differences-in-differences model, where all states are
treated though with varying treatment intensities. State-year observations for 1940–1960
constitute the pre-treatment and for 1970–2000 the post-treatment period.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the empirical results
establish a positive causal link between adult health, as measured by adult life expectancy,
and age-specific wages per worker. The decline of cardiovascular mortality in the U.S.
from 1968 onward led to an increase of life expectancy at 50 of approximately 3.16 years,
or roughly two thirds of the increase between 1960 and 2000. According to the baseline
estimation, this rise in life expectancy caused an increase of average gross wages for the
group of the 45- to 54-year-olds of roughly 9,762$, or 31 percent of initial wages in 1960.
This wage hike corresponded to 47 percent of the wage change observed in the same
time window. Furthermore, the results reveal that wage gains accrued to workers in the
prime-age group between 25 and 54 as well as to old-age workers above 65. Compared
to earlier generations, the life-cycle earnings profile of an average worker thus increases
more steeply at younger ages, while it flattens out more slowly at higher ages. Figure 4.1
illustrates this shift for wages of U.S. whites born between 1916 and 1955 and grouped
in ten-year cohorts. Overall, this pattern is consistent with a workforce that over time
becomes healthier at any given age, and at higher ages in particular.
Another contribution is the focus on the role of measurement of health conditions in
the context of age-specific outcomes. In many studies, life expectancy, a one-dimensional
summary measure of the survival experience of the population, serves as a proxy for the
average health status of the population of interest, for example, the total workforce. In
such a case, one implicitly assigns all individuals the same health status (or change thereof).
This assumption may produce severe systematic measurement error, if the chosen proxy
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does not closely reflect the health conditions of the population of interest. For example,
consider the third stage of the epidemiological transition during which life expectancy at
birth substantially increased thanks to reduced infant mortality following the invention
of vaccines and antibiotics (WHO, 2008). As important as this health shock was, it may
grossly overstate the health improvement for the median American who is around age 30
at this time.1 This type of mismeasurement introduces a systematic correlation between
the proxy of the health shock and the error term, thus leading to biased estimates. In
particular, mismeasurement leads to downward-biased estimates, if the change in average
population health is overstated. Therefore, age-specific heterogeneity in the effect of health
shocks and mismeasurement might be a reason for null results of life expectancy at birth
on GDP per capita found by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007, 2014), Hansen (2014) and
Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014). Even though these papers use the mortality rate from
infectious diseases as instrumental variable for life expectancy at birth, they cannot mend
the measurement problem, because the first stage again overstates the health improvement
for the median person. Hence, the published estimates can be considered a lower bound
for the causal effect of health improvements on economic growth.
Lastly, this paper can make progress in analyzing potential channels through which
adult health affects average wages by using individual data on health outcomes and
economic variables, as well as by combining data on longevity from vital statistics with
census data on wages, educational attainment, and labor supply. In particular, U.S.
states provide a favorable setting, because the institutional environment for the labor
market is homogeneous in contrast to cross-country studies. In addition, there is no
binding statutory retirement age in the U.S., which offers a clearer picture of productivity
and labor supply for old-age workers above 65 compared to other developed countries.2
The timing of wage hikes suggests that potential channels are health improvements, in
particular in the short-run, and higher educational attainment and changes in individual
behavior toward a more healthy lifestyle in the long run. In contrast, adjustments in
labor supply cannot explain the wage increase, because labor force participation rates as
well as usual working hours and weeks either declined or remained unchanged during the
treatment period. Moreover, heterogeneity in age group estimates preclude the possibility
of unilateral indirect wage effects through out-selection or increased bargaining power.
Thus, thanks to higher adult life expectancy, workers earn more, invest more in educational
attainment, but work slightly less. This evidence confirms theoretical predictions and
results from simulation exercises by Cervellati and Sunde (2013) and Strulik and Werner
(2016). They show that individuals may invest more in schooling and, at the same time,
reduce lifetime working hours, if leisure time while at work and consumption over the
1The median age of the U.S. population was 29.0 in 1940 and 30.2 in 1950 (Hobbs and Stoops, 2002).
2Nonetheless, certain age thresholds may still affect the timing of retirement. In particular, Americans
become eligible for Medicare at age 65; full Social Security benefits can be claimed around age 66 depending
on birth cohort; and there exist no further monetary incentives for delaying retirement beyond age 70.
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life-cycle increase.3 Therefore, higher lifetime labor supply is not a necessary condition for
increased educational attainment, as was claimed by Hazan (2009).
The paper’s main result of a positive association between adult health and average
wages per worker also holds for long-differences models and specifications that either
use a shorter pre- or post-treatment window, or both. Furthermore, the econometric
model accounts for initial state-level differences in income, education, and the rural-urban
gradient, as well as state-fixed effects and differential time trends across census regions.
Moreover, robustness tests show that sub-state level heterogeneity in the prevalence of
cardiovascular diseases or interstate migratory patterns are unlikely to produce a spurious
correlation between adult life expectancy and average wages on the state level. Finally, the
analysis reveals heterogeneity in the beneficial effects of health improvements on average
wages between rural and metropolitan areas as well as different occupational groups.
This paper relates most closely to work by Hansen and Strulik (2017), who investigate
the link between adult health and college enrollment of 18- to 24-year-old Americans by
also exploiting variation from the cardiovascular revolution across U.S. states. Instead,
this study examines specifically how adult health affects average wages of different age
groups by using cohort-specific variation over time. In particular, this approach uncovers
age-specific heterogeneity with respect to the causal effect of health gains on wages, which,
otherwise, could not be detected: Gains in adult health exert a positive effect on wages
for workers aged 25–54 but not for workers aged 55–64. This finding is also consistent
with a side result of Hansen and Strulik (2017), who find no causal effect of adult life
expectancy on wages pooling variation for workers aged 30–65. Furthermore, both papers
complement each other: According to the results presented in this study, education
constitutes one potential channel through which health improvements increase worker
wages in the long-run; however, education cannot explain hikes in wages immediately
following the treatment.4 Based on micro data, this study additionally finds that health
innovations have marginalized negative effects of cardiovascular diseases on individual
income over relatively short time. This result indicates significant positive health effects
on average wages per worker. Other closely related work is from Bleakley (2007) and
Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2015), who exploit similar empirical strategies to identify
positive long-run effects of health improvements during childhood on adult education,
income, and labor supply. In contrast to their work, this study focuses on a health shock
that predominantly affects adults and that, due to the nature of cardiovascular diseases,
unfolds heterogeneous effects across age groups.
3This finding is also consistent with work by d‘Albis, Lau, and Sánchez-Romero (2012), who demonstrate
that gains in life expectancy may lead to earlier retirement given that mortality reductions occur at
sufficiently young age to provide substantial increases in individual’s expected lifetime human wealth.
4As an internal consistency check, I re-estimate the effect of adult life expectancy on college enrollment
using the baseline specification of this paper. The resulting parameter estimates are quantitatively similar
to those of Hansen and Strulik (2017).
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Furthermore, this study relates to a large macro literature that has investigated the effect
of aggregate health measures on economic outcomes. In particular, reductions in mortality
and gains in longevity foster per capita income growth (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla,
2004; Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg, 2008; Cervellati and Sunde, 2011; Strittmatter
and Sunde, 2013; Hyclak, Skeels, and Taylor, 2016); are conducive to investment in
educational attainment (Tamura, 2006; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009; Hansen
and Strulik, 2017); spur old-age savings (Bloom, Canning, and Graham, 2003; De Nardi,
French, and Jones, 2009); and reduce fertility (Hansen, Jensen, and Lønstrup, 2018; Ager,
Hansen, and Jensen, 2018). In addition, these channels potentially interrelate closely
(Zhang and Zhang, 2005). This paper provides a cohort-based analysis of the effect of
adult health on average wages, which is novel to this literature. By focusing on different
age groups, the empirical analysis uncovers that health improvements benefit prime-age
workers between 25 and 54 as well as old-age workers above 65. Therefore, the cohort
analysis allows to track shifts in the life-cycle earnings profile of the average worker that
follow from the standard theories of human capital by Mincer (1958) and Ben-Porath
(1967). Related work reports mixed results on the change of life-cycle earnings profiles for
specific occupational groups. For example, Jones and Weinberg (2011) find that creativity
peaks of researchers as measured by scientific breakthroughs have shifted to higher ages. In
contrast, evidence by Falck, Heimisch, and Wiederhold (2016) indicates that introduction
of information and communication technologies might shift productivity peaks to younger
ages. The evidence in this paper implies a steeper life-cycle profile at younger ages, which
flattens out more slowly at higher ages. An optimistic interpretation of this result suggests
that health gains for prime-age and old-age workers might boost aggregate productivity
for aging societies and thus confine potentially adverse effects of demographic change.
Therefore, this paper also connects to work that investigates the role of demographic
change for past and future development, for example, Feyrer (2007), Sánchez-Romero
(2013), Cuaresma, Lutz, and Sanderson (2014), and Kotschy and Sunde (2018).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents background
information on health improvements during the cardiovascular revolution. Section 4.3
introduces the data as well as the empirical framework and discusses key identifying
assumptions. Section 4.4 presents the estimation results and examines potential channels
through which adult health may affect wages. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Background: The Cardiovascular Revolution
Over the course of the twentieth century, the United States experienced substantial
improvements in public health leading to a marked increase in life expectancy. In particular,
these improvements came down to two separate waves of medical breakthroughs: the
epidemiological transition and the cardiovascular revolution. Figure 4.2 depicts the decline
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Figure 4.2: Mortality Rates from Infectious and Cardiovascular Diseases
Source: Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006, p. 104).
in mortality rates for infectious and cardiovascular diseases in the U.S., which resulted
from these events.
The invention of antibiotics and vaccines in the first half of the twentieth century
initiated a sharp reduction in mortality from communicable infectious diseases, which was
especially pronounced for infants and children. The inventions during this period, which
was termed the third stage of the epidemiological transition (Omran, 1971), caused an
exceptional increase in life expectancy at birth, however, a significant but in comparison
modest gain for higher ages.
The pointed increase in old-age life expectancy had to wait until the second wave
of medical innovations around 1960, which was labeled cardiovascular revolution and
identified as fourth stage of the epidemiological transition (Olshansky and Ault, 1986;
Omran, 1998). The unexpected invention of new treatment possibilities for the non-
communicable cardiovascular diseases boosted life expectancy predominantly through a
decrease or delay in old-age mortality. Cardiovascular diseases become more likely as the
tissues of the cardiovascular system age and lose some of their flexibility (Kirkwood, 2001).
Therefore, mortality rates from cardiovascular diseases increase steadily with age, as
exemplified by Figure 4.3.
The cardiovascular revolution was successful in considerably reducing the mortality
rates from a broad spectrum of cardiovascular illnesses; for example, coronary heart
disease, which in 2000 still accounted for approximately twelve percent of total deaths in
the U.S. (National Center for Health Statistics, 2017a), and which in 2004 still was the
most common cause of death in high-income countries (WHO, 2008). Figure 4.4 showcases
how powerful the decline in mortality from cardiovascular diseases was: Between the peak
levels in 1968 and the year 2000, mortality from coronary heart disease fell by roughly
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Figure 4.3: Percent of Deaths that are Attributable to Cardiovascular Diseases
Data sources: National Center for Health Statistics (1963) and National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (2012b).
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Figure 4.4: Age-Adjusted Mortality from Cardiovascular Diseases
Data source: National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (2012a).
two thirds for both, men and women. As Figure 4.3 portrays, the number of incidents
dropped for all age groups, except for infants and those above age 85, although the median
age of the population had increased from 29.5 to 35.3 years during this period (Hobbs
and Stoops, 2002). The decline was especially pronounced for individuals in the age
range 35–84, thus especially boosting adult life expectancy as illustrated by Figure 4.5. In
contrast, for the group above age 85, the number of incidents more than doubled during this
period; however, the overall share of deaths that is attributable to cardiovascular diseases
halved from almost 80 to slightly below 40 percent. One reason was that newly introduced
drugs and treatment methods delayed the critical point at which the cardiovascular disease
72 CHAPTER 4. AGING AND AGGREGATE WAGES
24
26
28
30
Li
fe
 e
xp
ec
ta
nc
y 
at
 a
ge
 5
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
(a) United States
DC
20
25
30
35
Li
fe
 e
xp
ec
ta
nc
y 
at
 a
ge
 5
0 
in
 U
.S
. s
ta
te
s
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
(b) States
Figure 4.5: Life Expectancy at Age 50 in the United States
Data sources: United States Life Tables 1940–2000.
became lethal such that incidents occurred either at a higher age, or death originated from
other sources such as cancer. Importantly, there have been striking geographic differences
in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases across U.S. states, which above all were rooted
in social, cultural, and environmental factors (CDC, 1999b). The initial prevalence of
cardiovascular diseases determined how beneficial the treatment was for states. Hence,
the decline in mortality and, consequently, the increase in adult life expectancy varied
across states. Figure 4.6 displays the geographic differences in life expectancy at 50 and
mortality from cardiovascular diseases in the year 1960.
Reductions in mortality from cardiovascular diseases arrived through two channels.
First, a number of medical innovations between the years 1960 and 1970 allowed to prevent
certain diseases or to treat the symptoms. The most remarkable among these inventions
were the artificial cardiac pacemaker, which was first implanted in 1958; the application
of chest compression to restore blood circulation in a person that is in cardiac arrest
beginning in 1960; the invention of the beta blocker in 1962, which is used to lower blood
pressure and to treat cardiac arrhythmia; the invention of the portable defibrillator in
1959 and its application in the U.S. from 1966 onward; and the first adult human heart
transplantation in the U.S. in 1968. Subsequent innovations include first thrombolytic
therapies in 1986 to treat myocardial infarction, stroke, and pulmonary embolisms; the
invention of cholesterol lowering statins, first marketed in 1987; and beginning in 1988, the
implantation of intravascular stents to address acute closure of arteries and blood vessels.
These new treatments improve health relatively quickly; for example, serum cholesterol
reducing drugs achieve their full effect within five years (Law, Wald, and Thompson, 1994).
These advances in the available technology were complemented by an increasing number
of specialists and care centers for cardiovascular diseases (CDC, 1999b).
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(a) Life Expectancy at 50
(b) Mortality from Cardiovascular Diseases
Figure 4.6: Mortality from Cardiovascular Diseases and Life Expectancy at 50
Data source: Grove and Hetzel (1968).
The second channel for the decline in mortality constituted increased awareness of major
individual risk factors and changes in behavior. Research results by Keys et al. (1963), Keys
(1980), and Dawber (1980) established, among others, high blood cholesterol, high blood
pressure, physical inactivity, smoking, obesity, and unbalanced diet as major risk factors for
cardiovascular diseases.5 The federal government initiated national programs to educate
specialists and the general public about risks of high blood pressure in 1972; of high blood
cholesterol in 1985; and of the importance of cardiovascular health in 1989 (CDC, 1999a).
5According to Ezzati and Riboli (2012), high blood pressure and high blood cholesterol alone account
for one half of the global incidence of coronary heart disease. Too high body weight and smoking are
responsible for another 20 and 13 percent.
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Figure 4.7: Smoking in the United States
Sources: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1998, p. 123; 2000, p. 33).
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Figure 4.8: Alcohol Consumption in the United States
Data source: Haughwout and Slater (2017)
This increased awareness helped raise the share of patients with too high blood pressure,
who have their condition treated and under control (CDC, 1999b). Moreover, the report of
the Surgeon General in 1964 (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964)
highlighted the adverse effects of smoking on health, later followed by increased cigarette
taxes in the 1980s (CDC, 1999a). Preventive measures against smoking were particularly
successful, as Figure 4.7 shows. The share of smokers in the adult population was declining
from 1960 onward, while the per capita cigarette consumption started to rapidly fall during
the 1970s. Due to the cumulative damage from smoking, however, it takes about ten
years after cessation until the risk of cardiovascular disease for former smokers reaches
the same level as for non-smokers (Oza et al., 2011). Alcohol consumption, another risk
factor, if enjoyed in excess (Marmot and Brunner, 1991; Murray et al., 2002), only started
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to decline after 1980 as Figure 4.8 reveals. Therefore, the positive effects of behavioral
changes probably started only as early as the 1980s. Public health education, however,
also had its limits. Even though the health risks were known, physical activity declined
between 1970 and 2010, while the share of obese persons doubled (Flegal et al., 1998;
CDC, 2001; Kohl and Cook, 2013).
The unexpected and concentrated surge of medical breakthroughs in the 1960s and
the massive preventive efforts thereafter motivate a pre-treatment period until 1960 and
post-treatment from 1970 onward in the estimation sample at hand. The next section
discusses the empirical framework and the data.
4.3 Data and Empirical Framework
4.3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a balanced ten-year panel of the 48 contiguous states of
the U.S. for the period 1940–2000. Correspondingly, the estimation sample comprises 336
observations in total. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because of missing data for early
periods, the District of Columbia is omitted due to its special nature of a metropolitan
region. Because life expectancy in 1940 is only available for whites, the entire sample is
restricted to the white population.6
Data on gross wages, labor market outcomes, and educational attainment stem from
individual data in decennial U.S. censuses (IPUMS) by Ruggles et al. (2015). Wages
are adjusted for inflation and measured in logarithms. The variable comprises wages,
salaries, commissions, cash bonuses, tips, and other money income received from the
employer. Labor market outcomes cover individual labor force participation; usual hours
worked per week; usual weeks worked per year; and usual hours worked per year, which
are constructed by multiplying weekly hours with work weeks. Working weeks are not
available as continuous measures in 1960 and 1970, while the series on usual working hours
only starts in 1980. Intervalled hours and weeks, however, are available throughout all
time periods. For this reason, I construct a continuous measure for weeks and hours from
bivariate regressions of the continuous on the intervalled measure. For the cohort-specific
analysis, hours and weeks are constructed based on age-specific regressions.7 The share of
college graduates is constructed from the number of individuals, who attended at least
four years of college in their life relative to the entire number of individuals in the sample.8
6Table C.1 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for age-specific groups and the total workforce.
7This procedure will lead to downward-biased standard errors in the labor supply regressions, because
the missing data points are replaced by fitted values from the corresponding regressions. The respective
estimates, however, reveal no significant (positive) effect of adult life expectancy on labor supply such
that this bias does not translate to inference.
8Results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged, if educational attainment contains all individ-
uals who enrolled in college for at least one year.
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For representativity, the data are collapsed to the state level using person-sample weights.
Data on life expectancy are obtained from the U.S. decennial life tables and vital
statistics provided by the National Center for Health Statistics (2017b) of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Adult life expectancy enters the estimation
equation in logarithms.9 In 1960, adult life expectancy differed considerably between U.S.
states as shown by Panel (a) of Figure 4.6. Notably, white life expectancy at age 50 varied
by 2.48 years between Florida, the state with the highest value, and Nevada, the state
with the lowest value. Moreover, adult life expectancy was high in the West North Central
and West South Central census regions, whereas it was comparatively low in New England
and the Atlantic regions.
In order to capture the exogenous increase in adult life expectancy due to innovations in
medical technology, the analysis exploits state differences in mortality from cardiovascular
diseases prior to their introduction, that is, in 1960, as instrument for adult life expectancy.
Age-adjusted cardiovascular mortality in 1960 is obtained from Grove and Hetzel (1968)
and expressed in deaths per 100 whites.10 Panel (b) of Figure 4.6 illustrates spatial
differences in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases as measured by mortality in 1960.
The data reveal a strong negative unconditional correlation between adult life expectancy
and mortality from cardiovascular diseases: Life expectancy at 50 was high in the census
regions, where mortality rates were comparatively low, and vice versa. As shown in
Section 4.2, age-adjusted mortality from coronary heart disease did not decrease until
shortly before 1970—in fact, it even slightly increased between 1950 and 1968. Only from
this point on, mortality from coronary heart disease decreased substantially.11 For the
baseline specification, innovations in medical technology are thus coded to occur from 1970
onward. This designates the time intervals 1940–1960 as pre-treatment and 1970–2000 as
post-treatment periods (‘differences-in-differences model’). In a more flexible specification,
mortality from cardiovascular diseases in 1960 is interacted with a full set of year dummy
variables (‘flexible model’).
Importantly, adult life expectancy and mortality rates provide a conservative view on
the effect of health improvements on wages, because they cannot fully capture morbidity
reductions following the cardiovascular revolution. In the absence of better health measures
across U.S. states and time, they nonetheless represent the best option.
9Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, if, instead of a log specification, life expectancy
enters the estimation framework directly.
10Age-adjustment allows to compare the mortality rates between states even if they have different age
structures. Due to the adjustment, the mortality rates should not be interpreted as crude rates, unless a
state exhibits the same age structure as the standard population. For this reason, not the absolute figures
of mortality from cardiovascular diseases are of importance but the relative change over time.
11Declines in mortality rates and, thus, improvements in adult life expectancy slightly lag behind the
actual development for the average person, because medical innovations might come too late for the very
ill and the very old.
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In order to ensure that initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases is as good as ran-
domly assigned, further controls interacted with the treatment indicator are added. These
controls comprise initial life expectancy by the CDC; initial income and the initial share of
college graduates, both obtained from IPUMS by Ruggles et al. (2015); initial population
density by Hobbs and Stoops (2002); and initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases
by Grove and Hetzel (1968). Current values of these variables are not included, because
they might themselves be affected by treatment and thus constitute bad controls.
Due to the collapsing process, wages, education, and labor supply are grouped on the
state level. For this reason, I weight all regressions by the group size; that is, the initial
white population of a specific age cohort or of the total population.12
Finally, I further exploit the Health and Retirement Study (HRS, 2017) to investigate
whether improvements in adult health contributed to wage increases. This data set
provides representative, individual longitudinal data on income and health status for
more than 20,000 people over age 50 in the United States. Data on income comprise
wages, salaries, bonuses, overtime pay, commissions, tips, second jobs, military reserve
earnings, professional practice, or trade income, and refer to the previous year. Values
are adjusted for inflation using the annual urban Consumer Price Index by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and measured in logarithms. Individual health is proxied by binary
indicators, which indicate whether study participants have ever been diagnosed with heart
problems or high blood pressure.
4.3.2 Empirical Framework
This section introduces the empirical framework to study the effect of changes in adult life
expectancy on wages per worker and labor market outcomes. The structural model reads
ys,t = αxs,t + w
′
sI1960t β + γs + δt + ζr,t + εs,t, (4.1)
where ys,t denotes the outcome measure (for example, wages) for state s and time period
t; xs,t represents log life expectancy of the age group under consideration; ws is a vector of
controls measured in 1960, interacted with the indicator matrix I1960t , whose values take
unity from 1970 onward and zero else; γs and δt denote state-fixed and time effects; ζr,t
describes region-year interactions, which control for differential development trends across
the nine U.S. census regions r; and εs,t constitutes an idiosyncratic error term.
Due to omitted variables and reverse causality, log life expectancy is likely endogenous.
In order to uncover the causal link between adult health and average wages, I exploit
heterogeneity in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases across U.S. states as exogenous
12Since the population equation of interest is the effect of improved health conditions on individual
wages and labor supply, weighting the regression equation by the group size yields estimation results that
are closer to the micro data than unweighted averages. See, for example, Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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source of variation for instrumentation. The first-stage equation is given by
xs,t = ηzsd
1960
t + w
′
sI1960t θ + κs + λt + µr,t + ξs,t, (4.2)
where mortality from cardiovascular diseases in 1960, zs, is interacted with the post-
treatment indicator d1960t ; κs and λt denote state-fixed and time effects; µr,t describes
census-region-year effects; and ξs,t constitutes the error term.
Conceptually, the first-stage equation compares differences in the increase of adult life
expectancy to differences in the decline of mortality from cardiovascular diseases between
the pre-treatment and post-treatment period across states. For this reason, it corresponds
to a differences-in-differences approach, where all states are treated but with different
treatment intensities. Moreover, the first stage has a natural interpretation in this context:
A decline in the mortality rate from cardiovascular diseases initiates an increase in adult
life expectancy, which, in turn, affects the economic outcomes of interest in the structural
model.
For initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases to be a valid instrument, several
conditions must be fulfilled. First, initial mortality must be as good as randomly assigned
conditional on covariates. This assumption requires the instrument (initial cardiovascular
mortality interacted with the treatment indicator) to be independent of potential outcomes
and potential treatment assignments, given the complete set of covariates. To this end, the
baseline specification contains controls for initial state levels of income, the share of college
graduates, and population density. These controls take up state-level selection toward
more health, which is attributable to disparities in income, educational attainment, or
the rural-urban discrepancy between densely populated states at the coasts and spacious
states in the middle of the country. Moreover, initial non-cardiovascular mortality and
initial life expectancy control for the health environment prevailing before new medical
treatment technologies for cardiovascular diseases were introduced. Finally, state-fixed,
time, and census-region-year-fixed effects eliminate systematic state- and region-level
variation due to differences in further social, cultural, or environmental factors that do
not vary concomitantly over states and time, or that possess time-varying influences on
mortality from cardiovascular diseases. In particular, these trends cancel out differentials
between census regions.
Furthermore, mortality from cardiovascular diseases must affect outcomes only through
the first stage; that is, through the channel of health and longevity. Accordingly, mortality
from cardiovascular diseases is not part of the structural model. This exclusion restriction
is fundamentally untestable. It would be violated, if changes in cardiovascular mortality
rates were to affect the outcome of interest through a channel other than adult health as
measured by adult life expectancy. Because the instrument is specific to the channel of
health on the aggregate level, however, this assumption should plausibly be fulfilled in the
4.4. RESULTS 79
context of this paper. Additionally, the empirical model accounts for initial differences in
non-cardiovascular mortality to prevent the instrument from taking up beneficial effects
attributable to medical advancement in the treatment of other diseases.
Finally, changes in mortality from cardiovascular diseases must be predictive of changes
in adult life expectancy. Sufficiently high values of the first-stage F-statistics demonstrate
that this assumption is fulfilled for the differences-in-differences model.
I also report results for a flexible model, in which the instrument is interacted with
year dummies instead of the post-1960 treatment indicator. In this case, the first stage
corresponds to
xs,t =
2000∑
τ=1940
ητzsd
τ
t + w
′
sIτt θ + κs + λt + µr,t + ξs,t. (4.3)
4.4 Results
This section presents the empirical results. First, I report evidence on the first-stage
correlation between mortality from cardiovascular diseases and adult life expectancy as
well as evidence on the reduced form effect of mortality on average wages. After having
statistically established these relationships, I show results from two-stage least squares
estimates for wages by age group and the total workforce.13 Finally, this section concludes
by investigating potential channels for a causal positive link between health improvements
and wages.
4.4.1 First-Stage Evidence: Mortality and Adult Life Expectancy
First, I investigate the first-stage association between mortality from cardiovascular diseases
and adult health conditions, proxied by log life expectancy at age 50. The analysis is based
on the ten-year panel of the 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1940 to 2000, described in
Section 4.3.1, with pre-treatment periods 1940–1960 and post-treatment periods 1970–2000.
Table 4.1 reports least squares results for the differences-in-differences model from (4.2) in
Panel (a) and for the flexible model from (4.3) in Panel (b).14
Column (1) shows results without covariates. In this case, initial mortality from
cardiovascular diseases (interacted with the treatment indicator) and life expectancy at 50
correlate positively. This result is, however, driven by the omission of initial life expectancy.
Based on how life tables are constructed, mortality rates and life expectancy must correlate
negatively. Moreover, given better initial health conditions, there is less scope for future
reductions in the mortality rates and, consequently, less potential for future improvements
in life expectancy. Correspondingly, changes in life expectancy and initial life expectancy
13Table C.2 in the Appendix reports estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS).
14Because life expectancy at age 50 on average provides the most accurate picture of health for workers
around age 45–54, the sample is weighted by the initial white population of the 45- to 54-year-olds. The
results are unaltered, if instead weighted by the entire white population.
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Table 4.1: First Stage: Effect of Mortality on Adult Life Expectancy
Dependent variable: log life expectancy at age 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model
Mortality × Post 1960 0.50*** -0.53*** -0.86*** -0.77*** -0.61***
(0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21)
(b) Flexible model
Mortality × 1940 -0.13* -0.13* -0.15* 0.04 0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Mortality × 1950 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.10 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Mortality × 1970 0.21*** -0.82*** -1.16*** -0.78*** -0.65***
(0.05) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20)
Mortality × 1980 0.34*** -0.69*** -1.03*** -0.70*** -0.57***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
Mortality × 1990 0.50*** -0.54*** -0.88*** -0.64*** -0.54***
(0.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Mortality × 2000 0.71*** -0.32* -0.65*** -0.75*** -0.62*
(0.15) (0.18) (0.21) (0.25) (0.31)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white pop-
ulation of 45- to 54-year-olds. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
also correlate negatively. Therefore, the respective estimate is biased upward. Once, initial
life expectancy is included as additional control for Columns (2) to (5), the sign turns
negative. Accordingly, the larger the decline of cardiovascular mortality, the higher the
gain in life expectancy. Column (3) adds initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases
as control, which improves the fit of the first stage. Furthermore, this measure precludes
that the instrument takes up health improvements that cannot be attributed to the
cardiovascular revolution. This leads to a slightly more negative point estimate. Column
(4) adds region-year-fixed effects that eliminate systematic trends reflecting economic, social,
or cultural differences across U.S. census regions. Finally, the full specification in Column
(5) adds additional controls for the initial share of college graduates, initial population
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(a) DD Model (Table 4.1a, Column 5)
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(b) Flexible Model (Table 4.1b, Column 5)
Figure 4.9: Illustration: First Stage
density, and initial income. These variables cancel out any variation in life expectancy
originating from initial differences in education and development. The corresponding
point estimate takes a value of –0.61 and is significant at the one-percent level. Given
the quasi-natural source of variation, the parameter has a quantitative interpretation: A
reduction of mortality from cardiovascular diseases of one person per 1,000 whites leads to
an increase in white life expectancy at 50 of approximately 6.1 percent. Taken at face value,
the reduction in cardiovascular mortality by two persons per 1,000 whites (50 percent of
its initial value) between 1960 and 2000 thus led to an increase in life expectancy at 50 of
approximately 3.16 years, or two thirds of the overall increase over this time period.15 This
number conforms closely to the increase in life expectancy of 3.27 years, which, according
to Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), can be attributed to medical advancement
in the treatment of cardiovascular diseases between 1960 and 2000.
The flexible model in Panel (b) reports point estimates for the instrument interacted
with year dummies for every period and the year 1960 as reference category. Mortality
affects life expectancy negatively in the post-treatment period 1970 to 2000 for all specifi-
cations that control for initial longevity. In Column (5), the parameters are estimated to
be of similar quantity and significantly different from zero. In contrast, there is no effect
of mortality from cardiovascular diseases in 1960 on life expectancy for the pre-treatment
periods 1940 to 1960.16 Figure 4.9 plots the point estimates from the full specification
in Column (5) with the corresponding 95-percent confidence interval for both models.
The displayed coefficients of the flexible model in Panel (b) show a stable pattern for the
pre-treatment and post-treatment period such that the assumption of a constant effect for
each period in the differences-in-differences model appears appropriate.
15To arrive at these figures, compute ∆x = η̂ ·∆z · µ̄x = (−0.61) · (−0.20) · 25.91 ≈ 3.16, where µ̄x is
evaluated at the sample mean in 1960, and ∆x/(x
2000 − x1960) = 3.16/4.76 ≈ 0.66.
16Single outliers do not drive these partial correlations as Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows.
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4.4.2 Reduced-Form Evidence: Mortality and Aggregate Wages
Table 4.2 reports reduced form estimates for the effect of mortality on wages for the 45- to
54-year-olds. This age group is of particular interest for two reasons. On the one hand,
these workers are usually considered the most productive group of the workforce for their
high participation rate and their considerable experience. Therefore, these workers are
usually at the peak of their life-cycle earnings profile as illustrated in Figure 4.1. On the
other hand, they become increasingly susceptible to cardiovascular diseases due to aging
and behavioral risk factors, while still being young enough to profit quite considerably
from new treatment possibilities and changed behavior. For these reasons, this is one of
the age groups, which might profit from medical innovations in terms of both, health and
Table 4.2: Reduced Form: Effect of Mortality on Average Wages of Workers Aged 45–54
Dependent variable: log wages of whites 45–54
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model
Mortality × Post 1960 -0.87*** -1.20** -1.50*** -1.39*** -1.56**
(0.21) (0.45) (0.53) (0.49) (0.67)
(b) Flexible model
Mortality × 1940 0.50* 0.50* 0.43 -0.43** -0.23
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.20) (0.27)
Mortality × 1950 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.23 -0.05
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.41) (0.40)
Mortality × 1970 -0.42*** -0.76** -1.06** -1.39*** -1.67**
(0.13) (0.38) (0.42) (0.47) (0.69)
Mortality × 1980 -0.85*** -1.18*** -1.50*** -0.98** -1.45**
(0.23) (0.41) (0.44) (0.48) (0.71)
Mortality × 1990 -0.42 -0.75 -1.09* -1.70*** -1.85**
(0.33) (0.55) (0.63) (0.58) (0.72)
Mortality × 2000 -0.60* -0.93* -1.30** -1.73*** -1.76**
(0.35) (0.54) (0.62) (0.62) (0.77)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white pop-
ulation of 45- to 54-year-olds. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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(a) DD Model (Table 4.2a, Column 5)
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(b) Flexible Model (Table 4.2b, Column 5)
Figure 4.10: Illustration: Reduced Form
economic outcomes.17
Panel (a) shows the results for the differences-in-differences model. As for the first stage,
additional controls are included for initial values of life expectancy, mortality from non-
cardiovascular diseases, region-year-fixed effects, the share of college graduates, population
density, and income. The parameter estimate in the full specification in Column (5) takes
a value of –1.56 and is significant at the five-percent level.18 Given that the instrument is
as good as randomly assigned, the coefficient estimate reflects the intention-to-treat effect.
It measures the effect of being offered the treatment. Since not all individuals decide to
take up the treatment (for example, some patients do not take a beta blocker, although
they belong to high-risk groups for stroke or cardiac arrest), the intention-to-treat effect is
too low relative to the average treatment effect on the treated (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
According to the point estimate, a reduction of mortality from cardiovascular diseases by
one person per 1,000 whites leads to a wage increase of 15.6 percent for the group of the
45- to 54-year-olds.
In the full specification of the flexible model in Panel (b), there is no significant effect
of cardiovascular mortality on average wages in the pre-treatment period, though the
effect is significantly negative in the post-treatment period.19 Figure 4.10 depicts the
reduced-form estimates for the differences-in-differences and the flexible model. The
flexibly-estimated coefficients show again a stable pattern over time giving credibility to
the simpler differences-in-differences model.20
17Table C.3 in the Appendix reports qualitatively similar results for the entire workforce.
18The sample is again weighted by the initial population of the 45- to 54-year-olds. The resulting
coefficient is quantitatively similar, if weighted by the entire white population.
19Single outliers do not drive these partial correlations as Figure C.2 in the Appendix shows.
20Figure C.3 in the Appendix plots the corresponding reduced form parameters for the entire workforce.
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4.4.3 Life Expectancy and Aggregate Wages
The last two sections have established the existence of a first-stage correlation between
mortality from cardiovascular diseases and adult life expectancy, and a reduced-form effect
of mortality on wages for the 45- to 54-year-olds. Now, I turn to the average treatment
effect on the treated, which corresponds to the ratio of the intention-to-treat effect from
the reduced form, and the first-stage estimand, which corresponds to the compliance rate.
Using two-stage least squares (2SLS), this quantity can also be directly estimated by
instrumenting log life expectancy at age 50 with mortality from cardiovascular diseases in
1960 interacted with the treatment indicator. Table 4.3 reports the estimated effect of life
expectancy on wages of the 45- to 54-year-olds.21 Section 4.4.4 discusses the corresponding
estimates for all age groups and the entire workforce.
The first column of Panel (a) shows estimates for the differences-in-differences model
without any additional controls except state-fixed and time effects. In this case, an increase
in life expectancy leads to a decline in wages of workers aged 45 to 54. As argued by
Aghion, Howitt, and Murtin (2011) and Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014), however, this
specification is misspecified, because it omits initial life expectancy. In particular, initial
life expectancy correlates with initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases and subsequent
improvements in life expectancy. Furthermore, it concomitantly affects prospective wage
gains. For a given reduction in mortality rates, the first stage, therefore, underestimates
the corresponding improvement in life expectancy; in fact, the model suggests smaller
improvements in life expectancy for states with higher initial prevalence of cardiovascular
diseases. In addition, the reduced form underestimates the associated wage gains following
the health improvements of the cardiovascular revolution. In combination, the omission of
initial life expectancy results in a downward bias of the estimates. Correspondingly, initial
life expectancy is included in all remaining specifications. The third column adds initial
mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases to improve the fit of the first stage, leading to
an increase of the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic from 26.6 to 44.6. Moreover, this control
prevents the mortality instrument from taking up beneficial effects of medical innovations
that work through health channels other than the cardiovascular revolution. The last two
columns additionally contain region-year-fixed effects that take up differential trends in
wages and life expectancy across U.S. census regions.
Finally, the full specification in Column (5) adds initial values of the share of college
graduates, population density, and income—all interacted with the post-1960 treatment
indicator. Because there is a strong link between education and health (Grossman and
Kaestner, 1997; Lleras-Muney, 2005), the initial share of college graduates is added to
take up variation of life expectancy that is attributable to initial disparities in state-level
education. Population density is included to account for the rural-urban gradient in
21The sample is weighted by the initial white population of the 45- to 54-year-olds.
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Table 4.3: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages of Workers Aged 45–54
Dependent variable: log wages of whites 45–54
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy at 50 -1.73*** 2.26*** 1.73*** 1.81*** 2.54***
(0.40) (0.84) (0.61) (0.57) (0.95)
First-stage F–statistic 62.5 26.6 44.6 36.6 14.2
(b) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy at 50 -1.36*** 0.69 0.75** 1.73*** 2.35***
(0.37) (0.44) (0.38) (0.53) (0.89)
First-stage F–statistic 15.3 13.2 19.9 7.4 3.5
Hansen test p–value 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.2 0.8
(c) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy at 50 -1.47*** 0.92 0.91** 2.05*** 2.57**
(0.41) (0.57) (0.44) (0.66) (1.00)
First-stage F–statistic 15.3 13.2 19.9 7.4 3.5
Hansen test p–value 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.2 0.8
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white pop-
ulation of 45- to 54-year-olds. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
cardiovascular diseases with a particularly high prevalence of coronary heart disease and
hypertension in non-metropolitan areas (Pickle and Gillum, 1999; Cooper et al., 2000).
Finally, initial income is added to account for a potential feedback effect from income to
health (Ettner, 1996; Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields, 2005; Lindahl, 2005; Chetty et
al., 2016). The corresponding coefficient estimate takes a value of 2.54 and is significant at
the one-percent level. Therefore, an increase in life expectancy at age 50 by one percent,
ceteris paribus, causes a wage hike of 2.54 percent for the group of the 45- to 54-year-olds.
Thus, the average treatment effect on the treated is approximately 60 percent larger than
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the intention-to-treat effect from the reduced form. Taken at face value, the increase in
life expectancy at 50 between 1960 and 2000 led to a hike in average gross wages of the
45- to 54-year-olds of approximately 9,762$ per year, or around 47 percent of the overall
increase over this time period.22 The first-stage F-statistic shows a value of 14.2, which
indicates a sufficiently strong instrument given the conventional cutoff level of 10.
Panels (b) and (c) present results for the flexible model, estimated with two-stage least
squares and with a heteroskedasticity-robust version of limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) due to the small value of the F-statistic. The full specification in Column
(5) reports point estimates that are quantitatively similar to those of the differences-in-
differences model. Since the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentification takes a value
of 0.8, the null hypothesis that all instruments provide the same information is maintained.
4.4.4 Heterogeneity Across Age Groups and Measurement
Before turning to the effect of adult life expectancy for other age groups and the overall
workforce, consider measurement of health improvements in light of the demographic
structure of the population; a point that has so far largely gone unnoticed by the literature.
The convention is to use a specific measure to capture the effect of a positive health shock,
for example, life expectancy at a given age. By construction, this measure encompasses the
expected remaining lifetime including all following age groups. Thus, it provides a gross
approximation of expected health over the remaining part of the life-cycle. Accordingly,
one implicitly assigns the same health to all individuals in the population of interest.
This assumption is overly restrictive and masks heterogeneous effects across age cohorts.
Moreover, it may introduce a systematic measurement error into the empirical model that
cannot be solved by the instrumentation strategy.
This deficit becomes clear in light of the cohort structure of the labor force: On average,
young workers have a relatively good health and can still expect to live a high number
of years, while health of older workers is lower due to aging such that their remaining
expected years of life are considerably smaller than for young workers. A measure that
predominantly captures the health of young workers would thus overstate the health of
older workers, and vice versa. Hence, there would be systematic measurement error.
Suppose, for example, one is interested in estimating the effect of health changes on
average wages of the total workforce. In order to capture improvements in the health of
the workforce, one might use the (log-) change in life expectancy at age 30. By assumption,
every worker is assigned the expected health improvement of a thirty-year-old. This
measure may over- or understate the average health improvement, depending on how the
22To arrive at these figures, compute ∆y = α̂ ·∆x/x1960 · µ̄y ≈ 2.54 · 3.16/25.91 · 31515.35 ≈ 9762.82
with ∆y/(y
2000 − y1960) ≈ 9762.8220666.62 ≈ 0.47, and µ̄y evaluated at the mean in 1960. The corresponding
estimates based on the reduced-form estimate are 5,996$, or around 29 percent of the overall wage hike.
Table C.4 in the Appendix reports similar results for a model in which life expectancy enters linearly.
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health shock under consideration affects the average health status of the different age
groups. Hence, one does not use the exact measure xs,t in the empirical framework but
ps,t = xs,t + νs,t, (4.4)
where ps,t is the observed proxy in the sample and νs,t is a measurement error. Whether
this measure correctly captures the average health improvement of the workforce depends
on the demographic structure. For example, in the case of the cardiovascular revolution,
health gains concentrated among older adults with gains in life expectancy increasing
with age. If, without loss of generality, the number of young workers is small, the average
worker is older than 30. Therefore, the measure assigns a too pessimistic figure of the
health improvement to the workforce for all observational units s with the extent of the
error depending on state-level variation in the demographic structure of the workforce.
Hence, the health proxy ps,t and the measurement error νs,t correlate negatively. Plugging
the expression from (4.4) into the regression model yields
ys,t = αps,t + w
′
sI1960t β + γs + δt + ζr,t + εs,t − ανs,t. (4.5)
Define es,t = εs,t−ανs,t as the composite error term and suppose that there is no correlation
between the proxy ps,t and the idiosyncratic error εs,t. Given a non-negative α and the
negative correlation between ps,t and νs,t due to systematic error, the health proxy ps,t must
correlate positively with the composite error. Hence, the point estimate α̂ for this model
will be biased upward. The same logic applies to a too optimistic measure of average health
with the only difference that ps,t and νs,t correlate positively in this case. Accordingly,
systematic mismeasurement of the health status leads to downward-biased estimates of
the population parameter, if the health proxy overstates gains in average health, while
estimates are biased upward, if the health proxy understates the improvement in average
health. The more proxy and true health diverge, the more severe this bias will be.
For the age-group analysis, this problem can be solved by using age-specific life
expectancy as right-hand variable. Panel (a) of Table 4.4 reports the corresponding results
for the differences-in-differences model.23 Columns (1) to (5) show results for age cohorts
from 15 to 64 in ten-year intervals. Column (6) reports the estimated effect of adult life
expectancy on wages for old-age workers above the age of 65. Finally, Column (7) provides
the parameter estimates for the entire workforce.24 To this end, life expectancy for the
total workforce is approximated by the arithmetic mean over life expectancy at birth and
all following age cohorts, thus providing a health indicator closer to the average person of
23Table C.5 in the Appendix presents estimates for the flexible model.
24Regressions are weighted by the initial white population of each specific age cohort in 1960 in the first
six columns and by the entire white population for the last column.
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Table 4.4: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages by Age Cohorts
Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Life expectancy of specific age group
Log life expectancy 3.66 4.18*** 2.82*** 2.54*** 1.09 5.21*** 3.62***
(of specific age group) (3.10) (1.61) (0.88) (0.95) (0.95) (1.98) (1.09)
First-stage F–statistic 10.8 22.5 46.9 14.2 26.0 16.0 31.7
(b) Naive model: life expectancy at age 30
Log life expectancy at 30 1.19 4.18*** 4.30*** 4.46*** 2.26 11.47*** 3.67***
(1.77) (1.61) (1.48) (1.53) (1.66) (3.73) (1.31)
First-stage F–statistic 24.0 22.5 21.4 21.9 22.5 24.3 23.3
(c) Naive model: life expectancy at birth
Log life expectancy at birth 0.72 3.79** 3.46** 4.15** 3.15 15.26** 4.00**
(1.78) (1.73) (1.64) (1.77) (2.06) (6.10) (1.56)
First-stage F–statistic 11.6 11.4 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.3 11.0
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white popu-
lation of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy.
The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of
college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported
in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
the workforce.25
The effect of life expectancy is positive and significant at the five-percent level for the
prime-age groups of the working-age population from 25 to 54 and old-age workers above 65.
A one-percent increase of life expectancy, ceteris paribus, induces a wage hike of roughly
3.5 percent with coefficients ranging from 2.54 to 5.21. The values of the Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic show a strong first-stage correlation between adult life expectancy and mortality
from cardiovascular diseases. For very young workers, the effect of life expectancy on
wages is large and positive but insignificant due to high standard errors. A potential
explanation for this finding is that positive effects of health improvements are counteracted
by an out-selection of the most productive workers into college. Moreover, the explanatory
power of the instrument is weakest among all age groups with a value of the F-statistic
of 10.8. Likewise, for the group of the 55- to 64-year-olds, health improvements do not
significantly affect wages. The effect, however, is considerably stronger for those workers
25Similar results obtain for life expectancy at age 30 or 40 as health measure for the total workforce.
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who decide to work even after age 65. One reason for this finding might be selection into
retirement starting around age 60. In order to save enough for retirement, workers who
optimally would like to retire early due to bad health or outdated human capital continue
to work, thus lowering productivity for the 55- to 64-year-olds. Above age 65, only the
healthy, motivated, and productive workers remain in the workforce: The overall labor
force participation rate drops to slightly below 20 percent for this group. These workers
are also likely those who gain most from improvements in health innovations. Hence, life
expectancy shows the largest effect on wages with a coefficient of 5.21. Taken together, this
evidence indicates a sizable positive effect of adult life expectancy on wages for workers in
their prime-age and those above 65. Graphically, this translates into a shift toward steeper
life-cycle wage profiles consistent with the unconditional evidence presented in Figure 4.1.
Panel (b) reports estimation results for a naive version of the differences-in-differences
model, where life expectancy at age 30 is used for every age cohort. As outlined above,
using a mismeasured proxy for health conditions leads to downward-biased estimates for
age groups whose health gain is overstated by the measure—that is, the 15- to 24-year-olds—
and upward-biased estimates for age groups, whose health gains are understated—that
is, all groups above age 35. Correspondingly, the resulting point estimates would suggest
a too large effect of life expectancy on average wages for older workers. For the 25- to
34-year-olds, the model is identical to Panel (a). Panel (c) repeats this exercise for life
expectancy at birth, which is the most common health indicator in cross-country studies.
For the age groups above 35, where changes in life expectancy at birth understate the
actual change, the point estimates are overestimated. In contrast, for the age group 25
to 34, the results show slightly smaller effects of health innovations on average wages
compared to the results in Panel (a), although gains in life expectancy are quantitatively
similar for this age group. Because the first stage of life expectancy at birth is considerably
weaker compared to Panel (a), this finding might be due to a loss of precision in the
estimation. Compared to the more adequate specifications in Panel (a), the naive model
with life expectancy at birth suggests a too large effect of health gains on average wages,
because the health gains are relatively larger at higher ages.
Importantly, the instrumentation strategy cannot eliminate this measurement error,
because the correlation between adult life expectancy and mortality depends on age. If
measured at higher ages, gains in life expectancy do not contain health improvements
resulting from reduced mortality at younger ages. In contrast, if life expectancy is
measured at a too young age, the instrument assigns individuals beneficial effects from
health innovations that do not apply to them due to their age. Therefore, the first stage
again systematically over- or understates the average health improvement, if the wrong
age-specific proxy for health conditions is assigned.
This subtle point is of significant practical importance for a large number of published
work. For example, a branch of the growth literature has investigated the effect of health
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and life expectancy on long-run growth of output per capita. The conventional measure
employed in these studies is life expectancy at birth. Long-run changes in output are
thus explained by improvements of health conditions of infants, which might overstate
the improvements for the workforce. In such a case, the corresponding point estimates
would be biased downward. How severe the bias from measurement error is, depends
on how well changes in life expectancy at birth capture changes in the health status of
the workforce. For example, if improvements in medical technology mostly help infants
and young children, as it was the case for the epidemiological transition, the gains in
life expectancy at birth and for higher ages will differ greatly. In this case, the bias is
most pronounced. This might explain why Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Acemoglu and
Johnson (2014), Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014), and Hansen (2014) have not found
a substantial positive effect of health and life expectancy on growth for the reduction in
mortality from infectious diseases. If, in contrast, increases in life expectancy at birth
mostly reflect improvements in health at older ages, as it is case for the cardiovascular
revolution, the bias should be comparatively small, because changes in life expectancy at
birth provide still a reasonable approximation of improvements in adult health.
4.4.5 Accounting for Inter-State Migration
The analysis so far has investigated the causal relationship between adult life expectancy
and average wages, while treating states as closed entities. A potential concern relates to
workforce migration between states. About 1.5 percent of the total U.S. population move
between states per year and one third of the citizens do not live in the state, where they
were born (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2011). If, on average, high productivity workers
migrate into states, where life expectancy is higher, parameter estimates might be biased
upward. In order to address this problem, individuals in the census data are dropped, if
they do not live in the state, where they were born.26 Panel (a) of Table 4.5 presents the
respective results of the differences-in-differences model for state-level regression.27
The corresponding point estimates indicate a strong positive effect of increased life
expectancy on average wages, which is statistically significant at the five-percent level,
except for the age group of the 15- to 24-year-olds. For all age groups above 25, the
resulting coefficients are quantitatively larger than in the baseline model in Table 4.4.
The evidence from the non-migrant sample therefore conflicts with an upward bias due to
migrant workers, unless indirect effects owing to the complementarity between domestic
and migrating workers distinctly outweigh the direct effects. Hence, it is unlikely that the
considerable positive effect of adult life expectancy on average wages in the baseline model
is driven solely by workforce migration, and it appears conservative given the evidence
presented in Table 4.5. Moreover, this evidence tends to the concern whether health should
26Note, however, that the effect of migrants cannot be deducted from the life expectancy measure.
27Estimates for the flexible model are reported in Table C.6 in the Appendix.
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Table 4.5: Robustness: Migration
Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) No inter-state migration of workers
Log life expectancy 2.21 5.02*** 4.65*** 3.91*** 2.56** 6.61** 4.78***
(of specific age group) (2.76) (1.51) (1.05) (1.24) (1.01) (2.73) (1.18)
First-stage F–statistic 13.4 22.6 37.4 13.3 32.9 15.5 31.0
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
(b) No old-age migration
Log life expectancy 8.22 5.01** 3.11*** 2.43** 1.07 5.21*** 3.67***
(of specific age group) (7.48) (2.40) (1.12) (1.01) (0.83) (1.94) (1.19)
First-stage F–statistic 2.7 11.7 33.7 12.4 43.8 18.6 24.2
States 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial
white population of the respective age group. Average wages in Panel (a) are confined to workers, who work in the
same state they were born in. Panel (b) excludes Arizona, California, and Florida from the sample. Control variables
are measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log
initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial
population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
be measured by state of birth or state of residence: The results establish a causal link
between adult life expectancy and average wages in the non-migrant sample, for which
state of birth and state of residence coincide.
Furthermore, a frequent phenomenon is migration after retirement. While in the
1950s, fewer than one million people above age 60 moved from one state to another, the
corresponding number had increased to 1.6 million between 1975 and 1980; whereupon,
Florida, California, and Arizona were the most popular destination targets (Rogers and
Watkins, 1987). High values of life expectancy at higher ages in these states reflect
this popularity. If it is predominantly rich pensioners, who move for retirement, old-age
migration might act as a positive demand shock to the destination states. If, at the same
time, these pensioners are healthier than the average retiree, migration of the elderly
might bias upward the estimated effect of health gains on average wages. Panel (b) of
Table 4.5 presents results from the state panel without Florida, California, and Arizona.
The parameter estimates are quantitatively similar to the baseline results, thus revealing
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again a positive link between adult life expectancy and wages per worker.28 Overall, the
evidence indicates that old-age migration does not cause a spurious correlation between
life expectancy and wages.
4.4.6 Heterogeneity Along Further Dimensions: Metropolitan
Areas, Occupational Choice, and Educational Attainment
The analysis so far has investigated the causal relationship between adult life expectancy
and average wages on the state level. As noted by Cooper et al. (2000), however, there
might be disparities in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases, in particular, between
rural and metropolitan areas that might not be fully taken up by controlling for population
density. Therefore, this section analyzes the causal link between life expectancy and wages
only for metropolitan areas in the corresponding states. To this end, census data are
collapsed on the metropolitan-area level, and each area is assigned the corresponding
state-level value of life expectancy.29 Because metropolitan areas changed over time, only
those areas that are consistently defined throughout all time periods from 1940 to 2000
enter the estimation sample. This leaves 623 time-year observations for 89 metropolitan
areas in 33 states. Table 4.6 reports results for age groups and the workforce for the
differences-in-differences model including a full set of controls.30
Table 4.6: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages: Metropolitan Areas
Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log life expectancy 9.91** 6.23*** 4.09*** 5.40*** 3.05** 6.89* 6.31***
(of specific age group) (3.88) (1.78) (1.11) (1.86) (1.32) (3.53) (1.45)
First-stage F–statistic 12.2 37.3 65.1 12.6 25.1 6.3 44.2
States 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Metropolitan Areas 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 623 623
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment
dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the
initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the
state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
28Results for the flexible model are reported in Table C.7 in the Appendix.
29The motivation for using state-level health measures in this context is twofold: First, data on adult life
expectancy are not available below the state level. Second, more disaggregated measures for age-specific
life expectancy and disease-specific mortality rates may suffer from low quality, as relatively rare chance
events may generate spurious patterns in small populations.
30Table C.8 in the Appendix shows results for the flexible model.
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Throughout all age groups, the estimated coefficients are larger compared to state-level
estimates. According to the workforce estimate in Column (7), a one-percent gain in life
expectancy leads to a 4.17-percent increase in average wages per worker. All coefficient
estimates are statistically significant at the five-percent level, and the F-statistic indicates
a strong first-stage correlation between life expectancy and mortality from cardiovascular
diseases. This finding is in line with a rural-urban gap in health improvements related
to cardiovascular diseases as, for example, found by Kulshreshtha et al. (2014). One
explanation for this divide is that behavioral risk factors such as smoking, drinking, obesity,
and physical inactivity are more common in rural areas (CDC, 2017). Another potential
reason is that access to treatment for cardiovascular diseases is more readily available
in urban areas due to returns to scale. Overall, this evidence suggests that the positive
effect of adult life expectancy on average wages is not an artifact of comparing rural with
urban states. Moreover, the gains from health innovations are larger in metropolitan areas
compared to the state-level estimates.
Occupational choice constitutes another dimension of heterogeneity. Blue-collar workers,
on the one hand, execute tasks that are physically demanding, whereas white-collar jobs, on
the other hand, require minimal physical labor but usually more investment in educational
attainment. With increasing age, blue-collar workers are thus more vulnerable to negative
income shocks as a consequence of worsened health status compared to white-collar workers.
Hence, innovations in medical technology should benefit blue-collar workers especially
at advanced working age. In contrast, higher prospective health encourages potential
white-collar workers to invest more in human capital, thus resulting in higher productivity
particularly among younger age cohorts.
In order to test these hypotheses, workers in the decennial U.S. census are categorized
as blue-collar or white-collar, based on the occupation coding guidelines for the 1970 U.S.
census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972, pp. 152–154). Specifically, this coding classifies
workers as white-collar, if they belong to the group of professional, technical and kindred
workers; managers and administrators except farm; sales workers; or clerical and kindred
workers. In contrast, blue-collar occupations comprise craftsmen and kindred workers;
operatives except transport; transport equipment operatives; and laborers except farm.
The remaining workers belong to farm or service occupations and are exempt from the
analysis. Since occupational status was first reported in the U.S. census in 1950, the
number of state-year observations decreases to 288.
Table 4.7 presents results for a regression of average wages per worker on adult life
expectancy for a subsample consisting of white-collar workers in Panel (a) and blue-collar
workers in Panel (b).31 Adult life expectancy affects average wages of white-collar workers
in the age group 25 to 44 positively and significantly, whereas the effect vanishes for the
more advanced workers in the age range from 45 to 64. This finding points to better
31Table C.9 in the Appendix reports results for the flexible model.
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Table 4.7: Heterogeneity: White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers
Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) White-collar workers
Log life expectancy 3.83 8.99*** 4.08*** 1.36 0.05 5.83** 4.51***
(of specific age group) (6.76) (3.27) (1.58) (1.29) (0.95) (2.85) (1.68)
First-stage F–statistic 2.8 9.8 28.5 8.4 14.6 14.2 18.1
(b) Blue-collar workers
Log life expectancy 8.10 3.45 3.17* 4.07* 3.62** 0.35 4.15**
(of specific age group) (6.36) (2.85) (1.64) (2.17) (1.67) (2.60) (1.99)
First-stage F–statistic 4.5 9.3 24.4 5.7 13.0 11.4 16.8
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of the respective age group. Average wages contain observations from white-collar workers in Panel (a) and from
blue-collar workers in Panel (b). Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy.
The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial
share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
educated young white-collar workers.32 Conversely, wages of older white-collar workers
did not increase significantly following the cardiovascular revolution. Only for the selected
group above age 65, life expectancy and average wages are again positively and significantly
associated. This result is consistent with reduced sorting-out of productive workers due to
improved health.
The coefficient estimates for the blue-collar workers in Panel (b) show a mirror image
of the results for white-collar workers. Adult life expectancy and average wages show no
statistically significant correlation for the young age groups and old-age workers above
65. Health gains, however, caused a significant wage rise for more experienced workers in
the age range from 35 to 64. Hence, this finding supports the hypothesis that especially
blue-collar workers were to benefit from improved health conditions due to the demanding
physical activities they execute.
Finally, educational attainment represents another potential dimension of heterogeneity.
Typically, wages of college-educated workers grow faster with every additional year of
work experience compared to workers without any college education (see, for example,
Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1999). If, for example, health gains at higher ages prolong the
32The effect is slightly more pronounced, if adult life expectancy is lagged. Results are available upon
request.
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Table 4.8: Heterogeneity: College and Non-College Workers
Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Workers with some college education
Log life expectancy -0.34 3.08 2.27** 1.50 0.41 13.67** 2.22**
(of specific age group) (4.41) (2.01) (1.13) (1.03) (1.40) (5.68) (1.10)
First-stage F–statistic 8.5 20.9 45.5 16.6 26.5 16.9 29.1
(b) Workers without college education
Log life expectancy 2.14 1.69 0.91 1.53* 0.82 2.66 1.35
(of specific age group) (3.07) (1.35) (0.85) (0.88) (1.06) (1.76) (0.94)
First-stage F–statistic 11.1 22.8 47.1 13.8 26.1 16.1 31.7
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white population
of the respective age group. Average wages contain observations from workers with at least some college education in Panel (a) and
from workers without any college education in Panel (b). Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960
treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the
initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
work life, wage gains would, ceteris paribus, be larger for college workers as a result of
their relatively more favorable earnings trajectory. At the same time, however, wages
might show little growth for young college-educated workers, because individuals must
invest additional time on acquiring college education. Lastly, gains in adult life expectancy
likely raise the share of college enrollment in the population. If, at the margin, individuals,
who would have otherwise not chosen this option, select into college because of higher
prospective health, average wages for college workers remain unchanged or even decline.
Hence, the extent of heterogeneity regarding educational attainment is a priori unclear.
In order to test whether adult life expectancy affects average wages differently along
educational attainment, the sample is split into workers with at least some college education
and those with at most a high-school degree. Individuals who did not report on their
educational attainment are excluded from the sample. Table 4.8 reports parameter
estimates for college workers in Panel (a) and non-college workers in Panel (b).33 Overall,
the results reveal no statistically significant association between adult life expectancy
and average wages within educational groups. Therefore, health improvements do not
alter the within-educational-group earnings trajectories. This finding does, however, not
preclude wage increases as a consequence of structural shifts toward a more highly educated
33Table C.10 in the Appendix presents estimates for the flexible model.
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workforce. The next section highlights this point more closely in the context of potential
mechanisms that explain the wage hikes observed in the baseline sample.
4.4.7 Channels
What are the channels through which innovations in understanding and treatment of
cardiovascular diseases affect average wages? This section discusses four potential channels
that may explain how the treatment translates into higher wages: labor supply, educational
attainment, behavioral changes, and improved health.
First of all, consider the possibility that wage hikes may result from changes in labor
supply. At the intensive margin, individuals, who know about their improved health
prospects, might decide to work more hours per week or more weeks per year and thus
earn higher wages. Alternatively, at the extensive margin, workers might feel healthier
particularly at higher ages and thus decide to remain in the workforce. Because workers
typically earn higher wages with increasing experience and age, increased labor force
participation at advanced ages might keep productive workers in the workforce and thus
push average wages up. Table 4.9 reports the estimated semi-elasticities for the labor force
participation rate (measured as 0 to 100 percent) in Panel (a), usual hours worked per
week in Panel (b), usual weeks worked per year in Panel (c), and usual hours worked per
year (derived from individual hours and weeks) in Panel (d).34
Strikingly, labor supply increased neither at the extensive nor at the intensive margin.
In fact, the estimates in Panel (a) show that labor force participation rates decreased
by roughly 1 to 1.5 percentage points for most age groups and for the total workforce.
Moreover, the decrease was strongest among the 25- to 34-year-olds with no significant
effect for the 45- to 54-year-olds. Hence, higher wages for prime-age workers cannot be
the result of increased labor force participation. Furthermore, the evidence also precludes
the possibility that cohort wages increased unilaterally as a consequence of lower labor
supply. If wages and labor force participation were negatively correlated, one should
observe an increase of wages for the 55- to 64- but not the 45- to 54-year-olds; however,
this is not the case as shown in Table 4.4. The specifications in Panels (b) to (d) reveal
moderate negative effects of higher life expectancy on usual hours or weeks worked. For
the entire population, a one-percent increase in life expectancy leads to a decline of usual
working hours per week by 0.16, or 10 minutes per week. Likewise, usual working weeks
shrunk by 0.17, or roughly one workday per year. Neither effect is statistically significant
at the conventional significance levels. Again, there is no clear pattern, which explains
wage hikes as a consequence of reduced labor supply. Therefore, adjustments along the
intensive margin of workers’ labor provision cannot explain higher wages either. Finally,
the combination of raised wages and stable or reduced labor supply implies an increase of
34Tables C.11 and C.12 in the Appendix present estimates for the flexible model.
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Table 4.9: Adult Life Expectancy and Labor Supply by Age Cohorts
Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Labor force participation (0 to 100 percent)
Log life expectancy -86.15 -223.01*** -92.35*** -21.20 -116.37** -140.11** -149.56***
(of specific age group) (95.18) (61.93) (30.32) (30.71) (48.82) (59.82) (36.88)
(b) Usual hours per week
Log life expectancy -129.42** -64.50*** -28.72* -1.77 -35.32* -38.76* -15.95
(of specific age group) (54.81) (24.25) (15.24) (13.08) (19.86) (20.92) (14.57)
(c) Usual weeks per year
Log life expectancy -91.90* -86.82*** -33.48** 0.08 -43.91* -55.42** -17.21
(of specific age group) (54.38) (31.75) (16.58) (14.45) (22.95) (25.55) (15.58)
(d) Labor supply of those working (weeks × hours)
Log life expectancy -3138.79 -2584.40* -1147.17 350.41 -1780.77* -1741.36* -387.51
(of specific age group) (2183.64) (1322.99) (801.69) (655.21) (986.28) (896.19) (736.01)
First-stage F–statistic 10.8 22.5 46.9 14.2 26.0 16.0 31.7
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the labor force participation in Panel (a), usual hours worked per week in Panel (b), usual weeks worked
per year in Panel (c), and hours worked per year of those working in Panel (d). All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed
effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white population of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960 and
interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-
cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered
on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
productivity, as measured by wages per workers, per working hours, or per working weeks.
In sum, labor supply cannot account for the observed increase in average wages.
Education provides an alternative channel through which gains in adult life expectancy
might affect average wages per worker. Between 1960 and 2000, the share of U.S. whites
who enrolled into college at least once roughly doubled from 15 to 30 percent. At the
same time, the share of graduates with at least four years of college education tripled
from 5 to 15 percent. Based on a prototype Ben-Porath model of human capital and
life-cycle earnings, Cervellati and Sunde (2013) show that an increase in survival rates
during working ages may raise the benefits of education relative to its costs. Health
gains that take place at sufficiently young ages may consequently increase individuals’
educational investment. Hansen and Strulik (2017) find that college enrollment increases
by roughly ten percentage points as a consequence of higher life expectancy following
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the cardiovascular revolution in U.S. states. Reproducing their specification with college
enrollment of the 15- to 24-year-olds as dependent variable in the empirical framework
presented in this paper yields a quantitatively similar estimate of roughly nine percentage
points.35 Therefore, educational attainment is one possible channel through which adult
life expectancy affects average wages. Human capital is, however, tied to the person who
acquired it. Consequently, upskilling of older worker groups takes time. For example,
if individuals around age 20 enroll in college due to the treatment in 1970, the direct
benefits of education for wages of 45- to 54-year-olds will only take full effect after 20
to 30 years, when these individuals enter this age group. Hence, education may play a
key role in explaining wage hikes, though, only after sufficient time has elapsed.36 This
timing structure will help in confining direct health from gains through educational and
behavioral changes.
In combination, the results for education and labor supply indicate that increased
life-time labor supply is not a necessary condition for higher educational attainment, as
was claimed by Hazan (2009). In contrast, the evidence confirms simulation results of
Cervellati and Sunde (2013) and Strulik and Werner (2016). They argue that higher
educational attainment and lower life-time labor supply are compatible, if the income effect
of higher life expectancy is large enough to afford both, increased life-time consumption
and leisure time while at work.
Changes in individual behavior constitute another potential channel through which
health may affect wages. For example, preventive measures against smoking following
the report of the Surgeon General in 1964 (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, 1964) have reduced smoking among U.S. adults considerably after 1970, as
exemplified by Figure 4.7. Due to the cumulative damage of smoking, however, cessation
requires up to ten years to take the full beneficial health effects (Oza et al., 2011).
Consequently, health improvements from reduced smoking should show the full positive
effect on wages per worker only starting from the 1980s. Behavioral changes that have more
immediate positive effects are increased physical activity, reduced alcohol consumption,
and a more healthy diet. Physical activity, however, has gradually declined between 1970
and 2010, while the share of obese persons doubled (Flegal et al., 1998; CDC, 2001; Kohl
35Table C.13 presents the effect of a health shock on college enrollment for different measures of adult life
expectancy. Following Hansen and Strulik (2017), the estimation equation is weighted by the population
at risk; that is, the initial population of 15- to 24-year-olds. To arrive at the numbers, compute ∆y =
α̂
100 ·∆x =
0.77
100 ·12.20 ≈ 0.09 with ∆x =
3.16
25.91 ·100 ≈ 12.20 and π̂ ·∆z · µ̄x = (−0.61) · (−0.20) ·25.91 ≈ 3.16
computed from the first-stage estimates in Table 4.1, where µ̄x is evaluated at the mean in 1960.
36Training constitutes another dimension of educational attainment, which might raise worker pro-
ductivity and wages more immediately, because it is mostly directed at prime-age workers (Carnevale,
Strohl, and Gulish, 2015). Public expenditures on training, however, are quantitatively small compared
to spending on tertiary education and cover less than one-tenth of a percent of U.S. GDP in the year
2000 (OECD, 2018a; OECD, 2018b). Private expenditures on formal training appear quantitatively more
sizable with two to three per mill of U.S. GDP between 2010 and 2015, though, they are again minor in
comparison to spending on tertiary education (Training Magazine, 2015; OECD, 2018a).
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and Cook, 2013). At the same time, the consumption of alcohol started to decline only
after 1980, as shown in Figure 4.8. Hence, behavioral changes due to a more healthy
lifestyle do not cause immediate improvements in health conditions among U.S. adults.
Nevertheless, there should be positive long-run effects from reduced drinking and smoking.
Taken together, the presented evidence suggests that labor supply cannot explain the
observed wage hikes. Meanwhile, higher college enrollment and more healthy behavior only
unfold a positive effect on productivity starting in the 1980s. By eliminating these channels,
short-run effects of the treatment thus likely reflect health improvements. For example,
gains in individual health status arise through new drugs and treatment possibilities such
as the beta blocker or the cardiac pacemaker, which allow patients to continue to work
only with minor restrictions.
In order to understand how the cardiovascular revolution affected wages over time
consider the following fully-flexible model
ys,t =
2000∑
τ=1940
ατxs,td
τ
t + w
′
sIτt β + γs + δt + ζr,t + εs,t, (4.6)
where log life expectancy is interacted with a full set of time dummies. This model
allows to estimate the effect of life expectancy on wages for all six time periods relative to
Table 4.10: Effect of Treatment over Time
45–54 Year Olds Total Workforce
1940–2000 1940–1990 1940–2000 1940–1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log life expectancy × 1940 0.45 0.45 0.21 0.21
(0.80) (0.61) (1.81) (1.41)
Log life expectancy × 1950 0.12 0.12 -0.20 -0.20
(1.15) (0.90) (1.44) (1.10)
Log life expectancy × 1970 3.03** 2.83*** 5.26*** 5.20**
(1.31) (1.10) (1.97) (2.22)
Log life expectancy × 1980 3.11* 2.87** 5.84** 5.76**
(1.63) (1.37) (2.50) (2.88)
Log life expectancy × 1990 4.56** 4.30*** 7.73** 7.65**
(1.92) (1.63) (3.32) (3.68)
Log life expectancy × 2000 3.46 — 6.15** —
(2.20) — (2.39) —
First-stage F–statistic 0.6 7.6 2.2 2.0
States 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 288 336 288
Full controls X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white population
of 45- to 54-year-olds. Log life expectancy of the respective age group is interacted with time dummies. Initial log life expectancy
is measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. All other control variables are measured in 1960 and
interacted with time dummies. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular
diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the
state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 4.11: Illustration: Effect of Life Expectancy over Time (45- to 54-Year-Olds)
the reference year 1960. Using the flexible first stage from equation (4.3), the model is
just-identified. The estimated coefficients for the 45- to 54-year-olds are reported in Table
4.10 and plotted in Figure 4.11 for the time periods 1940–2000 and 1940–1990. Due to
the increased number of instruments, the value of the F-statistic falls to a level of below
one for the model from 1940–2000. If observations in the year 2000 are dropped, the
model is somewhat better identified with an F-statistic of approximately 7.6. The results
are qualitatively consistent with moving-window and long-differences models, which add
one additional year at a time. Therefore, it seems reasonable to provide a qualitative
interpretation of the patterns shown in Figure 4.11.37
Panel (a) shows the results for the time period 1940–2000. In the pre-treatment periods,
the effect of life expectancy is statistically insignificant and very close to zero. After the
treatment in 1970, the estimated effect is positive, significant at the five-percent level,
and takes a value of 3.03. The estimated parameter does not change much between 1970
and 1980 but becomes slightly less precise. Between 1980 and 1990, the effect increases
by approximately 50 percent to 4.56 before it slightly declines thereafter. The model
for the period 1940–1990 in Panel (b), which shows a higher value of the F-statistic,
confirms these patterns. According to the channels outlined in this section, the immediate
increase in 1970 and 1980 is likely due to health improvements. Finally, the gains from
higher educational attainment and behavioral changes materialize in the data from 1990
onward, thus explaining an increase in the effect of life expectancy on wages of the 45- to
54-year-olds.
Longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study provide another piece of
evidence that health effects contributed to wage increases following the cardiovascular
revolution. For approximately 22,000 respondents, the data set contains up to twelve
37Parameter estimates for the moving-window and long-differences models are reported in Tables C.14
and C.15 in the Appendix.
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Table 4.11: Effect of Individual Health on Wages
Dependent variable: respondents’ log wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heart Disease -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.07** -0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
× born before 1910 -0.89***
(0.07)
× born before 1920 -0.22
(0.23)
× born before 1930 0.09
(0.10)
× born before 1940 -0.10**
(0.05)
× born before 1950 -0.00
(0.06)
Individuals 22214 22214 22214 22214 22214 22214
Born before cutoff year — 71 1062 5947 36112 63154
Observations with heart disease 10023 10023 10023 10023 10023 10023
Total observations 84041 84041 84041 84041 84041 84041
Notes: All regressions include individual-fixed, state-fixed, wave, and census-region-wave effects as well as a quartic
age trend. Heart disease is a binary indicator that takes value one, if respondents reports to ever have heart problems
diagnosed, and zero else. Heart disease is interacted with a dummy indicator that takes value one, if the individual
has been born before a certain threshold level, for example, 1910, and zero else. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
observations from biannual interviews between 1992 and 2014. Table 4.11 shows results
for the effect of individual health status on wages. Estimates are obtained from an OLS
regression of log wage yi,t from individual i at interview wave t on a binary indicator
for health status hi,t; its interaction with a dummy, hi,tb
τ
i , which takes a value of one,
if individual i has been born before a certain cutoff year τ ; a quartic age trend aki,t,
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; and a set of fixed effects. Specifically,
yi,t = ϑhi,t + ρhi,tb
τ
i + φ1ai,t + φ2a
2
i,t + φ3a
3
i,t + φ4a
4
i,t + ιi + χt + ψs,t + ωr,t + εi,t (4.7)
where ιi, χt, ψs,t, and ωr,t denote individual-fixed, wave-fixed, state-fixed, and census-
region-wave effects; and εi,t constitutes an idiosyncratic error term. In particular, the
individual-fixed effect eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity in pivotal dimensions such
as ability, educational attainment, and occupational choice. Moreover, state-fixed effects
control for state-specific intercepts that pertain to individuals who migrate to another
state. Finally, wave and census-region-wave effects address wage differentials that result
from general wage trends over time.
The parameter ϑ describes the direct effect of having ever been diagnosed with a
negative health status such as ‘having heart problems’; in this case hi,t takes a value
of one. The respective parameter estimate corresponds to roughly 0.06 throughout all
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specifications except Column (5). Taken at face value, workers who have been diagnosed
with heart problems thus earn on average six percent lower wages compared to workers
without heart problems. The causal effect of adverse health effects, however, is likely
even more negative. Because the analysis examines variation in wages at the intensive
margin, it cannot capture particularly severe cases of heart problems, which end lethally
or in disability. Accordingly, cases in which the negative health effect corresponds to 100
percent are, by construction, omitted from the regression.
Furthermore, the parameter ρ captures heterogeneity with respect to the health effect
for different birth cohorts. Individuals who have been born before the year 1910 were
already around age 60, when new drugs and treatment procedures for cardiovascular
diseases became available. Hence, the cardiovascular revolution came too late for them to
affect most of their work life, or to provide significant incentives for further investment
in educational attainment. The corresponding estimate shows a large and significant
negative effect for this group compared to younger cohorts; however, a word of caution
is needed. Due to the small number of only 71 observations before 1910, the resulting
coefficient may be plagued by both, small sample properties and unobserved selection
of individuals within this age group. Even though the results from Column (2) conform
with the hypothesis of higher productivity and wages due to improved adult health, they
should be seen as suggestive and not conclusive. Columns (3) and (4) illustrate that once
the cutoff year is shifted toward younger cohorts for which new drugs and treatments
for cardiovascular diseases were at least partly available, the interaction term becomes
insignificant. Finally, the results in Columns (5) and (6) indicate that suffering from heart
problems poses no negative effect on individual wages for birth cohorts that are young
enough to fully harness beneficial effects of the cardiovascular revolution. Concretely, the
direct effect of suffering from heart problems becomes statistically insignificant, once the
interaction term splits the sample into individuals, who could not or only partly profit
from the treatment, and individuals of the reference group who could fully avail of it.
Overall, this evidence suggests that health innovations have marginalized negative effects
of cardiovascular diseases on individual productivity and income over time.38
4.4.8 Discussion
The preceding sections argued that productivity gains from improved health and higher
educational attainment explain the observed wage hikes. Here, I discuss to what extent
the evidence is consistent with general equilibrium effects and alternative wage theories,
38Similar findings apply, if negative health status is measured by ‘high blood pressure’ as Table C.16
in the Appendix shows. For ‘stroke’ as proxy of negative health status, the results show qualitatively
similar though statistically insignificant effects. This finding, however, is not surprising insofar that the
sample contains considerably fewer observations for stroke and that selection out of the labor market is
particularly strong for this group.
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in particular: positive demand effects, agglomeration economics, efficiency wages, and
compensating wage differentials.
First of all, newly available drugs and health services reduce the frequency of severe
courses of disease and, thus, costs for patients and relatives. Therefore, individuals may
reallocate income to commodities or additional, previously unaffordable health services,
boosting overall demand and wages. Catlin and Cowan (2015) show that national health
expenditures continuously increased over the period 1960–2000, and that annual growth
rates of national health expenditures exceeded GDP growth rates in all but three years
over this time period. As a result, the share of national health expenditures to GDP
increased substantially. Hence, individuals devoted rather more than less resources to
health services. This finding thus conflicts with a positive demand shock on commodity
markets, but it conforms with a positive demand shock on the health sector.
Agglomeration economies and local multipliers constitute another potential source of
prolonged income growth (see, for example, Moretti, 2010, and Kline and Moretti, 2013).
Specifically, the demand for local goods and services increases with the equilibrium wage
and the number of skilled workers in a city or economically-integrated area. The existence
of such multiplier effects is consistent with the evidence presented above. Better health
conditions and more training increase the number of skilled workers and raise average
productivity and, therefore, wages per worker. Consequently, demand for local goods and
services increases, thus providing further support for higher wages. Because skilled workers
concentrate in metropolitan areas, agglomeration economies may explain heterogeneity
in the size of health effects between rural and urban areas. Agglomeration economies,
however, constitute a second-round effect that requires initial improvements in productivity
or the distribution of skills within an area. Hence, they fail as the sole determinant of the
observed positive effect of adult health on average wages.
The discussion so far implicitly assumed that workers be remunerated according to
their marginal product on a competitive labor market. Efficiency wage theories depart
from this assumption by allowing wages above the market rate, as this profits the firm
(see, for example, Katz 1986, Stiglitz, 1986, and Krueger and Summers, 1988). In the
context of cardiovascular diseases, for example, firms might find it profitable to pay healthy
workers above their marginal product in order to reduce turn-over costs from replacing ill
workers. This argument is, however, contradicted by the finding of a larger beneficial effect
of health innovations in states with a high initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases.
Improved health conditions and better treatment possibilities, in particular through new
drugs, lower firms’ incentives to pay wages above market clearing. Therefore, efficiency
wage arguments cannot explain the observed wage increase.
Finally, the theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that jobs with less
favorable job characteristics must be remunerated with higher wages as “[t]he whole of
the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock must,
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in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality.
If in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less
advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so
many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of
other employments” (Smith, 1776, Book 1, Chapter 10). According to this prediction,
workers would, ceteris paribus, demand higher wages for jobs and states, which pose
more disadvantages due to higher risk of cardiovascular diseases. This reasoning, however,
conflicts with a larger beneficial effect of health innovations in states with high initial
prevalence of cardiovascular diseases. Following health innovations, the compensating
wage differentials should collapse, thus implying lower, not higher wage growth in states
with high initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases, as shown by the baseline results.
Hence, compensating wage differentials cannot explain the observed raise in average wages.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper establishes a positive causal link between adult health and average wages per
worker by exploiting the sharp decline in mortality from cardiovascular diseases in U.S.
states after the 1960s. This drop in mortality, also known as the cardiovascular revolution,
provides a well-suited source of quasi-experimental variation for several reasons. First,
because cardiovascular diseases become more likely with increasing age, they predominantly
affect adult health conditions and, thus, adult life expectancy. Second, the decline in
mortality rates was initiated by a number of unexpected, path-breaking medical innovations
during the 1960s. Lastly, treatment intensities vary across states due to heterogeneity in
the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases due to social, cultural, and environmental reasons.
Hence, this variation allows to estimate a differences-in-differences model, where all states
are treated but with varying treatment intensities. In order to account for endogeneity,
adult life expectancy is instrumented by mortality from cardiovascular diseases prior and
post the medical advancements in the 1960s.
The results suggest that the cardiovascular revolution was responsible for an increase
of life expectancy at 50 of approximately 3.16 years, or roughly two thirds of the increase
between 1960 and 2000. This rise in life expectancy can account for roughly 47 percent of
the wage increase observed between 1960 and 2000 for workers aged 45 to 54. In particular,
the results reveal that the gains concentrate on the prime-age workers between 25 and 54
as well as old-age workers above 65. Correspondingly, the life-cycle earnings profile for an
average worker increases more steeply at younger ages, whereas it flattens out more slowly
at higher ages. Overall, this pattern is consistent with a workforce that over time becomes
healthier at any given age, and at higher ages in particular.
The paper’s main finding of a positive causal link between adult life expectancy and
average wages also maintains for empirical models that exploit metropolitan-area variation
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in wages or account for interstate migratory patterns. Adjustments in labor supply cannot
explain the estimated wage increase, because labor force participation rates, working hours,
and working weeks either declined or remained unchanged during the treatment period.
Moreover, age group estimates preclude the possibility of unilateral indirect wage effects
through out-selection or increased bargaining power. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that
there exists heterogeneity in the beneficial effects of health improvements on average wages
between rural and metropolitan areas as well as different occupational groups. The timing
of the wage hikes suggests that potential channels are health improvements, in particular
in the short-run, and higher educational attainment and potential adoption of a more
healthy individual lifestyle in the long run. Evidence based on micro data further suggests
that health innovations have marginalized negative effects of cardiovascular diseases on
individual income over time. Overall, the evidence demonstrates that thanks to better
adult health, workers earn more, work slightly less, and invest more in human capital.
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Chapter 5
Population Aging and Income
Inequality: Evidence from the
Cardiovascular Revolution in
U.S. States
5.1 Introduction
Medical breakthrough and demographic change led to substantial population aging in
the United States during the twentieth century. This fundamental transformation of the
demographic structure was accompanied by a substantial rise of investment in educational
attainment, increased saving, better population health, a temporary preponderance of the
working-age relative to the dependent population, and ultimately resulted in a (second)
demographic dividend in terms of economic growth.1 While the beneficial effects of the
demographic dividend on growth and fertility have been analyzed in depth, little research
focused on the quantitative link between population aging and economic inequality.2
In order to investigate the causal link between population aging and income inequality
across cohorts, this study exploits variation in the unexpected sharp decline of mortality
from cardiovascular diseases in U.S. states starting in the 1960s. This sharp reduction in
mortality rates is used as an instrument for the change in adult life expectancy, which
proxies for average population health and longevity. The identification strategy exploits
1A non-exhaustive list on the positive effects of health improvements and the demographic dividend
on economic growth contains Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003, 2004); Bloom, Canning, and Graham
(2003); Zhang and Zhang (2005); Mason (2007); Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008); Jayachandran
and Lleras-Muney (2009); De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009); Cervellati and Sunde (2011); Hansen,
Jensen, and Lønstrup (2018); and Ager, Hansen, and Jensen (2018).
2Exceptions are studies by Deaton and Paxson (1994, 1997, 1998a, 1998b), which descriptively show
that income and to a lesser extent health inequality increase with age, and recent work by Guvenen et al.
(2016), which descriptively tracks changes in lifetime incomes over cohorts. However, they do not assess
the role of population aging across cohorts in a rigorous empirical framework.
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initial geographical differences in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases across U.S.
states in 1960, when medical services and treatment possibilities for patients were scarce.
This changed drastically between 1960 and 1970, when a number of seminal innovations
for identifying and treating cardiovascular diseases were introduced. New drugs, novel
treatment procedures, follow-up inventions, and public education about behavioral risk
factors contributed to halve mortality rates from cardiovascular diseases between 1970 and
2000 (CDC, 1999b; National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 2012a). As a consequence,
adult life expectancy rose substantially; with the degree of adjustment depending on the
initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases within each state.
This paper contributes to the literature by quantifying the contribution of population
aging to income inequality in the United States between 1940 and 2000. From a theoretical
viewpoint, this interrelation is mechanical, though the direction and size of its effect are a
priori ambiguous. As individuals age, income inequality evolves within age cohorts: Life-
cycle earnings profiles suggest that income inequality rises between ages 25 and 64, when
the return to educational attainment unfolds, while the income gap contracts again during
retirement. Moreover, within-cohort inequalities tend to accumulate over the life-cycle with
inequality being most pronounced among the 55- to 64-year-olds (OECD, 2017).3 Therefore,
changes in the demographic structure cause a composition effect that may intensify or
depress period income inequality, conditional on the relative size of age cohorts. For
example, income inequality may first increase and later fall as large baby boomer cohorts
work their way through the demographic structure (see Alm̊as, Havnes and Mogstad, 2014,
for the case of Norway). In addition, population aging may contribute to transformations
of life-cycle earnings profiles, which become steeper for young ages and flatten out more
slowly at higher ages, thus further reinforcing income dispersion over the life-cycle.
Panel (a) of Figure 5.1 illustrates shifts in the demographic structure of the United
States between the years 1950 and 2000. Strikingly, the baby boomer generation born
between 1946 and 1964 caused a substantial rise in population size which over time has
slowly shifted through the demographic structure. In the year 2000, this generation
constituted the sizable bulge for the age group of the 35- to 54-year-olds. Panel (b) depicts
an increase in pre-tax wage inequality between 1950 and 2000. In combination with the
dynamics of life-cycle earnings and within-cohort inequality, the demographic pattern
in Panel (a) suggests an aging-driven increase in income inequality following the baby
boom until 2020–2025, when the baby boomers start to retire, and a decrease thereafter.
Conceptually, a non-linear effect of the demographic structure on income inequality is
also consistent with the well-known Kuznets curve.4 Over the course of the demographic
3See, for example, Mincer (1958), Becker (1962), Ben-Porath (1967), and Ashenfelter and Rouse (1999)
for further information regarding human capital investment and life-cycle earnings.
4In his seminal work, Kuznets (1955) in fact acknowledges the role of demographic change on income
inequality; however, he emphasizes differential rates of increase between the rich and the poor rather than
dynamics of life-cycle earnings.
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Figure 5.1: Demographic Structure and Pre-Tax Income Inequality
Data sources: Panel (a): United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015).
Panel (b): IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2015).
transition, high population growth at first reduces income inequality as the share of young
individuals in the working-age population increases relative to the share of older individuals.
Once fertility declines, aging of the working-age population begins, thus raising life-cycle
income inequality. Finally, aging-related income inequality declines again after fertility
rates have stabilized sufficiently.
The empirical results in this paper confirm a positive causal link from population
aging to income inequality for a balanced panel of the 48 contiguous U.S. states between
1940 and 2000. In particular, the baseline estimate indicates that, at the margin, a
one-percent increase in adult life expectancy, measured at the age of 30, leads to an
increase in inequality of 0.9 Gini points, measured on a scale from 0 (perfect equality) to
100 (perfect inequality). The first-stage estimate implies that the decline in mortality rates
from cardiovascular diseases between 1960 and 2000 led to an increase in life expectancy at
30 of 3.17 years—that is, a plus of 7.2 percent compared to the initial value in 1960. Taken
at face value, higher adult life expectancy thus raised pre-tax income inequality overall
by 6.48 Gini points. Hence, population aging contributed considerably to the observed
rise of earnings inequality in the United States. Moreover, an age-specific analysis reveals
that the effect of improved adult health and longevity on income inequality reaches its
maximum when measured for young and middle-aged groups between age 20 and 30. In
contrast, the effect becomes small and even vanishes for higher ages. Correspondingly,
increased income dispersion results from health improvements and higher prospective
longevity during working ages rather than from population aging per se. In particular,
this finding is consistent with increasing income dispersion over the life-cycle due to
increased investment into educational attainment (Cervellati and Sunde, 2013), life-cycle
earnings profiles that flatten out more slowly at higher ages (Chapter 4 and Kotschy,
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2018), and wage polarization resulting from skill-biased technical change (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013).
Furthermore, the empirical findings are robust to different measures of income, such as
total income including capital returns or total family income allowing for within-family
transfers. Moreover, the instrumentation strategy addresses concerns of reverse causality
running from higher income inequality to public health by exploiting mortality reductions
before the treatment period.5 Additionally, the results show only weak signs of convergence
in income inequality across states. Population aging therefore affects income inequality
irrespective of the initial extent of within-state inequality. Finally, similar qualitative
results obtain, if population aging is measured by alternative indicators such as median
age or share of 45- to 64-years-olds in the total population. These findings also apply
irrespective of initial differences in the demographic structure or inequality between states.
This paper is most closely related to work by Hansen and Strulik (2017) and Kotschy
(2018). Both papers exploit variation from the cardiovascular revolution across U.S. states.
Hansen and Strulik (2017) investigate the role of gains in longevity for college enrollment,
whereas Kotschy (2018) examines the causal link between adult life expectancy and
aggregate wages. In contrast, this study highlights the link between adult life expectancy
and income inequality. Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2015) use a similar identification
strategy to identify positive long-run effects of pneumonia during infancy on adult education,
income, and labor supply.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents background
information on the cardiovascular revolution. Section 5.3 describes the data set and
the econometric framework in detail. Section 5.4 presents the empirical results. Finally,
Section 5.5 concludes. Because the empirical analysis uses the identification strategy from
Kotschy (2018), described in Chapter 4, Sections 5.2 and 5.3 overlap considerably with the
corresponding parts of Chapter 4. For clarity and completeness, the respective sections
nonetheless repeat the background information and comprehensively describe the data set
and the identification strategy.
5.2 Background: The Cardiovascular Revolution
During the second half of the twentieth century, the United States experienced substantial
improvements in adult health leading to a marked increase in life expectancy. Specifically,
these improvements came down to medical breakthroughs in the understanding, screening
and treatment of cardiovascular diseases. This period is thus also referred to as cardiovas-
cular revolution (Foege, 1987; Vallin and Meslé, 2009), and has been classified as fourth
stage of the epidemiological transition (Olshansky and Ault, 1986; Omran, 1998). The
5For further information regarding a link from income inequality to population health, see, for example,
Lynch et al. (2000) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2006).
5.2. BACKGROUND: THE CARDIOVASCULAR REVOLUTION 111
200
300
400
500
600
M
al
e 
ag
e-
ad
ju
st
ed
 m
or
ta
lit
y 
ra
te
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
fro
m
 C
or
on
ar
y 
H
ea
rt 
D
is
ea
se
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
(a) Males
150
200
250
300
350
Fe
m
al
e 
ag
e-
ad
ju
st
ed
 m
or
ta
lit
y 
ra
te
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
fro
m
 C
or
on
ar
y 
H
ea
rt 
D
is
ea
se
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
(b) Females
Figure 5.2: Age-Adjusted Mortality from Cardiovascular Diseases
Data source: National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (2012a).
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Figure 5.3: Percent of Deaths that are Attributable to Cardiovascular Diseases
Data sources: National Center for Health Statistics (1963) and
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (2012b).
cardiovascular revolution considerably contributed to a reduction in mortality from a broad
spectrum of cardiovascular illnesses to which a substantial number of deceases accrued. For
example, coronary heart disease, the most prominent cardiovascular illness, still accounted
for approximately twelve percent of total deaths in the U.S. in 2000 (National Center
for Health Statistics, 2017a) and still constituted the most common cause of death in
high-income countries in 2004 (WHO, 2008). Figure 5.2 showcases the substantial decline
in mortality from coronary heart disease: Between the peak in 1968 and the year 2000,
age-adjusted mortality rates per 100,000 shrunk by roughly two thirds for men and women.
In particular, the unexpected invention of new treatment possibilities for cardiovascular
diseases boosted life expectancy predominantly through a decrease or delay in advanced-age
mortality. Specifically, cardiovascular diseases become more likely as the tissues of the
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Figure 5.4: Life Expectancy at Age 30 in the United States
Data sources: United States Life Tables 1940–2000.
cardiovascular system age and lose some of their flexibility (Kirkwood, 2001). Therefore,
mortality rates from cardiovascular diseases increase steadily with age, as exemplified by
Figure 5.3. Notably, the number of registered deaths dropped considerably for almost all
age groups, although the median age of the population increased from 29.5 to 35.3 years
during that period (Hobbs and Stoops, 2002). The decline was especially pronounced
for individuals in the age range 35–84, thus especially boosting adult life expectancy,
measured at age 30, as illustrated Figure 5.4. In contrast, the number of incidents for
the group above age 85 more than doubled during that period; however, the overall share
of deaths attributable to cardiovascular diseases halved from almost 80 to slightly below
40 percent. A reason was that newly introduced drugs and treatment methods delayed
the critical point at which the cardiovascular disease became lethal such that incidents
occurred either at a higher age, or death originated from other sources as, for example,
cancer. Importantly, there have been striking geographic differences in the prevalence of
cardiovascular diseases across U.S. states, which, above all, were rooted in social, cultural,
and environmental factors (CDC, 1999b). The initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases
determined how beneficial the treatment was for states. Hence, the decline in mortality
and consequently the subsequent increase in adult life expectancy varied across states.
Panel (a) of Figure 5.5 displays the geographic differences in life expectancy at 30 and
mortality from cardiovascular diseases in the year 1960. Notably, expected life time of
whites at age 30 varied by 2.94 years between Kansas and Nevada—the states with the
highest and lowest values. Moreover, adult life expectancy displayed high levels in the West
North Central and West South Central census regions, whereas figures are comparatively
low in New England and the Atlantic regions. Panel (b) illustrates spatial differences in
the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases. In particular, Figure 5.5 reveals a negative strong
unconditional state-level correlation between adult life expectancy and the prevalence of
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(a) Life Expectancy at 30
(b) Mortality from Cardiovascular Diseases
Figure 5.5: Mortality from Cardiovascular Diseases and Life Expectancy at 30
Data source: Grove and Hetzel (1968).
cardiovascular diseases, as measured by mortality per 100 white people. Correspondingly,
states with high mortality rates are more likely to possess low levels of adult life expectancy
and vice versa.
Reductions in mortality from cardiovascular diseases arrived through two channels.
First, a number of medical innovations between the years 1960 and 1970 allowed to
prevent certain diseases or to treat the symptoms. The most remarkable inventions
were the artificial cardiac pacemaker, which was first implanted in 1958; the application
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of chest compression to restore blood circulation in a person that is in cardiac arrest
beginning in 1960; the invention of the beta blocker in 1962, which is used to lower blood
pressure and to treat cardiac arrhythmia; the invention of the portable defibrillator in
1959 and its application in the U.S. from 1966 onward; and the first adult human heart
transplantation in the U.S. in 1968. Subsequent innovations include first thrombolytic
therapies in 1986 to treat myocardial infarction, stroke, and pulmonary embolisms; the
invention of cholesterol lowering statins, first marketed in 1987; and beginning in 1988,
the implantation of intravascular stents to address acute closure of arteries and blood
vessels. The new treatment possibilities take effect relatively quickly, as for example,
serum cholesterol reducing drugs achieve their full effect within five years (Law, Wald, and
Thompson, 1994). These advances in the available technology were complemented by an
increasing number of specialists and care centers for cardiovascular diseases (CDC, 1999b).
The second channel for the decline in mortality constitute increased awareness of major
individual risk factors and changes in behavior. Research results by Keys et al. (1963),
Keys (1980), and Dawber (1980) established, among others, high blood cholesterol, high
blood pressure, physical inactivity, smoking, obesity, and unbalanced diet as major risk
factors for cardiovascular diseases.6 The federal government initiated national programs
to educate specialists and the general public about risks of high blood pressure in 1972;
of high blood cholesterol in 1985; and of the importance of cardiovascular health in 1989
(CDC, 1999a). This increase in awareness helped raise the share of patients with too high
blood pressure who have their condition treated and under control (CDC, 1999b). Moreover,
the report of the Surgeon General in 1964 (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, 1964) highlighted the adverse effects of smoking on health, later followed by
increased cigarette taxes in the 1980s (CDC, 1999a). As a result, the share of smokers
in the adult population was declining from 1960 onward, while the per capita cigarette
consumption started to rapidly fall during the 1970s (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1998, 2000). Alcohol consumption, another risk factor if enjoyed in
excess (Marmot and Brunner, 1991; Murray et al., 2002), started to decline after 1980
(Haughwout and Slater, 2017). However, public health education also had its limits. Even
though the health risks were known, physical activity gradually declined between 1970
and 2010, while obesity doubled (Flegal et al., 1998; CDC, 2001; Kohl and Cook, 2013).
The unexpected and concentrated surge of medical breakthroughs in the 1960s and
the massive preventive efforts thereafter motivate a pre-treatment period until 1960 and
post-treatment from 1970 onward in the estimation sample at hand. The next section
discusses the empirical framework and the data.
6According to Ezzati and Riboli (2012), high blood pressure and high blood cholesterol alone account
for one half of the global incidence of coronary heart disease. Too high body weight and smoking are
responsible for another 20 and 13 percent.
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5.3 Data and Empirical Framework
5.3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a balanced ten-year panel of the 48 contiguous states of
the U.S. for the period 1940–2000. Correspondingly, the estimation sample comprises 336
observations in total. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because of missing data for early
periods, the District of Columbia is omitted due to its special nature of a metropolitan
region. Because life expectancy in 1940 is only available for whites, the entire sample is
restricted to the white population.7
Data on wages and incomes stem from individual data in decennial U.S. censuses
(IPUMS) by Ruggles et al. (2015) and are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U price
index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the baseline specification, income inequality is
measured by the state-level wage Gini coefficient constructed from pre-tax data on wages
and salaries with values ranging from zero (perfect equality) to unity (perfect inequality).
Data on life expectancy between 1940 and 2000 are gathered from the U.S. decennial
life tables and vital statistics provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Adult life expectancy
enters the estimation equation in logarithms.8
In order to capture the exogenous increase in adult life expectancy due to innovations
in medical technology, the analysis exploits state differences in cardiovascular mortality
prior to their introduction, that is, until 1960. Age-adjusted cardiovascular mortality in
1960 is obtained from Grove and Hetzel (1968) and expressed in deaths per 100 whites.9
Data on age-adjusted mortality rates from coronary heart disease over time are obtained
from National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (2012a). As Figure 5.2 shows, mortality
rates from coronary heart disease increased slightly until around 1968 and only declined
substantially thereafter.10 Hence, for the baseline specification innovations in medical
technology are coded to occur from 1970 onward. This designates the time intervals 1940–
1960 as pre-treatment and 1970–2000 as post-treatment periods (‘differences-in-differences
model’). In a more flexible specification, mortality from cardiovascular diseases in 1960 is
interacted with a full set of year dummies (‘flexible model’).
In order to ensure that initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases is as good as
7Table D.1 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics.
8Results are qualitatively unchanged, if, instead of a log specification, life expectancy enters the
estimation framework directly. Results are available upon request.
9Age-adjustment allows to compare the mortality rates between states even if they possess different
age structures. Due to the adjustment, mortality rates should not be interpreted as crude rates, unless a
state exhibits the same age structure as the standard population. For this reason, not the absolute figures
of mortality from cardiovascular diseases are of importance but the relative change over time.
10Declines in mortality rates and, thus, improvements in adult life expectancy probably slightly lag
behind the actual development for the average white person as medical innovations might come too late
for the very ill and the very old.
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randomly assigned, the empirical analysis includes further controls interacted with the
treatment indicator. These control variables comprise initial life expectancy by the CDC;
initial income and initial share of college graduates, both obtained from IPUMS by Ruggles
et al. (2015); initial population density by Hobbs and Stoops (2002); and initial mortality
from non-cardiovascular diseases by Grove and Hetzel (1968). Current values of the
corresponding variables are not included in the empirical framework, because they might
themselves be affected by treatment and thus constitute bad controls.
Individual data are collapsed to the state level using person weights in order to ensure
representativity of the sample. Due to the collapsing process, wages and educational
attainment are grouped on the state level. For this reason, I weight all regressions by the
group size, that is, the white population of a given state in 1960.11
5.3.2 Empirical Framework
In order to examine the causal link between adult life expectancy and income inequality, I
estimate the following model:
ys,t = αxs,t + w
′
sI1960t β + γs + δt + ζr,t + εs,t, (5.1)
where ys,t denotes a measure of inequality for state s and time period t; xs,t represents
log adult life expectancy; ws is a vector of controls measured in 1960, interacted with
the treatment matrix I1960t , whose values take unity from 1970 onward, and zero else; γs
and δt denote state-fixed and time effects; ζr,t describes region-year-fixed effects, which
control for differential development trends across the nine U.S. census-regions r; and εs,t
constitutes an idiosyncratic error term.
Due to omitted variables and reverse causality, log life expectancy is likely endogenous.
In order to uncover the causal link between life expectancy and income inequality, I exploit
heterogeneity in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases across U.S. states as exogenous
source of variation for instrumentation. The first-stage equation is given by
xs,t = ηzsd
1960
t + w
′
sI1960t θ + κs + λt + µr,t + ξs,t, (5.2)
where mortality from cardiovascular diseases in 1960, zs, is interacted with the post-
treatment indicator d1960t ; κs, λt, and µr,t denote state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed
effects; and ξs,t constitutes the error term.
Conceptually, the first-stage equation compares differences in the increase of adult life
expectancy to differences in the decline of mortality from cardiovascular diseases between
the pre-treatment and post-treatment period across states. For this reason, it corresponds
11Since the equation of interest is the effect of adult life expectancy on income inequality, weighting
the regression equation by the group size yields estimation results that are closer to the micro data than
unweighted averages. See, for example, Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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to a differences-in-differences approach, where all states are treated though with different
treatment intensities. Moreover, the first stage possesses a natural interpretation in this
context: A decline in the mortality from cardiovascular diseases initiates an increase in
adult life expectancy, which, in turn, affects the income inequality in the structural model.
For initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases to be a valid instrument, several
conditions must be fulfilled. First, initial mortality must be as good as randomly assigned
conditional on control variables. To this end, the baseline specification contains controls for
initial state levels of income, the share of college graduates, population density; state-fixed,
time, and census-region-year-fixed effects; as well as mortality from non-cardiovascular
diseases and life expectancy in 1960. Second, the instrument must affect income inequality
only through the first stage. This exclusion restriction is fundamentally untestable. It
is, however, plausibly fulfilled in the context of this paper, because the instrument is
specific to the channel of health and life expectancy on the aggregate level. Moreover, the
empirical model accounts for differences in initial health conditions that are due to factors
other than cardiovascular diseases. This monotonicity condition is mechanically fulfilled
by the construction principle of life tables. Finally, initial cardiovascular mortality must
be correlated to adult life expectancy in the first-stage regression.
I also report results for a more flexible model, in which the treatment is interacted
with a full set of year dummies instead of the post-1960 treatment indicator. In this case,
the first stage corresponds to
xs,t =
2000∑
τ=1940
ητzsd
τ
t + w
′
sIτt θ + κs + λt + µr,t + ξs,t. (5.3)
5.4 Results
5.4.1 First-Stage Evidence: Mortality and Adult Life Expectancy
First, I start by presenting evidence on the first-stage correlation between life expectancy
at age 30 and mortality from cardiovascular diseases. The analysis is based on a balanced
ten-year panel for the 48 contiguous U.S. with 336 observations in total. Table 5.1
reports results for the differences-in-differences specifications in Panel (a) and the flexible
specifications in Panel (b). All regressions include state-fixed and time effects.
The first column reports parameter estimates for a parsimonious specification without
any additional covariates. According to the resulting parameter, life expectancy at age 30
correlates positively with initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases (interacted with the
post-1960 treatment indicator). This counter-intuitive result, however, follows directly from
the omission of initial life expectancy in the empirical model. By the construction of life
tables, age-adjusted mortality rates and life expectancy within a given year must correlate
negatively. Moreover, given better initial health conditions, there is less scope for future
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Table 5.1: First Stage: Effect of Mortality on Adult Life Expectancy
Dependent variable: log life expectancy at age 30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model
Mortality × Post 1960 0.26*** -0.17* -0.41*** -0.45*** -0.36***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
(b) Flexible model
Mortality × 1940 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Mortality × 1950 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Mortality × 1970 0.13*** -0.30*** -0.55*** -0.48*** -0.35***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Mortality × 1980 0.20*** -0.23*** -0.47*** -0.42*** -0.29***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
Mortality × 1990 0.28*** -0.15* -0.40*** -0.33*** -0.25**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Mortality × 2000 0.35*** -0.08 -0.33*** -0.46*** -0.30***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
reductions in mortality rates and, consequently, also less scope for future improvements
in adult life expectancy. Hence, the corresponding estimate is biased upwards. Once the
empirical model accommodates for initial life expectancy in the remaining columns, the
estimates turn negative, indicating the expected negative correlation between mortality
from cardiovascular diseases and life expectancy. The third column adds initial mortality
rates from non-cardiovascular diseases to the empirical model. Including this control
helps increasing the precision of the estimation and avoiding that the instrument takes up
variation from other health improvements that are not attributable to the cardiovascular
revolution. As a consequence, the point estimate becomes quantitatively larger, that is,
more negative. The fourth column adds region-year effects that account for differential
trends in health gains across U.S. census regions. Such differential trends might arise from
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(a) DD Model (Table 5.1a, Column 5)
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(b) Flexible Model (Table 5.1b, Column 5)
Figure 5.6: Illustration: First Stage
economic, social, or cultural factors, for example, disparities in wage trends or migration.
Finally, the last column presents results for a full set of covariates comprising the initial
share of college graduates, initial population density, and initial average state income.
These variables control for variation in life expectancy at 30 that arises from disparities in
initial development. The resulting parameter estimate in Panel (a) takes a value of –0.36
and is significant at the one-percent level. Given the quasi-natural source of variation,
this parameter possesses a quantitative interpretation: Ceteris paribus, a reduction of
mortality from cardiovascular diseases by one person per 1,000 whites leads to an increase
in life expectancy at 30 of 3.6 percent. Therefore, the reduction in cardiovascular mortality
by approximately two persons per 1,000 whites (50 percent of its initial value) between
1960 and 2000 led to an average increase in life expectancy at 30 by roughly 3.17 years.12
Panel (b) reports estimates for the flexible model, in which initial mortality from
cardiovascular diseases is interacted with a full set of year dummies instead of the post-1960
treatment indicator; the year 1960 serves as reference category. In particular, differences in
the initial prevalence of cardiovascular diseases exert a significant effect on life expectancy
at 30 only in the post-treatment period between 1970 and 2000. In contrast, disparities
in mortality from cardiovascular diseases cannot explain cross-state differences in life
expectancy in the pre-treatment periods from 1940 to 1960. Hence, the evidence suggests
common trends in life expectancy before and divergence in these trends after the onset of
the cardiovascular revolution.
Figure 5.6 displays parameter estimates for the full model in Column (5) with the
corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals. The point estimates are quantitatively
similar for the differences-in-differences model in Panel (a) and the flexible model in Panel
(b). In particular, the computed coefficients show a stable pattern over the post-treatment
12To obtain this figure, compute ∆x = η̂ ·∆z ·µx ≈ (−0.36) ·(−0.20) ·44.06 ≈ 3.17, where µx corresponds
to the sample mean in 1960.
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period between 1970 and 2000. Therefore, the differences-in-differences model with a
constant effect of initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases on adult life expectancy
within the pre- and post-treatment period appears appropriate.
5.4.2 Reduced-Form Evidence: Mortality and Wage Inequality
Table 5.2 presents the reduced-form estimates for a regression of wage inequality, as
measured by the wage Gini coefficient, on initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases.
All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. As before, the first column reports
results for a parsimonious specification without any additional covariates. The subsequent
columns add controls for initial levels of life expectancy; mortality from non-cardiovascular
diseases; regional-year-fixed effects; and, finally, education, population density, and income.
Panel (a) shows results for the differences-in-differences specification. The parameter
estimate for the full model in Column (5) takes a value of –0.33 which is significant at
the five-percent level. A reduction in cardiovascular mortality by one person per 1,000
whites leads to an increase in wage inequality by 0.033 unit points of the normalized Gini
coefficient, or 3.3 Gini points on a scale from 0 to 100. Given the conditional independence
assumption, this figure corresponds to the intention-to-treat effect—that is, the offer of
receiving treatment. However, not all individuals comply to the treatment (for example,
some individuals do not take a beta blocker, although they belong to high-risk groups
for cardiovascular diseases). Hence, the intention-to-treat effect understates the average
treatment effect on the treated in absolute terms (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Panel (b) presents estimates for the flexible model. According to the full specification
in Column (5), initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases affects wage inequality
only significantly in the post-treatment period between 1970 and 2000 but not before.
Therefore, initial differences in the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases had an impact
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(b) Flexible Model (Table 5.2b, Column 5)
Figure 5.7: Illustration: Reduced Form
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Table 5.2: Reduced Form: Effect of Mortality on Wage Inequality
Dependent variable: wage Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model
Mortality × Post 1960 0.39*** -0.22 -0.61*** -0.81*** -0.33**
(0.11) (0.20) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13)
(b) Flexible model
Mortality × 1940 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.00 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Mortality × 1950 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Mortality × 1970 0.14** -0.47** -0.88*** -0.86*** -0.44***
(0.06) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.15)
Mortality × 1980 0.31*** -0.30 -0.69*** -0.78*** -0.39***
(0.08) (0.19) (0.21) (0.17) (0.14)
Mortality × 1990 0.36*** -0.24 -0.63*** -0.75*** -0.40***
(0.09) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.15)
Mortality × 2000 0.44** -0.17 -0.56** -0.85*** -0.42**
(0.16) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.16)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
on the trajectories of state-level life expectancy only after the onset of the cardiovascular
revolution. Figure 5.7 graphically illustrates this result in Panel (b). The estimates for
the flexible model again reveal a stable pattern for the causal link between adult life
expectancy and wage inequality within the pre- and post-treatment period, thus providing
an argument for the simpler differences-in-differences model depicted in Panel (a).
5.4.3 Adult Life Expectancy and Wage Inequality
This section presents results for the instrumental variables model with initial mortality
from cardiovascular diseases (interacted with the treatment indicator) as instrument for
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Table 5.3: Adult Life Expectancy and Wage Inequality
Dependent variable: wage Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy at 30 1.53*** 1.24** 1.49*** 1.81*** 0.90***
(0.19) (0.58) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32)
First-stage F–statistic 43.9 8.4 29.9 50.9 23.3
(b) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy at 30 1.50*** 1.31*** 1.44*** 1.66*** 1.10***
(0.18) (0.28) (0.21) (0.25) (0.32)
First-stage F–statistic 11.3 6.1 9.1 12.4 5.4
Hansen test p–value 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9
(c) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy at 30 1.53*** 1.40*** 1.50*** 1.71*** 1.14***
(0.19) (0.33) (0.23) (0.26) (0.34)
First-stage F–statistic 11.3 6.1 9.1 12.4 5.4
Hansen test p–value 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
life expectancy at age 30.13 The respective estimate corresponds to the average treatment
effect on the treated. This quantity equals the ratio of the intention-to-treat effect obtained
from the reduced-form model to the compliance rate, which corresponds to the first-stage
estimate. Table 5.3 reports results for the effect of life expectancy at 30 on the wage Gini
coefficient. Panel (a) contains parameter estimates for the differences-in-differences model,
whereas Panels (b) and (c) present results for the flexible model. Estimates are obtained
from two-stage least squares (2SLS) and additionally from limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) for the overidentified flexible model.
13Table D.2 in the Appendix reports estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS).
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The first column shows results for a parsimonious specification without any additional
covariates. As Aghion, Howitt, and Murtin (2011) and Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2014),
however, argue in the context of economic growth, this model is misspecified, because
it does not control for initial life expectancy in order to capture convergence in health
conditions over time. Specifically, initial life expectancy correlates with both, mortality
rates of cardiovascular diseases in 1960 and subsequent improvements in life expectancy. At
the same time, initial life expectancy affects the subsequent trajectory of wage inequality.
Without controlling for initial life expectancy, the first stage thus underestimates the
beneficial effect of the cardiovascular revolution on subsequent improvements in life
expectancy. In addition, the reduced form underestimates the increase in wage inequality
for a given reduction in mortality from cardiovascular diseases. The results in Tables 5.1
and 5.2 demonstrate how serious these biases are: Once initial life expectancy enters the
empirical framework as additional control, the parameter estimates change their sign. In
combination, these biases lead to a too large estimate for the effect of adult life expectancy
on wage inequality. Hence, all remaining specifications control for initial life expectancy.
In the third column, the empirical model includes initial mortality from non-cardiovascular
diseases. This control precludes the instrument from taking up variation from health
improvements that cannot be attributed to the cardiovascular revolution. Moreover,
the inclusion of these variables improves the goodness of fit of the first-stage model as
documented by an increase of the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic from 8.4 to 29.9. The
fourth column adds region-year-fixed effects that accommodate for differential trends in
life expectancy and wage inequality across census regions. Finally, the full specification
in the fifth column controls for initial cross-state disparities in educational attainment,
population density, and average income. These additional explanatory variables account
for the link from education to health (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Lleras-Muney, 2005),
the rural-urban gradient in risk factors for cardiovascular diseases (Pickle and Gillum,
1999; Cooper et al., 2000), and potential feedback effects from income to health (Ettner,
1996; Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields, 2005; Lindahl, 2005; Chetty et al., 2016).
The parameter estimate for the full specification in Column (5) takes a value of 0.90.
The estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the one-percent level. The
corresponding F-statistic shows a value of 23.3 indicating a sufficiently strong first-stage
correlation between initial mortality from cardiovascular diseases (interacted with the
treatment indicator) and subsequent improvements in life expectancy at 30. Ceteris
paribus, a one-percent gain in life expectancy at 30 thus leads to an increase of wage
inequality by approximately 0.009 of the normalized Gini coefficient, or 0.9 full Gini points
on a scale between 0 and 100. Taken at face value, this estimate suggests that the gain
in life expectancy at 30 from the cardiovascular revolution between 1960 and 2000 led
to an increase in wage inequality of 0.0648 unit points of the normalized Gini.14 Albeit
14To obtain these figures, compute ∆y = α̂ · ∆x/x1960 · µ̄y ≈ 0.90 · 3.17/44.06 ≈ 0.0648, where µy
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this figure is quantitatively large, it is in line with the overall state-level development of
wage inequality as the raw data in Panel (b) of Figure 5.1 illustrate. In particular, states
that started from low levels of wage inequality simultaneously experienced substantial
gains in adult life expectancy and wage dispersion over time. For example, the states of
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York improved their life expectancy at 30 by roughly
six years between 1960 and 2000 according to the raw data. At the same time, wage
inequality in these states increased between by up to eleven Gini points on a scale from 0 to
100. In contrast, states that experienced smaller improvements in life expectancy at 30 of
roughly three to four years such as Arkansas, Nebraska, or Oregon also show considerably
smaller increases in wage inequality (and even a decline in the case of Arkansas).
Panels (b) and (c) report results for the flexible model. All specifications are estimated
with two-stage least squares and a heteroskedasticity-robust version of limited information
maximum likelihood in order to account for the low first-stage correlation of the endogenous
variable and the instruments, as expressed by small values of the F-statistic. Column
(5) reports parameter estimates that are quantitatively somewhat larger compared to
the differences-in-differences model though also slightly less precisely estimated. The
Hansen test of overidentification shows high p-values such that the null hypothesis that all
instruments provide the same information cannot be rejected.
5.4.4 Robustness of Results
This section briefly discusses the robustness of the results with respect to alternative
measures of income equality and population aging as well as controlling for convergence in
income inequality across states.
Different Measures of Income Inequality. In the baseline specification, income
inequality across states was proxied by the wage Gini coefficient computed from individual
census data. However, this measure includes only employees’ wages and salaries, thus
neglecting incomes of the self-employed as well as income derived from other sources
such as savings, businesses, social security, or transfers from family members. In order
to account for these additional income dimensions, I additionally construct two income
Gini coefficients based on total personal income and total family income. Table D.3 in the
Appendix confirms the positive link between adult life expectancy and income inequality
for the alternative measures. Quantitatively, the corresponding estimates take slightly
larger values, indicating the important role of health improvements and aging on income
inequality during the period 1940 to 2000.
corresponds to the sample mean in 1960. Quantitatively similar results (not reported) obtain, if wage
inequality is measured in logarithms. Results are available upon request.
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Different Measures of Population Aging. The baseline model revealed a positive
effect of population aging, as measured by adult life expectancy, on income inequality.
Table D.4 in the Appendix reports results for specification that instead proxy population
aging by the changes in median age or the share of 45- to 64-year-olds in the workforce.
The findings again confirm the positive association between population aging and income
inequality. Quantitatively, the estimated parameters for median age conform closely to
the baseline results, whereas estimates for model with the workforce share of the 45- to
64-year-olds predict a somewhat more moderate increase in income inequality over time.
Convergence in Income Inequality. Adjustments in income inequality over time
might depend on the initial extent of income inequality within each state. Correspondingly,
the specifications in Tables D.3 and D.4 include initial inequality to control for convergence
dynamics in the adjustment process. In particular, the results show only weak signs of
convergence in income inequality across states. Hence, the evidence suggests a causal
link from population aging to income inequality irrespective of the initial within-state
dispersion of incomes and regardless of the employed inequality and aging measures.
5.4.5 Heterogeneity Along the Age Dimension: Does It Matter
Who Profits from Health Improvements?
The empirical results in Section 5.4.3 show a positive causal link from population aging
proxied by life expectancy at age 30 to wage inequality for the observation period from
1940 to 2000. However, individuals earn most of their work incomes during working age
between 16 and 64. Hence, it might matter for individual life-cycle earnings at which age
health improvements take place. Health gains at young ages should economically benefit
individuals the most, whereas health improvements shortly before retirement likely exert a
minuscule effect of individual income. In order to test this hypothesis, I vary the age at
which life expectancy is measured. Table 5.4 presents results for the full specification with
controls for initial levels of life expectancy, mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases,
education, population density, and average income. All regressions include state-fixed,
time, and region-year-fixed effects.
Panel (a) reports estimates for the differences-in-differences model. Values (equal to
or) above the conventional threshold of 10 for the F-statistic suggest a sufficiently strong
first-stage correlation between life expectancy and initial mortality from cardiovascular
diseases (interacted with the treatment indicator) for all specifications. Column (1) reveals
a significant positive effect of life expectancy at birth on wage inequality. The computed
parameter takes a value of 0.64 corresponding to roughly 70 percent of the baseline
estimate of 0.90. The effect of life expectancy on wage inequality reaches maximum values,
if measured around ages 20 and 30 as documented in Columns (2) and (3). For health
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Table 5.4: Adult Life Expectancy Measured at Different Ages
Dependent variable: wage Gini
Life expectancy measured at
birth 20 30 40 50 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 0.64** 0.97* 0.90*** 0.45** 0.26 0.24
(0.32) (0.51) (0.32) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
First-stage F–statistic 11.0 10.0 23.3 49.4 14.3 30.1
(b) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 0.69** 1.02** 1.10*** 0.62*** 0.34* 0.26
(0.32) (0.46) (0.32) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16)
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 3.2 5.4 8.7 3.6 6.4
Hansen test p–value 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
(c) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy 0.72** 1.07** 1.14*** 0.62*** 0.34* 0.26
(0.35) (0.49) (0.34) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16)
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 3.2 5.4 8.7 3.6 6.4
Hansen test p–value 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
States 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Control variables are mea-
sured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log
initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college gradu-
ates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and
reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
improvements that mostly benefit individuals at age 40 or above, the estimated effect life
expectancy on income inequality roughly halves to 0.45 as Column (4) shows. Finally,
Columns (5) and (6) reveal that health gains accruing above age 50 exert no significant
effect on income inequality. Hence, the evidence indicates that health gains during working
ages rather than aging per se constitute the driving forces behind income inequality.
This result is consistent with theoretical predictions and simulation results from
Cervellati and Sunde (2013). In particular, they show that mortality reductions must
take place at sufficiently early ages to increase educational attainment and individual
life-time wealth. In this case, the benefits of education increase relative to its cost such
that individuals invest more in educational attainment implying a steeper trajectory for
their life-time earnings, particularly at young ages. Consequently, there is more scope for
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income dispersion over the life-cycle. Evidence by Hansen and Strulik (2017) supports
this view: College enrollment increased considerably as a result of the cardiovascular
revolution. Moreover, empirical results for the same setting by Kotschy (2018)—described
Chapter 4—indicate a transformation towards flatter life-cycle earnings profiles at older
ages. Therefore, health gains may shift the old-age contraction of life-cycle inequality to
higher ages. Finally, the evidence is consistent with wage polarization as a consequence of
skill-biased technical change (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Given
higher educational investment following health gains from the cardiovascular revolution, a
larger amount of high-skilled workers allows a structural shift to highly productive but
skill-intensive jobs that cannot be replaced by machines. In contrast, routine jobs vanish as
a consequence of automation, and workers reallocate to low-skill low-productivity service
jobs. Hence, the polarization between an increasing number of high-skilled individuals
with steep life-cycle earnings profiles and a sizable number of low-skill service workers with
flat life-cycle earnings profiles exacerbates income inequality across cohorts.
Panels (b) and (c) report results for the flexible model. The corresponding parameters
are quantitatively slightly larger than those obtained for the differences-in-differences
model. Qualitatively, the estimates again indicate a large effect of life expectancy on
income inequality during working ages, whereas the effect becomes small and marginally
significant for higher ages. The null hypothesis that all instruments provide the same
information is maintained given the p-values of the Hansen test for overidentification.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper documents a positive causal link from life expectancy during early working-ages
on pre-tax income inequality for the United States between 1940 and 2000. To this end, the
empirical identification strategy exploits quasi-natural variation in the decline of mortality
rates from cardiovascular diseases in U.S. states after 1960. This variation allows the
estimation of a differences-in-differences model, where all states are treated by health
gains following the cardiovascular revolution though with different treatment intensities.
In order to account for endogeneity concerns, adult life expectancy is instrumented by
initial cross-state disparities in mortality from cardiovascular diseases (interacted with a
treatment indicator).
The empirical results indicate that, at the margin, a one-percent increase in life
expectancy at age 30 is associated with a hike in wage inequality of 0.9 Gini points
on a scale from 0 to 100. Overall, the estimates suggest that pre-tax wage inequality
increased by 6.48 Gini points following health gains for working-age individuals during
the cardiovascular revolution. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the effect of health
improvements and longevity on income inequality declines sharply and even vanishes
for higher ages. This finding suggests that increased income dispersion results from
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health improvements and higher prospective longevity during working ages rather than
from population aging per se. In particular, this finding is consistent with reinforced
dispersion of incomes over the life-cycle due to higher educational attainment (Cervellati
and Sunde, 2013; Hansen and Strulik, 2017), flatter life-cycle earnings profiles at higher
ages (Chapter 4), and wage polarization as a consequence of skill-biased technical change
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013). However, more research is still
needed to shed light on the channels that link individual decisions regarding educational
attainment and occupational choices to aggregate inequality.
Chapter 6
Income Shocks, Inequality, and
Democracy
6.1 Introduction
Since Lipset’s famous hypothesis that a sufficiently high level of income is a prerequisite
for democracy (Lipset, 1959), the causal effect of income on democracy has been a central
theme in the social sciences. While much of the previous literature found evidence
consistent with a positive effect of income on the quality of democratic institutions (for
example, Barro, 1999), more recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) suggests that the
positive association between income and democracy disappears, once relevant systematic
differences across countries are accounted for that affect both income and democracy. In
particular, their results reveal no significant effect of income on democracy in cross-country
panel regressions with country and time fixed effects. This finding has initiated an ongoing
debate about the role of income for democracy, with some studies finding evidence for a
positive effect based on non-linear estimators or refined methods, others finding substantial
heterogeneity in the effect of income, and yet others providing evidence for significant
improvements in democratic institutions in response to negative income dynamics or shocks.
To date, there is no coherent explanation for this apparently incoherent and contradictory
evidence on the effect of income on democracy.
This paper tests the hypothesis that income shocks—rather than minor fluctuations in
income—trigger major changes in institutional quality, as reflected by transitions between
autocracy and democracy, and that the effect depends crucially on the social environment,
as reflected by economic inequality. This hypothesis is rooted in the theoretical literature
of democratic transitions under threats of revolutions (see, for example, Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2000, 2005) and the alternative of elite-driven transitions to democracy (see,
for example, Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).1 According to this literature, negative economic
1See also Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde (2014) for a unified theory of different transition scenarios.
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shocks might provide an opportunity to overcome autocratic institutions, in particular in
an environment with high inequality. Conversely, democracy might emerge for economic
reasons in environments of low inequality and, thus, low redistributive conflict.
In light of these predictions, we hypothesize that an appropriate empirical analysis of
the income-democracy nexus should focus on economic shocks and non-marginal changes
in democratic quality instead of exploiting continuous variation in income and institutional
quality. Moreover, the theory suggests that the effects of income shocks crucially differ by
the cohesiveness of society, as reflected by economic inequality. In economically highly
unequal societies, negative income shocks are likely to trigger revolts and, thereby, open
a window of opportunity for democratization, whereas positive income shocks tend to
stabilize oligarchic structures. In economically equal societies, by contrast, positive income
shocks do not generate much distributive pressure, thus helping to consolidate and improve
democratic quality, whereas negative income shocks might erode democracy by creating
tensions within the society.
The results provide support for this hypothesis and document the crucial role of
inequality for the effects of economic shocks on the quality and stability of political
institutions. In particular, the findings show that negative income shocks unfold a negative
effect on democracy in countries with low inequality but a positive effect in countries with
high inequality.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. In response to the
analysis by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009), several studies find a positive effect of income
on democracy using non-linear estimators (Heid, Langer, and Larch, 2012; Benhabib,
Corvalan, and Spiegel, 2013; Che et al., 2013). At the same time, papers analyzing the
effect of exogenous income shocks find both, positive and negative effects on democratic
quality. For instance, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) document pronounced negative
income dynamics before democratization, and Aidt and Franck (2015) show that poverty-
related riots led to democratic improvements in 19th Century England. Similarly, Brückner
and Ciccone (2011) find that negative income shocks have a positive effect (a window
of opportunity) for democratic improvements in Africa. In contrast, Brückner, Ciccone,
and Tesei (2012) find that positive income shocks due to increases in oil prices have a
positive effect on democratic quality in countries that are net oil exporters. Our findings
reconcile earlier results for positive effects of income on democracy with evidence that
negative income shocks have a positive effect on democratic improvements: We document
an important role of major income fluctuations and a significant asymmetry in interaction
with economic inequality. Moreover, this finding also complements evidence from other
recent contributions that suggest that income unfolds vastly heterogeneous effects on
democratic institutions (for example, Moral-Benito and Bartolucci, 2012, for heterogeneity
across low and high income countries, and Cervellati et al., 2014, for heterogeneity with
respect to colonial history).
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This study most closely relates to work by Dorsch and Maarek (2014a, 2014b) according
to which episodes of democratization can be explained by variation in income inequality,
whose effect is amplified during economic downturns. In contrast, this paper focuses on
the role of economic shocks rather than income inequality. In particular, we show that
economic shocks non-monotonically affect democratic institutions conditional on the level
of inequality. This result holds irrespective of whether economic shocks are measured by
cyclical fluctuations around the long-run trend of income per capita, by the trend itself,
or by devaluation of disposable income as a consequence of episodes of high inflation.
Moreover, we provide evidence for an asymmetry with respect to the nature of economic
shocks: While negative shocks open a window of opportunity for institutional change,
no comparable countervailing effect is found for positive shocks. Finally, our empirical
analysis considers demographic pressure as another determinant of democratic transitions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents the empirical
approach, data sources, and variable construction. Section 6.3 presents the main results
and provides a brief discussion of robustness and additional findings. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Empirical Framework and Data
6.2.1 Empirical Framework
The empirical framework required to test the hypothesis of this paper focuses on identifying
the effect of major income fluctuations on the quality of political institutions, in isolation
as well as in interaction with inequality. To this end, the estimation framework exploits
within-country variation over time in a dynamic linear panel model.2 The estimation
equation is given by
di,t = αsi,t−k + βxi,t−k + γ(s · x)i,t−k + w′i,t−kδ + ζi + ηt + εi,t, (6.1)
where di,t denotes democratic quality (or democratization) in country i in year t, measured
continuously or by a binary indicator reflecting major changes in the index between t− k
and t; si,t−k indicates whether an economic shock occurred during the time period t− k
and t− (k + l); xi,t−k denotes inequality; and wi,t−k is a vector of controls that includes
the quality of democratic institutions, the level of GDP per capita as well as education
in period t− k. In the baseline analysis, we use three-year windows; that is, k = 3. The
specification includes a full set of country and time dummies, ζi and ηt, respectively. The
coefficients of interest in light of the hypothesis to be tested are α and γ.
Country-specific fixed effects are removed using the within-transformation. The analysis
exploits a yearly panel data set ranging from 1950 to 2014 with a maximum number
2Similar specifications were used by Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Murtin and Wacziarg (2014).
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of 64 time periods. Therefore, the time dimension T is sufficiently large such that the
well-known Nickell (1981) bias is of little concern for the identification of the coefficients
of interest (Judson and Owen, 1999).
We define economic shocks as cyclical fluctuations in output. Unlike long-run growth
trends, these fluctuations are arguably largely unforeseen by individual agents. For this
purpose, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to disentangle cyclical fluctuations from
long-run trends in economic development. Section 6.2.3 discusses the construction of the
shock indicator in more detail.
6.2.2 Data Sources
There is an ongoing debate about the appropriate measurement of institutional quality.
Specifically, this debate refers to the information on which the respective indices are
based, as well as their measurement on a discrete or continuous scale. While continuous
measurements conform more to the slowly-changing nature of institutions described
by North (1990), dichotomous measures provide a clearer distinction of the bi-modal
distribution of political institutions observed in practice (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland,
2010). In the absence of a consensus with respect to this question, we report results for
both continuous and dichotomous measures from different sources. In particular, we use
the composite PolityIV index by Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2013), a composite indicator
based on the Freedom House (2014) Political Rights and Civil Liberties measures, and
the binary Democracy-Dictatorship index by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). For
comparability, we normalize all measures of democratic quality to a range from zero (full
autocracy) to one (full democracy).3 Following recent suggestions by Voigt (2013), we
additionally construct an artificial indicator based on the principal components of the
PolityIV, Freedom House, and Democracy-Dictatorship indicators. This composite index
isolates and extracts the common variation among all three measures and combines them
in a single indicator that can be interpreted as democratic institutions.4
Data for (log) GDP per capita and its growth rate are taken from Penn World Tables
by Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). We proxy income inequality with market (that
is, pre-tax, pre-transfer) Gini coefficients from the Standardized World Income Inequality
3The PolityIV and the composite Freedom House index both constitute broad measures of institutional
quality comprising not only features of the political but also the economic domain. Both dimensions are
in practice highly correlated but not necessarily identical as Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Kotschy
and Sunde (2017) point out. We presume that democratic transitions aim to improve institutional quality
compared to the previous regime. Hence, we choose rather broad measures of institutional quality in order
to capture all possible facets of these transitions.
4Factor analysis synthesizes the variation contained in several variables into common, orthogonal
factors, or principal components. This way, one can decompose the variation in institutional variables
that corresponds more closely to democratic institutions, from variation that corresponds more closely to
other institutional dimensions such as those affecting the economic domain. Hence, this artificial index
corresponds to a more narrow measure of democratic quality compared to its source indicators. For more
information see Voigt (2013, pp. 20–21).
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Database by Solt (2009, 2016a). These data provide standardized Gini coefficients that are
comparable across countries and time.5 Despite recent criticism by Jenkins (2015) regarding
quality of the data and of the underlying imputation model used for their construction,
these inequality data appear as best suited for the purpose of this paper due to their
comparability across countries and time.6 We normalize the observed Gini coefficients to
vary between zero and one, where a value of one indicates maximum inequality and zero
perfect equality. Moreover, we control for human capital differences using average years of
schooling from Barro and Lee (2013).
6.2.3 Economic Shocks and Binary Democracy Indicators
The main hypothesis of this paper is that, in light of the existing evidence and the
theoretical motivation, an investigation of the effect of income on democracy should
focus on the consequences of major income fluctuations instead of exploiting marginal
changes. Likewise, most theoretical models consider dichotomous institutional regimes—
democracy and autocracy—suggesting the relevance of using dichotomous measures of the
quality of political institutions rather than multi-valued indices or continuous measures.
To implement this, we construct measures of economic shocks and binary measures of
democratic institutions.
In particular, we code a binary indicator for economic shocks that takes a value of one,
if at least once over the past two years an adverse (that is, negative) cyclical income shock
occurred, which in absolute terms is larger or equal than five percent of the HP-filtered
income per capita trend. Note that negative cyclical shocks of more than five percent are
sizable. For example, even during the Great Recession and its aftermath, most Western
countries did not experience shocks of more than two to three percent of GDP per capita.
In Greece, a country that was hit especially hard by the recession and the following Euro
Crisis, the largest shock amounted to a value of -5.33 percent in 2011. As consequence,
such events are relatively rare and occur only in less than five percent of the country-year
observations of our data. A substantial amount of these shocks occurs in low and middle
income countries. Because these shocks pose a sizable strain on incomes and the political
discourse within countries for some time, we allow the shock indicator to take a value of
one also if the shock occurred in one of the two previous years (that is, l = 2). Given
a democratic transition begins in period t− k, we thus code the shock indicator st−k to
take a value of one, if a cyclical shock occurred in either of the years t− k, t− (k + 1), or
t− (k+ 2). The so-measured shock indicator overall takes a value of one for roughly twelve
percent of the annual observations with economic shocks being concentrated among low
5In particular, the SWIID uses imputation procedures to construct a comprehensive set of inequality
estimates over time, with the numerous Gini data points varying with respect to their (un-)certainty.
6In fact, Solt (2015), refuted the critique on this data set by asserting that “[t]hose pursuing research
on income inequality across many countries and over time [...] will often find that the SWIID is their best
choice of data source” (Solt, 2015, p. 690).
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and middle income countries. Choosing a longer window (l > 2) for economic shocks to
affect democratic institutions results in a larger number of “shock” observations and, thus,
a noisier measure. In contrast, choosing a narrower window (l < 2) results in fewer but
more concentrated effects of economic shocks on democratic institutions. A more narrow
coding is more likely to miss slumps that unfold their full effects only over the span of
several years. We present results for alternative windows lengths for the construction of
shocks in the robustness analysis.
Following the rule suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the smoothing parameter for
the HP filter is set to λ = 6.25. The smoothing parameter determines how smooth the
trend component of the filtered GDP series is, and, thus, how large the peaks of cyclical
fluctuations are. A lower smoothing parameter produces smaller cyclical fluctuations and
thus stronger changes in the long-run trend, and vice versa. We consider the sensitivity of
our results regarding the choice of this parameter in the robustness section.
In order to investigate whether economic shocks affect not only small but also major
changes in democratic institutions, we construct a binary measure of changes in democratic
quality (that is, a “democratization” indicator). This indicator takes a value of one, if
the change in normalized democratic quality exceeds a certain threshold over an interval
of k = 3 years. In order to account for disparities in variation among the different
indicators of democratic quality, we set these thresholds to 0.50 for the PolityIV, 0.30 for
the Freedom House, 0.40 for the artificial principal components indicator. This coding
choice generates a similar number of roughly 80 democratic transitions across the three
continuous democracy indices. By construction, democratization takes a value of one, if
the dichotomous Democracy-Dictatorship index changes from zero to one. Due to the
binary dependent variable, the empirical framework corresponds to a linear probability
model that estimates the likelihood of democratization conditional on economic shocks
and inequality. In the robustness section, we explore the sensitivity of the findings with
respect to alternative assumptions about the choice of k and the threshold for the required
change in the democracy indices.
In the baseline specifications of the empirical model, economic shocks are coded to
occur before the democratization process started. Conceptually, the switch from autocracy
to democracy and economic shocks might also overlap. However, in such a case, the
economic shock might result from a feedback effect from democratization to economic
performance and, thus, be endogenous. Therefore, our baseline coding choice presents
a cleaner and more conservative view on the effect of income shocks and inequality on
democratization. Nevertheless, we also report results for economic shocks that overlap
with democratization in the robustness analysis.
The analysis is based on a yearly unbalanced panel of 130 countries for the period
1950–2014 with more than 3,000 country-year observations.7
7Table E.1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics of the data.
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6.3 Empirical Results
6.3.1 Income, Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democracy
Income and Income Shocks. We begin the empirical analysis by replicating the
standard specification in the related literature with democracy, measured by an index of
the quality of political institutions, as dependent variable and income per capita as main
regressor, using a country panel with annual observations. In addition, we add income
inequality and an interaction between income and income inequality. Panel (a) of Table 6.1
presents the corresponding results, which effectively reproduce the analysis of Acemoglu
et al. (2008) extended to the consideration of economic inequality and an interaction
between income and inequality. The results confirm their main finding of no effect of
income on democracy, once country and time fixed effects are accounted for. Moreover,
the estimates provide no evidence for an interaction between income and inequality in
shaping democratic institutions. The point estimates for the coefficients of income and
the interaction term combined are not different from zero.8
Panel (b) of Table 6.1 goes beyond estimating the effect of marginal changes in income
levels and investigates the effects of substantial negative economic shocks instead of
continuous variations in income. The dependent variable is still an index measure of
democratic quality measured on a discrete or continuous support. The results reveal
that the occurrence of a negative cyclical income shock possesses a significant, adverse
direct effect on democratic quality. According to the estimates in Column (1), a negative
income shock leads to a reduction in democratic quality of 0.09 on the Polity IV index,
which has been normalized to lie in the interval [0,1]. In contrast, the interaction term
suggests that negative income shocks exert a positive effect on democratic quality, which
increases with the level of income inequality. Given the empirical results from Column
(1), the overall effect of a negative economic shock on democratic quality turns positive
above a threshold value of roughly 0.47 for the lagged market Gini coefficient. This cutoff
corresponds approximately to the 60th percentile of the lagged market Gini coefficient
in the estimation sample. Correspondingly, the estimated marginal effect of an adverse
cyclical shock on democratic quality would be positive for approximately 40 percent of the
observations and negative for the remainder. Similar estimates obtain for other indicators
of democratic quality. This result is a first piece of evidence that income shocks rather
than minor fluctuations in income levels trigger major changes in institutional quality.
Democratic Quality vs. Democracy. As next step, we consider binary measures of
democracy instead of index measures. Hence, the following analysis considers the effect of
8Figure E.1 in the Appendix illustrates this finding by comparing the (collapsed) unconditional variation
between log GDP per capita and the PolityIV index with the residuals of both variables after partialling
out country and time fixed effects.
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Table 6.1: Income, Inequality, and Democracy
Dependent variable is
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Acemoglu et al. (2008) with inequality interaction
Democratic Qualityt−1 0.86*** 0.84*** 0.80*** 0.84***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Incomet−1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Inequalityt−1 0.42 0.19 -0.45 0.25
(0.50) (0.35) (1.01) (0.50)
(Income·Inequality)t−1 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06)
Controls X X X X
Countries 128 133 131 125
Observations 3898 3794 3307 3026
R2 0.82 0.78 0.71 0.79
(b) Negative cyclical income shocks and inequality
Democratic Qualityt−1 0.86*** 0.84*** 0.80*** 0.84***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Shockt−1 -0.09*** -0.05* -0.16*** -0.09***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Inequalityt−1 -0.11 -0.04 -0.38** -0.16
(0.08) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10)
(Shock·Inequality)t−1 0.19*** 0.12** 0.35*** 0.20***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Controls X X X X
Shocks 492 490 400 382
Countries 128 133 131 125
Observations 3881 3782 3290 3015
R2 0.82 0.79 0.71 0.79
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Average years of schooling is included as control for
education. In Panel (b), log GDP p.c. is added to as control for income. The shock indicator in Panel (b) takes a
value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative cyclical shock of at least minus
five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the
smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
income shocks on substantial changes in institutional quality instead of marginal changes of
the respective index. Table 6.2 presents the baseline results for the effect of negative cyclical
shocks, economic inequality, and their interaction on the probability of observing a shift
to democracy. The first row of coefficients provide a mirror image of the previous results
regarding the autocorrelation of institutional quality: Countries that originally possess
high democratic quality are less likely to undergo a transition from a non-democratic to a
democratic regime. The point estimates for the direct effect of an adverse cyclical shock
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Table 6.2: Negative Cyclical Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−3 -0.17*** -0.13** -0.33*** -0.26***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Inequalityt−3 -0.32** -0.02 -0.82** -0.54**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.33) (0.25)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.37*** 0.31** 0.68*** 0.55***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 448 450 349 332
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
R2 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as
controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality
occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative
cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn
and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Standard errors are clustered on the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
reveal a negative sign and vary between –0.13 and –0.33. Conditional on the occurrence
of such a negative income shock, the probability of democratization declines by 13 to 33
percentage points. This direct effect is quantitatively larger compared to a model that
instead uses index measures of democratic quality. Again, this direct effect is moderated by
the interaction between cyclical shocks and income inequality. The corresponding estimate
possesses a positive sign for all measures of democratization and ranges between 0.31 and
0.68, which is again quantitatively larger than before. Throughout all specifications, the
point estimates for the direct effect of a negative cyclical shock and its interaction with
inequality are significant at the five-percent level.
The implied marginal effect of an economic shock on democratization is thus non-
monotonic and can be either positive or negative conditional on the level of economic
inequality. The marginal effect can be obtained by computing
MEshocki,t = β̂ + γ̂ · xi,t−3 . (6.2)
The point estimates from the first column therefore imply a positive marginal effect of a
negative income shock on democratization for values of the market Gini in period t− 3
above a cutoff of 0.46, and a negative marginal effect otherwise.
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Figure 6.1: Effect of a Negative Income Shock on Changes in Democratic Quality
Notes: The marginal effects of negative income shocks are based on the estimates in Table 6.2.
Figure 6.1 depicts the marginal effects of a negative income shock on changes in
democracy conditional on the level of inequality for all four specifications of Table 6.2.
The solid line represents the respective marginal effect, whereas the dashed lines depict
the corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals.9 The estimated marginal effects are
significant at the five-percent level for a sufficiently equal or unequal distribution of incomes
as all panels in Figure 6.1 confirm. For intermediate levels of economic inequality, the
marginal effects become quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.10
For the sample at hand, these results suggest that negative economic shocks unfold a
positive marginal effect on the likelihood of a shift to democracy for roughly 53 percent of
the country-year observations and a negative marginal effect for the remaining 47 percent.
9For a large sample, the confidence interval of the marginal effect is given by ME ± z1−τ/2 × ŜE
with ŜE =
√
[V ar(β̂) + x2t−3 × V ar(γ̂) + 2× xt−3 × Cov(β̂, γ̂)] and z1−τ/2 being the critical value of a
two-sided t-test of size τ .
10Figure E.2 in the Appendix shows the corresponding marginal effects of economic inequality on the
likelihood of democratization conditional on the occurrence of a negative cyclical shock. The figure reveals
that in the absence of negative cyclical shocks, a marginal increase in economic inequality reduces the
likelihood of democratization. In the presence of an adverse cyclical shock, this hampering effect vanishes,
which concurs with a window of opportunity for democratic transitions.
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Given a domain of values for the market Gini coefficient in period t−3 of roughly [0.23, 0.68],
the estimated marginal effect varies across all specifications between [−0.17, 0.13] with a
zero effect for intermediate levels of inequality. Thus, in the most extreme case of inequality
observed in the data, a negative cyclical shock increases the likelihood of democratization
by 13 percentage points. In contrast, for the most equal society observed in the data,
a negative cyclical shock reduces the probability of a substantial change in democratic
quality by 17 percentage points.
Positive and Negative Shocks. Up to this point, the analysis restricted attention to
negative income shocks and confirmed the finding of a non-monotonic effect of negative
cyclical income shocks on the likelihood of democratization conditional on the extent of
economic inequality. However, similar to the rationale of a window of opportunity for
democratization during economic downturns, positive shocks might mute the support for
a switch from autocracy to democracy during economic upturns and thereby stabilize
autocracies. Analogous to the negative cyclical shock indicator, we thus construct a binary
indicator variable for positive economic shocks, which takes a value of one, if, within a time
interval of three years, there was at least once a positive cyclical shock of at least plus five
percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP-filtered income series. Sizable
positive shocks are rare events and occur only in slightly more than five percent of the
country-year observations. Following the same coding convention as for negative cyclical
shocks, the positive shock indicator takes also value one if a sizable shock occurred during
one of the two previous years (that is, l = 2). Overall, the shock indicator takes value
one for roughly 15 percent of the observations with economic shocks being concentrated
among low and middle income countries.
Table 6.3 presents the results for a specification with both positive and negative eco-
nomic shocks. In order to account for the possibility of heterogeneous effects from positive
and negative cyclical shocks, both variables enter the estimation equation separately.
Therefore, countries that do not experience either shock constitute the reference category.
Throughout all specifications, negative cyclical shocks again exhibit a negative direct
effect on the likelihood of democratization. Moreover, the estimated interaction term
between negative cyclical shocks and inequality shows a positive sign and is significant at
the five-percent level throughout all specifications. Notably, the point estimates for the
negative cyclical shock and the corresponding interaction term are quantitatively almost
identical to the baseline estimates presented in Table 6.2. Positive cyclical shocks, in
contrast, do not affect the likelihood of democratization; the results provide no evidence
for either a direct or an indirect effect through the interaction with economic inequality.
In light of this result, we focus attention on negative income shocks for the remainder of
this paper.
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Table 6.3: Cyclical Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Negative Shockt−3 -0.17*** -0.13** -0.33*** -0.26***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Positive Shockt−3 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Inequalityt−3 -0.33** -0.01 -0.84** -0.55**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.33) (0.25)
(Negative Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.36*** 0.31** 0.68*** 0.56***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
(Positive Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.09
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Negative shocks 448 450 349 332
Positive shocks 534 523 430 394
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
R2 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as controls for income
and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurred that over a period of three
years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if,
within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative/positive cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by
the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25.
Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
6.3.2 Robustness
This section briefly discusses the findings of robustness checks regarding alternative
specifications or modifications in the coding of variables. The corresponding tables are
presented in the Appendix.
Accounting for Multiple Imputation. The SWIID data set is based on imputation
procedures to construct a comprehensive set of inequality estimates over time. As conse-
quence, the data set provides numerous Gini data points are created for a given country
and period (100 per year), which vary with respect to their respective (un-)certainty.
Accounting for this uncertainty related to multiple imputation requires a time-consuming
procedure in which the analysis of interest is conducted 100 times for different poten-
tial Gini candidate values. Table E.2 shows that this correction is inessential for the
quantitative and qualitative results of our baseline specification.
Length of Time Window for Income Shocks. The construction of a variable of
income shocks requires an assumption about the time window l during which the cyclical
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component is below a certain threshold relative to the trend component. A narrower
window choice (l < 2) allows for a more precise timing of the effect but might miss out
the effects of prolonged economic downturns. Instead choosing a longer window (l > 2)
results in a larger number of “shock” observations and, thus, a noisier measure. Table E.3
shows that the main results do not change considerably for different coding choices (for
example, l = 0 or l = 4) of the window length of economic shocks.
Sensitivity of the Trend/Cycle Decomposition. The construction of a variable of
income shocks using a HP decomposition also requires an assumption about the smoothing
parameter. Table E.4 explores how the effect of negative economic shocks on democratic
institutions varies for different specifications of the smoothing parameter λ. In particular,
cyclical shocks unfold a stronger effect on the likelihood of democratic transitions for a
more smoothed long-run trend (λ = 1) with fewer shocks and a weaker effect for a less
smoothed long-run trend (λ = 100) with more shocks.
Length of Time Window for Changes in Democracy. Ideally, democratization
processes that are triggered by economic shocks should show first detectable results within
a short period of time. However, it is conceivable that democratization processes require
more time to be completed. If the switch from autocracy to democracy spans over a longer
period, for instance because it is accompanied by civil conflict, economic shocks are unlikely
to be the single most important determinant for the success of democratization. Table
E.5 explores how the empirical results react to a different coding of the democratization
period (for example, k = 1 or k = 5).
Thresholds for Changes in Binary Democracy Variable. The construction of a
binary democratization variable requires an assumption about a threshold for the required
change in the normalized democratic quality index. Table E.6 confirms that the qualitative
findings of this paper do not hinge on the difference in thresholds for the construction of
our dichotomous democratization variable.
Alternative Binary Democracy Measures. As an alternative robustness check, we
apply our coding of negative cyclical shocks and democratic transitions to the concept of
a binary democracy variable suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2016). In addition to their
democracy indicator, their data additionally contains the binary measure constructed by
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). Both measures of democratic quality are based on
sizable changes in the democracy indicators by PolityIV and Freedom House in conjunction
with certain stability criteria for successful democratic transitions. Table E.7 shows that
applying our coding choices to the data set of Acemoglu et al. (2016) yields the same
qualitative results with quantitatively even slightly larger coefficients. The respective cutoff
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values for the market Gini coefficient in period t− 3 are quantitatively almost identical
to our baseline specification. The implied marginal effects are slightly larger in absolute
terms; that is, they take somewhat higher values for a given level of economic inequality.
This result demonstrates that our baseline results do not hinge on coding conventions
regarding democratic quality. Moreover, our baseline results provide a conservative view
on the role of economic shocks and inequality for the likelihood of democratic transitions.
Time Overlap Between the Occurrence of Shocks and Changes in Democracy.
As discussed above, economic shocks are coded to occur before the democratization process
started in the baseline specifications of the empirical model. Conceptually, the switch
from autocracy to democracy and economic shocks might also overlap, though implying
that the baseline specification applies a timing restriction that is too conservative for
capturing the full effect. However, this timing excludes direct feedback effects. To explore
the robustness of the results with respect to this timing convention, we estimated models
that allow for the democratization process and the cyclical shocks to overlap. Explicitly,
we still measure changes in democratic quality between t and t − k. Economic shocks,
however, enter the empirical analysis either in period t− k+ 1 or t− k+ 2, thus generating
an overlap between economic shocks and democratic transitions. As expected, in this case
the estimated interaction between economic shocks and inequality is, in fact, larger than
in the baseline specification as documented in Table E.8.
Logit Estimates. While the linear probability model is preferable in the context of
specifications with interactions, the use of a binary dependent variable suggests the use
of a logit estimator to check robustness. As shown in Table E.9, such an estimation
produces similar qualitative results for a conditional logit regression as for the linear
probability model. However, due to the small number of major political transitions and
economic shocks in the sample, the logistic regression framework drops a large number of
observations for which the estimated likelihood would diverge to infinity. The findings
from a logit regression should thus be seen as suggestive at best.
6.3.3 Additional Results
This section reports further results with respect to different measures of economic shocks
and discusses the role of demographic characteristics for the likelihood of democratization.
Income Trends. The specifications in Section 6.3.1 considered short-term cyclical
income shocks together with economic inequality as key determinant for democratization.
Long-run growth trends constitute an alternative angle to approach the definition of
economic shocks. A spell of prolonged stagnation or shrinkage presents a potential
environment for individual agents to voice their discontent with the existing political
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Table 6.4: Negative Long-Run Growth Trends, Inequality, and Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Trendt−3 -0.22*** -0.19* -0.24* -0.22**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09)
Inequalityt−3 -0.32** -0.02 -0.84** -0.56**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.33) (0.25)
(Trend·Inequality)t−3 0.49*** 0.49* 0.50* 0.47**
(0.18) (0.25) (0.29) (0.22)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Trends 256 263 242 237
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3663 3561 3022 2759
R2 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as controls for
income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurred that over a
period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero else. The trend indicator takes
a value of one, if the real, HP-filtered GDP p.c. series shrinks by at least five percent over a time interval of three years, and zero
else. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Standard errors are clustered
on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
institutions. According to this rationale, we code an adverse (that is, negative) economic
trend indicator which takes a value of one, if the real, HP-filtered GDP per capita
series shrinks by more than five percent over a time period of three years, and zero
else. Prolonged trends of shrinking real income occur in roughly seven percent of the
country-year observations with again a strong concentration in low and middle income
countries.
Table 6.4 reports results for the negative growth trend dummy variable instead of
the cyclical shock indicator. The estimated parameters confirm the finding of a non-
monotonic effect of economic distress and inequality on the likelihood of democratization.
The point estimates show a similar qualitative pattern as those obtained in the baseline
model for negative cyclical shocks reported in Table 6.2. In comparison, however, the
computed coefficients in Table 6.4 vary less across the different specifications. The
estimated parameter for adverse trends and their interaction with economic inequality
are significant at the ten-percent level throughout all specifications with the most precise
estimates for the PolityIV index. Over all specifications, the implied marginal effects of
a negative growth trend on the probability of democratization are quantitatively similar
to the baseline estimates and lie within the interval [−0.13, 0.14]. Hence, conditional on
the level of economic inequality, a prolonged spell of shrinking real per capita income
reduces the likelihood of democratization up to 13 percentage points for the most equal
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society observed in the data. On the other extreme, a negative growth trend increases
the likelihood of a democratic transition by 14 percentage points for the most unequal
society observed in the sample. For intermediate levels of inequality, the marginal effects
are again close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Inflation Shocks. Up to this point, economic shocks were defined as cyclical fluctu-
ations around a long-run growth trend, or the trend itself. Another way of modeling
economic shocks is to consider hikes in inflation rates. Many low income countries, for
example, heavily rely on the export of certain agricultural products and natural resources.
Fluctuations in international commodity prices, however, may put substantial strain on per
capita incomes and open a window of opportunity for changes in political institutions.11
Hence, we construct an economic shock indicator based on price changes derived from
the GDP deflator. Because countries, which catch up economically, typically experience
high inflation rates during the convergence process, we limit attention to cases with rather
drastic price changes. Therefore, the economic shock indicator takes a value of one, if the
inflation rate within a given year equals or exceeds 20 percent, and zero otherwise. In order
to be consistent with the coding of negative economic shocks in the baseline specification,
the indicator also takes a value of one, if the inflation rate exceeded the cutoff value in
either of the two previous years. In total, approximately 24 percent of the country-year
observations of the data set classify as periods with high inflation. Most of these cases
are observed in low and middle income countries with strong persistence regarding the
(in-)stability of prices. For data availability, the estimation sample slightly shrinks by 300
to 400 country-year observations.
Table 6.5 reports results for the effect of inflation shocks and inequality on the likelihood
of democratization. The point estimates are of similar magnitude as those obtained for the
baseline specification. Due to the considerably larger number of shocks, the coefficients
are however less precisely estimated compared to the model with negative cyclical shocks.
Hence, the empirical model lacks the power to estimate an interaction term that is
statistically different from zero for the specifications in Columns (2) and (4). Overall, the
findings again confirm the non-monotonic pattern of economic shocks on the democratic
transitions conditional on the degree of economic inequality. Given the distribution of
market Gini coefficients in period t − 3, the marginal effects of an inflation shock on
the probability of democratization lie within the interval [−0.14, 0.10] which conforms
closely to the range of marginal effects obtained for the baseline model. We interpret this
result as another piece of evidence that shocks to (disposable) income rather than minor
fluctuations in income levels trigger major changes in democratic institutions.
11See, for example, work by Brückner, Ciccone, and Tesei (2012), which exploits oil price shocks to
identify changes in democratic quality.
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Table 6.5: High Inflation, Inequality, and Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.31*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.38***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Shockt−3 -0.18*** -0.13* -0.26** -0.15
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
Inequalityt−3 -0.35* -0.06 -1.00** -0.55*
(0.19) (0.15) (0.40) (0.31)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.40*** 0.29 0.53** 0.31
(0.13) (0.18) (0.23) (0.21)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 64 61 94 64
Shocks 715 682 639 606
Countries 123 123 118 118
Observations 3239 3132 2547 2440
R2 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.14
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as
controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality
occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, at least once within a time interval of three years, the inflation rate,
measured by the GDP deflator, exceeds a threshold of 20 percentage points. Inequality refers to the market Gini coefficient.
Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The Role of Demography. Finally, the demographic structure of a country represents
another possible driving force behind political transitions. In particular, conflict and
struggle for power become more likely if young individuals, “those who are in demand
of land, jobs, higher education, opportunity, and other kinds of resources in society”
(Fuller, 1995, p. 152), constitute a large portion of the total population. Building on
Fuller’s (1995) insights, the probability of a democratic transition should thus be higher for
economically unequal countries that experience a “youth bulge”, that is, a large share of
youths that causes a bulge in the population tree. Following this reasoning, we interpret a
high proportion of youths as measured by the share of 15- to 24-year-olds in the population
as demographic pressure.12 In our sample, the mean share of 15- to 24-year-olds in the
population corresponds to approximately 18 percent with values ranging between 9 and 26
percent. Moreover, we interact demographic pressure and economic inequality in order to
allow for a window of opportunity.
Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table 6.6 present the results of a linear probability
model, which extends the baseline specification with negative cyclical shocks by including
the population share of the 15- to 24-year-olds and its interaction with economic inequality
as additional variables to control for demographic pressure.13 The results confirm a non-
12This categorization follows Fuller (1995) and represents “the conventional cutoff for youth in the
literature” (Nord̊as and Davenport, 2013, p. 932).
13Table E.10 in the Appendix reports results for an empirical model without negative income shocks.
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Table 6.6: Demographic Pressure as Determinant of Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.40*** -0.40***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Shockt−3 -0.18*** -0.23*** -0.14** -0.19** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.27*** -0.28***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10)
Inequalityt−3 -1.32*** -1.34*** -0.99* -1.01* -0.97 -0.97 -1.27* -1.27*
(0.48) (0.49) (0.59) (0.59) (0.78) (0.78) (0.67) (0.67)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.32** 0.30** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.56*** 0.56***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
(Sh.15–24)t−3 -2.10* -2.14* -2.57* -2.63* 0.17 0.17 -1.61 -1.63
(1.12) (1.12) (1.38) (1.38) (1.98) (1.99) (1.60) (1.60)
(Sh.15–24·Inequality)t−3 6.36** 6.38** 5.66* 5.71* 1.38 1.38 4.48 4.50
(2.48) (2.48) (3.10) (3.09) (4.21) (4.22) (3.54) (3.54)
(Shock·Sh.15–24)t−3 0.31 0.35 -0.00 0.07
(0.29) (0.39) (0.50) (0.38)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Transitions 76 76 81 81 114 114 79 79
Shocks 448 448 450 450 349 349 332 332
Countries 128 128 133 133 129 129 124 124
Observations 3678 3678 3575 3575 3036 3036 2773 2773
R2 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as controls for income and
education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurred that over a period of three years
equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a
time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component
of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Sh.15–24 measures the
share of 15- to 24-year-olds in the total population. Inequality refers to the market Gini coefficient. Standard errors are clustered on the
country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
monotonic effect of negative cyclical shocks on the likelihood of democratic transitions
conditional on the extent of economic inequality. The reported estimates and the implied
marginal effects conform almost perfectly to those obtained for the baseline specifications
in Table 6.2.
The computed estimates in Columns (1) and (3) parallel the previous qualitative
findings of a non-monotonic effect for demographic pressure as potential window of
opportunity. Specifically, the likelihood of democratization decreases with an increasing
share of youths. However, this effect is moderated by economic inequality through the
interaction term. For more unequal societies, for example, above a Gini coefficient of 0.45
according to estimates of the third column, a youth bulge implies an increased likelihood
of democratization. Correspondingly, the marginal effect of demographic pressure on
the likelihood of democratic transitions is positive for approximately one half of the
country-year observations in the sample and negative else. However, the respective
These parsimonious specifications produce parameter estimates for demographic pressure and its interaction
with economic inequality that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 6.6.
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parameter estimates for the youth share and its interaction with economic inequality are
not statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels for the specifications
in Columns (5) and (7). Hence, the results indicate a potential role of demographic pressure
for democratic transitions; though, we view this evidence as too weak to be conclusive.
Finally, Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report results for an extended model in which
economic shocks and demographic pressure may interact. Throughout all specifications,
the estimated coefficient of the interaction is small and not statistically different from zero
at the conventional significance levels. Moreover, including this interaction term does not
considerably change the qualitative and quantitative findings. Hence, economic shocks
and demographic pressure operate not jointly but in parallel to each other.14
6.4 Conclusion
This paper documents novel cross-country panel evidence for a non-monotonic effect of
income on democracy. In particular, the evidence suggests that when focusing on major
fluctuations in income rather than continuous variation in income levels, income shocks
have a significant effect on democratic quality. Moreover, the results reveal an important
asymmetry of this effect. Negative income shocks exhibit a significantly negative effect
on democracy, whereas no comparable countervailing effect is found for positive income
shocks. In the absence of shocks, inequality has a deteriorating effect on democracy.
Additionally, negative income shocks reveal an important interaction effect with economic
inequality. Negative income shocks lead to a deterioration of democratic quality in equal
societies, whereas they entail an improvement in democratic quality in unequal societies,
as illustrated in Figure 6.1. No such interaction is found for positive income shocks.
This suggests that negative economic shocks might initiate democratic movements in an
environment with high inequality. By highlighting the role of asymmetric shocks and their
interaction with inequality, the results shed new light on the intricate relation between
income and democracy and on the seemingly contradictory findings in the literature.
14Table E.11 in the Appendix presents results for an empirical model that additionally incorporates a
triple interaction term between adverse cyclical shocks, demographic pressure, and economic inequality.
The estimated triple interaction term, however, possesses large confidence intervals and is thus insignificant
at conventional significance levels throughout all specifications. In combination with the statistically
insignificant interaction between demographic pressure and cyclical shocks reported in even columns of
Table 6.6, the results preclude a considerable interaction between demographic pressure and economic
shocks. Therefore, this evidence further indicates that both channels operate in isolation.
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Chapter 7
Democracy, Inequality, and
Institutional Quality1
7.1 Introduction
The quality of institutions granting economic freedom and liberties is generally thought to
be a crucial factor for long-run development. A recent empirical literature has identified
two key determinants of institutional quality. First, democracy provides constraints on
those in power and is often used as a proxy for the quality of economic institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu, 2008). Second, a moderate inequality of income and economic
resources limits the distributive pressures that might erode institutional quality through
influence activities and informality (Chong and Calderon, 2000; Chong and Gradstein,
2007a, 2007b).
Based on intuitive reasoning, however, it has been claimed repeatedly that the beneficial
effect of democracy on the quality of economic institutions might be eroded by excessive
inequality. In fact, as is discussed in more detail below, there is a considerable theoretical
literature that underpins this conjecture and suggests that democracy and inequality do
not affect the quality of economic institutions independently from each other. Instead,
there might be important interactions between inequality and political institutions in
determining institutional quality. This conjecture seems to have been present in the works
by De Tocqueville (1835) as well as Lipset (1959), who saw economic equality as a central
co-factor of democracy in generating good institutions. More recently, this conjecture has
been rephrased in the context of the debate regarding the increasing inequality and the
consequences for civil liberties and social peace (Piketty, 2014). Yet, to date, there exists
little to no evidence on the question as to whether the beneficial effect of democracy on
institutional quality is eroded by excessive inequality.
1The final version of this paper is published in the European Economic Review, 91, 209–228. Please
refer to the published version.
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This paper tests if such an interaction between democracy and equality exists in
shaping the de facto quality of economic institutions. The starting point of the empirical
analysis is the conceptual distinction between political and economic institutions. There is
a widespread perception in the literature that democracy, as measured by de jure measures,
such as constraints on the executive or political freedom, is equivalent to high de facto
quality of institutions as experienced by individuals, particularly in the economic domain.
While both conform to North’s notion of “rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 3), political
institutions describe the extent to which individuals can engage and participate in the
political process via elections and referendums, economic institutions comprise aspects
of de facto economic freedom, as well as institutional features that directly affect the
incentives for entrepreneurial activities and investment, such as bureaucratic efficiency
and impartiality of the judiciary. There are important conceptual differences, which refer
to the nature of institutions, as well as their perception. Economic institutions are mostly
implemented by laws that have been passed by the government and reflect de facto liberties
of individual citizens in the economic domain. In contrast, political institutions, in terms of
democracy, the constraints on the executive, or the ability to vote, reflect legally codified,
constitutional rules. In this sense, political institutions can be seen as determinants
of economic institutions but not vice versa (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2005). Likewise, some authors have pointed out the inherently different nature
of institutions by emphasizing the different functions of political institutions as constraints
for politicians and the government, as opposed to economic institutions that enable private
actors to interact and achieve their goals (see, for example, Voigt, 2013).
Figure 7.1 provides a first indication that democracy and institutional quality are not
necessarily equivalent. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the correlation of country averages
of democracy and equality with institutional quality over the time period 1970 to 2010.
Institutional quality is measured either in terms of an index of Economic Freedom or in
terms a composite index that is based on the first principal component of the Economic
Freedom and the Civil Liberties indices. Panels (c) and (d) plot the respective raw data
for the same time frame in terms of five-year averages, which is the variation in the data
used in the empirical analysis below (jittered for better visibility). The figure on the left
in each panel plots the quality of economic institutions against the extent of democracy,
proxied by Constraints on the Executive. In the figure on the right, the quality of economic
institutions is plotted against equality, proxied by (1−Gini). Henceforth, we refer to this
measure as the reversed Gini coefficient. All variables are normalized to range between 0
and 1 with higher values indicating either a higher institutional quality, more democracy,
or more equality.
The data reveal the expected positive correlation between institutional quality and
democracy, but contrary to the widespread assumption that democracy and high quality
institutions are essentially synonyms, there is substantial variation in institutional quality,
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(a) Cross-Country Correlations: Economic Freedom (b) Cross-Country Correlations: Composite Index
(c) Raw Correlations: Economic Freedom (d) Raw Correlations: Composite Index
Figure 7.1: Correlation Between Institutional Quality and Democracy or Income Equality
Notes: Institutional Quality is measured either by the Economic Freedom index or by a composite index based on the first principal component
of the Economic Freedom and the Civil Liberties indices, respectively. Democracy is measured in terms of constraints on the executive. Income
Equality is (1 − Gini). Variables and data sources are described in more detail in Section 7.3, see also Table F.1.
even conditional on the same level of democracy. In particular, the figures illustrate that
there are countries that exhibit very democratic political institutions but that at the
same time have low scores of institutional quality, such as India. Other countries with
autocratic regimes (that is, low democracy scores) score high in terms of the quality of
economic institutions. Examples are Jordan, Panama, or Singapore, which achieved a
considerably high quality of institutions despite relatively low levels of democracy. When
looking beyond country averages, another interesting case is Brazil, which scored high on
institutional quality during the military dictatorship during the 1980s.2 Incidentally, these
countries exhibit relatively moderate levels of equality, as measured by the world-wide
distribution of reversed Gini coefficients.
The figures on the right in each panel of Figure 7.1 show the corresponding relationship
between institutional quality and the degree of income equality. There is no clear correlation
pattern. However, as suggested by the non-linear fit in panels (a) and (b) or a categorization
into democratic and non-democratic observations in panels (c) and (d), the relationship
between equality and institutional quality appears to be heterogeneous or even non-
monotonic. In particular, the data patterns suggest a positive correlation between equality
and economic freedom for democracies but a negative correlation for non-democracies.3
2Similar levels of economic institutions have been achieved only during the boom years between 2005
and 2010, fueled by revenues from the state owned oil company. The period after democratization, on
the other hand, had been characterized by high corruption, involving bribes of high-ranking politicians
through the state owned oil company and large construction companies.
3The democracy split is based on the binary Democracy-Dictatorship index constructed by Cheibub,
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This is mirrored in the correlation between democracy and institutional quality. This
correlation is substantially weaker when economic inequality is high as compared to when
inequality is low.
Taken together, the data depicted in Figure 7.1 suggest that democracy and equality
might potentially reinforce each other in shaping institutional quality. Observations ex-
hibiting high scores of democracy and equality are likely to exhibit the highest institutional
quality, whereas institutional quality might also be (relatively) high for observations charac-
terized by low equality and low scores of democracy. In particular, the two graphs suggest
the possibility of a positive interaction between democracy and equality in determining
institutional quality. For example, for India or Brazil, or some other Latin American
countries, there appears not to have been a clear positive correlation between democratic
quality and institutional quality, while at the same time, inequality was high. At the
opposite ends of the spectrum, there are examples or countries with low inequality, where
democratization was conducive to the quality of economic institutions, such as several
former socialist states in Eastern Europe.4
The main contribution of this paper is the identification of a robust empirical interaction
between democracy and equality in shaping the quality of the economic institutions. The
empirical analysis is based on cross-country panel data ranging over the period 1970 to
2010, which are behind the patterns shown in Figure 7.1. Corresponding to the theoretical
arguments in the existing literature, the empirical framework treats economic institutions
as the dependent variable that is determined by the quality of political institutions in
terms of democracy and constraints on the executive, as well by the prevailing level of
economic (in-)equality.5 The empirical strategy exploits variation in democratic quality
and income equality within countries over time, thereby conditioning on country-specific
and time-specific unobserved heterogeneity that might influence institutional quality, and
on controls for institutional quality in the past. Different estimation methods are employed
in order to account for the well-known problems in dynamic panels. Irrespective of the
estimation method and the underlying identification assumptions, the results reveal a
robust, significant positive interaction between democracy and equality in shaping the
quality of economic institutions. In terms of size, this interaction term is large enough to
render the effect of democracy on institutional quality negative for high levels of inequality
within the range of what is observed in the data. Hence, the results provide evidence for a
relevant dimension of heterogeneity in the way income inequality and democracy affect
the quality of economic institutions.
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Similar results obtain for splits based on alternative democracy indices.
4Likewise, there are highly unequal, non-democratic countries, like the Gulf states or some East Asian
countries, that appear to implement high quality economic institutions. Due to missing inequality data,
these countries are not included in the data sample, however.
5Clearly, there are indirect feedback effects from economic institutions through income growth, unem-
ployment, etc. to political institutions. These effects need time to work and are accounted for accordingly
in the empirical model, as discussed in detail below.
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By documenting a robust interaction between political institutions and inequality in
shaping institutional quality, this paper contributes to several branches of the literature.
The analysis provides evidence for an untested implication of an entire strand of theoretical
papers that will be discussed in the next section. The results also contribute to a small
empirical literature that has tried to identify the role of democracy and inequality for
institutional quality. Chong and Gradstein (2007b) provide evidence for a two-way causality
between the quality of institutions and a more equal distribution of income. In related
work, Chong and Gradstein (2007a) show that greater inequality can erode institutional
quality through fostering inequality. However, both papers do not investigate potential
interaction effects between inequality and democracy in affecting institutional quality. The
empirical contribution closest to the present investigation is by Sunde, Cervellati, and
Fortunato (2008). They provide evidence for an interaction effect when using cross-country
variation. Given the problems of omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity that
abound in cross-section regressions, their evidence can at best be seen as suggestive. The
present study shows that the finding of an interaction effect also emerges in a panel setting
after eliminating unobserved time-invariant cross-country heterogeneity, accounting for
past institutional outcomes, and applying state-of-the-art panel data estimation methods.
Besides this methodological contribution, our analysis also provides a more direct test of the
theoretical prediction, which stipulates an interaction of democracy and (in-)equality over
the development path, that is, within the same country over time. The empirical findings
also have implications for the interpretation of some of the earlier results on the role of
institutions for development—for example, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004)—
because they suggest a potentially more important role than previously thought of political
institutions and inequality. Moreover, this paper contributes to an ongoing debate about
how institutions should be measured, and what is comprised by different measures that are
frequently used in the literature. In particular, while there is a common perception that
different measures capture similar underlying institutional features, our findings document
that there is substantial variation across measures of political and economic institutions,
and that the correlation is lower than commonly thought, complementing the conceptual
arguments by Voigt (2013). To our knowledge, our analysis is among the first to open this
black box and test a theoretical prediction using a variety of different measures of political
and economic institutions. The results indicate a very robust interaction between political
institutions and (in-)equality within and across countries that has gone largely unnoticed
in the existing literature and that holds across combinations of various measures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 7.2 presents the theoretical
background that motivates the empirical analysis. Section 7.3 describes the data and their
sources. Section 7.4 presents the empirical model and identification strategy. Section 7.5
presents the main empirical results as well as the results of extensive robustness checks.
Section 7.6 concludes.
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7.2 Theoretical Background
The hypothesis that political institutions and inequality interact in shaping institutional
quality goes back as far as De Tocqueville (1835), who recognized the possible problems
associated with democracy in societies characterized by large economic inequality, in
particular, the possibility of a deterioration of equality of rights. At the same time, he
conjectured that equality was a prerequisite for a functioning democracy, because “(w)hen
no member of the community has much power or much wealth, tyranny is, as it were,
without opportunities”(De Tocqueville, 1835, Book 4, Chapter 6).6 Intuitive arguments
suggesting the existence of an interaction between democracy and inequality in shaping
institutional quality like those by De Tocqueville (1835) also seem to closely resemble the
view by Lipset (1959), according to whom not only income but also equality are the key
prerequisites of universal civil (and presumably economic) freedom.7 More recently, this
view has been been extended by arguments that excessive inequality leads to a breakdown
of institutional quality in democracies, see, for example, Piketty (2014).
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the commonly accepted perception
of the hierarchy of institutions, as reflected in the schematic model displayed in Figure
7.2. This conceptualization of the interplay between political institutions, inequality, and
institutional quality experienced by the citizens of a country adapts the framework of
institutional and economic development described by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005). They view political institutions and the distribution of resources as the two state
variables for analyzing institutional and economic dynamics. Through their influence on
de facto political power, these state variables determine the actual quality of institutions
that individuals experience and take as a basis for their decisions, in terms of, for example,
economic institutions or economic freedom. The consequences materialize both in terms of
economic performance and the future distribution of resources.8 This framework explicitly
6Alternatively, in Book 2, Chapter 3, de Tocqueville writes: “When the conditions of men are very
unequal, and inequality itself is the permanent state of society, individual men gradually become so
dissimilar that each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race: only one of these classes is ever in view
at the same instant; and losing sight of that general tie which binds them all within the vast bosom
of mankind, the observation invariably rests not on man, but on certain men. Those who live in this
aristocratic state of society never, therefore, conceive very general ideas respecting themselves, and that is
enough to imbue them with an habitual distrust of such ideas, and an instinctive aversion of them. He,
on the contrary, who inhabits a democratic country, sees around him, on every hand, men differing but
little from each other; he cannot turn his mind to any one portion of mankind, without expanding and
dilating his thought till it embraces the whole. All the truths which are applicable to himself, appear to
him equally and similarly applicable to each of his fellow-citizens and fellow-men.”
7In his famous article, Lipset writes that low inequality is consistent with democracy and individual
freedom: “From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which
relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population
could intelligently participate in politics [...] A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a
small favored elite would result either in oligarchy [...] or in tyranny.” (Lipset, 1959, p. 77).
8The framework is an adaptation of that presented by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), who
write that “(t)he two state variables are political institutions and the distribution of resources, and the
knowledge of these two variables at time t is sufficient to determine all the other variables in the system.
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Figure 7.2: A Conceptual Framework of Institutional and Economic Dynamics (Adapted
from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005, p. 392)
accounts for the possibility that economic development and wealth accumulation affect
political institutions, as argued in the political economy literature (see, for example, Olson,
1982). This framework can be implemented empirically by exploiting the difference in the
available empirical measures of institutions between the de jure political institutions and
the de facto liberties and freedoms in the economic domain. According to the view of
political institutions and the distribution of resources as state variables in the dynamic
process, the empirical framework treats economic institutions as dependent variable and
the quality of (de jure) political institutions as well as the level of economic inequality as
explanatory variables.9
This conceptual framework does not yet provide testable hypotheses regarding the signs
and form of the influence of the state variables on institutional quality. The commonly
accepted view in the literature, including Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), is
that inclusive political institutions, such as democracy, as well as moderate inequality in
the distribution of resources, are conducive to high-quality economic institutions and, thus,
a favorable environment for economic performance.
A series of formal models that study the institutional and economic dynamics in more
detail also predict an interaction of political institutions, in terms of democracy, and
inequality in determining the quality of economic institutions. For instance, Cervellati,
Fortunato, and Sunde (2008) investigate the interactions between political regime (oligarchy
versus democracy) and inequality in shaping the social contract in terms of rule of law,
and derive conditions under which rule of law emerges in equilibrium. In their model,
rule of law can emerge and persist in oligarchies, if economic inequality is sufficiently
large. Under these conditions, this equilibrium is preferred by all groups of society to an
equilibrium involving a democratic regime but wasteful social conflict. The reason is the
excessive distributive pressure that reduces the incentives for the protection of private
property rights by the state. A direct consequence is that democracy is not sufficient to
While political institutions determine the distribution of de jure political power in society, the distribution
of resources influences the distribution of de facto political power at time t. These two sources of political
power, in turn, affect the choice of economic institutions and influence the future evolution of political
institutions” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005, p. 392).
9In spirit, the framework captures the main elements of the framework of Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2005), which suffers from the shortcoming that de facto political power is hard to measure
empirically using the available measures.
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implement good institutions, and can, in the context of excessive inequality, lead to even
lower quality of the economic institutions. At the same time, democracy is instrumental
for implementing high institutional quality when inequality is low. A similar prediction
emerges out of dynamic models of franchise extension that allow for different scenarios of
democratization and show that peaceful transitions to democracy are more likely to occur
in societies in which resources are distributed more equally. In turn, peaceful transitions
to democracy lead to greater improvements in institutional quality, as well as greater
stability of democracy, see, for example, Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde (2012, 2014).
A non-monotonic effect of democracy on institutional quality is also consistent with
the predictions of the model by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), which is based on the
distinction between de jure political power reflected in democratic institutions, and the
distribution of de facto political power, which is the result of economic power as reflected
by inequality of income and wealth. The model illustrates how an elite can use their
wealth to influence electoral outcomes. An elite that commands a large fraction of income
and resources in the economy can use these to capture the state and enforce institutions
that serve their own interests. If economic resources are relatively evenly spread among
the population, it is difficult for the elite to direct sufficient funds and amass enough de
facto power to bias institutions in their favor, thereby eroding the quality of institutions.
Consequently, oligarchic structures and high inequality complement each other in restricting
institutional quality and civil liberties for the masses, and vice versa.
Alternatively, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik (2013) consider a political environment,
where groups of the population can bribe the elected government in order to achieve the
desired institutional outcome, provided they overcome a collective action problem. In
weakly institutionalized polities, where such bribe payments may play a role, voters prefer
to allow rents for the government in order to reduce incentives for bribes to be accepted.
Consequently, the sovereign will deliberately remove some of the checks and balances so
that the elite cannot successfully influence the executive and legislative. This leads to
two possible equilibrium constellations. On the one hand, there is a properly working
democracy, where the elite is not influential enough such that bribes do not play a significant
role for political decisions; in this scenario citizens can exert their democratic rights to
the full extent. On the other hand, if the elite is influential enough to effectively control
the government via bribes and implement policies favoring themselves, the government
is either de jure democratic but de facto autocratic, or the people remove some checks
and balances to reduce the incentives for corruption, rendering the government de jure
autocratic. Hence, “checks and balances are less likely to emerge [...] when inequality and
taxes are quite high” (Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik, 2013, p. 845). Hence, institutional
quality will depend on an interaction of inequality and the constraints imposed on the
executive, de facto or de jure, consistent with the empirical hypothesis of a non-monotonic
effect of democracy on institutional quality conditional on equality.
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A common feature of these theoretical considerations is that inequality is a determinant
of, or even a proxy for, the de facto power of the elite as well as a key factor behind the
redistributive pressure faced by the elite. If inequality is low, a democracy that provides
efficient economic institutions can be implemented, because the elite is relatively weak and
has no incentive for influencing the institutions. On the other hand, if inequality is high,
the elite either has the means and the incentive to control the government indirectly via
de facto power, or it can even directly take over because the poor majority accepts a social
contract with limited franchise in exchange for more efficient economic institutions. The
consequence is low institutional quality in terms of civil liberties and economic freedom
for the broad majority.
The non-monotonicity immanent in each of these theories implies the testable hypothesis
of a positive interaction of equality and political institutions, in shaping institutional
quality. The following empirical analysis is devoted to testing this hypothesis.
7.3 Data
In order to empirically assess the effects of equality and democracy on institutional quality,
we construct an unbalanced panel of 96 countries over the period 1970 to 2010.10 Because
institutions and equality exhibit limited variation over time, the data are used in five-year
periods, similar to Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008). This section gives
a short overview over the construction and coding of the main variables. A detailed
description of the data and their sources can be found in Table F.1 in the Appendix.
Table F.2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the
empirical analysis.11
7.3.1 Institutional Quality
The two main measures of (de facto) institutional quality are based on the Economic
Freedom of the World Index provided by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013) and the
Freedom House (2014) Civil Liberties indicator. The Economic Freedom index (EF)
is composed of 42 distinct variables in five general categories: size of government and
taxation; private property and the rule of law; soundness of money; trade regulation and
tariffs; regulation of business, labor, and capital markets. The Civil Liberties index (CL)
is based on 15 items for four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief; associational
and organizational rights; rule of law; and personal autonomy and individual rights.
10During earlier periods, developed countries of Europe and North America are oversampled due to
data availability reasons. This selection is less severe for the data starting at 1970. A possibility to further
circumvent this problem would be to impute the data set and work with a balanced panel. This would
require additional (strong) assumptions on the missing data points, however.
11Table F.3 in the Appendix reports simple (pairwise Pearson) correlation coefficients for the variables
of main interest.
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These comprise dimensions such as freedom of residence, employment, and education;
the right to own property and establish businesses; personal social freedom including
marriage partners and size of family; and equality of opportunity and the absence of
exploitation. Both measures are conceptually somewhat broader than only reflecting
economic institutions. Nevertheless, Economic Freedom as well as some components of the
Civil Liberties index reflect the de facto institutional quality as implied by the conceptual
framework in Figure 7.2. The empirical analysis, therefore, uses the Economic Freedom
index as a baseline measure of institutional quality. In addition, we construct a composite
measure of economic institutional quality by extracting the first principal component from
the Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties indices, normalized to range from 0 to 1 (see
Table F.2 in the Appendix). This composite index extracts the variation in institutional
quality in the economic domain contained in the two variables, and, in particular, it
isolates common factors among institutional indicators that can be interpreted as economic
institutions.12 We view this composite index as more suited for the purpose of measuring
institutional quality in the sense of the theoretical framework underlying the empirical
analysis than the plain Civil Liberties index, which also comprises aspects of political
freedom and is sometimes even used as proxy for political institutions. The composite
measure of institutional quality provides a more clear-cut distinction of institutional
quality from the measures of political institutions. The use of such a composite measure
also follows recent suggestions in the literature (see, for example, Voigt, 2013) for the
construction of a suitable measure of the institutional quality. Below, we also report
the results of extensive robustness checks regarding the measure of institutional quality.
In addition, the robustness analysis makes use of information about the Civil Liberties
index, property rights protection (Investment Profile), and protection against corruption
(Corruption) provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).13 These data
are available only for the shorter time span from 1985 to 2010. Results are also reported
for subcomponents of the Economic Freedom index.14 All indicators are normalized and
adjusted to range from 0 (low quality) to 1 (high quality).
7.3.2 Democracy
To measure political institutions (in terms of democracy), we apply two of the most
widely used indicators of (de jure) political institutions in the literature, namely the
Constraints on Executive indicator and the composite PolityIV index provided by the
12Factor analysis synthesizes the variation contained in several variables into common, orthogonal
factors, or principal components. This way, one can decompose the variation in institutional variables
that corresponds more closely to economic institutions, from variation that corresponds more closely to
political institutions. For more information see Voigt (2013, pp. 20–21).
13http://epub.prsgroup.com/products/international-country-risk-guide-icrg.
14These are, in particular, the regulation of credit, labor and business (regulation), and the soundness
of money.
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PolityIV data set by Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2013). Constraints on the executive
reflect the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief
executives, whether individuals or collectives.15 The composite PolityIV index is based
on the evaluation of competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive
recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, competitiveness of political participation,
and regulation of participation.16 In contrast to the measures of institutional quality
above, political institutions indicators are based on comparably more objective criteria
and reflect more closely the de jure nature of political institutions. The indicators are
rescaled to range from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (full democracy).
For the robustness exercises we use the Freedom House (2014) Political Rights indicator,
the Index of Democracy (as well as its components) constructed by Vanhanen and Lundell
(2014), the binary Democracy-Dictatorship indicator of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
(2010), as well as artificially created indicators based on principal component analysis.
As with institutional quality, we obtain alternative measures of political institutions by
decomposing the variation contained in various indices using factor analysis. All alternative
indicators are also rescaled to range from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (full democracy).
The categorization of institutional measures in terms of institutional quality and
democracy can also be justified in terms of the distinction into de jure and de facto
institutional quality, consistent with the conceptual framework of Figure 7.2. In particular,
both measures of institutional quality, economic freedom and civil liberties, represent
measures of the de facto institutional quality as experienced by individuals, predominantly
(or to a large extent) related to the economic domain. The democracy measures, in
contrast, more closely reflect a de jure aspect of political institutions. This is also reflected
in the relatively more objective criteria on which these measures are based.17
7.3.3 (In-)Equality
The degree of economic (in-)equality within a country is measured using the (reversed)
income Gini coefficient, (1−Gini), based on net incomes from the Standardized World
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) constructed by Solt (2009, 2016b).18 We reverse
the scale of the Gini coefficients and normalize them so that values range from 0 (perfect
inequality) to 1 (perfect equality). This reversion of the scale of the Gini coefficient into
15The raw data assign a value from 1 to 7. The empirical analysis uses a rescaled measure that takes
values between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the highest constraints, see Table F.1 in the Appendix
for details.
16The raw composite polity score ranges from –10 to 10. The empirical analysis uses a rescaled measure
that takes values between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to most democratic institutions, see Table F.1 in
the Appendix for details.
17See also Table F.1 in the Appendix for details.
18The distinctive feature of this data set compared to other inequality data is that the standardization
of Gini coefficients across countries allows for cross-country comparisons, while the multiple imputation
used in its construction provides a comprehensive data set with global coverage. In contrast to many
non-standardized data sets often used in applied work, this data set is ideal for the purposes of this study.
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a measure of equality rather than inequality, which might seem counterintuitive at first
glance, facilitates the interpretation of the interaction term with political institutions. In
order to limit the gaps in the data set, the SWIID uses multiple imputation procedures to
recover missing values. For this reason, the data set provides 100 values of (in-)equality for
each country-year cell, which can be used for the correction of standard errors to account
for multiple imputation. Following the standard in the literature, the empirical analysis in
this study uses the simple mean of the reversed Gini.
In the robustness analysis, we provide results based on standard errors that are adjusted
to account for the multiple imputation of the inequality measures. In the robustness
analysis, we also use alternative measures of (in-)equality, in terms of the gross Gini
coefficient by Solt (2009, 2016b), a binary indicator of equality (obtained by a median
split), and a human capital Gini coefficient which reflects (in-)equality in the distribution
of skills and human capital available for production.19 To facilitate the interpretation of
the results, all indicators are normalized to range from 0 (perfect inequality) to 1 (perfect
equality).
7.3.4 Controls
In order to explore problems of omitted variables and reduce the systematic variation
captured in the country fixed effect, the analysis is also conducted with specifications
of the empirical model with additional controls for log GDP per capita and GDP per
capita growth from Penn World Tables 8.1 by Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015);
average years of schooling by Barro and Lee (2013); log population size by Barro and Lee
(2013); ethnic polarization by Reynal-Querol and Montalvo (2005); colonial history by
the CEPII data set by Mayer and Zignago (2011); an inflation and a deflation dummy
variable constructed by the inflation rate of World Development Indicators by the World
Bank (2014); as well as binary indicator variables for oil exports and for former socialist
countries.
19Following Castelló and Doménech (2002), a human capital Gini coefficient is constructed based on
average years of schooling for primary, secondary, and tertiary education using the Barro and Lee (2013)
data set. The human capital Gini coefficient is computed as
Gh =
1
2H̄
3∑
i=0
3∑
j=0
|x̂i − x̂j |ninj ,
where H̄ are average years of schooling of the entire population aged 15 and older, xi and xj are the
cumulative average years of schooling associated with four different educational levels (no formal, primary,
secondary, and tertiary education, correspondingly) with their respective population shares ni and nj .
7.4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 161
7.4 Empirical Approach
7.4.1 Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis is rooted in the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 7.2.
This framework stipulates an interaction between political institutions and inequality in
shaping institutional quality in a dynamic setting, that is, when exploiting variation within
a country over time. The empirical analysis is therefore based on a standard dynamic
linear panel model:20
insti,t = α insti,t−1 + βe eqi,t−1 + βd demoi,t−1 + γ (eqi,t−1 × demoi,t−1)
+ z′i,t−1δ + ηt + ηi + εi,t, (7.1)
where insti,t measures the quality of (economic) institutions for country i in period
t ; eqi,t−1 the indicator for economic equality; demoi,t−1 is the lagged democracy index;
z′i,t−1δ is a vector of lagged control variables and their corresponding coefficients; ηt and
ηi denote a time effect and a time-invariant country-specific fixed effect; and εi,t is an
idiosyncratic error term. The novel element is the inclusion of the lagged interaction of
democracy and equality (eqi,t−1 × demoi,t−1). Time periods are five-year intervals from
1970 to 2010. Because the evolution of economic institutions and civil liberties is strongly
persistent, the specification also includes a lagged value of the dependent variable.21
Political participation and equality also vary slowly over time. Therefore, using first lags
instead of a model with contemporaneous variables seems appropriate. General time trends
as well as country-specific features that are constant over time like culture or ethnic and
linguistic fractionalization are captured by the period and country effects. In addition,
dummy variables for oil production and former socialist countries are included for models
that use level equations in order to reduce the risk of omitted variables and to diminish the
variance explained by the country fixed effect and, thus, the risk that instruments are weak
in some of the specifications (explained in more detail below). To account for unobserved
heterogeneity and slow-moving dynamics in institutional quality, the empirical specification
also includes a lagged value of the measure of institutional quality as explanatory variable
in the empirical analysis unless stated otherwise. Finally, the specification also accounts
for country- and period-specific variation in the measurement of the institutional indicators
used in the analysis, such as changes in the questionnaires underlying the indices or discrete
shifts in the judgment of institutional quality over time (for example, corruption). This
point is of particular importance given the construction of some of the indicators is based
20Similar specifications are used in Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008, 2014) and Murtin
and Wacziarg (2014).
21This specification measures the short-run effect of democracy on institutional quality, conditional on
the degree of economic equality. The long-run effect can be computed imposing a steady-state condition
and solving for inst.
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on subjective assessments, and occasional changes in the survey methodology from one
wave to another. The panel estimation thus also restricts the problem of measurement
error.
The main interest of the empirical analysis lies in the interaction of political institutions
(democracy) with economic equality, and the corresponding heterogeneity or even non-
monotonicity of the effect of democracy and equality on the quality of economic institutions.
Correspondingly, the total effect of democracy can be computed from the values of βd
and γ, conditional on the level of equality. In general, the specification allows for the
possibility that the effect of democracy is positive for some country-period observations
(for example, those with a very equal income distribution) and negative for others (those
with high inequality).
7.4.2 Estimation and Identification
Due to the lack of quasi-experimental variation in democracy and equality, five different
dynamic panel estimators are applied in order to estimate the coefficients of interest:
random effects, fixed effects, bias-corrected fixed effects, differences GMM, and system
GMM. Each of these estimators relies on a set of identification assumptions and therefore
has advantages and disadvantages. The main contribution of this paper is based on a
comparison of the coefficient estimates obtained from these different estimation methods.
Even if each specification by itself may suffer from biases due to mechanical endogeneity,
overly restrictive exogeneity, or inappropriate stationarity assumptions, the overall pattern
of estimates is informative with respect to the bounds of the true coefficient and the poten-
tial relevance of problems regarding the identification assumptions. In particular, finding
a robust significant interaction effect between democracy and equality on institutional
quality throughout all models would provide qualitative evidence for the existence of such
an interaction, and the pattern of estimates can be informative regarding the quantitative
relevance of the effect in terms of the appropriateness of different sets of identification
assumptions. In the following, we provide a brief summary of the pros and cons of each
estimator, of the caveats regarding the validity in the present application, and of the
interpretation of the estimation results.
Without the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable, random and fixed
effects models share the requirement of strong exogeneity of the error terms; that is, all
explanatory variables, including lagged and future realizations of the explanatory variables,
must be uncorrelated with current-period error terms. For the random effects model, the
regressors also have to be uncorrelated with the unobserved individual fixed effect to obtain
unbiased estimates. In the fixed effects model, this problem can be avoided by eliminating
the unobserved fixed effect through performing a within-transformation. Correspondingly,
a potential omitted variable would have to be correlated with the demeaned regressors
7.4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 163
to bias the estimates. When time effects are accounted for, an omitted variable would
have to be both time- and country-varying, which restricts the set of potential confounds
considerably.
Dynamic fixed and random effects panel estimates (obtained with specifications that
include the lagged dependent variable) are biased in short panels because of mechanical
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. This bias vanishes
as the number of time periods increases (Nickell, 1981). One way to deal with this inherent
endogeneity problem is to perform a bias correction, as proposed by Bun and Kiviet (2003)
for balanced panels, or by Bruno (2005) for unbalanced panels. The resulting estimator
approximates and eliminates the bias that results from the fixed panel length, thereby
yielding more credible results than the fixed effects estimator without requiring additional,
potentially more restrictive assumptions such as stationarity.22
In the context of dynamic panels, the most frequently used solution to the endogeneity
problem is the application of estimators based on generalized methods of moments (GMM).
The difference GMM estimator identifies the coefficients of interest from changes in
the explanatory variables, exploiting the lagged values of the explanatory variables as
instruments for the endogenous regressors (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Panel GMM models
require weaker assumptions than the strong exogeneity condition needed in the fixed effects
case. In particular, GMM only requires lagged instruments to be uncorrelated with the
current-period error terms. A well-known problem that can arise when using lagged values
as instruments is that these may only be weakly correlated after country fixed effects are
removed. This weak instruments problem, which is more severe in persistent time series,
implies that the estimates for the autoregressive parameter α are biased toward the fixed
effects estimator, and can thus be seen as a lower bound for the true parameter. The
bias-corrected fixed effects estimator can serve as a rough guidance in this case.
The system GMM estimator achieves more efficient estimates and provides more stable
results for highly persistent variables, that is, for estimates of α close to unity, by including
levels as additional instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In order to further reduce the
danger of weak instruments in the SGMM specification and the relative variance of the
country fixed effects to the idiosyncratic error term, also time-invariant variables can be
included in the level regressions.23 A comparison of results of differences and system GMM
also provides further information as to whether instruments are weak. The parameter
estimate of SGMM is a weighted sum of the difference and level equation with more weight
being put on the differenced model if identification is strong. Therefore, quantitatively
22See also Bun and Carree (2005) and Bun and Kiviet (2006).
23Bun and Windmeijer (2010) point out that, if the variance of the unobserved individual fixed effect
is high compared to the variance of the idiosyncratic error term, there may be severe downward bias in
the autoregressive parameter for the SGMM estimator. Adding level controls that absorb some of the
variation that is explained by the country fixed effect helps to alleviate this problem. In our setting, the
variation explained by fixed effects and the unexplained variation are of approximately similar size.
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similar estimates from DGMM and SGMM are an indication for instrument relevance.
However, in addition to the identifying assumptions of DGMM, SGMM also demands a
stationarity assumption requiring changes in the dependent variable be uncorrelated with
the country fixed effect. This condition likely holds only approximately in the present
application, where democratic transitions may affect the long-run steady state. The
condition is, however, still satisfied as long as countries are sufficiently close to their
long-run steady state at the end of the panel period (see also Roodman, 2009, p. 144).
An important aspect of both GMM estimators is the choice of the number of instruments
employed in the estimation. The number of moments available for estimation increases
efficiency without affecting the consistency of the estimated parameters provided that
the identifying assumptions are valid. A high number of instruments can lead to bias
in the Hansen J-test whether instruments provide statistically similar results in the case
of overidentification. Using lags that have little explanatory power for contemporaneous
variables can weaken the set of instruments. Hence, there is a trade-off between the
efficiency of results and the strength of instruments as well as the validity of the test
statistics for the validation of the identification assumptions. According to Roodman
(2009), as a rule of thumb, the number of instruments should not exceed the number
of cross-sectional units (here: countries) in the sample.24 To determine which lags are
most informative and prima facie causal, we use Granger (1969, 1980) tests of different
lag specifications in combination with the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria.
While, in general, the choice of the transformation matrix that removes the unobserved
individual fixed effects does not matter, if the complete instrument set is used (Arellano
and Bover, 1995), the transformation matrix may be of importance in light of the need to
limit the number of lags used as instruments. In this respect, the forward orthogonalized
deviations method is useful, because it eliminates less data than first differences.25
In sum, all estimators have their strengths and caveats. Appendix A in the supple-
mentary material provides a more detailed description and discussion of the identification
assumptions of each estimator. In the context of the current application, the bias-corrected
fixed effects estimator as well as the difference GMM estimator appear to be the most
conservative and reliable estimators.
7.5 Empirical Results
7.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 7.1 presents the findings for the baseline specification (7.1), including the lagged
dependent variable as explanatory variable. This specification represents the most con-
24Note that this rule of thumb is not conservative such that instrument counts close to the respective
threshold are no guarantee that test statistics are not biased.
25See Hayakawa (2009) for a comparison of different transformation techniques.
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servative approach to the determinants of institutional quality, as it directly accounts for
unobservable heterogeneity that is reflected in past institutional quality. Columns (1) and
(2) report results from random effects, Columns (3) and (4) present fixed effects estimates,
Columns (5) and (6) bias-corrected fixed effects, Columns (7) and (8) difference GMM, and
Columns (9) and (10) contain system GMM estimates. In addition to country and time
effects, the empirical specifications include log per capita income and human capital in
terms of average years of schooling as controls. The level equations of random effects and
system GMM additionally include dummies for former socialism and oil production. For
every specification, we report the count of observations, countries, instruments as well as
the p-values of the AR(2) and the Hansen J-test for the GMM models below the coefficient
estimates of interest. Moreover, we report the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen test
for additional level instruments for system GMM models. To determine the lags used as
instruments in the GMM estimates, we conducted Granger (1969, 1980) tests of different
lag specifications in combination with the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria.26
Panel (a) of Table 7.1 reports the results for the Economic Freedom measure as the
dependent variable. The measure of political institutions (denoted as democracy) is the
index of Constraints on the Executive; equality is measured by (1−Gini), where Gini is
the Gini index based on net incomes. The estimation results reveal moderate persistence
in institutional quality, as expressed by highly significant and positive coefficient estimates
of α between 0.47 and 0.74 across all specifications. Only for the corrected fixed effects
estimates, the coefficient estimate is higher (around 0.83). The comparably low parameter
estimates obtained with the fixed effects estimator might be the result of the Nickell-bias
discussed above and can be seen as a lower bound of the estimate.
In the specifications without interaction term, the parameter β̂e of economic equality,
which is measured by the normalized reversed net Gini coefficient, is not significantly
different from zero, which might suggest that equality does not have a significant direct
effect on institutional quality. The point estimates are typically positive. The estimated
effect of democracy β̂d for the models without interaction term is positive and significant
at the five-percent level, with the exception of the random effects estimates in Column (1)
and the system GMM estimates in Column (9). In line with some results in the literature,
these findings support the hypothesis that democracy alleviates the creation of high-quality
26The first lag of the dependent variable has to be instrumented, because it is mechanically correlated
with the error term in short panels, as discussed above. The level lags yt−2 and yt−3 are thus chosen as
instruments for the difference (yt−1 − yt−2) in Differences GMM. Instrumenting explanatory variables can
improve efficiency in case of predetermined variables. Hence, the first three lags xt−1, xt−2, xt−3 are also
used as instruments for differences GMM. For system GMM, yt−2 and xt−1, xt−2 are used as instruments
in the differences equation; further lags are not used to limit the instrument count, because a large number
of may lead to severe bias in the Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions and weaken the instrument
set. The level equation of system GMM uses the first lagged difference of the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables as instruments so that the same number of time periods is exploited in differenced
and level equations. Robustness results with respect to different lags specifications and the choice of the
transformation matrix to eliminate the country fixed effects are reported in the Supplementary Material.
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Table 7.1: Effect of Democracy and Equality on Institutional Quality
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.83*** 0.81*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.68***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 -0.15** 0.03 -0.16 0.00 -0.21**
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.05 0.04*** -0.15** 0.04*** -0.13** 0.04** -0.14 0.02 -0.16**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.12 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.32** 0.35***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.80 0.71 0.86 0.66
Hansen p–value 0.15 0.39 0.09 0.24
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.70 0.85
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Dependent Variable: Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties
L.Inst. Quality 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.89*** 0.83*** 0.75*** 0.69*** 0.78*** 0.71***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Equality 0.08** -0.06 0.00 -0.20* -0.03 -0.16 0.08 -0.16 0.12* -0.12
(0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.07) (0.12)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.10* 0.02 -0.20*** -0.02 -0.17** -0.01 -0.18* -0.01 -0.22***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.20** 0.42*** 0.30* 0.33* 0.39**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10
Hansen p–value 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.20
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.87 0.73
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic
Freedom in Panel (a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the
Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling.
Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of the bias-corrected
fixed effects estimator is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter
are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size
(Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory
variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first two lags
of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used so that for the variables of interest the
same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the
transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
economic institutions. Overall, the direct effect seems to be small and not overly robust.
Inserting an interaction between equality and political institutions, however, delivers a
positive and (with the exception of the random effects estimates) significant coefficient
estimate of the interaction term γ̂. The point estimate varies between 0.31 and 0.35 and
is quantitatively very similar throughout the different specifications.
Panel (b) of Table 7.1 reports the corresponding results for the composite index
of institutional quality as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar. The persistence in institutional quality, as indicated by the
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coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable, is quantitatively almost identical to
that obtained for Economic Freedom in Panel (a). Also the positive and significant effect
of the interaction between equality and democracy, as well as the negative main effects for
democracy and equality, are found consistently throughout all specifications.
Taken together, the empirical results provide evidence that is in line with the conjecture
of an interaction, regardless of the estimation method and the measure of institutional
quality. The finding of this significant interaction constitutes the main contribution of this
study and suggests that democracy and equality complement each other in the ability of
a country to establish high-quality economic institutions. In line with the hypothesis of
several models in the literature discussed in Section 7.2, these findings suggest that the
positive effect of democracy on institutional quality is reinforced by an equal distribution
of incomes. In contrast, the effect of democracy is eroded, if inequality becomes too high.
This is indicated by the estimated coefficients of democracy β̂d, which turns negative
and even significant in most specifications. This result, which seemingly contradicts the
conventional wisdom and most previous empirical findings in the literature, reflects the
effect of democracy in a society with an entirely unequal distribution of income (a reversed
Gini coefficient of 0), and is moderated by the significant positive interaction term γ̂. A
similar finding applies to equality, which also displays a negative, and sometimes significant,
coefficient β̂e for the direct effect. Given the empirical specification, this reflects the effect
of an increase in equality under entirely undemocratic political institutions.
Table 7.2 presents the results for the baseline specification (7.1), under the constraint
that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, α is set to zero. This static specifi-
cation corresponds to the typical specification of empirical models found in the existing
literature. Again, Panel (a) presents the results with the Economic Freedom index as
measure of institutional quality, Panel (b) presents the results for the composite index of
institutional quality; democracy is measured by the index of Constraints on the Executive,
and equality is measured by the reverse Gini index. For better comparability, the structure
of the Table is the same as in Table 7.1. Columns (1) and (2) report random effects
estimates, Columns (3) and (4) are fixed effects estimates, Columns (5) and (6) are DGMM,
and Columns (7) and (8) contain SGMM estimates.27 Again, all empirical models include
country and time effects, as well as log per capita income and human capital in terms of
average years of schooling as additional controls. As in the baseline specification, the level
equations of random effects and system GMM additionally include binary indicators for
former socialism and oil production.28
27Due to the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable from the empirical model, the corrected fixed
effects estimator, reported in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 7.1 is redundant in this Table.
28Although the specification does not include a dynamic component, the GMM estimators provide
useful information as they use additional moment conditions for identification. As before, the count of
observations, countries, instruments as well as the p-values of the AR(2), the Hansen J-test for both
GMM models, and the difference-in-Hansen test for additional level lags for SGMM are reported below
the coefficient estimates of interest. The slightly increased number of observations is due to countries for
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Table 7.2: Static Model: Effect of Democracy and Equality on Institutional Quality
Random Effects Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Equality 0.10* -0.11 0.07 -0.13 0.03 -0.21* 0.04 -0.19
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.13)
L.Democracy 0.05** -0.15** 0.05** -0.18** 0.04* -0.18** 0.03 -0.23***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.49***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.31 0.22 0.39 0.25
Hansen p–value 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.39
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.54 0.96
Instruments 49 69 54 75
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 553 553 553 553 457 457 553 553
(b) Dependent Variable: Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties
L.Equality 0.18** -0.29** 0.06 -0.31** -0.02 -0.38** 0.19* -0.21*
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.16*** -0.28*** 0.13*** -0.28*** 0.07* -0.31*** 0.09** -0.38***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.79*** 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.87***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.06
Hansen p–value 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.15 0.50
Instruments 49 69 54 75
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 553 553 553 553 457 457 553 553
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable
is Economic Freedom in Panel (a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b).
Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables
are log GDP p.c., average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist
countries. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample
size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The
differenced equation of SGMM uses the first two lags of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference
of the regressors is used so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The
number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
In the specifications without interaction term, democracy exhibits a positive effect β̂d,
which is significant in most cases, while equality has a positive but typically insignificant
(and in some cases in Panel (b) even negative) effect on institutional quality. These results
resemble the findings in the previous literature, where democracy has been associated with
better institutional quality, and where the evidence for equality is more scarce.29
Most importantly, however, the estimates obtained with a specification without a lagged
which data for explanatory variables are available during the first period but no data for institutional
quality. Details are available upon request.
29The findings by Chong and Gradstein (2007b) for the years 1960–2000 are a notable exception.
Possible explanations for the slight difference in the estimates are the composition of the data set as
well as problems with the cross-country comparability of earlier inequality indicators, such as the one by
Deininger and Squire (1996), as was pointed out in Section 7.3.
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dependent variable also reveal a positive and significant coefficient γ̂ for the interaction
term between equality and democracy, regardless of the estimator employed. The effect is
qualitatively very similar, and quantitatively even slightly larger, when compared to the
estimates obtained in specifications that include a lagged dependent variable.
The results from both sets of estimates suggest that democratic political institutions
can even have a non-monotonic effect on institutional quality, the sign of which depends
on the degree of economic equality. For countries with an equal distribution of incomes,
the overall effect of a marginal increase in democratic quality on institutional quality is
positive, while for highly unequal societies the total effect is negative. Likewise, an increase
in equality appears to have a detrimental effect on institutional quality in non-democratic
countries, whereas the opposite is true in democracies. Given the estimates for political
institutions, income equality, and the corresponding interaction term, the marginal effects
(ME) of democracy and equality are given by
MEdemoi,t = β̂d + γ̂ × eqi,t−1 and ME
eq
i,t = β̂e + γ̂ × demoi,t−1 . (7.2)
Using this expression, one can calculate a threshold of equality that indicates whether a
marginal change in democracy has a positive or negative effect on economic institutions.
Taking the estimated parameters from bias-corrected fixed effects and GMM in Columns
(6), (8), and (10) in Table 7.1, the corresponding threshold values are approximately 0.45
for Economic Freedom and 0.55 for the composite index of institutional quality. For a
reversed Gini coefficient that is higher than this respective threshold, that is, for sufficiently
high equality, the effect of a marginal change in the democracy score is positive. This is
the case for about 92 percent and 70 percent of the observations in the sample, respectively.
On the other hand, the effect of a marginal change in democracy on institutional quality
is negative for about 8 to 30 percent of the observations in the sample. Similarly, the
threshold of democracy that indicates whether a marginal increase in equality has a
positive or negative effect is 0.55 for Economic Freedom and 0.48 for the composite index,
respectively. Consequently, an increase in equality has a positive effect on the respective
institutional quality variable when the democracy index is above this threshold. This
is the case for 65 and 67 percent of the sample. The effect is therefore negative for the
remaining countries.
Figure 7.3(a) plots the marginal effect of democracy conditional on the level of equality
for the different estimates reported in Table 7.1. Figure 7.3(b) presents the corresponding
marginal effect of equality conditional on the level of democracy.30 The solid lines depict
the marginal effect of democracy on institutional quality given by equation 7.2. The
30Figure A.1 in the Supplementary Material provides the corresponding graph for the results for the
composite index of institutional quality. The heterogeneity is even more pronounced when plotting the
corresponding graphs based on the estimation results in Table 7.2. The figures are available on request.
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(a) Democracy and Institutional Quality: MEdemo
(b) Equality and Institutional Quality: MEeq
Figure 7.3: Marginal Effects of Estimates in Table 7.1(a)
dashed lines represent the +/– five-percent confidence intervals of the composite effect.31
The graphs show that democracy has a heterogeneous and even non-monotonic effect,
which strongly depends on the level of equality. The effect is largest in absolute value for
extreme degrees of (in-)equality and zero for intermediate levels. For low equality, the
effect of democracy is even negative, suggesting that inequality may erode the possibility of
31For a large sample, the confidence interval of the composite effect is given by ME ± z1−τ/2 × ŜE
with ŜE =
√
[V ar(β̂d) + eq2t−1 × V ar(γ̂) + 2× eqt−1 × Cov(β̂d, γ̂)] and z1−τ/2 being the critical value of
a two-sided t-test of size τ .
7.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 171
(a) Equality and Institutional Quality (b) Democracy and Institutional Quality
Figure 7.4: Marginal Effects Across Estimators, Table 7.1(a)
democracies to implement high institutional quality. Likewise, the effect of an increase in
equality is highest in democracies, and lower, potentially even negative, in non-democracies.
Finally, Figure 7.4 illustrates the composite effect of democracy and equality on
institutional quality for the five different estimators in Table 7.1.32 The effect of democracy
is heterogeneous and non-monotonic throughout all estimators. In addition, all estimators
yield comparable estimates for the total effect, except for random effects which shows a
somewhat flatter slope. A similar comment applies to the effect of equality. The finding of
a significant interaction between democracy and equality, which implies a non-monotonic
effect of political institutions on institutional quality, thus appears not to be driven by the
specific identification assumptions for a particular estimator. The finding that the total
effect is quantitatively similar across specifications provides additional support for the
hypothesis that there is substantial heterogeneity and even non-monotonicity in the effect
of democracy on institutional quality.
7.5.2 Robustness
The baseline results in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate an interaction between democracy,
measured by Constraints on the Executive, and equality, regardless of whether institutional
quality is measured by the Economic Freedom index or the composite index of institutional
quality. One potential concern with the results is multicollinearity, if the quality of
political institutions is strongly correlated with the extent of income equality. In addition,
this problem might be more severe the less variation over time the respective variables
exhibit. The correlations, however, are rather moderate, indicating that this is not likely
to affect the results.33 In the data, which are measured in five-year intervals, the pairwise
correlation of the Constraints on the Executive and the reversed Gini coefficient is about
32The corresponding plots for the estimates in Table 7.2 are very similar and available upon request.
33See Table F.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 7.3: Robustness: Economic Institutions (CFE)
Civil Regulation Soundness Investment Protection vs.
Liberties of Money Profile Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L.Inst. Quality 0.73*** 0.79*** 0.61*** 0.32*** 0.46***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
L.Equality -0.27* -0.14 -0.33* -0.56** 0.21
(0.16) (0.10) (0.19) (0.26) (0.24)
L.Democracy -0.30** -0.17** -0.38** -0.36* -0.08
(0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.48** 0.29** 0.78*** 0.72** 0.17
(0.24) (0.14) (0.26) (0.35) (0.32)
Controls X X X X X
Groups 112 96 96 90 90
Observations 610 539 557 407 407
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are
computed using the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator by Bruno (2005). Dependent variables in the respective
columns are the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties; Civil Liberties; Regulation of Credit,
Labor and Business; Soundness of Money; Investment Profile (Property Rights); and Protection against Corruption.
Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator. Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control
variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using
bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from
DGMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
0.37 unconditionally, and 0.12 when conditioning on country-fixed and time effects. In
addition, simple diagnostic tools such as the variance inflation factor suggest that the
problem of multicollinearity does not pose a threat to the findings.
The remainder of this section reports the results of several robustness checks that
explore the sensitivity of the results. A first set of robustness checks replicates the analysis
using several alternative measures of institutional quality. These alternative measures
include the Civil Liberties index; an index of the regulation of credit, labor, and business,
and an index of the soundness of money as a measure of reliability of the economic
environment (both of these measures are taken from subindices underlying the Economic
Freedom index); an index of the quality of property rights, and finally an index of the
protection against corruption (both taken from the ICRG data set). These measures
capture different dimensions of institutional quality. For instance, the index of Civil
Liberties is more closely linked to political liberties than the Economic Freedom index.
Moreover, some of these measures are only available for a substantially shorter time span
(1985–2010), which limits the variation over time. Nevertheless, the empirical estimates
obtained with these institutional measures as the dependent variable also deliver evidence
for a positive interaction between democracy and equality, which is significant in all but
one specification, as shown in Table 7.3.34
A second set of robustness checks replicates the analysis for several alternative measures
of political institutions. In particular, in analogy to the construction of the institutional
quality index, we constructed a composite measure based on a principal component
analysis of political institutions. This measure is based on the index of Constraints on the
34The estimates are based on the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator. Additional results for the other
estimators are contained in the Supplementary Material.
7.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 173
Table 7.4: Robustness: Political Institutions (CFE)
Principal Comp. PolityIV Political Principal Comp. Democracy-
XC & VHC Index Rights PIV & PR & VH Dictatorship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L.Inst. Quality 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.83***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
L.Equality -0.15** -0.10 -0.20** -0.13 -0.09
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
L.Democracy -0.14** -0.05 -0.18*** -0.12 -0.10**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.35*** 0.20* 0.40*** 0.34** 0.22***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07)
Controls X X X X X
Groups 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 550 550 550 546
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are computed
using the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator by Bruno (2005). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. The
democracy proxies in the respective columns are the principal component of Constraints on Executive and the Vanhanen
Competition indicator; the combined PolityIV indicator; Political Rights; the principal component of the combined
PolityIV indicator, Political Rights and the composite Vanhanen Democracy indicator; and the dichotomous Democracy-
Dictatorship indicator. Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years
of schooling. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions.
Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Executive and the political competition component of the democracy index by Vanhanen
and Lundell (2014)—see, for example, Voigt, 2013, for a discussion of the advantages of
such a composite measure. Alternatively, we employ the PolityIV composite index (for
democracy and autocracy); the Political Rights index constructed by Freedom House; a
composite measure of political institutions based on the principal component of the index
constructed by Vanhanen and Lundell (2014), the Polity IV index and the Political Rights
index; and finally a binary indicator of democracy vs. dictatorship constructed by Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), as advocated by some scholars (for example, Persson and
Tabellini, 2006, and Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). The results, which are shown in
Table 7.4, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline results.35 Overall,
these results also indicate that the finding of a non-monotonic effect of democracy in
relation to equality is not sensitive to the particular democracy indicator that is used in
the estimation.
A third set of robustness checks refers to the measure of economic (in-)equality. The
SWIID data reflect the state of the art when it comes to comparative panel data on
inequality. Nevertheless, recent criticism regarding data comparability, quality, and the
imputation model used for their construction has led some to question their suitability for
cross-country comparative studies (see Jenkins, 2015). This criticism has been convincingly
refuted by Solt (2015), who concludes that “[t]hose pursuing research on income inequality
across many countries and over time [...] will often find that the SWIID is their best choice
of data source” (Solt, 2015, p. 690). Nevertheless, some features of the inequality measure
35Again, the estimates are based on the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator. Additional results for the
other estimators as well for other measures that have been suggested in the literature are contained in the
Supplementary Material.
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Table 7.5: Robustness: Economic (In-)Equality (CFE)
Multiple Gross Binary Human Cap. Lowest 2nd–4th Highest
Imputation Gini Indicator Gini Quintile Quintile Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.Inst. Quality 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 1.23** 0.82*** 1.14
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.53) (0.17) (1.28)
L.Equality -0.14* -0.09 -0.03** 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
L.Democracy -0.12* -0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.07** 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.17)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.29** 0.24** 0.07*** 0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05)
Controls X X X X X X X
Groups 96 96 96 96 38 80 29
Observations 553 543 543 639 126 324 114
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are computed using the
bias-corrected fixed effects estimator by Bruno (2005). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. Democracy is measured by the
Constraints on Executive indicator. Equality measures in the respective columns are (1 − Net Gini); (1 − Gross Gini); a binary equality
indicator which takes a value of 1 if (1 − Net Gini) is above the median of the respective distribution for a given year and 0 else;
(1 − Human Capital Gini Gini). Columns (5)–(7) split the sample with respect to quintiles of the distribution of (1 − Net Gini): results
are shown for the lowest quintile in Column (5), the second to fourth quintile in Column (6), and the highest quintile in Column (7).
Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap
procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
lend themselves to additional robustness checks. The first check explicitly accounts for
the concern that the results are affected by the multiple imputation techniques that
were used by Solt (2009, 2016b) in order to reduce the number of missing values in the
SWIID data set. In particular, we use the multiple observations for each country-year cell
provided in the SWIID data to estimate the coefficients multiple times (for every single
Gini realization) and then take the average over all estimated coefficients to compute
the respective coefficients and standard errors.36 Second, instead of measuring economic
inequality using net incomes as in the baseline, we use a measure of equality based
on market incomes. Arguably, this might be a better proxy for the de facto political
power, and, hence, the relevant determinants of economic institutions. Third, to alleviate
the concern that the results are driven by measurement error due to the interpolation
procedure, we employ a binary measure of inequality. Because economic inequality is
also reflected by the distribution of skills, the fourth alternative measure of equality is
provided by 1 – the human capital Gini coefficient described in Section 7.3.3. Consistent
with the earlier findings, the results reveal a positive interaction effect between equality
36This procedure reflects the underlying uncertainty in the equality measure that has been introduced by
the imputation procedure. Intuitively, instead of using the mean over all 100 realizations in the estimation,
this procedure estimates each model 100 times and takes the mean over the estimated parameters thereafter.
The robustness check uses all available 100 Gini realizations, even though a smaller number is typically
already sufficient. For a more technical discussion see Rubin (1996) and the Supplementary Material. To
the knowledge of the authors only few existing papers account for multiple imputation or interpolation of
inequality data. To the extent that the effect for many variables might be overstated without accounting
for the imputation noise, the analysis in this study also provides a contribution in this respect by applying
more extensive corrections for standard errors than what is usually done in the literature. At the same time,
the analysis abstracts from the problem of sample selection that also arises from imputation procedures,
if the pattern of missing observations is not random and not adequately modeled in the imputation
procedure, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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and democracy, which is significant in all specifications except for the human capital Gini,
see Table 7.5.37 Finally, we estimate the empirical model separately on subsamples that
were split by equality quintiles (into the lowest quintile, the three intermediate quintiles,
and the highest quintile) without an interaction term. Here, the effect of democracy
on institutional quality is negative (although not significant) in the subsample in which
equality is lowest, whereas the effect becomes increasingly positive in the subsamples
reflecting intermediate inequality, and is most positive in the subsample where equality is
highest.38 Overall, the results deliver a coherent pattern of heterogeneity in the effect of
democracy on institutional quality that is related to equality.
Additional results reported in the Appendix confirm the robustness of the results for
different estimators, different specifications with additional or fewer control variables, lag
specifications and transformations in the context of the GMM estimators, and additional
interactions of democracy with variables like income per capita or years of schooling in
order to account for other factors that have been identified in the previous literature.39 The
findings from these robustness checks suggest that democracy has a robust heterogeneous
effect on institutional quality conditional on the degree of economic equality.
Additional results also provide some tentative evidence for the mechanisms underlying
the interaction term. One set of results points to a negative interaction effect between
democracy and equality in an estimation framework with redistribution as the dependent
variable.40 The arguments mentioned in the Introduction regarding the question of stability
of democracy also imply that democracies might become unstable, if inequality becomes too
large. Estimations with the level of political institutions as dependent variable using the
baseline sample 1970–2010 in five-year intervals, as well as a sample over the longer period
from 1870–2010 in ten-year intervals, deliver a positive interaction effect of democracy and
equality on political stability, particularly over the longer horizon. Democratic institutions
are thus self-reinforcing, but this effect is stronger the greater the level of equality in society.
This evidence is suggestive, or at least not inconsistent, with the theories underlying the
main hypothesis of this paper. In an attempt to investigate the possibility of heterogeneity
37The coefficient is smaller in size and estimated with less precision, which might indicate that this
measure involves more measurement error. Interestingly, however, the findings are consistent with recent
evidence by Castelló-Climent and Doménech (2014), who find divergent trends in income inequality and
education inequality.
38Additional results for the other estimators as well for additional alternative measures, including the
top-10-percent income share by Piketty (2014), are contained in the Supplementary Material.
39These estimates account for the view that a multitude of factors might be relevant for institutions
to work successfully. For example, motivated by the arguments forwarded by Lipset (1959), Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008, 2009) investigate the importance of income for political institutions,
while Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) and Fortunato and Panizza (2015) identify human capital as a central
determinant of institutional quality.
40This analysis is limited by data availability on redistribution, however. Additional unreported results
using a relative political extraction indicator for industrial countries by Hendrix (2010) and Arbetman-
Rabinowitz et al. (2013) as measure for taxation and redistribution reveal a positive interaction effect,
but the coefficient is estimated with insufficient precision to deliver statistically significant results.
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in the interaction effect, we also conducted the estimation separately for countries that
democratized before and after 1974, following the classification by Huntington (1993).
While the interaction appears positive throughout, the coefficient estimate is indeed
somewhat larger and more significant for the sample that democratized after 1974 (the
“third wave” of democratization). This suggests that the interaction between a democratic
political regime and an equal distribution of income had a particularly large impact on
institutional quality in countries in which the institution building process was on the way
or not yet finished.41
7.6 Conclusion
This study has investigated the role of economic equality in moderating the effect of
democracy on institutional quality. Based on the arguments and predictions from an
entire strand of the literature, the hypothesis motivating the analysis was that the quality
of economic institutions is affected by an interaction between political institutions and
equality. Based on a panel of 96 countries over the period 1970–2010, dynamic panel
estimates deliver evidence for a non-monotonic effect of democracy on institutional quality
that is moderated by inequality. The results are robust and quantitatively similar across
different specifications of the dynamic panel model. The results are therefore not driven
by endogeneity issues that are specific to certain models. The results are also robust to
different empirical specifications, choices of explanatory variables, controls, dependent
variables, and standard error corrections for multiply imputed data. Furthermore, the
interaction of equality and political institutions that measures the degree of heterogeneity
is positive and also significant in the presence of interactions between democracy and
income, as well as between democracy and human capital.
Taken together, the findings suggest that equality is a pivotal factor, which determines
whether democratic institutions have a positive and lasting effect on institutional quality.
In particular, the results are consistent with a negative effect of democracy on institutional
quality in very unequal societies, thus providing supportive evidence for the existence of
two equilibria with efficient institutions, one characterized by a very equal distribution
of resources and democracy, and another characterized by high inequality and autocracy.
These findings support the argument by Lipset (1959) that democracies only work and
provide good institutions under specific preconditions. Likewise, the findings support
arguments that raise concerns about the consequences of increasing inequality (see, for
example, Piketty, 2014).
This paper also provides a first step toward opening the black box of institutional
quality and its determinants, and of the hierarchy and interdependencies of different
concepts of institutions. Thereby, the results add to an ongoing debate about what is
41Detailed results are contained in the Supplementary Material.
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meant by institutions and how institutions should be measured. While there is a common
perception that different measures capture similar underlying institutional features, our
data as well as our analysis documents that there is substantial variation across measures,
and that the correlation is lower than commonly thought. By opening this black box
and testing the prediction of a heterogeneous effect of democracy depending on the level
of equality using different measures of political and economic institutions, our analysis
essentially follows the suggestion by Voigt (2013) and investigates the variation across
different dimensions of institutions. Thereby, the results shed new light on the question
regarding what these different measures actually stand for and how this affects empirical
results. To address this question, the analysis exploited within-country variation in a
dynamic panel setting, and used various synthetic constructs that extract variation in
institutional quality from different measures typically used in the literature. Overall, the
results are supportive of a framework that views inequality and democracy as the key
state variables of the institutional quality that determines individual economic behavior.
At the same time, the interpretation of the results raises additional implications for
future research. Although the data suggest that high institutional quality can be achieved
both under democracy and autocracy, the highest scores of civil liberty are observed
for countries with the highest democracy scores. Consequently, the equilibrium with
democratic rights and low economic inequality appears preferable to the autocratic regime
in terms of institutional quality. Moreover, even though economic institutions of high
quality can emerge in regimes with autocratic political institutions and high inequality,
this does not imply that autocratic regimes are able or even willing to implement such
institutions. In fact, many autocracies perform very poorly in terms of institutional quality;
that is, the lowest scores of the Economic Freedom index are realized in purely autocratic
countries. Hence, the results indicate that, while democracies appear neither necessary
nor sufficient for high institutional quality, the corresponding corollary for states with
limited franchise implies that autocratic regimes are neither necessary nor sufficient for
low institutional quality. In our view, more research is needed on uncovering the precise
channels underlying the empirical findings presented in this paper.
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
Working on this dissertation, I investigated long-run determinants and processes of socioe-
conomic development from two different perspectives: population economics and political
economy. During this process, my interest for causes and consequences of population
aging and demographic change on macroeconomic performance steadily increased. In
particular, while researchers and informed laypeople generally agree about the important
implications of aging processes on socioeconomic development, our scientific understanding
of these processes seems surprisingly limited. For example, the rule of changing preferences
over the life-cycle received attention only relatively recently (see, for example, Sunde and
Dohmen, 2016). Moreover, changes and disparities in life-cycle productivity will likely play
a significant role in the context of aging societies and skill-biased technical change. A sound
understanding of these transformations requires knowledge about the role of individual
health, educational attainment and occupational choice for worker productivity. Finally,
population aging may also have major implications for social cohesiveness of societies
through health and income inequality (OECD, 2017). Therefore, I am convinced that
further research on the role of population aging and demographic change on socioeconomic
development will yield valuable insights for our society.
In this setting, I also expect institutions to play a prominent role in shaping and
moderating consequences of socioeconomic transformations. For example, differentials in
longevity between different societal groups may unfold (unintended) redistributive effects
through the pension system (see, for example, Sanchez-Romero and Prskawetz, 2017).
Furthermore, population aging will shift up the age of the median voter in democracies.
Correspondingly, policies will more likely target the needs of the elderly than of the young.
Finally, technological progress and subsequent transformations of labor markets require
policies that foster educational attainment and alleviate the matching process of workers
to suitable jobs. In this context, I deem economic research necessary to inform the public
and policymakers in order to devise policies that minimize economic inefficiencies and
maximize social welfare.
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A.1 Additional Figures
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Figure A.1: Population Dynamics – Selected Regions
Data source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015).
World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.
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Figure A.2: Population Dynamics – Selected Countries
Data source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015).
World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.
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(a) Five-year cohorts
(b) Ten-year cohorts
(c) Human capital, five-year cohorts
(d) Human capital, ten-year cohorts
Figure A.3: Illustration of Demographic Dynamics as Instrumental Variable
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(a) Five-year cohorts (Table A.5, Column 3)
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(b) Five-year cohorts (Table A.6, Column 3)
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(c) Ten-year cohorts (Table A.7, Column 3)
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(d) Ten-year cohorts (Table A.8, Column 3)
Figure A.4: Macro Productivity Profiles: Barro-Lee Data
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(a) Fifteen-year cohorts (estimates unreported)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
S
iz
e 
of
 e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t (
95
%
-C
I)
 
15-24 25-39 40-54 55-69
 
Age cohort
Differences Model
 
(b) Fifteen-year cohorts (estimates unreported)
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(c) Prime-age group (estimates unreported)
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(d) Prime-age group (estimates unreported)
Figure A.5: Macro Productivity Profiles (Alternative Cohort Structure)
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(a) Five-year cohorts (Table A.10, Column 3)
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(b) Five-year cohorts (estimates unreported)
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(c) Ten-year cohorts (estimates unreported)
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(d) Ten-year cohorts (estimates unreported)
Figure A.6: Macro Productivity Profiles: Income Per Capita
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Figure A.7: Within-Sample Projection (2000–2010)
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Figure A.8: Actual and Projected Educational Attainment
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Figure A.9: Projections Under Different Scenarios
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Figure A.10: Projections for Model Without Lagged Dependent Variable
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Figure A.11: Projections Under Different Scenarios
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Figure A.12: Projections for Model with Prime-Age Group (See Figure A.5, Panel b)
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Figure A.13: Projections for Income Per Capita
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Figure A.14: Projections for Income Per Capita
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Figure A.15: Projections when Controlling for the Size of the Working-Age Population
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Figure A.16: Projections when Controlling for the Size of the Working-Age Population
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Figure A.17: Projections for Instrumental Variables Model
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Figure A.18: Projections with Alternative Assumptions About Fertility, Mortality, and
Migration
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Figure A.19: Projections with Endogenous Capital
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Figure A.20: Projections for 1990–2010 Sample
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Figure A.21: Projections for 1990–2010 Sample
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(b) Non-OECD Countries
Figure A.22: Economic Performance for Constant Relative to Changing Demographic
Structure
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Figure A.23: Economic Performance for Constant Relative to Changing Human Capital
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Figure A.24: Projected Change in Cohort Labor Supply Between 2010 and 2050
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Figure A.25: Projected Change in Cohort Labor Supply Between 2010 and 2050
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Figure A.26: Reduced-Form Projections: Changing Labor Force Participation Based on
Estimates from Working-Age Population
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(a) Estimates based on Labor Force
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(b) Estimates based on Working-Age Population (Baseline)
Figure A.27: Projections: Labor Force Participation Versus Working-Age Population
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Figure A.28: Projections for Changing Labor Force Participation (Germany and France)
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Figure A.29: Projections for Shifted Productivity Profile
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Figure A.30: Projections for Shifted Productivity Profile
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Figure A.31: Projections for Shifted Productivity Profile
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Figure A.32: How Large Must λh Be to Offset Aging Effect?
A.2. ADDITIONAL TABLES 213
A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
IIASA-VID sample (n = 120) Barro-Lee sample (n = 139)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
GDP and physical capital
Log output p.w. 9.59 1.12 6.92 12.12 1098 9.72 1.12 6.18 13.07 1259
Growth of output p.w. 0.11 0.22 -1.56 1.24 1098 0.10 0.23 -1.19 1.24 1259
Log output p.c. 8.61 1.18 5.95 11.45 1098 8.71 1.19 5.05 12.43 1259
Growth of output p.c. 0.12 0.23 -1.57 1.24 1098 0.11 0.23 -1.28 1.20 1259
Log capital p.w. 10.31 1.50 5.69 13.02 1098 10.45 1.45 5.69 13.87 1259
Growth of capital p.w. 0.17 0.25 -2.05 2.12 1098 0.17 0.25 -1.31 2.16 1259
Share of age cohort in working-age population
Total (in millions) 28.34 90.41 0.08 1013.06 1098 25.01 85.21 0.09 1018.27 1259
Change (in millions) 2.77 9.04 -4.18 93.45 1098 2.16 7.81 -4.13 96.55 1259
Share < 20 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.25 1098 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.25 1259
Share 20–24 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.21 1098 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.24 1259
Share 25–29 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.19 1098 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.25 1259
Share 30–34 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.19 1098 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.20 1259
Share 35–39 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.15 1098 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.18 1259
Share 40–44 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.15 1098 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.15 1259
Share 45–49 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.13 1098 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.13 1259
Share 50–54 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.12 1098 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.12 1259
Share 55–59 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.11 1098 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.11 1259
Share 60–64 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.11 1098 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.11 1259
Share 65+ 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 1098 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 1259
Share high-skills in working-age population
Share high-skill 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.37 1098 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.58 1259
Change in share high-skill 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06 1098 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.15 1259
Share < 20 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.25 1098 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.46 1259
Share 20–24 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.54 1098 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.93 1259
Share 25–29 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.56 1098 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.83 1259
Share 30–34 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.53 1098 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.66 1259
Share 35–39 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.50 1098 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.62 1259
Share 40–44 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.46 1098 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.62 1259
Share 45–49 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.44 1098 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.62 1259
Share 50–54 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.42 1098 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.60 1259
Share 55–59 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.39 1098 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.58 1259
Share 60–64 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.37 1098 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.57 1259
Share 65+ 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.32 1098 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.54 1259
Dependency ratio and life expectancy
Dependency ratio 0.64 0.21 0.21 1.07 1086 0.64 0.21 0.16 1.09 1236
Life expectancy 64.79 11.20 23.73 82.98 1053 65.25 10.86 23.73 82.98 1198
Share of age cohort in total labor force
Total (in millions) 22.45 78.59 0.06 801.59 582 19.36 73.45 0.06 801.59 672
Change (in millions) 1.66 5.31 -6.22 58.49 479 1.44 4.96 -6.22 58.49 551
Share < 20 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.20 645 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.19 742
Share 20–24 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.22 645 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.22 742
Share 25–29 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.22 645 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.23 742
Share 30–34 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.23 645 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.23 742
Share 35–39 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.20 645 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.20 742
Share 40–44 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.17 645 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.17 742
Share 45–49 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.16 645 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.17 742
Share 50–54 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.14 645 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.14 742
Share 55–59 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.12 645 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.12 742
Share 60–64 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.09 645 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.09 742
Share 65+ 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.10 645 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.10 742
Table A.2: Robustness: Differenced and Lagged Share of High-Skills
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) IIASA-VID sample
Share < 20 -3.84*** -2.97** -2.96** -3.54*** -2.01 -2.73**
(1.22) (1.21) (1.40) (1.21) (1.27) (1.26)
Share 20–24 -2.37** -1.87* -1.86 -3.27** -0.96 -2.40*
(1.10) (1.10) (1.39) (1.36) (1.13) (1.39)
Share 25–29 -3.56** -3.25** -3.28* -2.88** -2.22* -1.80
(1.42) (1.39) (1.90) (1.47) (1.34) (1.41)
Share 30–34 -3.06** -2.80** -2.79* -4.03*** -1.84 -3.35**
(1.27) (1.25) (1.54) (1.43) (1.22) (1.49)
Share 35–39 -4.01*** -3.72** -3.64** -2.99* -3.84** -2.58
(1.44) (1.43) (1.75) (1.57) (1.55) (1.68)
Share 40–44 -1.53 -1.32 -1.34 -1.81 -0.79 -1.82
(1.32) (1.30) (1.62) (1.42) (1.30) (1.44)
Share 45–49 -3.19** -3.01** -3.24* -3.93** -2.81** -3.80**
(1.43) (1.40) (1.94) (1.55) (1.40) (1.53)
Share 55–59 -4.66** -4.28** -4.68** -4.30** -3.94** -4.15**
(1.85) (1.81) (2.17) (1.83) (1.81) (1.83)
Share 60–64 -5.48*** -5.45*** -5.90*** -6.01*** -5.64*** -6.46***
(1.37) (1.35) (1.76) (1.51) (1.30) (1.48)
Share 65+ -3.06* -3.28** -3.39* -4.26*** -3.31* -3.97**
(1.58) (1.54) (1.80) (1.60) (1.73) (1.75)
∆ Share high-skill 1.89* 2.23* 1.80 1.82* 0.68 -0.12
(1.07) (1.16) (1.23) (1.10) (2.31) (2.29)
Share high-skill (t–1) 0.87** 0.94** 0.70** 0.72 2.80*** 2.65***
(0.35) (0.43) (0.33) (0.45) (0.84) (0.86)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Skill shares (p–value) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 13.5 37.1 8.7
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.39 0.50
(b) Barro-Lee sample
Share < 20 -3.64*** -3.18*** -2.88** -3.03* -3.26** -3.01*
(1.17) (1.20) (1.36) (1.55) (1.30) (1.61)
Share 20–24 -1.55 -1.24 -1.29 -1.72 -1.08 -1.58
(1.14) (1.13) (1.61) (1.63) (1.17) (1.63)
Share 25–29 -3.61** -3.39** -3.38** -2.88 -3.16** -2.51
(1.41) (1.41) (1.57) (1.84) (1.41) (1.81)
Share 30–34 -2.39* -2.23* -1.95 -1.93 -1.99 -1.55
(1.29) (1.29) (1.65) (1.81) (1.30) (1.83)
Share 35–39 -2.53* -2.32* -2.01 -2.71 -2.90* -3.15
(1.39) (1.40) (1.65) (2.01) (1.60) (2.24)
Share 40–44 -2.24 -2.03 -2.13 -1.08 -1.58 -0.74
(1.44) (1.41) (1.63) (1.76) (1.41) (1.74)
Share 45–49 -1.83 -1.82 -1.72 -2.39 -1.66 -1.97
(1.47) (1.46) (2.14) (2.15) (1.46) (2.09)
Share 55–59 -3.75** -3.51* -3.88 -2.71 -3.36* -2.52
(1.85) (1.84) (2.49) (2.40) (1.83) (2.38)
Share 60–64 -4.95*** -4.92*** -5.50*** -5.40*** -5.05*** -5.40***
(1.40) (1.39) (1.90) (1.67) (1.36) (1.62)
Share 65+ -1.44 -1.48 -1.48 -2.28 -1.43 -2.33
(1.65) (1.61) (2.06) (2.08) (1.67) (2.20)
∆ Share high-skill 0.69 0.51 0.37 0.56 -1.35 -0.93
(0.50) (0.51) (0.40) (0.50) (2.08) (2.29)
Share high-skill (t–1) 0.68*** 0.55** 0.34 0.60** 0.78* 0.83*
(0.22) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.40) (0.42)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00
Skill shares (p–value) 0.01 0.07 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.03
First-stage F–statistic 12.5 4.0 1.0
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.78 0.88
Notes: Panel (a) reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007), Panel (b) for data from Barro and
Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output
p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms (coefficients unreported). Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno
(2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill
shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the
edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage
F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction
test. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Robustness: Levels Model Without Lagged Dependent Variable
Demography Skills Demography Demography Skills Both
& Skills Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share < 20 -5.56*** -3.77*** -4.46*** -2.80** -3.32**
(1.14) (1.22) (1.43) (1.32) (1.56)
Share 20–24 -1.65 -0.56 -2.35* 0.03 -1.75
(1.11) (1.14) (1.35) (1.19) (1.35)
Share 25–29 -4.41*** -3.41*** -2.91** -2.87** -2.42*
(1.19) (1.19) (1.41) (1.19) (1.43)
Share 30–34 -3.79*** -3.04*** -4.56*** -2.63** -4.18***
(1.20) (1.15) (1.34) (1.16) (1.35)
Share 35–39 -3.63*** -3.02** -2.15 -2.69** -1.72
(1.28) (1.30) (1.36) (1.30) (1.34)
Share 40–44 -1.87 -1.45 -1.71 -1.22 -1.66
(1.26) (1.23) (1.38) (1.21) (1.36)
Share 45–49 -2.12* -1.94* -2.49* -1.85* -2.47*
(1.14) (1.12) (1.34) (1.10) (1.32)
Share 55–59 -2.02 -1.60 -0.89 -1.37 -0.83
(1.30) (1.29) (1.37) (1.27) (1.34)
Share 60–64 -5.25*** -5.32*** -5.66*** -5.35*** -5.95***
(1.32) (1.28) (1.39) (1.26) (1.39)
Share 65+ -2.40 -2.84* -3.97** -3.08* -3.95**
(1.72) (1.68) (1.69) (1.69) (1.75)
Share high-skill 2.64*** 2.32*** 1.80** 3.59*** 3.24***
(0.52) (0.70) (0.80) (1.09) (1.19)
Capital p.w. 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.56***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 13.2 27.4 4.5
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.37 0.59
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable
is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Capital p.w., measured in logarithms, is
included as control in all specifications. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-
age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5) (see
Figure A.3), the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of
both in Column (7). First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer
to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Robustness: Alternative Instrumentation of Human Capital (Levels)
Inflow and Outflow Inflow and Outflow Outflow
(Baseline) GMM Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share < 20 -2.09* -2.53** -1.79 -2.31** -1.87 -2.31**
(1.20) (1.18) (1.18) (1.16) (1.18) (1.17)
Share 20–24 -1.16 -2.58* -0.93 -2.25* -1.01 -2.45*
(1.11) (1.36) (1.09) (1.32) (1.09) (1.33)
Share 25–29 -2.58* -2.30 -2.27* -2.05 -2.45* -2.16
(1.32) (1.41) (1.30) (1.39) (1.30) (1.39)
Share 30–34 -2.33* -3.61** -2.37* -3.72*** -2.24* -3.56**
(1.21) (1.41) (1.21) (1.40) (1.21) (1.41)
Share 35–39 -3.33** -2.49* -2.95** -1.93 -3.24** -2.39
(1.39) (1.51) (1.35) (1.42) (1.37) (1.47)
Share 40–44 -1.12 -1.81 -0.66 -1.46 -1.07 -1.80
(1.26) (1.39) (1.19) (1.35) (1.24) (1.39)
Share 45–49 -2.92** -3.89** -2.71** -3.64** -2.89** -3.89**
(1.37) (1.51) (1.35) (1.50) (1.36) (1.51)
Share 55–59 -4.00** -4.16** -3.59** -3.79** -3.91** -4.11**
(1.74) (1.77) (1.70) (1.73) (1.72) (1.75)
Share 60–64 -5.53*** -6.33*** -5.29*** -6.10*** -5.53*** -6.38***
(1.30) (1.48) (1.29) (1.47) (1.30) (1.48)
Share 65+ -3.47** -4.22** -3.28** -3.88** -3.52** -4.02**
(1.56) (1.68) (1.55) (1.65) (1.58) (1.68)
Share high-skill 2.45*** 2.35*** 2.56*** 2.44*** 2.77*** 2.64***
(0.76) (0.77) (0.75) (0.77) (0.80) (0.82)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.45***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 27.9 4.5 27.9 4.53 59.7 5.4
Hansen test (p–value) 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.28 — —
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The
dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged
output p.w. and capital p.w., measured in logarithms, are included as controls in all specifications. The p–value for
a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are
jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are the shifted shares of high-skills for the 15- to 19-year-olds
(inflow) and the 65- to 69-year-olds (outflow) in all columns as well as the shifted age cohorts as in even columns. See
Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic.
Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Robustness: Barro-Lee Data (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.64*** -3.18*** -2.88** -3.03* -2.86** -2.60*
(1.17) (1.20) (1.35) (1.56) (1.15) (1.47)
Share 20–24 -1.55 -1.24 -1.29 -1.72 -1.02 -1.50
(1.14) (1.13) (1.60) (1.63) (1.09) (1.58)
Share 25–29 -3.61** -3.39** -3.37** -2.89 -3.24** -2.68
(1.41) (1.42) (1.57) (1.88) (1.38) (1.82)
Share 30–34 -2.39* -2.23* -1.96 -1.93 -2.11* -1.65
(1.29) (1.28) (1.64) (1.81) (1.25) (1.79)
Share 35–39 -2.53* -2.31* -2.02 -2.71 -2.15 -2.49
(1.39) (1.38) (1.64) (2.01) (1.35) (1.95)
Share 40–44 -2.24 -2.04 -2.13 -1.08 -1.89 -0.92
(1.44) (1.42) (1.62) (1.78) (1.36) (1.75)
Share 45–49 -1.83 -1.82 -1.72 -2.40 -1.82 -2.21
(1.47) (1.46) (2.13) (2.19) (1.43) (2.14)
Share 55–59 -3.75** -3.51* -3.89 -2.71 -3.33* -2.46
(1.85) (1.83) (2.47) (2.40) (1.77) (2.34)
Share 60–64 -4.95*** -4.91*** -5.49*** -5.41*** -4.89*** -5.41***
(1.40) (1.39) (1.90) (1.68) (1.37) (1.68)
Share 65–69 -1.44 -1.47 -1.47 -2.28 -1.50 -2.10
(1.65) (1.60) (2.05) (2.07) (1.57) (2.04)
Share high-skill 0.68*** 0.55** 0.36* 0.60** 0.94** 0.96**
(0.22) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.37) (0.38)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.64*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.50***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 12.6 27.8 5.1
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.30 0.45
Countries 139 139 139 139 138 139 138
Observations 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,211 1,248 1,259 1,248
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.84
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by Barro and Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output
per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms.
Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of
workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are
shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and
a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Robustness: Barro-Lee Data (Differences)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ Share < 20 -3.16*** -2.66*** -1.66* -4.13*** -2.84** -4.66***
(1.01) (1.01) (0.98) (1.39) (1.12) (1.70)
∆ Share 20–24 -2.52*** -1.92** -1.60* -3.14** -2.06* -3.63**
(0.93) (0.91) (0.92) (1.44) (1.10) (1.68)
∆ Share 25–29 -3.16*** -2.70*** -1.89* -4.08*** -2.82** -4.58**
(1.03) (1.01) (1.13) (1.57) (1.11) (1.87)
∆ Share 30–34 -2.99*** -2.57** -2.44** -3.21** -2.40** -3.58**
(1.08) (1.08) (1.20) (1.56) (1.10) (1.78)
∆ Share 35–39 -3.38*** -2.89** -2.43** -3.80** -3.23** -4.27**
(1.14) (1.15) (1.20) (1.78) (1.32) (2.01)
∆ Share 40–44 -2.53** -2.12* -1.16 -2.18 -2.17* -2.55*
(1.11) (1.10) (0.97) (1.36) (1.15) (1.49)
∆ Share 45–49 -2.41** -2.20** -0.88 -3.12** -2.14** -3.26**
(1.09) (1.08) (0.92) (1.56) (1.08) (1.62)
∆ Share 55–59 -2.08** -1.96* -0.97 -1.75 -1.88* -1.86
(1.02) (1.02) (1.00) (1.17) (1.03) (1.24)
∆ Share 60–64 -5.06*** -5.07*** -3.10*** -4.83*** -5.20*** -4.85***
(1.22) (1.24) (1.07) (1.44) (1.23) (1.46)
∆ Share 65+ -5.56*** -5.31*** -1.89 -5.19*** -5.50*** -5.38**
(1.66) (1.65) (1.47) (1.97) (1.72) (2.13)
∆ Share high-skill 1.07** 0.94** 0.65* 0.91* 0.34 -0.30
(0.48) (0.47) (0.33) (0.47) (1.89) (2.18)
Share high-skill (t–1) 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.37*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.52**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (0.23) (0.20) (0.24)
Output p.w. (t–1) -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.03*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.27***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ Capital p.w. 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01
Skills shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
First-stage F–statistic 6.8 6.5 0.8
AR(2) test (p–value) 0.35
Hansen test (p–value) 0.25 — 0.07 0.09
Countries 139 139 139 139 138 139 138
Observations 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,120 1,200 1,211 1,200
R2 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by Barro and Lee (2013). The dependent variable is the log
difference in output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w.
are measured in logarithms. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the system GMM estimator by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age
population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged
shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See
Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values
refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. For system GMM, also the p–values of the AR(2) test are reported. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Robustness: Ten-Year Cohorts (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) IIASA-VID sample
Share < 20 -4.19*** -2.89*** -2.23 -3.30*** -1.79 -2.13*
(1.03) (1.02) (1.39) (1.13) (1.14) (1.28)
Share 20–29 -2.26** -1.56 -0.93 -1.90* -0.97 -1.20
(0.92) (0.95) (1.34) (1.08) (1.00) (1.12)
Share 30–39 -2.82*** -2.43*** -1.87* -2.57** -2.11** -2.31**
(0.92) (0.92) (1.08) (1.01) (0.92) (1.01)
Share 40–49 -2.17* -1.93* -1.29 -2.35* -1.73 -2.07*
(1.11) (1.09) (1.68) (1.23) (1.08) (1.21)
Share 60+ -5.68*** -5.83*** -6.09*** -5.84*** -5.95*** -5.89***
(1.38) (1.34) (1.94) (1.34) (1.34) (1.35)
Share high-skill 1.81*** 1.78*** 1.35** 1.65*** 3.26*** 3.17***
(0.47) (0.52) (0.58) (0.53) (0.94) (0.97)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.38*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital p.w. 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.50***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 121.8 30.0 8.0
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.32 0.33
Countries 120 120 120 120 119 119 119
Observations 541 541 541 496 540 540 540
R2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
(b) Barro-Lee sample
Share < 20 -3.95*** -3.08** -2.52* -3.14*** -2.36* -2.43**
(1.24) (1.29) (1.51) (1.20) (1.33) (1.20)
Share 20–29 -2.19** -1.80* -1.55 -2.01* -1.47 -1.68
(0.98) (0.98) (1.35) (1.15) (0.98) (1.17)
Share 30–39 -2.51** -2.22** -1.75 -2.21** -1.99* -1.96*
(1.07) (1.08) (1.28) (1.08) (1.09) (1.11)
Share 40–49 -2.09* -1.86 -1.51 -2.20 -1.68 -1.95
(1.20) (1.19) (1.87) (1.43) (1.17) (1.43)
Share 60+ -4.77*** -4.67*** -4.99** -5.59*** -4.59*** -5.51***
(1.58) (1.54) (2.33) (1.46) (1.52) (1.44)
Share high-skill 1.20*** 0.97*** 0.73* 1.09*** 1.76*** 1.85***
(0.32) (0.36) (0.42) (0.37) (0.65) (0.68)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.20***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.45***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 23.8 20.0 5.8
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.24 0.39
Countries 139 139 139 139 137 138 137
Observations 621 621 621 573 615 620 615
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Notes: Panel (a) reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007), Panel (b) for data from Barro and
Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w.
and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value
for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from
zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the edge of the working-age population
in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A.8: Robustness: Ten-Year Cohorts (Differences)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) IIASA-VID sample
∆ Share < 20 -3.87*** -2.67*** -3.01** -2.31** -4.42*** -3.60***
(0.97) (0.99) (1.20) (1.08) (1.16) (1.26)
∆ Share 20–29 -2.68*** -1.77** -1.92** -2.34** -2.70*** -2.89***
(0.80) (0.84) (0.94) (1.06) (0.88) (1.05)
∆ Share 30–39 -3.00*** -2.53*** -2.95*** -2.82** -2.49** -2.19*
(0.82) (0.87) (1.04) (1.11) (0.97) (1.24)
∆ Share 40–49 -2.50*** -2.30*** -2.53*** -2.95*** -2.54*** -2.37**
(0.78) (0.75) (0.81) (0.91) (0.84) (0.98)
∆ Share 60+ -5.28*** -5.03*** -4.47*** -4.26*** -5.26*** -5.05***
(0.94) (0.93) (0.93) (1.05) (0.96) (1.18)
∆ Share high-skill 4.05*** 3.44*** 2.35*** 3.95*** -2.04 -2.46
(0.96) (1.07) (0.79) (1.06) (3.16) (3.30)
Share high-skill (t–1) 1.10** 1.08** 0.51* 0.90 1.58*** 1.51**
(0.46) (0.49) (0.28) (0.62) (0.61) (0.73)
Output p.w. (t–1) -0.41*** -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.03*** -0.49*** -0.46*** -0.46***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Capital p.w. 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skills shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11
First-stage F–statistic 49.1 31.8 8.1
AR(2) test (p–value) 0.13
Hansen test (p–value) 0.75 — 0.14 0.11
Countries 120 120 120 119 119 119 119
Observations 541 541 541 421 495 495 495
R2 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
(b) Barro-Lee sample
∆ Share < 20 -2.93*** -2.27** -2.62** -2.96** -3.38*** -3.77**
(1.03) (1.03) (1.09) (1.38) (1.30) (1.67)
∆ Share 20–29 -2.02** -1.47* -1.31* -2.22** -2.15** -2.88**
(0.79) (0.79) (0.78) (1.05) (1.03) (1.38)
∆ Share 30–39 -2.15** -1.66* -2.22** -1.69 -2.17** -2.39*
(0.83) (0.84) (0.99) (1.13) (1.04) (1.44)
∆ Share 40–49 -2.06** -1.75** -1.32 -1.43 -2.33** -1.94
(0.84) (0.84) (0.90) (1.03) (0.93) (1.18)
∆ Share 60+ -4.74*** -4.61*** -3.64*** -4.72*** -4.72*** -4.89***
(1.00) (1.01) (1.10) (1.14) (1.04) (1.17)
∆ Share high-skill 1.28** 0.99* 0.88* 1.08** -0.58 -1.05
(0.56) (0.53) (0.50) (0.54) (1.75) (2.07)
Share high-skill (t–1) 1.10*** 1.06*** 0.84*** 1.15*** 0.84 0.62
(0.39) (0.39) (0.22) (0.44) (0.53) (0.65)
Output p.w. (t–1) -0.43*** -0.48*** -0.46*** -0.06*** -0.51*** -0.48*** -0.48***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Capital p.w. 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skills shares (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.12
First-stage F–statistic 27.5 6.1 1.5
AR(2) test (p–value) 0.13
Hansen test (p–value) 0.15 — 0.09 0.06
Countries 139 139 139 138 137 138 137
Observations 621 621 621 482 567 572 567
R2 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.54
Notes: Panel (a) reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007), Panel (b) for data from Barro
and Lee (2013). The dependent variable is the log difference in output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time
effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the system
GMM estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce
shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age
cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in
Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen
test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. For system GMM, also the p–values of the AR(2) test are reported. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Robustness: Human Capital Granularity (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.64*** -3.51*** -3.10*** -3.53** -3.50*** -3.50**
(1.17) (1.21) (1.20) (1.54) (1.22) (1.52)
Share 20–24 -1.55 -1.36 -1.43 -1.93 -1.47 -2.19
(1.14) (1.10) (1.40) (1.61) (1.11) (1.68)
Share 25–29 -3.61** -3.55** -3.45** -3.09 -3.57** -3.14*
(1.41) (1.43) (1.66) (1.89) (1.46) (1.90)
Share 30–34 -2.39* -2.42* -2.11 -2.35 -2.66** -2.59
(1.29) (1.29) (1.39) (1.77) (1.28) (1.85)
Share 35–39 -2.53* -2.38* -2.08 -2.75 -2.44* -2.82
(1.39) (1.38) (1.55) (2.00) (1.38) (2.02)
Share 40–44 -2.24 -2.21 -2.25 -1.39 -2.32* -1.68
(1.44) (1.42) (1.51) (1.75) (1.39) (1.75)
Share 45–49 -1.83 -2.01 -1.84 -2.76 -2.29 -3.03
(1.47) (1.45) (2.12) (2.20) (1.43) (2.27)
Share 55–59 -3.75** -3.64** -3.97* -3.09 -3.76** -3.27
(1.85) (1.83) (2.11) (2.40) (1.82) (2.43)
Share 60–64 -4.95*** -5.15*** -5.65*** -5.59*** -5.03*** -5.61***
(1.40) (1.43) (1.74) (1.71) (1.48) (1.73)
Share 65–69 -1.44 -1.77 -1.72 -2.76 -2.17 -3.08
(1.65) (1.60) (1.68) (2.09) (1.58) (2.15)
Years of schooling < 4 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
4–6 years of schooling -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
6–7 years of schooling 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09)
8–10 years of schooling 0.05** 0.04* 0.03 0.04* 0.09 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Years of schooling > 10 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.08 0.12*** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.65*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.05
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.07 0.07
First-stage F–statistic 12.7 10.5 3.4
Countries 139 139 139 139 138 139 138
Observations 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,211 1,248 1,259 1,248
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by Barro and Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output
per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms.
Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce
shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age
cohorts in Column (5), the lagged years of schooling (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Panel (a) of Figure A.3 for an
illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
222 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Table A.10: Robustness: Income Per Capita
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.41** -2.60* -2.45 -4.56** -1.84 -3.40*
(1.41) (1.40) (1.51) (1.89) (1.42) (1.84)
Share 20–24 -3.06*** -2.43** -2.52* -3.50** -1.83* -2.99**
(1.11) (1.09) (1.43) (1.49) (1.10) (1.47)
Share 25–29 -4.41*** -3.89*** -4.03** -3.39** -3.41** -2.98*
(1.42) (1.39) (1.95) (1.59) (1.35) (1.54)
Share 30–34 -2.96** -2.58** -2.66* -3.66*** -2.23* -3.35**
(1.22) (1.19) (1.59) (1.41) (1.18) (1.40)
Share 35–39 -5.05*** -4.67*** -4.78*** -3.83** -4.31*** -3.38**
(1.38) (1.38) (1.79) (1.58) (1.35) (1.53)
Share 40–44 -1.80 -1.56 -1.73 -1.91 -1.33 -1.82
(1.31) (1.28) (1.67) (1.42) (1.25) (1.40)
Share 45–49 -4.31*** -4.13*** -4.56** -4.72*** -3.96*** -4.62***
(1.50) (1.47) (2.01) (1.78) (1.43) (1.75)
Share 55–59 -5.29*** -4.92*** -5.50** -4.75*** -4.57*** -4.50**
(1.70) (1.65) (2.25) (1.83) (1.59) (1.77)
Share 60–64 -5.95*** -5.94*** -6.67*** -6.35*** -5.93*** -6.54***
(1.41) (1.37) (1.83) (1.54) (1.33) (1.52)
Share 65+ -3.61** -3.80** -4.20** -4.47** -3.97** -4.54**
(1.60) (1.58) (1.87) (1.74) (1.58) (1.77)
Dependency Ratio -0.79** -1.19*** -0.80** -0.71* -1.32** -0.81** -1.25**
(0.39) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.56) (0.38) (0.54)
Dependency Ratio (t–1) -0.27 0.22 -0.25 -0.20 0.68 -0.24 0.53
(0.51) (0.36) (0.51) (0.49) (0.81) (0.51) (0.77)
Share high-skill 1.03*** 1.22*** 0.91*** 0.95** 2.37*** 2.20***
(0.39) (0.40) (0.34) (0.43) (0.74) (0.75)
Output p.c. (t–1) 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.64*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.48***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 13.2 28.7 6.7
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.19 0.22
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,053 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable is
log output per capita. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.c., capital p.w. and the (lagged)
dependency ratio, measured in logarithms, are included as controls in all specifications. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias
using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age
population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged
shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See
Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values
refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Heterogeneity: Accounting for Human Capital Differences Between Cohorts
Demography & Skills Bias Correction Skills
Instrumented
IIASA-VID Barro-Lee IIASA-VID Barro-Lee IIASA-VID Barro-Lee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share < 20 -2.59** -3.16*** -2.55* -2.64** -1.91 -2.63
(1.20) (1.16) (1.33) (1.32) (1.75) (1.92)
Share 20–24 -1.04 -1.07 -1.00 -0.96 -1.99 -0.50
(1.13) (1.14) (1.31) (1.53) (1.75) (2.18)
Share 25–29 -2.07 -2.97** -2.15 -2.73* -1.53 -2.56
(1.41) (1.43) (1.84) (1.60) (2.14) (1.86)
Share 30–34 -2.02 -2.11* -2.07 -1.67 -1.86 -1.80
(1.24) (1.26) (1.53) (1.59) (1.62) (1.46)
Share 35–39 -2.77* -2.21 -2.72 -1.69 -2.30 -1.69
(1.47) (1.39) (1.66) (1.64) (1.96) (2.16)
Share 40–44 -0.58 -1.86 -0.62 -1.77 -0.33 -1.32
(1.27) (1.35) (1.58) (1.60) (1.69) (2.17)
Share 45–49 -2.36* -1.77 -2.65 -1.51 -2.35 -1.74
(1.40) (1.50) (1.88) (2.09) (2.13) (1.65)
Share 55–59 -3.39* -3.02* -3.64* -2.97 -3.07 -2.46
(1.78) (1.74) (1.95) (2.36) (2.24) (2.67)
Share 60–64 -4.78*** -4.49*** -5.24*** -4.85** -4.99*** -3.94*
(1.28) (1.46) (1.70) (1.90) (1.70) (2.10)
Share 65+ -2.19 -1.18 -2.30 -0.97 -0.95 -0.72
(1.56) (1.57) (1.80) (2.11) (3.18) (1.88)
Share high-skill < 20 0.53 -0.27 0.39 -0.21 -1.76 -0.70
(0.37) (0.23) (0.59) (0.24) (2.22) (2.11)
Share high-skill 20–24 -0.52*** 0.22* -0.43* 0.22 -1.11 1.16
(0.19) (0.11) (0.23) (0.14) (1.05) (3.78)
Share high-skill 25–29 1.16*** 0.07 1.01*** 0.04 6.19 -0.58
(0.35) (0.12) (0.37) (0.17) (6.92) (2.69)
Share high-skill 30–34 0.46 0.03 0.31 -0.03 -9.38 -0.03
(0.43) (0.18) (0.56) (0.25) (12.76) (0.41)
Share high-skill 35–39 -1.04* -0.31 -1.09 -0.33 6.13 -0.44
(0.62) (0.27) (0.70) (0.39) (9.39) (1.06)
Share high-skill 40–44 0.12 -0.17 0.25 -0.25 -1.51 -0.05
(0.54) (0.31) (0.79) (0.49) (2.39) (0.78)
Share high-skill 45–49 0.44 -0.39 0.40 -0.55 0.21 -0.35
(0.59) (0.34) (0.82) (0.52) (0.74) (0.76)
Share high-skill 50–54 -0.31 0.70 -0.39 0.77 -0.51 0.36
(0.71) (0.47) (0.80) (0.52) (0.78) (0.74)
Share high-skill 55–59 -0.61 0.55 -0.52 0.71 -1.64 0.74
(0.62) (0.56) (0.75) (0.61) (1.68) (0.97)
Share high-skill 60–64 0.86 -0.07 0.89 -0.13 1.07 0.97
(0.59) (0.44) (0.84) (0.57) (0.84) (3.59)
Share high-skill 65+ 0.78 0.13 0.76 0.13 0.64 -0.76
(0.55) (0.41) (0.75) (0.53) (0.86) (2.76)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.46*** 0.52*** 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.47*** 0.52***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.28***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.22
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.35
First-stage F–statistic 0.1 0.0
Countries 120 139 120 139 120 139
Observations 1,098 1,259 1,053 1,211 1,098 1,259
R2 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.84
Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) report results for demographic and human capital data from IIASA-VID (Lutz et al.,
2007), Columns (2), (4), and (6) for data by Barro and Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All
regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms.
Columns (3) and (4) correct for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. Instruments are the lagged shares
of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Columns (5) and (6); see Panel (c) of Figure A.3 for an
illustration. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population)
and the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic are reported. The IV specification is just-identified. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Heterogeneity: Accounting for Human Capital Differences Between Cohorts
Demography & Skills Bias Correction Skills
Instrumented
IIASA-VID Barro-Lee IIASA-VID Barro-Lee IIASA-VID Barro-Lee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share < 20 -3.33*** -3.41*** -3.08** -2.86** -3.34*** -3.39***
(1.21) (1.18) (1.36) (1.30) (1.19) (1.16)
Share 20–24 -1.83 -1.13 -1.65 -1.05 -1.83* -1.11
(1.13) (1.15) (1.37) (1.55) (1.11) (1.12)
Share 25–29 -3.37** -3.43** -3.21* -3.23** -3.37** -3.42**
(1.40) (1.43) (1.85) (1.53) (1.37) (1.40)
Share 30–34 -3.06** -2.26* -2.90* -1.81 -3.06** -2.26*
(1.25) (1.29) (1.54) (1.62) (1.22) (1.27)
Share 35–39 -3.68** -2.56* -3.47** -2.06 -3.68*** -2.56*
(1.44) (1.35) (1.71) (1.59) (1.41) (1.32)
Share 40–44 -1.67 -2.00 -1.54 -1.93 -1.67 -1.99
(1.30) (1.44) (1.56) (1.60) (1.28) (1.41)
Share 45–49 -3.30** -1.94 -3.41* -1.71 -3.30** -1.95
(1.40) (1.47) (2.01) (2.07) (1.37) (1.45)
Share 55–59 -4.50** -3.26* -4.59** -3.42 -4.50** -3.23*
(1.80) (1.82) (2.05) (2.26) (1.77) (1.78)
Share 60–64 -5.76*** -5.10*** -6.12*** -5.52*** -5.76*** -5.11***
(1.38) (1.41) (1.74) (1.83) (1.36) (1.38)
Share 65+ -3.74** -1.69 -3.75** -1.58 -3.74** -1.70
(1.55) (1.63) (1.85) (2.07) (1.52) (1.60)
Share high-skill 50–54 0.78** 0.52*** 0.69*** 0.40** 0.78*** 0.56***
(0.31) (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) (0.30) (0.21)
Rel. sh. high-skill < 20 -0.0001*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.0001*** 0.00
(0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.0000) (0.00)
Rel. sh. high-skill 20–24 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Rel. sh. high-skill 25–29 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Rel. sh. high-skill 30–34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Rel. sh. high-skill 35–39 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Rel. sh. high-skill 40–44 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Rel. sh. high-skill 45–49 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Rel. sh. high-skill 55–59 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Rel. sh. high-skill 60–64 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.06
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
Rel. sh. high-skill 65+ 0.03** 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03** 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.48*** 0.51***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital p.w. 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.29***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.81 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 7.3e+5 2505.3
Countries 120 139 120 139 120 139
Observations 1,098 1,255 1,053 1,208 1,098 1,255
R2 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.85
Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) report results for demographic and human capital data from IIASA-VID (Lutz et al.,
2007), Columns (2), (4), and (6) for data by Barro and Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All
regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms.
Columns (3) and (4) correct for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. Instruments are the lagged shares
of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Columns (5) and (6); see Panel (c) of Figure A.3 for an
illustration. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population)
and the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic are reported. The IV specification is just-identified. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A.13: Robustness: Controlling for the Dependency Ratio (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) IIASA-VID sample
Share < 20 -3.45*** -2.70** -2.61* -3.37*** -1.71 -2.21*
(1.26) (1.25) (1.43) (1.27) (1.25) (1.24)
Share 20–24 -2.65** -2.10* -2.21 -3.46** -1.38 -2.79**
(1.08) (1.08) (1.38) (1.38) (1.08) (1.36)
Share 25–29 -3.56** -3.13** -3.22* -2.82* -2.56* -2.34*
(1.42) (1.39) (1.89) (1.46) (1.32) (1.40)
Share 30–34 -3.03** -2.71** -2.74* -3.96*** -2.29* -3.59**
(1.28) (1.25) (1.53) (1.43) (1.22) (1.41)
Share 35–39 -4.07*** -3.77*** -3.72** -3.03* -3.37** -2.54*
(1.44) (1.43) (1.74) (1.58) (1.39) (1.51)
Share 40–44 -1.66 -1.47 -1.55 -2.00 -1.22 -1.94
(1.30) (1.28) (1.62) (1.39) (1.23) (1.37)
Share 45–49 -3.26** -3.14** -3.37* -4.02*** -2.98** -3.93***
(1.43) (1.41) (1.95) (1.55) (1.37) (1.51)
Share 55–59 -4.63** -4.35** -4.75** -4.39** -3.96** -4.14**
(1.85) (1.81) (2.18) (1.83) (1.74) (1.77)
Share 60–64 -5.44*** -5.46*** -5.93*** -6.04*** -5.49*** -6.32***
(1.36) (1.33) (1.76) (1.50) (1.29) (1.48)
Share 65+ -2.90* -3.09* -3.25* -4.16** -3.34** -4.20**
(1.60) (1.57) (1.79) (1.64) (1.57) (1.69)
Dependency ratio -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09
(0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Share high-skill 0.89** 1.08*** 0.85*** 0.84** 2.51*** 2.40***
(0.34) (0.40) (0.32) (0.41) (0.76) (0.77)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 12.6 28.6 4.7
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.20 0.25
(b) Barro-Lee sample
Share < 20 -3.63*** -3.15** -2.71** -3.08* -2.87** -2.65*
(1.22) (1.24) (1.36) (1.58) (1.20) (1.50)
Share 20–24 -1.64 -1.32 -1.56 -1.67 -1.13 -1.46
(1.15) (1.12) (1.58) (1.67) (1.08) (1.63)
Share 25–29 -3.61** -3.38** -3.39** -2.88 -3.24** -2.68
(1.42) (1.42) (1.59) (1.88) (1.38) (1.83)
Share 30–34 -2.46* -2.31* -2.08 -1.93 -2.23* -1.65
(1.30) (1.30) (1.76) (1.81) (1.27) (1.79)
Share 35–39 -2.63* -2.41* -2.18 -2.69 -2.28* -2.49
(1.38) (1.38) (1.75) (2.00) (1.34) (1.95)
Share 40–44 -2.24 -2.02 -2.19 -1.06 -1.90 -0.90
(1.43) (1.40) (1.63) (1.78) (1.34) (1.75)
Share 45–49 -1.76 -1.77 -1.69 -2.39 -1.78 -2.21
(1.48) (1.46) (2.31) (2.19) (1.44) (2.15)
Share 55–59 -3.70** -3.43* -3.82* -2.71 -3.27* -2.46
(1.84) (1.82) (2.23) (2.40) (1.76) (2.33)
Share 60–64 -5.16*** -5.18*** -5.79*** -5.41*** -5.20*** -5.41***
(1.39) (1.37) (1.58) (1.68) (1.34) (1.68)
Share 65+ -1.47 -1.48 -1.53 -2.29 -1.49 -2.12
(1.66) (1.61) (2.13) (2.07) (1.58) (2.04)
Dependency ratio -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Share high-skill 0.71*** 0.61** 0.43* 0.60** 0.97** 0.96**
(0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.38) (0.39)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 10.5 29.5 5.5
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.47 0.47
Notes: Panel (a) reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007), Panel (b) for data from Barro and
Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output
p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms (coefficients unreported). Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno
(2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill
shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the
edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage
F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction
test. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Robustness: Population Scale Effects (in Logarithms)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.54*** -3.06*** -3.04** -3.62*** -2.61** -3.06***
(1.13) (1.16) (1.40) (1.14) (1.21) (1.15)
Share 20–24 -1.65 -1.39 -1.45 -2.71** -1.14 -2.47*
(1.05) (1.06) (1.39) (1.33) (1.08) (1.34)
Share 25–29 -3.08** -2.86** -2.97 -2.64* -2.64** -2.46*
(1.38) (1.37) (1.90) (1.44) (1.33) (1.40)
Share 30–34 -2.58** -2.43** -2.43 -3.50** -2.28* -3.39**
(1.18) (1.18) (1.54) (1.38) (1.17) (1.37)
Share 35–39 -3.60** -3.45** -3.48** -2.80* -3.31** -2.58*
(1.38) (1.38) (1.75) (1.52) (1.36) (1.50)
Share 40–44 -0.95 -0.90 -0.95 -1.48 -0.86 -1.52
(1.23) (1.22) (1.63) (1.34) (1.19) (1.33)
Share 45–49 -2.67* -2.66* -2.95 -3.76** -2.65** -3.76**
(1.36) (1.35) (1.96) (1.48) (1.32) (1.47)
Share 55–59 -4.00** -3.90** -4.36** -4.11** -3.79** -4.05**
(1.66) (1.66) (2.19) (1.69) (1.64) (1.68)
Share 60–64 -5.35*** -5.38*** -5.87*** -6.10*** -5.41*** -6.25***
(1.33) (1.32) (1.77) (1.47) (1.29) (1.47)
Share 65+ -4.52*** -4.45*** -4.41** -4.62*** -4.37*** -4.67***
(1.49) (1.48) (1.83) (1.59) (1.47) (1.60)
Working-Age Population -0.20*** -0.12** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Share high-skill 0.70** 0.72* 0.55 0.51 1.42* 1.34*
(0.32) (0.39) (0.35) (0.40) (0.75) (0.75)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.08
First-stage F–statistic 13.2 26.4 4.2
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.18 0.16
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,053 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable is log
output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w., capital p.w. and the working-age
population are measured in logarithms. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a
Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero
are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the edge of the working-age population
in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.15: Robustness: Population Scale Effects (in Absolute Values)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.75*** -2.80** -2.75** -3.41*** -1.69 -2.16*
(1.23) (1.22) (1.38) (1.22) (1.22) (1.20)
Share 20–24 -2.41** -1.80 -1.78 -3.28** -1.09 -2.61*
(1.10) (1.09) (1.39) (1.37) (1.10) (1.35)
Share 25–29 -3.48** -2.94** -2.97 -2.60* -2.31* -2.03
(1.42) (1.39) (1.89) (1.46) (1.32) (1.39)
Share 30–34 -3.04** -2.66** -2.64* -3.90*** -2.21* -3.51**
(1.28) (1.25) (1.54) (1.44) (1.21) (1.42)
Share 35–39 -4.01*** -3.65** -3.58** -2.96* -3.24** -2.46
(1.45) (1.44) (1.75) (1.58) (1.40) (1.52)
Share 40–44 -1.54 -1.33 -1.33 -1.86 -1.08 -1.80
(1.32) (1.29) (1.62) (1.41) (1.26) (1.40)
Share 45–49 -3.15** -3.00** -3.23* -3.88** -2.81** -3.75**
(1.43) (1.40) (1.96) (1.55) (1.36) (1.51)
Share 55–59 -4.71** -4.39** -4.79** -4.38** -4.01** -4.13**
(1.85) (1.81) (2.20) (1.83) (1.74) (1.77)
Share 60–64 -5.49*** -5.52*** -6.00*** -6.01*** -5.56*** -6.28***
(1.37) (1.34) (1.77) (1.50) (1.30) (1.48)
Share 65+ -2.95* -3.12** -3.22* -4.11** -3.32** -4.06**
(1.59) (1.57) (1.81) (1.63) (1.59) (1.70)
Working-Age Population 0.04* 0.05** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.07*** 0.07***
(β̂, se(β̂) × 100) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Share high-skill 1.08*** 1.28*** 1.06*** 0.99** 2.77*** 2.62***
(0.34) (0.41) (0.34) (0.43) (0.79) (0.81)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.46***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 13.2 26.6 4.4
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.31 0.37
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,053 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable is log
output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in
logarithms. The working-age population is measured in millions. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005)
estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares
are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the edge of the
working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic
reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A.16: Robustness: Controlling for Life Expectancy (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) IIASA-VID sample
Share < 20 -3.70*** -2.71** -2.69* -3.49*** -1.29 -1.91
(1.23) (1.22) (1.38) (1.22) (1.26) (1.23)
Share 20–24 -2.36** -1.72 -1.83 -3.22** -0.80 -2.33*
(1.12) (1.11) (1.36) (1.39) (1.13) (1.39)
Share 25–29 -3.51** -2.95** -3.06 -2.65* -2.13 -1.82
(1.45) (1.41) (1.87) (1.49) (1.35) (1.42)
Share 30–34 -2.52** -2.11* -2.16 -3.61** -1.52 -3.21**
(1.25) (1.22) (1.53) (1.46) (1.19) (1.43)
Share 35–39 -4.59*** -4.30*** -4.28** -3.29* -3.88** -2.61
(1.63) (1.60) (1.72) (1.77) (1.55) (1.68)
Share 40–44 -1.17 -0.93 -1.03 -1.64 -0.59 -1.55
(1.31) (1.29) (1.60) (1.41) (1.29) (1.43)
Share 45–49 -2.95** -2.80** -3.07 -3.77** -2.59* -3.58**
(1.43) (1.40) (1.93) (1.52) (1.37) (1.48)
Share 55–59 -4.45** -4.11** -4.57** -4.16** -3.62** -3.79**
(1.87) (1.84) (2.16) (1.82) (1.78) (1.77)
Share 60–64 -5.37*** -5.41*** -5.88*** -5.99*** -5.47*** -6.32***
(1.35) (1.32) (1.75) (1.48) (1.27) (1.46)
Share 65+ -2.97* -3.04* -3.18* -4.22** -3.14* -4.11**
(1.77) (1.74) (1.80) (1.70) (1.79) (1.81)
Life expectancy 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.005** 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share high-skill 1.14*** 1.32*** 1.13*** 0.98** 3.21*** 3.04***
(0.35) (0.42) (0.32) (0.44) (0.86) (0.89)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
First-stage F–statistic 12.2 30.4 5.1
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.47 0.57
(b) Barro-Lee sample
Share < 20 -3.21*** -2.61** -2.35* -2.41 -2.24* -1.84
(1.21) (1.24) (1.31) (1.52) (1.20) (1.44)
Share 20–24 -1.12 -0.66 -0.90 -1.24 -0.38 -0.99
(1.14) (1.11) (1.54) (1.61) (1.07) (1.56)
Share 25–29 -3.10** -2.78* -2.87* -2.13 -2.57* -1.86
(1.42) (1.44) (1.54) (1.81) (1.40) (1.76)
Share 30–34 -1.78 -1.62 -1.48 -0.88 -1.52 -0.52
(1.29) (1.27) (1.72) (1.84) (1.24) (1.83)
Share 35–39 -2.87* -2.54* -2.42 -2.85 -2.34 -2.59
(1.53) (1.51) (1.70) (2.23) (1.47) (2.16)
Share 40–44 -1.34 -1.07 -1.28 -0.08 -0.90 0.12
(1.39) (1.36) (1.57) (1.69) (1.31) (1.68)
Share 45–49 -1.15 -1.12 -1.08 -1.37 -1.11 -1.15
(1.51) (1.49) (2.24) (2.13) (1.47) (2.09)
Share 55–59 -2.87 -2.49 -3.00 -1.91 -2.26 -1.62
(1.83) (1.82) (2.19) (2.35) (1.76) (2.30)
Share 60–64 -4.53*** -4.50*** -5.08*** -4.52*** -4.49*** -4.57***
(1.35) (1.33) (1.55) (1.61) (1.30) (1.61)
Share 65+ -0.74 -0.75 -0.77 -1.65 -0.76 -1.44
(1.72) (1.67) (2.08) (2.12) (1.64) (2.09)
Life expectancy 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share high-skill 0.86*** 0.74*** 0.60*** 0.69*** 1.20*** 1.17***
(0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.44) (0.44)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 15.5 28.1 4.9
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.15 0.15
Notes: Panel (a) reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007), Panel (b) for data from Barro and
Lee (2013). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output
p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms (coefficients unreported). Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno
(2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill
shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the
edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage
F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction
test. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.17: Robustness: Average Years of Schooling (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share < 20 -3.64*** -3.66*** -3.23** -3.70** -3.83*** -3.97***
(1.17) (1.18) (1.37) (1.55) (1.16) (1.53)
Share 20–24 -1.55 -1.54 -1.53 -2.04 -1.47 -1.83
(1.14) (1.14) (1.60) (1.65) (1.11) (1.68)
Share 25–29 -3.61** -3.62** -3.52** -3.15* -3.65*** -3.36*
(1.41) (1.41) (1.58) (1.89) (1.36) (1.92)
Share 30–34 -2.39* -2.37* -2.05 -2.30 -2.28* -2.24
(1.29) (1.28) (1.64) (1.77) (1.26) (1.69)
Share 35–39 -2.53* -2.54* -2.21 -3.01 -2.55* -2.86
(1.39) (1.39) (1.64) (2.03) (1.37) (2.03)
Share 40–44 -2.24 -2.24 -2.29 -1.25 -2.23 -1.44
(1.44) (1.44) (1.62) (1.79) (1.42) (1.81)
Share 45–49 -1.83 -1.81 -1.70 -2.60 -1.70 -2.53
(1.47) (1.47) (2.13) (2.20) (1.48) (2.20)
Share 55–59 -3.75** -3.78** -4.11* -3.05 -3.91** -3.39
(1.85) (1.85) (2.47) (2.42) (1.82) (2.43)
Share 60–64 -4.95*** -4.96*** -5.53*** -5.43*** -5.07*** -5.69***
(1.40) (1.40) (1.90) (1.70) (1.36) (1.68)
Share 65+ -1.44 -1.40 -1.39 -2.47 -1.20 -1.95
(1.65) (1.63) (2.04) (2.10) (1.63) (2.07)
Years of schooling 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04** -0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.66*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 1.00 0.68 0.26 0.67 0.04 0.04
First-stage F–statistic 12.3 103.5 18.9
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.00 0.00
Countries 139 139 139 139 138 139 138
Observations 1,259 1,259 1,259 1,211 1,248 1,259 1,248
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by Barro and Lee (2013). Human capital is proxied by average years
of schooling. The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output
p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms. Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The
p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different
from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the edge of the working-age
population in Column (6), and a combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A.18: Heterogeneity: Sample Split OECD and Non-OECD Countries (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) OECD Countries
Share < 20 0.35 0.60 0.44 0.72 1.28 1.43
(0.99) (1.07) (1.23) (1.05) (1.09) (1.16)
Share 20–24 -0.98 -0.89 -0.66 -1.89* -0.63 -1.73*
(0.89) (0.89) (1.35) (0.97) (0.82) (0.98)
Share 25–29 -0.40 -0.26 -0.15 1.05 0.12 1.16
(1.22) (1.24) (1.56) (1.24) (1.21) (1.29)
Share 30–34 -0.41 -0.32 -0.04 -1.18 -0.07 -1.02
(1.12) (1.12) (1.33) (1.32) (1.03) (1.26)
Share 35–39 0.49 0.62 0.87 1.01 1.00 1.25
(0.97) (0.98) (1.54) (0.98) (0.94) (1.05)
Share 40–44 -0.77 -0.74 -0.70 -0.55 -0.66 -0.62
(1.10) (1.10) (1.31) (1.01) (1.08) (1.02)
Share 45–49 -0.54 -0.52 -0.47 -0.78 -0.47 -0.90
(1.12) (1.13) (1.84) (0.99) (1.10) (1.01)
Share 55–59 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.09 -0.08
(1.59) (1.62) (1.69) (1.47) (1.59) (1.52)
Share 60–64 -1.57 -1.65 -1.75 -1.79 -1.87* -2.18**
(1.14) (1.12) (1.52) (1.11) (1.02) (1.06)
Share 65+ -1.76 -1.71 -1.87 -2.22 -1.60 -2.14
(1.29) (1.34) (1.53) (1.41) (1.45) (1.61)
Share high-skill 0.21 0.41 0.51* 0.42 1.51** 1.60***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.29) (0.28) (0.61) (0.59)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.45 0.24 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.54 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 22.8 9.9 1.8
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.33 0.31
Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Observations 341 341 341 318 341 341 341
(b) Non-OECD countries
Share < 20 -5.44*** -4.88*** -5.15** -6.88*** -3.03* -4.47**
(1.85) (1.84) (2.54) (2.07) (1.78) (1.89)
Share 20–24 -3.14* -2.85 -3.24 -5.58** -1.88 -4.42*
(1.77) (1.77) (2.88) (2.40) (1.76) (2.27)
Share 25–29 -4.35* -4.11* -4.57* -5.80** -3.29* -4.54**
(2.23) (2.18) (2.77) (2.54) (1.99) (2.24)
Share 30–34 -4.48** -4.30** -4.70* -6.55** -3.67** -6.21**
(1.88) (1.85) (2.84) (2.67) (1.78) (2.59)
Share 35–39 -7.06*** -6.89*** -7.04** -6.87** -6.30*** -5.29*
(2.48) (2.47) (2.96) (3.19) (2.32) (3.01)
Share 40–44 -1.71 -1.66 -1.86 -3.80 -1.48 -3.88
(2.46) (2.42) (3.09) (3.06) (2.26) (2.98)
Share 45–49 -4.12 -4.18 -5.02 -8.14** -4.37* -7.74**
(2.55) (2.53) (3.98) (3.54) (2.43) (3.25)
Share 55–59 -7.70*** -7.56*** -8.24* -9.02*** -7.11*** -8.37***
(2.83) (2.78) (4.58) (3.16) (2.61) (3.02)
Share 60–64 -7.66*** -7.67*** -8.96*** -9.60*** -7.73*** -10.11***
(2.34) (2.27) (2.97) (2.92) (2.04) (2.67)
Share 65+ -4.47 -4.41 -4.92 -6.23* -4.21 -5.95*
(2.81) (2.76) (3.58) (3.21) (2.63) (3.12)
Share high-skill 0.96* 0.92 0.60 0.50 4.03*** 3.98***
(0.50) (0.68) (0.67) (0.73) (1.45) (1.49)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Skill share (p–value) 0.06 0.18 0.37 0.49 0.01 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 6.3 28.2 4.6
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.83 0.90
Countries 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Observations 757 757 757 735 757 757 757
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). Panel (a) reports results for
OECD countries, Panel (b) for non-OECD countries. The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-
specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms (coefficients unreported). Column (4)
corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce
shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted
age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a
combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.19: Heterogeneity: Sample Split Before and After 1990 (Levels)
Demography & Skills Bias Correction Skills
Instrumented
–1990 1990+ –1990 1990+ –1990 1990+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share < 20 2.49 -5.21*** 2.83 -4.40** 2.50* -1.38
(1.51) (1.68) (2.15) (1.96) (1.50) (2.19)
Share 20–24 1.64 -3.60** 1.60 -2.92 1.63 -0.27
(1.30) (1.58) (2.08) (2.32) (1.27) (1.89)
Share 25–29 0.76 -5.05*** 0.88 -4.65** 0.76 -2.82
(1.82) (1.79) (2.64) (2.35) (1.78) (1.82)
Share 30–34 1.30 -4.72*** 1.59 -4.40 1.29 -1.72
(1.68) (1.64) (2.15) (2.70) (1.69) (2.16)
Share 35–39 0.66 -5.31*** 1.44 -5.00* 0.65 -3.89**
(1.60) (1.74) (2.69) (3.02) (1.61) (1.76)
Share 40–44 2.83** -5.45*** 3.20 -5.47** 2.83** -1.95
(1.37) (1.76) (2.49) (2.65) (1.34) (2.11)
Share 45–49 1.36 -5.56*** 0.52 -4.85 1.38 -4.61**
(1.52) (1.87) (2.95) (3.34) (1.49) (1.99)
Share 55–59 1.49 -5.60*** 1.68 -5.80** 1.49 -4.18**
(1.85) (2.10) (3.30) (2.88) (1.81) (2.02)
Share 60–64 -1.56 -7.34*** -1.56 -8.29*** -1.55 -8.21***
(1.62) (1.89) (2.57) (2.22) (1.57) (1.84)
Share 65+ 1.66 -7.56*** 3.00 -7.53** 1.65 -8.40***
(1.67) (2.12) (2.97) (3.25) (1.60) (2.54)
Share high-skill 1.10 0.56 0.28 0.42 1.17 6.36**
(1.01) (0.81) (0.90) (0.92) (2.03) (2.53)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.54*** 0.23*** 0.80*** 0.42*** 0.54*** 0.20***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
Capital p.w. 0.28*** 0.46*** 0.19*** 0.41*** 0.28*** 0.46***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.15 0.02 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.28 0.49 0.75 0.65 0.56 0.01
First-stage F–statistic 19.0 14.3
Hansen test (p–value) 0.29 0.52
Countries 103 120 103 120 85 120
Observations 516 582 471 479 498 582
R2 0.82 0.74 0.82 0.70
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The
sample is split in periods before 1990 (1955–1985) and after 1990 (1990–2010). The dependent variable is log output
per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are
measured in logarithms. Columns (3) and (4) correct for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator.
Instruments are the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Columns
(5) and (6); see Panel (c) of Figure A.3 for an illustration. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of
workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) and the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic
are reported. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.20: Heterogeneity: Sample Split Before and After 1990 (Levels, Barro-Lee Data)
Demography & Skills Bias Correction Skills
Instrumented
–1990 1990+ –1990 1990+ –1990 1990+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share < 20 0.05 -3.78* 0.74 -2.74 0.05 -2.56
(1.38) (2.15) (2.31) (1.70) (1.35) (2.20)
Share 20–24 1.76 -2.24 1.01 -1.23 1.77 -0.74
(1.31) (1.78) (2.36) (1.92) (1.30) (1.89)
Share 25–29 -1.84 -4.49** -1.52 -3.68* -1.83 -4.05*
(1.61) (2.03) (2.74) (2.08) (1.57) (2.08)
Share 30–34 -0.49 -2.52 -0.14 -1.75 -0.47 -1.40
(1.54) (2.21) (2.28) (2.31) (1.56) (2.28)
Share 35–39 -0.13 -1.95 0.13 -1.43 -0.12 -1.14
(1.27) (2.17) (2.50) (2.46) (1.24) (2.19)
Share 40–44 1.01 -5.42** 1.57 -5.32** 1.00 -4.26**
(1.33) (2.19) (2.45) (2.60) (1.30) (2.17)
Share 45–49 -0.14 -2.58 -0.45 -0.99 -0.14 -2.33
(1.34) (2.72) (3.30) (2.86) (1.32) (2.71)
Share 55–59 1.61 -4.39 1.34 -4.22 1.61 -3.56
(1.54) (2.73) (3.51) (2.67) (1.51) (2.78)
Share 60–64 -1.12 -7.16*** -1.76 -7.98*** -1.10 -6.92***
(1.60) (1.81) (2.79) (1.83) (1.56) (1.81)
Share 65+ 0.54 -3.98 1.76 -3.68 0.56 -3.38
(1.89) (2.54) (3.14) (3.03) (1.83) (2.68)
Share high-skill 0.18 0.69 -0.01 0.59 0.13 2.11**
(0.38) (0.55) (0.44) (0.46) (0.51) (1.05)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.54*** 0.23*** 0.84*** 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.21***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Capital p.w. 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.36 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.36 0.01
Skill share (p–value) 0.64 0.21 0.99 0.20 0.80 0.04
First-stage F–statistic 8.3 15.6
Hansen test (p–value) 0.31 0.18
Countries 122 139 122 139 97 139
Observations 582 677 534 555 557 677
R2 0.81 0.67 0.81 0.66
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by Barro and Lee (2013). The sample
is split in periods before 1990 (1955–1985) and after 1990 (1990–2010). The dependent variable is log output per
worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are
measured in logarithms. Columns (3) and (4) correct for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator.
Instruments are the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Columns
(5) and (6); see Panel (c) of Figure A.3 for an illustration. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of
workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) and the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic
are reported. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A.21: Robustness: Old Versus Young Populations (Levels)
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Old populations (above median of the young-age dependency ratio)
Share < 20 -4.26*** -3.92** -4.12*** -3.35** -3.57** -2.86*
(1.54) (1.55) (1.58) (1.38) (1.60) (1.47)
Share 20–24 -1.93 -1.76 -1.97 -3.62** -1.58 -3.51**
(1.27) (1.28) (1.91) (1.47) (1.27) (1.51)
Share 25–29 -4.79** -4.64** -5.08*** -2.24 -4.48*** -2.03
(1.82) (1.79) (1.82) (1.53) (1.74) (1.54)
Share 30–34 -3.32** -3.22** -3.23* -5.28*** -3.12** -5.18***
(1.32) (1.31) (1.72) (1.72) (1.28) (1.72)
Share 35–39 -4.51** -4.39** -4.54** -2.27 -4.27** -2.11
(1.81) (1.80) (2.16) (1.78) (1.75) (1.75)
Share 40–44 -3.27** -3.23** -3.59** -3.85*** -3.19** -3.86***
(1.32) (1.31) (1.53) (1.28) (1.27) (1.29)
Share 45–49 -5.28*** -5.25*** -5.65** -4.43*** -5.22*** -4.43***
(1.80) (1.80) (2.33) (1.65) (1.74) (1.64)
Share 55–59 -5.47** -5.38** -6.19** -5.38*** -5.29*** -5.32***
(2.10) (2.09) (2.42) (1.92) (2.02) (1.91)
Share 60–64 -6.22*** -6.29*** -7.11*** -6.32*** -6.37*** -6.54***
(1.59) (1.57) (1.63) (1.67) (1.51) (1.68)
Share 65+ -6.13*** -6.13*** -6.29*** -5.90*** -6.13*** -5.95***
(1.54) (1.54) (1.83) (1.54) (1.52) (1.56)
Share high-skill 0.15 0.54 0.47 0.41 1.10 1.13
(0.38) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.95) (0.92)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skill share (p–value) 0.69 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.22
First-stage F–statistic 6.5 16.2 2.6
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.24 0.18
Observations 549 549 549 525 543 543 543
R2 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
(b) Young populations (below median of the young-age dependency ratio)
Share < 20 3.42 3.67 2.88 -0.49 4.45 0.65
(3.11) (3.18) (3.80) (5.27) (3.01) (5.35)
Share 20–24 3.42 3.46 2.80 -1.90 3.58 -1.47
(3.09) (3.09) (4.01) (5.33) (3.02) (5.41)
Share 25–29 5.23 5.24 4.24 1.70 5.26* 1.88
(3.26) (3.25) (3.99) (6.07) (3.13) (6.14)
Share 30–34 0.50 0.53 -0.20 -2.22 0.63 -1.88
(3.94) (3.96) (4.62) (5.29) (3.93) (5.41)
Share 35–39 4.45 4.45 4.25 1.23 4.46 1.41
(2.84) (2.84) (4.24) (6.31) (2.80) (6.41)
Share 40–44 7.66* 7.60* 6.65 4.25 7.39* 3.99
(3.90) (3.89) (4.54) (6.70) (3.77) (6.71)
Share 45–49 3.66 3.55 2.95 -6.74 3.22 -6.71
(3.94) (3.95) (5.89) (7.94) (3.91) (8.04)
Share 55–59 -0.84 -0.67 -1.37 -7.54 -0.17 -7.34
(5.22) (5.19) (7.04) (10.07) (4.95) (10.20)
Share 60–64 1.76 2.04 1.21 -2.17 2.87 -1.75
(6.15) (6.13) (7.46) (11.31) (5.81) (11.26)
Share 65+ 9.94 9.91 9.45 14.80 9.84* 17.70
(6.26) (6.22) (6.43) (13.30) (5.97) (13.16)
Share high-skill 0.88 0.77 0.48 0.63 3.09** 3.05*
(0.92) (1.07) (1.11) (1.11) (1.44) (1.61)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.66 0.11 0.66
Skill share (p–value) 0.34 0.47 0.66 0.57 0.03 0.06
First-stage F–statistic 0.9 32.2 0.9
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.50 0.53
Observations 549 549 549 528 545 545 545
R2 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69
Notes: This table reports results for demographic and human capital data by IIASA-VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The sample has been split
with respect to the young-age dependency ratio. Panel (a) reports results for observations for which the young-age dependency ratio
is above the median, Panel (b) for observations below the median. The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions
include country-specific fixed and time effects. Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w. are measured in logarithms (coefficients unreported).
Column (4) corrects for the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of
workforce shares (proxied by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments
are shifted age cohorts in Column (5), the lagged share of high skills of the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a
combination of both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F–statistic. Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.22: Robustness: Labor Force Shares
Demography Skills Demography Bias Demography Skills Both
& Skills Correction Instrumented Instrumented Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Labor Force Share < 20 -4.96*** -4.91*** -4.53*** -5.64*** -3.14* -1.85
(1.34) (1.37) (1.44) (1.74) (1.63) (2.39)
Labor Force Share 20–24 -4.16*** -4.07*** -3.76*** -6.00*** -0.85 -3.96**
(1.27) (1.32) (1.43) (1.41) (1.77) (1.66)
Labor Force Share 25–29 -4.03*** -3.96*** -4.25** -4.67*** -1.45 -2.10
(1.34) (1.38) (1.70) (1.60) (1.65) (2.10)
Labor Force Share 30–34 -4.28*** -4.21*** -4.05** -7.13*** -1.79 -5.36**
(1.51) (1.52) (1.69) (1.83) (1.81) (2.31)
Labor Force Share 35–39 -5.54*** -5.48*** -5.49*** -5.68*** -3.50** -4.43**
(1.49) (1.48) (1.89) (1.90) (1.65) (2.15)
Labor Force Share 40–44 -4.25*** -4.22*** -4.30** -5.63*** -3.01** -5.01***
(1.38) (1.39) (1.67) (1.64) (1.42) (1.93)
Labor Force Share 45–49 -4.60** -4.57** -4.62* -6.59*** -3.70* -5.49**
(1.77) (1.77) (2.40) (1.81) (1.94) (2.14)
Labor Force Share 55–59 -5.78*** -5.77*** -5.79** -6.27*** -5.35*** -6.78***
(1.88) (1.89) (2.52) (1.92) (2.01) (2.11)
Labor Force Share 60–64 -6.93*** -6.92*** -7.68*** -9.28*** -6.71** -10.16***
(2.43) (2.44) (2.24) (2.71) (3.04) (3.41)
Labor Force Share 65+ -2.00 -1.98 -1.28 -6.80 -1.57 -11.76*
(2.12) (2.13) (1.98) (4.74) (3.16) (6.69)
Share high-skill 0.85** 0.19 -0.29 0.08 6.99*** 6.29**
(0.33) (0.66) (0.59) (0.69) (2.54) (2.93)
Output p.w. (t–1) 0.25*** 0.50*** 0.25*** 0.41*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.19***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Capital p.w. 0.46*** 0.33*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.48***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Cohort shares (p–value) 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02
Skill share (p–value) 0.01 0.77 0.62 0.91 0.01 0.03
First-stage F–statistic 2.8 10.9 1.1
Hansen test (p–value) — 0.60 0.73
Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Observations 645 1,098 645 645 645 645 645
R2 0.76 0.86 0.76 0.75 0.68 0.65
Notes: This table reports results for demographic data by International Labour Organization (2011) and human capital data by IIASA-
VID (Lutz et al., 2007). The dependent variable is log output per worker. All regressions include country-specific fixed and time effects.
Lagged output p.w. and capital p.w., measured in logarithms, are included as controls in all specifications. Column (4) corrects for
the dynamic-panel bias using the Bruno (2005) estimator. The p–value for a Wald test whether coefficients of workforce shares (proxied
by the working-age population) or high-skill shares are jointly different from zero are reported. Instruments are shifted age cohorts in
Column (5), the lagged shares of high skills of cohorts at the edge of the working-age population in Column (6), and a combination of
both in Column (7). See Figure A.3 for an illustration. First-stage F–statistic reports the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F–statistic.
Hansen test p–values refer to the robust overidentifying restriction test. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Robustness: Return of Health and Education to Productivity
No Adding Fixed Adding Lagged IV IV IV
Controls Controls Effects Gini Controls ∆(hi,t) ∆(si,t) ∆(hi,t), ∆(si,t)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(yi,t−1) -0.051*** -0.15*** -0.33*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14***
(0.0095) (0.017) (0.052) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
∆ ln(ki,t) 0.51*** 0.35*** 0.27** 0.23*** 0.48*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.052) (0.063) (0.11) (0.066) (0.075) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068)
∆(hi,t) 1.22*** 0.63** 0.66** 0.76** 0.72** 0.97 0.60** 0.56
(0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.35) (0.28) (1.13) (0.30) (1.18)
∆(si,t) 0.057** 0.038 0.035 0.020 0.035 0.043* -0.019 -0.019
(0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.087) (0.088)
∆(ai,t) 0.0063 0.0061 -0.010 0.0082 0.0077 0.0051 0.0083 0.0084
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0098) (0.010) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0085)
∆(a2i,t) -0.00052 -0.00051 0.00028 -0.00054 -0.00057* -0.00048 -0.00055* -0.00056*
(0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00037) (0.00039) (0.00032) (0.00034) (0.00033) (0.00033)
∆(σ2i,t) — — — -0.63 — — — —
— — — (0.45) — — — —
R2 0.29 0.38 0.38 — 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.36
First-stage F — — — — — 19.6 25.3 10.0
Countries 116 116 116 109 116 116 116 116
Observations 613 613 613 461 613 613 613 613
Controls — X X X X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of log output per worker ∆ ln(yt). All specifications include lagged schooling si,t−1 and a
full set of time effects. Columns (2) to (8) add further controls xi,t for the quality of economic institutions, the value added by the agricultural
sector, the percentage of land area in the tropics, and a full set of regional dummies. First-stage F refers to the Kleibergen-Paap first-stage
F -statistic. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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B.2 Coding of Compulsory Schooling Laws
Table B.2: Coding Description
This table describes coding choices for countries in which compulsory schooling laws differ by schooling type or target group, and countries
which experienced longer spells of turbulence and civil war. This list contains all countries for which information on compulsory schooling
was available and, thus, even those that do not enter the estimation sample.
Albania: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) yearbooks report four plus an additional three years
of compulsory schooling for 1963 and 1964. From 1965 to 1967, four plus an additional other four years of compulsory schooling are reported.
We code these as seven and eights years of schooling because “[f]our years’ schooling is compulsory for all children; a second period of
three (four) years is compulsory for children in towns and villages where a seven-grade (eight-grade) school is available” (UNESCO, 1963–1968).
Andorra: Andorra’s educational system is split into French and Spanish schools. However, because both schooling system differ in terms of
compulsory schooling, we follow UNESCO’s convention and code values as missing until 1977. Afterwards, both schools require a minimum
of ten years of schooling so that we code a value of ten.
Angola: “The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is
consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas”
(UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for the years 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as it is the case
for Portugal.
Argentina: In 1972, compulsory schooling takes a value of eights years, while before and afterwards compulsory schooling is consistently
reported with seven years. Because the structure of the educational system did not change in 1972, we code a value of seven years.
Australia: For 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report eight to ten years of compulsory schooling, varying by state. We take the figure
of New South Wales, the most densely populated state, and thus code nine years. From 1968 onward, the yearbooks report values between
nine and eleven years, varying by state or whether kindergarten counts toward primary education. We code ten years of compulsory schooling.
This figure is consistent with more recent data published by the World Bank (2017). Moreover, the number reflects average compulsory
schooling.
Bahrain: For 1971 and 1972, eight years of compulsory schooling are reported. However, change “will be applied in 1973/1974” (UNESCO,
1971). Following the value of the preceding years, we code a value of zero. For the period 1987 to 1993, zero compulsory schooling is reported.
This figure contrasts with the high values before and afterwards. We thus code a missing rather than a zero value. Based on the age range,
twelve years of compulsory are reported for the period 1995 to 1997. However, the compulsory program only contains six years of primary
schooling with a general academic curriculum combined with religious instruction, which continues to nine years. Correspondingly, we code
nine instead of twelve years for the period 1995 to 1997.
Barbados: There is no compulsory schooling from 1963 to 1967; however, the value for 1966 is missing. We impute this value to be zero. For
the years 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report twelve years of compulsory schooling instead of eleven in preceding and subsequent periods.
Belgium: In 1985 and 1986, UNESCO yearbooks report eight and nine years of compulsory schooling. Based on the preceding years and the
age range, nine years of compulsory schooling are implausible, however. Therefore, we code eight years in 1985 and 1986.
Benin: After independence in 1960, there was a longer spell of political turbulence. In particular, several changes in power occurred at the
beginning of the 1970s. According to the UNESCO yearbooks, compulsory schooling amounts to six years until 1970, zero years from 1971 to
1974, and seven years from 1975 onward. Due to the unstable nature of government, the exact role of compulsory schooling and whether it
was enforced is unclear. Therefore, we decide to code the years 1971 to 1974 as missing rather than a clean zero.
Brazil: For 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling values of four and five years. From 1965 onward, the level
remains consistently at four years. Because Brazil follows the Portuguese educational system, we code a value of four for 1963 and 1964.
Brunei: For the years 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling levels of twelve years. These stand in contrast to
nine years of compulsory schooling before and afterwards. Because neither the educational system nor the age range of compulsory schooling
changed during this period, we code nine instead of twelve years.
Cameroon: Historically, the educational system consisted of French schools in the Eastern and British schools in the Western part of
Cameroon. In 1976, the British system was adopted in the entire country. We use the British system’s compulsory schooling regulations
throughout all periods. UNESCO yearbooks list eight years of compulsory schooling in 1969 and 1970. Given the subsequent period without
any compulsory schooling, it is unlikely that this regulation has been enforced. We thus code a zero value for both 1969 and 1970.
Canada: Compulsory schooling “[...] figures vary slightly from one Province to another” (UNESCO, 1963). Values range from seven to ten
years between 1963 and 1968, and eight to ten years between 1969 and 1994. We take a slightly conservative view and code a value of eight
years for 1963–1968 and nine years for 1969–1994.
Cape Verde: “The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is
consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas”
(UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for the years 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as it is the case
for Portugal.
Czech Republic and Slovakia: We use compulsory schooling regulations of former Czechoslovakia for both countries prior to 1994.
Egypt: For 1989 to 1991, UNESCO yearbooks report nine years of compulsory education. However, these figures are implausible given five
years of primary and three years of lower secondary education. Therefore, we code eight rather than nine years. For 1995 and 1996, the
yearbooks report five years of compulsory schooling. This figure does not reflect lower secondary education, which is also compulsory since
the educational reforms in the early 1990s. Hence, we set the corresponding value to eight years instead of five.
Fiji: Between 1975 and 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report zero years of compulsory schooling in contrast to eight years from 1963 to 1974.
We follow the World Bank convention, which codes missing values of compulsory schooling between 1998 and 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Thus,
we code missing values for the years 1975 to 1997.
Finland: For 1967, 1971, and 1972, UNESCO yearbooks report eight instead of formerly nine years of compulsory schooling. Based on the
age range and structure of the educational system, these shifts seem implausible. Thus, we code nine year of compulsory schooling.
Germany: Figures are based on West Germany prior to 1990. We code twelve rather than nine years of compulsory schooling in 1968–1970
and 1973–1988. This coding includes nine years of compulsory schooling plus an additional three years of “[...] part time vocational education”
(UNESCO, 1973).
Guinea: In 1971/1972, compulsory schooling increases from eight to twelve years before it dropped again back to eight years in 1973.
Throughout this period, the overall structure of the educational system remained unaltered. The only detectable change was the range
of compulsory schooling from 7–15 to 7–22 which is implausible in comparison to other countries and also Guinea’s legal age. Therefore,
compulsory schooling is coded to remain at eight years instead of twelve.
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Guinea-Bissau: For 1981 and 1982, UNESCO yearbooks report seven years of compulsory schooling in contrast to six years in preceding
and subsequent periods. Because the educational system remained unaltered during these years, this change seems implausible. Hence, we
code six rather than seven years.
Guyana: Throughout the period 1963 to 1997, compulsory schooling takes a value of eight years with the exception of 1981 and 1982 (nine
years), 1983 (six years) and 1995 to 1997 (ten years). However, the shifts are inconsistent with the relative stability of the educational system
between 1980 and 1984, as well as the age range of compulsory schooling from six to 14 for the period 1995 to 1997. We thus code eight years
over the entire period.
India: In 1971 and 1972, the UNESCO yearbooks report various levels of compulsory schooling. In the years thereafter, only a uniform level
of five years is reported. This change is justified by the fact that “[t]his information pertains to the majority of states” (UNESCO, 1975).
Therefore, we code also a value of five years for 1971 and 1972.
Indonesia: In 1973 and 1974, UNESCO yearbooks report zero values for compulsory schooling. These figures stand in contrast to six years
of compulsory schooling before and thereafter. Moreover, the educational system remained unaltered during this period. Hence, we code a
value of six instead of zero years.
Iran: For the years 1966, 1967, 1973, and 1974, UNESCO yearbooks report five years of compulsory schooling in contrast to six years in
preceding and intermediate periods. However, these figures seem implausible, because the educational remained unaltered during this period.
Therefore, we code six rather than five years.
Iraq: UNESCO yearbooks consistently report six years of compulsory schooling. In 1983, however, five years are reported, although the
educational structure did not change. We code six instead of five years. Moreover, compulsory schooling is missing in 1973 and 1974. Because
the educational system remained unaltered, we set the value to six years—the same as in the preceding and following years.
Israel: Between 1981 and 1987, UNESCO yearbooks report nine years of compulsory schooling in contrast to eleven years in preceding and
subsequent periods. Moreover, this figure seems implausible given the age range from five to 15. Hence, we code eleven instead of nine years
for this period.
Jordan: According to the UNESCO yearbooks, compulsory schooling increased from six to nine years in 1964 based on a widening of
the age range. However, this increase is not observed in 1965 where the age range is again six years. Therefore, we code six instead of nine years.
Kiribati and Tuvalu: Until 1976, the islands were a British protectorate under the name Gilbert and Ellice Islands. We thus use compulsory
schooling of the former protectorate for both Kiribati and Tuvalu. For the years 1975 to 1980, during which the islands became independent,
we code missing instead of the reported zero values. For the years 1985 and 1986, UNESCO yearbooks report five years of schooling in
contrast to nine years in the preceding and subsequent periods. Because the educational system remained unaltered during this time, we code
nine instead of five years.
Kuwait: For 1982 and 1983, UNESCO yearbooks report four in contrast to eight years in preceding and subsequent periods. Because the
educational system remained unaltered during this period, we code eight instead of four years.
Laos: For the years 1990 to 1994, UNESCO yearbooks report eight in contrast to five years of compulsory schooling in preceding and
subsequent periods. Because the educational system with five years of compulsory primary schooling remained unaltered during this period,
we code five instead of eight years.
Lebanon: Throughout the period 1963 to 1997, compulsory schooling is consistently zero years, except for 1971 where UNESCO yearbooks
report a value of twelve. Given the overall trend, this value seems implausible so that we code zero years.
Lesotho: The UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling of eight years for the former British Crown colony Basutoland in 1964 and
1965. However, there was no compulsory schooling for the independent state of Lesotho between 1966 and 1984. Moreover, the yearbooks
also report a value of zero for the colony in 1963. We thus set the value for compulsory schooling to zero for 1964 and 1965.
Malawi: For 1963 to 1965, UNESCO yearbooks report eight years of compulsory schooling based on the English schools in the former British
colony. From 1966 onward, zero years of schooling are reported. Because Malawi became independent in 1964, eight years of compulsory
schooling seem implausible. Hence, we code zero rather eight years.
Malaysia: From 1968 to 1984, UNESCO yearbooks report six years of compulsory schooling for some and zero or missing values for other
regions. Because there is no compulsory schooling in the most populous regions, we code zero years from 1968 to 1984.
Malta: In 1986 and 1987, UNESCO yearbooks report twelve years of compulsory schooling. Based on the stable educational system, the age
range, and subsequent values, these figures seem implausible. We code ten instead of twelve years.
Mauritius: For the years 1981 to 1983, UNESCO yearbooks report eight years of compulsory schooling in contrast to seven years in preceding
and subsequent years. Because the educational system remained unaltered during this period, we code seven rather than eight years. Between
1987 and 1994, figures for compulsory schooling drop to zero. However, these values seem implausible, because the educational system did
not change in this period either. We code missing instead of zero values.
Monaco: For 1973 and 1974, UNESCO yearbooks report eleven years of compulsory schooling in contrast to ten years before and afterwards.
Because the educational system remained unaltered during this period, we code ten rather than eleven years.
Mozambique: “The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese education. It is
consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are to be found overseas”
(UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for the years 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four years as it is the case
for Portugal.
Nauru: For the years 1963 to 1970, UNESCO yearbooks report nine years of compulsory schooling for European and ten years for Nauruan
schools. We code a value of ten years.
Nepal: Historically, the Nepalese educational system consisted of English and Sanskrit schools. Until 1967, there was no compulsory
schooling for either of these schools. Beginning in 1968, the English school system prescribed five years of schooling while attendance at
Sanskrit schools was not compulsory. Following the UNESCO’s convention to document compulsory schooling based on the English system
from 1973 onward (UNESCO, 1973), we code five years of compulsory schooling.
New Zealand: For the years 1994 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report eleven years of compulsory schooling. However, the educational
system consists of six years of primary and four years of lower secondary schooling. For this reason, we code ten rather than eleven years.
This coding choice is consistent with preceding and subsequent periods and the stability of the educational system overall.
Niger: For the period 1973 to 1979, the UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling of 12/13 years in contrast to eight years in the
preceding and subsequent periods. This substantial change is not reflected in a corresponding transformation of the educational system
and only represents shifts in the age range for compulsory schooling. Therefore, this extreme increase seems implausible so that we code
compulsory schooling to remain at eight years throughout 1973 to 1979.
Norway: From 1968 to 1970, values of seven and nine years are being reported, because “[a] law passed in 1968 extended compulsory
education from seven to nine years. This has been applied in most municipalities” (UNESCO, 1968).
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Philippines: In 1963 and 1964, a missing value of compulsory schooling is reported. However, we decide to code a zero value, because “[i]n
implementation of Republic Act No. 1124, Department Order No. 1, s.1957, Article 2 states that elementary education shall ultimately be
made available for all children between 7 and 13 years” (UNESCO, 1963). Hence, compulsory schooling was not yet implemented in 1963 and
1964.
Poland: Between 1963 and 1970, UNESCO yearbooks report various values of compulsory schooling. We take a conservative view and code
1963 and 1964 with a value of seven years and 1965 to 1970 with a value of eight years.
Republic of Congo: For the period 1973 and 1974, compulsory schooling dropped from an initial value of ten to six years. From 1975
onward, compulsory schooling reverted back to a value of ten years. Throughout this entire time, compulsory schooling age ranges from six
to 16 years for boys and six to 17 years for girls. Therefore, we also code a value of ten years for 1973 and 1974.
Romania: For 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report seven or eight years of compulsory schooling. In subsequent years, educational
regulations prescribe eight years of compulsory schooling. Based on this stability in the educational system, we set values to eight years for
1963 and 1964.
Saint Lucia: For 1985 and 1986, UNESCO yearbooks report eleven years of compulsory education in contrast to ten years in preceding and
subsequent periods. Because the structure of the educational system with seven years of primary and three years of lower secondary schooling
did not change during these years, this shifts seems implausible. Hence, we code ten rather than eleven years.
Sao Tome and Principe: “The school system in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces forms part of the general pattern of Portuguese
education. It is consequently the same as in metropolitan territory, but not all the levels and types of education provided in Portugal are
to be found overseas” (UNESCO, 1964–1967). Therefore, we assume that for the years 1964 to 1967, compulsory schooling amounts to four
years as it is the case for Portugal.
Senegal: UNESCO yearbooks report seven years of compulsory education for 1971 and 1972 and six years for 1973 and 1974. However,
compulsory primary education corresponded only to six and five years. Therefore, we code six and five years rather than seven and six.
Singapore: Compulsory schooling has only been introduced in 2003. Hence, we code one missing value as zero before 2003.
South Africa: Between 1963 and 1984, UNESCO yearbooks report seven and nine years of compulsory schooling, varying by state and race.
We code seven years of schooling as the corresponding figure for the black population, which constitutes approximately 80 percent of the total
population.
Sri Lanka: From 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report eleven years of compulsory schooling in contrast to ten years beforehand. Based
on the age limits that remained unaltered over this period, we code ten instead of eleven years.
St. Vincent and The Grenadines: UNESCO yearbooks report ten years of compulsory schooling for 1968–1974 as well as 1978–1985, and
zero years for the periods 1963–1967, 1975–1977, and 1986–1995. Between 1996 and 2004, no values are reported. The overall structure of the
educational system did not change substantially throughout all these periods so that large shifts in compulsory schooling appear implausible.
We thus code values for 1963–1967, 1975–1977 and 1986–1995 to be missing rather than zero.
Suriname: UNESCO yearbooks report eleven years of compulsory schooling for the period 1995 to 1997. This figure stands in stark contrast
to only six years before and afterwards. Because the educational system with six years of compulsory primary schooling remained unaltered
during these years, we code six instead of eleven years.
Swaziland: In the early years until 1965, the educational system consisted of European, African, and Eurafrican schools. Because education
was compulsory only at European schools, which were abolished from 1966 onward, and not for the other school types, we code a value of
zero.
Switzerland: According to the UNESCO yearbooks, compulsory schooling varies between seven and nine years across Swiss cantons from
1963 to 1997. In some cantons, students are additionally required to take up at least two years of “complementary part-time schooling”
(UNESCO, 1963). Hence, the reported figures are likely too low. Thus, we follow the convention of UNESCO reports from 1975 to 1981 and
code nine years of compulsory schooling throughout the entire period.
Thailand: In 1963 and 1964, UNESCO yearbooks report between four and seven years of compulsory schooling. Based on the age range and
subsequent values, we code both observations as seven.
Tonga: For the years 1995 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks report eight years of compulsory schooling. However, this figure seems implausible
in comparison to six years in preceding and subsequent periods. Moreover, the educational system remained unaltered during these years.
Hence, we code six rather than eight years. For 2012 to 2015, the World Bank (2017) reports eight and then 15 years of compulsory schooling.
These figures are implausible, because only primary education, which requires six years of schooling, is compulsory in Tonga. Therefore, we
code also six years of compulsory schooling for the period 2012 to 2015.
Trinidad and Tobago: In 1973 and 1974, compulsory schooling is reported to possess a value of ten years. Before 1973 and after 1974, this
figure corresponds to seven years. Because only primary schooling is compulsory with a standard duration of seven years given entry ages for
primary and secondary schooling, we code a value of seven for 1973 and 1974.
Turkey: Between 1965 and 1967, eight years of compulsory schooling is reported. However, only five years of primary schooling were
compulsory. In line with preceding and subsequent periods, we thus code a compulsory schooling of five years.
Tunisia: From 1968 to 1981, UNESCO yearbooks report six years of compulsory schooling. For 1982 and 1983, no values are reported. From
1984 onward, compulsory schooling is documented with a value of zero until 1992. The yearbooks show eleven years of compulsory schooling
for 1993/1994, and nine years from 1995 onward. The educational system consists of six years of primary schooling, three years of lower
secondary schooling, and a further four years of upper secondary schooling. This structure is maintained throughout the entire period 1981
to 1995. Because zero values are implausible, we code them as missing. For the years 1993 and 1994, we set compulsory schooling to nine
instead of eleven years.
United States: For the years 1963 to 1997, UNESCO yearbooks present values ranging from ten to twelve years for the U.S. Minimum
compulsory schooling corresponds to ten years, formally from age six to 16. Some states require students to remain in school until coming of
age, implying two further years. However, there are also exemption regulations for religious groups and homeschooling. We take a conservative
view and set the compulsory schooling thus to the minimum value of ten years, which is fulfilled by all states.
Vanuatu: Historically, the educational system consists of English and French schools. Compulsory schooling years refer to regulations with
respect to English schools.
Yemen: Figures are based on compulsory schooling of the former Arab Republic of Yemen and the Republic of Yemen.
Zambia: For the years 1963 to 1966, UNESCO yearbooks report compulsory schooling of eight years with zero years from 1967 onward.
Because “[e]ducation is compulsory in certain areas only” (UNESCO, 1963–1966), we code the years 1963 to 1966 as zero.
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan: Prior to 1992, we code compulsory schooling according to the values of the former Soviet Union.
Between 1963 and 1966, UNESCO yearbooks report eight and nine years of compulsory schooling. Because primary schooling comprises only
eight grades, we code eight rather than nine years.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia: Prior to 1993, we code compulsory schooling according
to values of former Yugoslavia. Figures of Serbia and Montenegro are taken from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the years 1993 to 1997.
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(a) Pre Treatment (Table 4.1b, Column 5)
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(b) Post Treatment (Table 4.1b, Column 5)
Figure C.1: Partial Correlation Plots: First Stage (Flexible Model)
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(a) Pre Treatment (Table 4.2b, Column 5)
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(b) Post Treatment (Table 4.2b, Column 5)
Figure C.2: Partial Correlation Plots: Reduced Form (Flexible Model)
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(a) DD Model (Table C.3a, Column 5)
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(b) Flexible Model (Table C.3b, Column 5)
Figure C.3: Robustness: Reduced Form – Total Workforce
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(a) 1940–2000 (Table 4.10, Column 3)
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(b) 1940–1990 (Table 4.10, Column 4)
Figure C.4: Illustration: Effect of Life Expectancy over Time (Total Workforce)
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group
Total 15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+
Log wages 10.20 9.41 10.24 10.44 10.46 10.36 9.90
(0.37) (0.26) (0.35) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.31)
Labor force participation 58.43 56.78 71.71 73.26 71.23 56.42 17.86
(6.25) (9.90) (9.81) (9.54) (9.03) (5.51) (5.79)
Usual work hours per week 17.68 19.19 29.59 30.32 29.47 23.23 6.84
(3.63) (4.85) (5.76) (5.29) (5.03) (3.21) (1.93)
Usual work weeks per year 18.78 19.99 31.27 31.99 31.50 25.46 8.03
(5.97) (6.29) (10.18) (10.44) (9.76) (6.93) (2.43)
Average work hours per year 723.93 641.58 1250.97 1304.04 1283.79 993.46 254.08
(254.28) (240.45) (445.50) (452.71) (424.22) (282.46) (87.69)
Log life expectancy 3.65 4.00 3.81 3.58 3.29 2.95 2.74
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
Mortality from CVD in 1960 0.23 — — — — — —
× Post 1960 (0.20) — — — — — —
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial log life expectancy at 50 2.07 2.27 2.16 2.03 1.86 1.66 1.53
(1.80) (1.97) (1.88) (1.76) (1.61) (1.44) (1.33)
Initial mortality other than CVD 0.21 — — — — — —
(0.18) — — — — — —
Initial share college graduates 0.03 — — — — — —
(0.03) — — — — — —
Initial share college enrollment 0.07 — — — — — —
(0.06) — — — — — —
Initial population density (× 1
100
) 0.75 — — — — — —
(1.60) — — — — — —
Initial log wages 5.80 — — — — — —
(5.03) — — — — — —
Sample weights:
Initial white population (× 1
100000
) 32.95 4.36 4.17 4.47 3.83 2.94 3.18
(34.26) (4.31) (4.42) (4.84) (4.18) (3.27) (3.41)
Notes: Descriptive statistics for balanced panel of the 48 contiguous states from 1940–2000 with a total number of 336 observations.
Numbers are means for the respective variable in the total population or a specific age group. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
CVD is an abbreviation for cardiovascular diseases.
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Table C.2: OLS: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages of Workers Aged 45–54
Dependent variable: log wages of whites 45–54
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ordinary Least Squares
Log life expectancy at 50 -0.43 -0.05 -0.04 0.23 -0.01
(0.26) (0.37) (0.38) (0.41) (0.37)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white pop-
ulation of 45- to 54-year-olds. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: Robustness: Reduced Form for Total Workforce
Dependent variable: log wages of the total workforce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model
Mortality × Post 1960 -0.62*** -0.65 -1.34** -1.18** -1.58**
(0.19) (0.43) (0.61) (0.56) (0.66)
(b) Flexible model
Mortality × 1940 0.36 0.36 0.35 -0.33 -0.05
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.28)
Mortality × 1950 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.06
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20)
Mortality × 1970 -0.05 -0.08 -0.75 -1.11* -1.55**
(0.17) (0.41) (0.58) (0.56) (0.68)
Mortality × 1980 -0.79*** -0.81 -1.49** -0.77 -1.36**
(0.27) (0.50) (0.64) (0.54) (0.67)
Mortality × 1990 -0.42 -0.44 -1.15 -1.49** -1.64**
(0.35) (0.54) (0.72) (0.64) (0.69)
Mortality × 2000 -0.57 -0.60 -1.34* -1.67** -1.64**
(0.39) (0.57) (0.76) (0.72) (0.76)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: Robustness: Linear Specification of Life Expectancy
Dependent variable: log wages of whites 45–54
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
Life expectancy at 50 -0.08*** 0.39 0.22** 0.10*** 0.15**
(0.02) (0.29) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06)
First-stage F–statistic 46.8 2.1 6.8 35.5 9.4
(b) Flexible model (2SLS)
Life expectancy at 50 -0.05*** 0.03 0.04* 0.09*** 0.12*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
First-stage F–statistic 10.9 7.7 9.8 7.9 2.0
Hansen test p–value 0.04 0.002 0.004 0.2 0.8
(c) Flexible model (LIML)
Life expectancy at 50 -0.06*** 0.12 0.10* 0.12*** 0.15*
(0.02) (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09)
First-stage F–statistic 10.9 7.7 9.8 7.9 2.0
Hansen test p–value 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.9
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white pop-
ulation of 45- to 54-year-olds. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.5: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages by Age Cohorts
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 1.00 3.61*** 2.71*** 2.35*** 0.84 0.66 3.13***
(of specific age group) (2.05) (1.29) (0.80) (0.89) (0.74) (1.10) (0.94)
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 5.3 8.5 3.5 5.9 2.4 5.8
Hansen test p–value 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.02 0.8
(b) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy 1.13 3.84*** 2.75*** 2.57** 0.90 1.48 3.30***
(of specific age group) (2.52) (1.40) (0.81) (1.00) (0.78) (2.80) (1.00)
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 5.3 8.5 3.5 5.9 2.4 5.8
Hansen test p–value 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.02 0.8
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with a full set of time
dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial
mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial
income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.6: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages: No Migration
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 1.71 4.36*** 4.83*** 3.91*** 1.85** 6.41** 4.88***
(of specific age group) (1.91) (1.19) (0.97) (1.20) (0.93) (2.84) (1.08)
First-stage F–statistic 4.7 6.1 6.6 3.2 5.4 3.8 5.9
Hansen test p–value 0.01 0.008 0.009 0.02 0.006 0.1 0.002
(b) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy 3.67 6.24*** 6.89*** 5.51*** 2.59** 7.44** 6.60***
(of specific age group) (3.61) (2.06) (1.72) (2.07) (1.27) 7.44** (1.65)
First-stage F–statistic 4.7 6.1 6.6 3.2 5.4 3.8 5.9
Hansen test p–value 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.009 0.1 0.008
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with a full set of time
dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial
mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial
income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.7: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages: No Old-Age Migration
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 0.25 3.93** 2.59*** 2.22** 0.65 1.72 3.00***
(of specific age group) (3.28) (1.61) (0.93) (0.89) (0.65) (1.43) (0.97)
First-stage F–statistic 1.4 3.2 6.3 3.9 7.8 2.7 4.7
Hansen test p–value 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.05 0.3
(b) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy -0.97 4.42** 2.91*** 2.63** 0.75 3.90 3.45***
(of specific age group) (9.13) (1.90) (1.07) (1.10) (0.71) (4.16) (1.18)
First-stage F–statistic 1.4 3.2 6.3 3.9 7.8 2.7 4.7
Hansen test p–value 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.08 0.4
States 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with a full set of time
dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial
mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial
income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.8: Adult Life Expectancy and Average Wages: Metropolitan Areas
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 2.48 5.01*** 3.73*** 4.35*** 2.40** 0.60 4.97***
(of specific age group) (2.16) (1.33) (0.91) (1.64) (0.94) (1.35) (1.15)
First-stage F–statistic 6.2 12.8 15.3 4.4 7.5 3.3 11.8
Hansen test p–value 0.02 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.2
(b) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy 2.99 5.40*** 3.82*** 5.27** 2.47** 0.58 5.29***
(of specific age group) (3.13) (1.48) (0.95) (2.17) (0.99) (1.58) (1.27)
First-stage F–statistic 6.2 12.8 15.3 4.4 7.5 3.3 11.8
Hansen test p–value 0.02 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.01 0.2
States 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Metropolitan Areas 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 623 623
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include metropolitan-area-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are
weighted by the initial white population of the respective age group. Control variables are measured in 1960
and interacted with a full set of time dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of con-
trols comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of
college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state
level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.9: Heterogeneity: White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) White-collar workers: flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy -3.29 6.40*** 3.63** 1.00 -0.53 4.83** 3.60***
(of specific age group) (4.66) (2.13) (1.45) (1.12) (0.74) (2.04) (1.29)
First-stage F–statistic 2.0 3.5 6.4 2.6 5.2 5.3 4.7
Hansen test p–value 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.09 0.04 0.3
(b) White-collar workers: flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy -5.82 8.31*** 3.97** 1.26 -0.60 6.74** 4.21***
(of specific age group) (8.09) (3.14) (1.60) (1.48) (0.86) (3.11) (1.62)
First-stage F–statistic 2.0 3.5 6.4 2.6 5.2 5.3 4.7
Hansen test p–value 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.09 0.07 0.3
(c) Blue-collar workers: flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 5.37 4.65** 3.41** 4.12** 3.57** -1.28 4.32**
(of specific age group) (3.50) (2.17) (1.38) (2.02) (1.43) (1.94) (1.74)
First-stage F–statistic 2.3 3.2 5.9 2.4 5.0 5.3 4.4
Hansen test p–value 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.0
(d) Blue-collar workers: flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy 6.09 5.30** 3.62** 4.55** 3.81** -1.35 4.44**
(of specific age group) (4.00) (2.50) (1.47) (2.31) (1.54) (2.21) (1.79)
First-stage F–statistic 2.3 3.2 5.9 2.4 5.0 5.3 4.4
Hansen test p–value 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.0
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial
white population of the respective age group. Average wages contain observations from white-collar workers in
Panels (a) and (b) and from blue-collar workers in Panels (c) and (d). Control variables are measured in 1960
and interacted with a full set of time dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of controls
comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college
graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and
reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.10: Heterogeneity: College and Non-College Workers
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) College workers: flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy -1.54 2.63* 2.12** 1.16 -0.01 2.86 2.27**
(of specific age group) (3.39) (1.59) (1.06) (0.96) (1.30) (2.97) (0.90)
First-stage F–statistic 3.1 5.5 8.7 3.8 6.1 2.8 5.9
Hansen test p–value 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.09 0.06 0.7
(b) College workers: flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy -1.74 2.76 2.19** 1.28 0.01 4.52 2.34**
(of specific age group) (3.71) (1.70) (1.10) (1.10) (1.62) (5.69) (0.94)
First-stage F–statistic 3.1 5.5 8.7 3.8 6.1 2.8 5.9
Hansen test p–value 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.09 0.08 0.7
(c) Non-college workers: flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy 0.14 1.48 0.94 1.67* 0.88 0.28 1.20
(of specific age group) (2.21) (1.11) (0.76) (0.86) (0.82) (1.06) (0.85)
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 5.3 8.5 3.4 5.9 2.4 5.7
Hansen test p–value 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.09 0.6
(d) Non-college workers: flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy 0.22 1.56 1.01 1.81* 0.90 0.54 1.28
(of specific age group) (2.65) (1.19) (0.80) (0.93) (0.83) (1.55) (0.89)
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 5.3 8.5 3.4 5.9 2.4 5.7
Hansen test p–value 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.09 0.6
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of the respective age group. Average wages contain observations from workers with at least some college
education in Panels (a) and (b) and from workers without any college education in Panels (c) and (d). Control variables
are measured in 1960 and interacted with a full set of time dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full
set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share
of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.11: Adult Life Expectancy and Labor Supply by Age Cohorts: Flexible Model
(2SLS)
Flexible model (2SLS)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Labor force participation (0 to 100 percent)
Log life expectancy -92.22 -227.50*** -108.21*** -25.16 -106.01*** -63.96* -170.43***
(of specific age group) (71.25) (53.62) (29.89) (27.30) (40.48) (36.56) (41.13)
Hansen test p–value 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.10 0.2 0.7
(b) Usual hours per week
Log life expectancy -83.21** -66.01*** -32.40** -0.84 -34.18** -15.37 -26.91*
(of specific age group) (36.75) (20.93) (13.91) (11.40) (17.03) (12.83) (14.53)
Hansen test p–value 0.05 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.01 0.2 0.5
(c) Usual weeks per year
Log life expectancy -81.63** -85.75*** -43.09*** -4.91 -48.33** -21.19 -30.87**
(of specific age group) (41.08) (25.03) (15.14) (12.86) (19.01) (16.54) (15.14)
Hansen test p–value 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.03 0.03 0.8
(d) Labor supply of those working (weeks × hours)
Log life expectancy -2384.18 -2820.10*** -1519.95** 193.90 -2094.78** -643.37 -956.40
(of specific age group) (1466.70) (1043.86) (688.12) (581.45) (858.40) (631.58) (671.45)
Hansen test p–value 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.02 0.06 0.6
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 5.3 8.5 3.5 5.9 2.4 5.8
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the labor force participation in Panel (a), usual hours worked per week in Panel (b), usual weeks
worked per year in Panel (c), and hours worked per year of those working in Panel (d). All regressions include state-fixed, time, and
region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white population of the respective age group. Control variables are
measured in 1960 and interacted with a full set of time dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of controls
comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial
population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.12: Adult Life Expectancy and Labor Supply by Age Cohorts: Flexible Model
(LIML)
Flexible model (LIML)
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Labor force participation (0 to 100 percent)
Log life expectancy -104.64 -261.05*** -118.71*** -36.96 -213.46*** -97.21 -177.53***
(of specific age group) (85.79) (65.51) (33.20) (36.26) (80.06) (71.79) (43.29)
Hansen test p–value 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7
(b) Usual hours per week
Log life expectancy -132.30* -76.23*** -33.37** -5.18 -95.30** -24.01 -30.39*
(of specific age group) (73.57) (24.70) (14.30) (20.70) (47.01) (22.59) (16.26)
Hansen test p–value 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.08 0.3 0.5
(c) Usual weeks per year
Log life expectancy -94.45* -93.64*** -46.03*** -6.19 -88.84** -57.58 -33.69**
(of specific age group) (49.23) (27.78) (16.11) (14.58) (35.89) (79.40) (16.32)
Hansen test p–value 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.09 0.3 0.8
(d) Labor supply of those working (weeks × hours)
Log life expectancy -2685.52 -3106.16*** -1543.29** 212.52 -4100.54** -1474.06 -1056.13
(of specific age group) (1696.27) (1146.91) (697.33) (691.18) (1750.78) (1974.76) (727.12)
Hansen test p–value 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.07 0.2 0.6
First-stage F–statistic 3.4 5.3 8.5 3.5 5.9 2.4 5.8
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the labor force participation in Panel (a), usual hours worked per week in Panel (b), usual weeks
worked per year in Panel (c), and hours worked per year of those working in Panel (d). All regressions include state-fixed, time, and
region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white population of the respective age group. Control variables are
measured in 1960 and interacted with a full set of time dummies with the year 1960 as reference category. The full set of controls
comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial
population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.13: Adult Life Expectancy and College Enrollment
Dependent variable: college enrollment 15–24
Diff-in-Diff. Model Flexible Model Flexible Model
(2SLS) (2SLS) (LIML)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log life expectancy at 30 1.19** 0.85* 0.91
(0.56) (0.49) (0.58)
Log life expectancy at 50 0.77** 0.65** 0.84*
(0.33) (0.31) (0.43)
First-stage F–statistic 22.6 15.0 5.4 3.2 5.4 3.2
Hansen test p–value — — 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4
States 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by
the initial white population of 15- to 24-year-olds. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted
with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial
mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college enrollment, initial population den-
sity, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.14: Robustness: Moving-Window Model
Dependent variable: log wages of whites 45–54
1940–1970 1940–1980 1940–1990 1940–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log life expectancy at 50 3.05** 2.09** 2.45*** 2.54***
(1.37) (0.96) (0.87) (0.95)
First-stage F–statistic 23.6 37.5 47.3 14.2
States 48 48 48 48
Observations 192 240 288 336
Full controls X X X X
Notes: Regression results for moving window model which adds one post-treatment period at a time. All
regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white
population of 45- to 54-year-olds. Control variables are measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960
treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-
cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density, and log initial income.
Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance
levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table C.15: Robustness: Long-Differences Model
Dependent variable: log wages of whites 45–54
1960–1970 1960–1980 1960–1990 1960–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log life expectancy at 50 5.96*** 2.61* 4.72*** 4.13
(2.16) (1.57) (1.62) (4.38)
First-stage F–statistic 13.7 24.3 14.6 0.8
States 48 48 48 48
Observations 96 96 96 96
Full controls X X X X
Notes: Regression results for long differences model. All regressions include state-fixed and region-year-fixed
effects. Estimates are weighted by the initial white population of 45- to 54-year-olds. Control variables are
measured in 1960 and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log
initial life expectancy, initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates,
initial population density, and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported
in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.16: Effect of Individual Health on Wages
Dependent variable: respondents’ log wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High blood pressure -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
× born before 1910 -1.39***
(0.22)
× born before 1920 -0.02
(0.29)
× born before 1930 -0.01
(0.10)
× born before 1940 -0.08*
(0.04)
× born before 1950 -0.03
(0.04)
Individuals 22213 22213 22213 22213 22213 22213
Born before cutoff year — 72 1061 5942 36103 63142
Observations with high blood pressure 34171 34171 34171 34171 34171 34171
Total observations 84016 84016 84016 84016 84016 84016
Notes: All regressions include individual-fixed, state-fixed, wave, and census-region-wave effects as well as a quartic age
trend. High blood pressure is a binary indicator that takes value one, if respondents report to have ever had high blood
pressure been diagnosed, and zero else. High blood pressure is interacted with a dummy indicator that takes value one, if
the individual has been born before a certain threshold level, for example., 1910, and zero else. Standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Wage Gini 0.45 0.03 0.35 0.52 336
Total income Gini 0.48 0.02 0.40 0.54 288
Total family income Gini 0.37 0.03 0.31 0.47 288
Log life expectancy at 30 3.81 0.06 3.65 3.93 336
Mortality from CVD in 1960 × Post 1960 0.23 0.20 0 0.46 336
Median age 29.95 4.74 18 42 336
Share 45–64 in working-age population 0.32 0.03 0.22 0.39 336
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial log life expectancy at 30 2.16 1.88 0 3.81 336
Initial mortality not CVD 0.21 0.18 0 0.47 336
Initial share college graduates 0.03 0.03 0 0.07 336
Initial population density (× 1
100
) 0.75 1.60 0 8.23 336
Initial log wages 5.80 5.03 0 10.41 336
Initial wage Gini 0.25 0.22 0 0.51 336
Initial income Gini 0.28 0.24 0 0.52 288
Initial family income Gini 0.20 0.17 0 0.41 288
Initial median age 16.35 14.30 0 33 366
Initial share 45–64 in working-age population 0.19 0.17 0 0.38 366
Sample weights:
Initial white population (× 1
100000
) 32.95 34.26 2.63 152.87 336
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Table D.2: Adult Life Expectancy and Wage Inequality – OLS Estimates
Dependent variable: wage Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log life expectancy at 30 0.52*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 0.64*** 0.21*
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12)
Controls in 1960 × Post 1960:
Initial life expectancy X X X X
Initial mortality (not CVD) X X X
Initial share college X
Initial population density X
Initial income X
Region-year FE X X
FE & TE X X X X X
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed and time effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state level
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
259
Table D.3: Robustness: Different Inequality Measures
Inequality is measured by Gini coefficient of
wage income total income total family income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Differences-in-differences model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy at 30 0.90*** 0.87*** 1.49*** 1.57** 1.39*** 1.33***
(0.32) (0.31) (0.56) (0.62) (0.54) (0.51)
Initial inequality × Post 1960 -0.19 0.21 0.33**
(0.16) (0.29) (0.14)
First-stage F–statistic 23.3 25.2 12.5 11.1 12.5 14.1
(b) Flexible model (2SLS)
Log life expectancy at 30 1.10*** 0.95*** 1.49*** 1.51*** 1.19*** 1.16***
(0.32) (0.29) (0.48) (0.51) (0.41) (0.40)
Initial inequality × Post 1960 -0.36*** 0.07 0.31**
(0.13) (0.27) (0.13)
First-stage F–statistic 5.4 6.0 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.9
Hansen test p–value 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.3
(c) Flexible model (LIML)
Log life expectancy at 30 1.14*** 0.97*** 1.66*** 1.71*** 1.57** 1.50**
(0.34) (0.30) (0.57) (0.61) (0.64) (0.59)
Initial inequality × Post 1960 -0.37*** 0.09 0.37**
(0.13) (0.29) (0.16)
First-stage F–statistic 5.4 6.0 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.9
Hansen test p–value 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4
States 48 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Control variables are measured in 1960
and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy,
initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density,
and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table D.4: Robustness: Different Measures of Population Aging
Dependent variable: wage Gini
Differences-in-differences model Flexible model
2SLS 2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Median age
Median age 0.008*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Initial median age × Post 1960 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Initial inequality × Post 1960 -0.071 -0.269* -0.270*
(0.154) (0.148) (0.151)
First-stage F–statistic 18.6 19.3 20.0 3.7 3.7
Hansen test p–value — — — 1.0 1.0
(b) Share of 45 to 64 in the workforce
Share 45–64 0.62*** 0.64** 0.66** 0.64*** 0.74***
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.28)
Initial share 45–64 × Post 1960 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Initial inequality × Post 1960 0.17 -0.02 0.00
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
First-stage F–statistic 19.0 16.7 16.3 3.6 3.6
Hansen test p–value — — — 0.7 0.8
States 48 48 48 48 48
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Full controls X X X X X
Notes: All regressions include state-fixed, time, and region-year-fixed effects. Control variables are measured in 1960
and interacted with the post-1960 treatment dummy. The full set of controls comprises log initial life expectancy,
initial mortality from non-cardiovascular diseases, the initial share of college graduates, initial population density,
and log initial income. Standard errors are clustered on the state level and reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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E.1 Additional Figures
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Figure E.1: Reproduction of Correlations Following Acemoglu et al. (2008)
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Figure E.2: Effect of Inequality on Changes in Democratic Quality
Notes: The marginal effects of negative income shocks are based on the estimates in Table 6.2.
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E.2 Additional Tables
Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics
Transitions,
shocks or trends
in sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Democracy indicators
PolityIV index (PIV) 0.72 0.32 0 1 3678
Political Rights & Civil Liberties (FH) 0.64 0.31 0 1 3563
Democracy-Dictatorship index (DD) 0.62 0.49 0 1 2971
Principal Components (PCA) 0.66 0.34 0.03 1 2856
Democratization
Democratization (PIV) 76 0.02 0.14 0 1 3678
Democratization (FH) 81 0.02 0.15 0 1 3480
Democratization (DD) 114 0.04 0.19 0 1 2970
Democratization (PCA) 79 0.03 0.17 0 1 2773
Income, shocks and trends
Income p.c. 8.92 1.17 5.82 11.98 3678
Negative cyclical shock [332,450] 0.12 0.33 0 1 3678
Positive cyclical shock [394,534] 0.15 0.35 0 1 3678
Negative income trend [247,273] 0.07 0.26 0 1 3678
High inflation shock [741,878] 0.24 0.43 0 1 3612
Inequality and human capital
Market Gini 0.46 0.06 0.28 0.68 3591
Share 15–24 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.26 3678
Average years of schooling 7.34 2.92 0.95 13.18 3678
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Table E.2: Robustness: Multiple Imputation
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−3 -0.15*** -0.11* -0.30*** -0.23***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Inequalityt−3 -0.22 -0.02 -0.50* -0.35
(0.16) (0.17) (0.29) (0.25)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.33*** 0.27* 0.61*** 0.49***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 448 450 349 332
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as
controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality
occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative
cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn
and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Standard errors are clustered on the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.3: Robustness: Different Coding for Economic Shocks
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Negative cyclical shock within the current year
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−3 -0.15*** -0.13 -0.29*** -0.25***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Inequalityt−3 0.28* 0.00 -0.77** -0.51**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.32) (0.24)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.33** 0.31* 0.64*** 0.57***
(0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 178 175 137 128
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3695 3587 3053 2784
R2 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.16
(b) Negative cyclical shock at least once within last five years
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.30*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.40***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Inequalityt−3 -0.35** -0.02 -0.88** -0.57**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.34) (0.26)
Shockt−3 -0.14** -0.07 -0.31*** -0.18**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.31** 0.17 0.65*** 0.38**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.18)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 684 685 535 507
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3646 3544 3005 2742
R2 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as controls for
income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurred that over a
period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero else. In Panel (a), the shock
indicator takes a value of one, if, within one year, there is a cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical
component of the HP filter. In Panel (b), the shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of five years, there is a
cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig
(2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.4: Robustness: Smoothing Parameter λ and Negative Cyclical Shocks
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) λ = 1
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−3 -0.24** -0.14 -0.36* -0.32*
(0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16)
Inequalityt−3 -0.31** 0.00 -0.79** -0.53**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.32) (0.24)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.53** 0.34 0.75* 0.68*
(0.25) (0.30) (0.42) (0.37)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 220 218 150 141
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
R2 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.16
(b) λ = 100
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−3 -0.04 -0.02 -0.22*** -0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Inequalityt−3 -0.28* 0.04 -0.83** -0.53**
(0.15) (0.17) (0.32) (0.24)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.07 0.01 0.43** 0.18
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 916 912 819 756
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
R2 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as
controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality
occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a cyclical shock
of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. The smoothing parameter for the HP
filter is set to λ = 1 in Panel (a) and λ = 100 in Panel (b). Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.5: Robustness: Different Coding for Democratization Period
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Democratization is completed within one year
Democratic Qualityt−1 -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Shockt−1 -0.05** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.09**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Inequalityt−1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.38*** -0.24**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.14) (0.10)
(Shock·Inequality)t−1 0.10* 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.22**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 21 17 49 28
Negative Shocks 492 490 400 382
Countries 128 133 131 125
Observations 3881 3782 3290 3015
R2 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.05
(b) Democratization is completed within five years
Democratic Qualityt−5 -0.47*** -0.56*** -0.47*** -0.63***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Shockt−5 -0.19* -0.15 -0.32** -0.21*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
Inequalityt−5 -0.60** -0.32 -1.20** -0.85**
(0.25) (0.29) (0.49) (0.40)
(Shock·Inequality)t−5 0.42* 0.35 0.67** 0.45*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.27)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 117 126 164 124
Shocks 403 399 298 278
Countries 126 132 124 119
Observations 3451 3342 2785 2532
R2 0.23 0.19 0.30 0.25
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added
as controls for income and education. In Panel (a), the dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in
democratic quality occurs which larger or equal to the respective threshold over a period of one year, or zero else. In Panel
(b), the dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurs which is larger or equal
to the respective threshold over a period of five years, and zero else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a
time interval of five years, there is at least once a cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical
component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25.
Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.6: Robustness: Negative Cyclical Income Shocks, Inequality, and Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
∆ ≥ 0.5 ∆ ≥ 0.5 ∆ = 1 ∆ ≥ 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.09*** -0.32*** -0.32***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−3 -0.17*** -0.09** -0.33*** -0.18***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06)
Inequalityt−3 -0.32** 0.02 -0.82** -0.47**
(0.16) (0.06) (0.33) (0.22)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 0.37*** 0.21** 0.68*** 0.37**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.14)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 15 114 56
Shocks 448 450 349 332
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
R2 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.14
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as
controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality
occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative
cyclical shock of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn
and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Standard errors are clustered on the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
E.2. ADDITIONAL TABLES 269
T
ab
le
E
.7
:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s:
E
v
id
en
ce
fo
r
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e
D
em
o
cr
ac
y
C
o
d
in
gs
(D
at
a
fr
om
A
ce
m
og
lu
et
al
.,
20
16
)
D
em
o
cr
a
ti
za
ti
o
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
b
a
se
d
o
n
P
o
li
ty
IV
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
R
ig
h
ts
D
em
o
cr
a
cy
-
P
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
P
a
p
a
io
a
n
n
o
u
&
A
ce
m
o
g
lu
et
a
l.
P
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
In
d
ex
&
C
iv
il
L
ib
er
ti
es
D
ic
ta
to
rs
h
ip
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
S
io
u
ro
u
n
is
(2
0
0
8
)
(2
0
1
6
)
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
(F
u
ll
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
D
em
o
cr
a
ti
c
Q
u
a
li
ty
t−
3
-0
.3
6
*
*
*
-0
.2
8
*
*
*
-0
.3
3
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
*
*
*
-0
.3
3
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
5
)
S
h
o
ck
t−
3
-0
.3
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
-0
.3
1
*
*
*
-0
.2
2
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.1
1
)
In
eq
u
a
li
ty
t−
3
-0
.9
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
4
-0
.8
4
*
*
-0
.5
2
*
*
-0
.4
6
-0
.8
8
*
*
*
-1
.0
5
*
*
(0
.3
0
)
(0
.2
2
)
(0
.3
3
)
(0
.2
5
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.3
3
)
(0
.4
0
)
(S
h
o
ck
·In
eq
u
a
li
ty
) t
−
3
0
.7
2
*
*
*
0
.3
6
*
0
.6
5
*
*
*
0
.4
7
*
*
*
0
.7
2
*
*
*
0
.8
1
*
*
*
0
.9
4
*
*
*
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.2
4
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
T
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
s
1
3
8
1
1
8
1
1
5
8
8
9
4
1
4
4
1
1
7
S
h
o
ck
s
3
6
3
3
6
0
3
3
1
3
1
5
3
3
1
3
6
9
2
8
4
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
2
0
1
2
7
1
2
6
1
2
0
1
1
7
1
2
7
1
1
0
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
0
9
1
3
0
1
6
2
9
7
4
2
6
8
4
2
9
6
9
3
2
1
9
2
4
7
2
R
2
0
.2
4
0
.1
8
0
.2
1
0
.1
7
0
.2
4
0
.2
5
0
.1
9
N
o
te
s:
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
a
n
d
ti
m
e
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
.
L
o
g
G
D
P
p
.c
.
a
n
d
a
v
e
ra
g
e
y
e
a
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
a
re
a
d
d
e
d
a
s
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
in
c
o
m
e
a
n
d
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
e
s
a
v
a
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
,
if
a
p
o
si
ti
v
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
in
d
e
m
o
c
ra
ti
c
q
u
a
li
ty
o
c
c
u
rr
e
d
th
a
t
o
v
e
r
a
p
e
ri
o
d
o
f
th
re
e
y
e
a
rs
e
q
u
a
le
d
o
r
e
x
c
e
e
d
e
d
th
e
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
th
re
sh
o
ld
d
e
sc
ri
b
e
d
in
S
e
c
ti
o
n
6
.2
.3
,
a
n
d
z
e
ro
e
ls
e
.
T
h
e
sh
o
c
k
in
d
ic
a
to
r
ta
k
e
s
a
v
a
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
,
if
,
w
it
h
in
a
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l
o
f
th
re
e
y
e
a
rs
,
th
e
re
is
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
c
e
a
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
c
y
c
li
c
a
l
sh
o
c
k
o
f
a
t
le
a
st
m
in
u
s
fi
v
e
p
e
rc
e
n
t,
a
s
e
x
p
re
ss
e
d
b
y
th
e
c
y
c
li
c
a
l
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
o
f
th
e
H
P
fi
lt
e
r.
F
o
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
R
a
v
n
a
n
d
U
h
li
g
(2
0
0
2
)
ru
le
,
th
e
sm
o
o
th
in
g
p
a
ra
m
e
te
r
fo
r
th
e
H
P
fi
lt
e
r
is
λ
=
6
.2
5
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
c
lu
st
e
re
d
o
n
th
e
c
o
u
n
tr
y
le
v
e
l.
A
st
e
ri
sk
s
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
ls
:
*
p
<
0
.1
;
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
;
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
270 APPENDIX E. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6
Table E.8: Robustness: Overlap Between Cyclical Shocks and Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) One-year overlap
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.29*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.40***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−2 -0.25*** -0.20** -0.37*** -0.34***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Inequalityt−2 -0.34** 0.00 -0.85** -0.55**
(0.15) (0.17) (0.33) (0.26)
(Shock·Inequality)t−2 0.57*** 0.49** 0.83*** 0.78***
(0.16) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 80 86 121 84
Shocks 469 465 374 352
Countries 128 133 130 124
Observations 3779 3645 3159 2855
R2 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.18
(b) Two-year overlap
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.30*** -0.37*** -0.33*** -0.42***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Shockt−1 -0.20*** -0.16** -0.34*** -0.31***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Inequalityt−1 -0.33** 0.06 -0.90*** -0.56**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.34) (0.28)
(Shock·Inequality)t−1 0.46*** 0.40** 0.77*** 0.70***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 86 92 129 91
Shocks 481 471 389 363
Countries 128 133 130 124
Observations 3860 3692 3271 2924
R2 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.19
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as
controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality
occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a cyclical shock
of at least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002)
rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. In Panel (a), the democratization period and the economic shock
overlap for one year. Explicitly, the specification allows cyclical shocks that occur during the first year of democratization to
affect the overall likelihood of a democratic transition. Panel (b) allows an overlap of two years. Correspondingly, cyclical
shocks during the first and second year of democratization may also affect the overall likelihood of a democratic transition.
Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
E.2. ADDITIONAL TABLES 271
Table E.9: Robustness: Logistic Regression Model
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Fixed effects
Democratic Qualityt−3 -19.51*** -15.28*** -32.94 -11.70***
(3.09) (1.83) (1205.34) (1.65)
Shockt−3 -4.08 -3.85 -21.97*** -14.75***
(5.76) (3.31) (6.21) (5.42)
Inequalityt−3 15.16 4.60 -23.46 -21.71
(16.57) (14.07) (17.46) (19.17)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 7.13 7.89 44.32*** 29.88***
(11.69) (6.89) (12.66) (10.74)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 113 79
Shocks 176 148 143 142
Countries 31 34 36 31
Observations 1134 1070 1065 846
(b) Fixed effects without lagged democratic quality
Shockt−3 -8.74** -5.42* -11.16*** -11.45***
(3.74) (2.98) (3.64) (4.11)
Inequalityt−3 -12.15* -19.44** -25.38*** -27.09***
(7.28) (7.76) (7.14) (9.15)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 17.52** 11.57* 21.49*** 22.38***
(7.47) (6.08) (7.26) (8.05)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 113 79
Shocks 176 148 143 142
Countries 31 34 36 31
Observations 1134 1070 1065 846
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Results are reported for the full fixed-effects logit specification in
Panel (a) and fixed-effects logit without the lagged dependent variable in Panel (b). Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling
are added as controls for income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic
quality occurred that over a period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero
else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within a time interval of three years, there is at least once a cyclical shock of at
least minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the
smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. In Panel (a), the democratization period and the economic shock overlap for
one year. Explicitly, the specification allows cyclical shocks that occur during the first year of democratization to affect the overall
likelihood of a democratic transition. Panel (b) allows an overlap of two years. Correspondingly, cyclical shocks during the first and
second year of democratization may also affect the overall likelihood of a democratic transition. Standard errors are clustered on the
country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.10: Demographic Change as Determinant of Democratization
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.30*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.40***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Inequalityt−3 -1.18** -0.92 -0.79 -1.08*
(0.49) (0.57) (0.81) (0.64)
(Sh.15–24)t−3 -1.89 -2.50* 0.49 -1.26
(1.16) (1.36) (2.08) (1.54)
(Sh.15–24·Inequality)t−3 5.85** 5.46* 0.70 3.74
(2.57) (3.04) (4.40) (3.41)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3695 3587 3053 2784
R2 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as controls for
income and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurred that over a
period of three years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero else. Sh.15–24 measures the
share of 15- to 24-year-olds in the total population. Inequality refers to the market Gini coefficient. Standard errors are clustered on
the country level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.11: Triple-Interaction Between Shocks, Inequality, and Share of Youths
Democratization indicator based on
PolityIV Political Rights Democracy- Principal
Index & Civil Liberties Dictatorship Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Qualityt−3 -0.31*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.40***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Shockt−3 -0.61 -0.16 -0.76 -0.74
(0.41) (0.44) (0.75) (0.76)
Inequalityt−3 -1.41*** -1.00 -1.05 -1.37*
(0.50) (0.61) (0.78) (0.70)
(Sh.15–24)t−3 -2.33** -2.61* -0.03 -1.87
(1.16) (1.43) (2.01) (1.71)
(Shock·Sh.15–24)t−3 2.31 0.14 2.29 2.50
(2.13) (2.26) (3.86) (3.95)
(Shock·Inequality)t−3 1.22 0.22 1.67 1.61
(0.89) (0.97) (1.66) (1.67)
(Sh.15–24·Inequality)t−3 6.79*** 5.66* 1.81 5.03
(2.56) (3.21) (4.25) (3.75)
(Shock·Sh.15–24·Inequality)t−3 -4.45 0.46 -5.16 -5.44
(4.58) (4.99) (8.51) (8.59)
Controls X X X X
Transitions 76 81 114 79
Shocks 448 450 349 332
Countries 128 133 129 124
Observations 3678 3575 3036 2773
R2 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.16
Notes: All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling are added as controls for income
and education. The dependent variable takes a value of one, if a positive change in democratic quality occurred that over a period of three
years equaled or exceeded the respective threshold described in Section 6.2.3, and zero else. The shock indicator takes a value of one, if, within
a time interval of three years, there is at least once a negative cyclical shock of minus five percent, as expressed by the cyclical component of
the HP filter. Following the Ravn and Uhlig (2002) rule, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is λ = 6.25. Sh. 15–29 measures the share
of 15- to 24-year-olds in the total population. Inequality refers to the market Gini coefficient. Standard errors are clustered on the country
level. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix F
Appendix to Chapter 7
F.1 Estimation Models
In order to estimate this model, five different dynamic panel models are proposed, fixed
effects, random effects, bias corrected fixed effects (CFE), differences GMM (DGMM), and
system GMM (SGMM), each having advantages and disadvantages. The material in this
section draws strongly on Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Bruno (2005). Throughout
this paper, vectors and matrices are indicated by bold characters.
Random Effects and Fixed Effects. The random effects model can be written as
yi,t = α yi,t−1 + x
′
i,t−1θ + ηi + εi,t.
For a static version of the model (that is, without the lagged dependent variable),
consistency requires regressors be uncorrelated with individual-specific effects,
E[xi,t−1(ηi + εi,t)] = 0.
Under these assumptions, feasible GLS which is more efficient than OLS, yields
consistent estimates. If a lagged dependent variable is added to the regression equation,
E[yi,t−1(ηi + εi,t)] 6= 0, because by definition E[yi,t−1, ηi] 6= 0. Identification requires the
regressors to be uncorrelated with the unobserved individual fixed effect. This represents
a restrictive assumption whose failure leads to biased estimates. Hence, for α > 0 the
autoregressive parameter will be overstated. In contrast, explanatory variables with βj > 0
will exhibit downward bias. The direction of bias in explanatory variables is ambiguous,
because the inclusion of an interaction term allows for non-monotonous overall effect.
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The fixed effects or within estimator is obtained by subtracting the time-averaged
model from the original model
yi,t − ȳi = α (yi,t−1 − ȳi) + (xi,t−1 − x̄i)′θ + (εi,t − ε̄i),
where time-average variables are indicated by upper bars. For notational convenience,
explanatory variables, time effects and controls are now summarized by the vector xi,t−1.
Consistency of the fixed effects estimator requires either the number of countries N →∞
or the count of observation periods T →∞ and differences of error terms from their time
average to be uncorrelated with the respective differences of the right-hand side variables,
or formally
E[(εi,t − ε̄i)|(xi,t−1 − x̄i)] = 0 and E[(εi,t − ε̄i)|(yi,t−1 − ȳi)] = 0. (F.1)
In a static model (without lagged dependent variable as explanatory variables), a
sufficient condition for equation (F.1) to hold is strict exogeneity of the regressors. In
the fixed effects model, the problem of correlation between the error and the unobserved
individual effect is dealt with mechanically when the unobserved fixed effect is eliminated
by the within-transformation. Correspondingly, a potential omitted variable must be
correlated with the demeaned regressors to bias the results. In the presence of time effects,
omitted variables therefore have to be both time- and country-varying, which restricts
the set of potential confounds considerably. Estimates obtained with these estimators
can be informative regarding the existence of a non-monotonic effect in a differences or
level model, respectively. However, including a lagged dependent variable automatically
introduces bias, because ȳi and ε̄i are by definition correlated through the averaged model.
Consequently, the second part of condition (F.1) is necessarily violated. For fixed effects
to be nonetheless consistent ε̄i has to become very small relative to εi,t, which is the case
for T → ∞. This is clearly not the case for the short panel at hand. Correspondingly,
the autoregressive parameter α will be downward biased, while the bias for the effect of
democracy and equality is ambiguous due to the inclusion of an interaction term.1
Another problem is the requirement of strong exogeneity of the error terms; that is, all
regressors, including lagged and future realizations, must be uncorrelated with current-
period error terms. This assumption is substantially stronger as the weak exogeneity
condition needed in panel GMM models discussed below, which only requires lagged
instruments to be uncorrelated with the current-period error terms.
Bias-Corrected Fixed Effects. One way to deal with the inherent endogeneity problem
that is introduced by the lagged dependent variable is to perform a bias correction. For
instance, Bun and Kiviet (2003) propose a bias-corrected fixed effects estimator for balanced
1For further information see Nickell (1981).
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panels that has been generalized to the unbalanced case by Bruno (2005). The resulting
estimator approximates and eliminates the bias that results from the fixed panel length.
Consider the standard dynamic model from above
yi,t = α yi,t−1 + xi,t
′θ + εi,t,
Stacking observations across countries and over time yields
y = Dη + Wδ + ε,
where W = (y−1
...X) is a (NT × k) matrix of stacked observations; D = IN ⊗ ιT is a
(NT×N) matrix of individual dummies (where ιT is a vector of unity elements); δ = (α
...θ′)′
denotes the (k × 1) vector of coefficients; and y as well as η are stacked vectors of the
dependent variable and the unobserved country fixed effects.2
Define a selection rule si,t that only selects those observations that are usable for the
dynamic panel, that is, those with observations for the current as well as the lagged period.
Stacking the selection indicator into a matrix of dimension (NT × NT ), the dynamic
model can be written as
Sy = SDη + SWδ + Sε.
The fixed effect estimator for this unbalanced panel is then given by
δ = (W′MsW)
−1W′Msy
with
Ms = S
[
I−D(D′SD)−1D′
]
S
being the symmetric and idempotent (NT ×NT ) transformation matrix that removes the
unobserved country-specific fixed effects.
The bias of the fixed effects estimator can then be approximated by
c1(T̄
−1) = σ2ε tr(Π)q1,
c2(N
−1T̄−1) = −σ2ε
[
QW̄
′
ΠMsW + tr(QW̄
′
ΠM− sW̄)Ik+1
+ 2σ2ε q11tr(Π
′ΠΠ)Ik+1
]
q1,
2Note that the corresponding elements of the vector θ are 0 for xi,t, because contemporaneous effects
are excluded from the model. This notation is chosen to follow Bruno (2005) as closely as possible.
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and
c3(N
−1T̄−2) = σ4ε tr(Π)
[
2q11QW̄
′
ΠΠ′W̄q1 +
[
(q1
′W̄′ΠΠ′W̄q1)
+ q11tr(QW̄
′
ΠΠ′W̄) + 2tr(Π′ΠΠ′Π)q211
]
q1
]
,
where Q =
[
E(W′MsW)
]−1
=
[
W̄′MsW̄ + σ
2
ε tr(Π
′Π)e1e1
′]−1; W̄ = E(W); e1 =
(1, 0, . . . , 0)′ is the (k × 1) unit vector; q1 = Qe1; q11 = e′1; LT is a (T × T ) matrix
for which the first lower sub-diagonal is unity and all other entries take value zero;
L = IN ⊗ LT ; AT = (IT − αLT )−1; A = IN ⊗ AT ; Π = MsLA; and r is an indicator
whether the observation is non-missing.
This leads to bias approximations with increasing accuracy of:
B1 = c1(T̄
−1); B2 = B1 + c2(N
−1T̄−1); B3 = B2 + c3(N
−1T̄−2).
Using a consistent estimate for σ2ε and α, one can estimate the approximate bias B̂i
and obtain the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator
δi = δFE − B̂i, i = 1, 2, 3.
Estimates for α can be obtained using either the Anderson and Hsiao (1981), the
Arellano and Bond (1991) or the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. For the model at
hand, the Arellano-Bond estimator is used with the computed variance
σ̂2AB =
(y −WδAB)′Ms(y −WδAB)
(N − k − T )
.
In this study, the variance-covariance matrix is estimated using bootstrap procedures
with 100 repetitions. Therefore, the corrected estimator yields more credible results than
the standard OLS based dynamic panel models.3
Differences GMM. Alternatively, the inconsistency problem of standard panel regres-
sors can be resolved by applying an IV variant of a first-differences OLS estimator. The
differences GMM estimator identifies the coefficients of interest from changes in the ex-
planatory variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991). For identification, the estimation exploits
the lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments for the endogenous regressors.
Taking the first difference of the model presented in equation (1) in the main text yields
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + (xi,t−1 − xi,t−2)′θ + (εi,t − εi,t−1), t = 3, ..., T.
3For more information see Bun and Carree (2005) and Bun and Kiviet (2006).
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Instrumenting (yi,t−1− yi,t−2) with the level lags (yi,t−2, yi,t−3, . . . ) removes the mechan-
ical bias between the difference of the lagged dependent variable and the error term.4 The
second level lag is a good instrument, because it is correlated with the lagged difference
(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) through the level yi,t−2 and unrelated to the differenced error term. The
count of available instruments increases with the time period t such that the model is
overidentified.
Using all potential instruments gives the differences GMM (Arellano-Bond) estimator
that yields consistent estimates under the moment conditions
E[yi,s(εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 with s ≤ t− 2.
A typical and well-known problem that may arise from using lagged values as instru-
ments is that these may only be weakly correlated after the country fixed effects are
removed. In other words, instruments might be weak because either α moves toward
unity or as the relative variance of the fixed effects ηi increases.
5 This problem is more
severe in more persistent time series. In the case of weak instruments, the estimates for
the autoregressive parameter are biased toward the fixed effects estimator. Since α is
overestimated in a standard dynamic fixed effects model, the resulting coefficient can be
seen as a lower bound for the true parameter.
System GMM. More efficient results can be achieved, if one uses the additional moment
conditions
E[(ηi + εi,t)(yi,s − yi,s−1)] = 0 with s ≤ t− 1.
For these additional conditions to be satisfied, a simple stationarity condition is required:
deviations from the initial steady state must be uncorrelated with the level itself. Under
these assumptions, not only the level lags but also the lagged first difference can be used
as instruments, which may result in substantial efficiency gains. Under a stationarity
assumption regarding the dependent variable, this so-called system GMM estimator by
Blundell and Bond (1998) is preferable to the differences GMM estimator, because it is
more efficient and provides more stable results for highly persistent variables, that is, for
estimates of α close to unity. Furthermore, the estimator can better accommodate for
moderately high values of the autoregressive parameter and relatively low counts of time
periods T .
In addition to the identifying assumptions of differences GMM (DGMM), system GMM
(SGMM) also demands a stationarity assumption that requires changes in the dependent
variable be uncorrelated with the country fixed effect. This condition likely holds only
4Alternatively, it is also possible to use the lagged difference as an instrument. In practice, however,
this often leads to weak instruments so that level lags are the preferred choice. For more information see
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991).
5For further information see Blundell and Bond (1998).
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approximately in the present application, as there are cases where democratic transitions
lead to a change in the long-run steady state.
This is not too problematic, if countries are sufficiently close to their long-run steady
state at the end of the panel. As a heuristic approach to test whether stationarity may be
violated, SGMM is run on a subsample of the data, where, one after another, the first two,
the last two, and the first as well as the last sample periods are removed to see whether
the resulting regression coefficients are substantially affected by restricting the analysis
to particular subsamples. The results reveal that the coefficient estimates do respond
to these sample changes with the largest effects emerging when the first two periods are
removed and only little effect when the last two periods are removed. This indicates that
the stationarity assumption required by the SGMM is not necessarily satisfied. Therefore,
DGMM is expected to provide more reliable estimates than SGMM. Nevertheless, results
for both estimators are reported for completeness. Moreover, this condition is probably
not crucially violated, if the estimates of DGMM and SGMM are reasonably close to each
other, because the differences model does not rely on the stationarity assumption.
In order to further reduce the danger of weak instruments in the SGMM specification,
also time-invariant variables are included in the level regressions in order to reduce the
relative variance of the country fixed effects to the idiosyncratic error term. One first
indication whether instruments are weak is a comparison of results of differences and
system GMM. The parameter estimate of SGMM is a weighted sum of the difference and
level equation with more weight being put on the differenced model, if identification is
strong. Therefore, quantitatively similar estimates of both models are an indication for
instrument relevance.
The employed number of instruments is relevant for both DGMM and SGMM models.
First, consistency of the estimated parameters is not affected, but efficiency increases with
the number of moments available for estimation. Increasing the number of instruments
can also lead to biases in the Hansen J-test whether instruments are statistically different
from each other in the case of overidentification, however. Moreover, using lags that have
little explanatory power for contemporaneous variables can weaken the instrument set.
Hence, there is a trade-off between the efficiency of results and the strength of instruments
as well as the validity of the test statistics for the validation of identification assumptions.
According to Roodman (2009), as a rule, the number of instruments should not exceed
the number of cross-sectional units (here: countries) in the sample.6
In the empirical analysis, we conduct Granger (1969, 1980) tests of different lag
specifications in combination with the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria to
determine which lags are most informative and prima facie causal. Finally, Arellano
and Bover (1995) note that the choice of the transformation matrix that removes the
6Note that this rule of thumb is not conservative such that instrument counts close to the respective
threshold are no guarantee that test statistics are not biased.
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unobserved individual fixed effects does not matter, if the complete instrument set is used.
However, as it is necessary to limit the number of lags, the choice of the transformation
matrix may be of importance. For the baseline specifications, the forward orthogonalized
deviations method is used, because it eliminates less data than first differences.7
F.2 Additional Robustness Checks
This section reports the results of extensive robustness checks in order to test whether the
results are sensitive to the use of alternative indicators of institutional quality, to different
measures of democracy or equality, or to different sets of control variables. Moreover,
results are presented for standard errors that are corrected for multiple imputation of the
reversed Gini coefficients, as well as for different lag specifications and transformations
in the context of the GMM estimators. Finally, the baseline interaction of democracy
and equality is tested against additional interactions with income per capita or years of
schooling. The respective Tables are reported below.
Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality. The baseline results in Tables 1 and
2 indicate an interaction between democracy, measured by Constraints on the Executive,
and equality, regardless of whether institutional quality is measured by the Economic
Freedom index or the composite index of institutional quality. To investigate the robustness
of this finding, we also replicated the analysis using alternative indices. In the main text,
Table 4 presents robustness results obtained with the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator.
Tables F.4 and F.5 below show the respective results for the DGMM estimator and for
alternative estimators, respectively. The first alternative measure of institutional quality
is the Civil Liberties index. However, it should be noted that this measure includes
components that are more closely linked to political liberties than economic freedom.
Nevertheless, the main finding of a significant interaction between executive constraints
and equality remains robust.8 Alternative measures for the quality of economic institutions
are the regulations of credit, labor and business, or the soundness of money as a measure of
reliability of the economic environment. Both of these measures are taken from subindices
underlying the Economic Freedom index. Estimates for these institutional measures as
dependent variable also deliver evidence for a significant interaction between democracy
and equality.9 From the ICRG, alternative measures of the quality of economic institutions
are the quality of property rights, or the protection against corruption. However, these
variables are only available for a substantially shorter time span (1985–2010), which limits
the variation over time. Also for these measures, the estimates systematically reveal
7See Hayakawa (2009) for a comparison of different transformation techniques.
8See Table F.5, Panel (a).
9See Panels (b) and (c) of Table F.5.
282 APPENDIX F. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7
a positive interaction term, which is not statistically significant in all cases; however,
presumably due to the limited variation that can be used for estimation.10
Alternative Measures of Political Institutions. In order to gauge the importance
of the particular democracy indicator used in the estimation, we also conducted robustness
checks with alternative measures of political institutions. Table 5 in the main text presents
robustness results obtained with the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator. Table F.7 below
shows the respective results for the DGMM estimator, and Table F.6 presents additional
results. The robustness analysis uses various measures of political institutions. In parallel
to the methodology for institutional quality, we constructed a composite measure based on a
principal component analysis of political institutions from the Constraints on the Executive
index and of the political competition component of the democracy index by Vanhanen
and Lundell (2014). Alternative measures of democracy are the PolityIV composite index
(for democracy and autocracy), the Political Rights index, a composite measure of political
institutions based on the principal component of the index by Vanhanen and Lundell
(2014), the PolityIV index, and the Political Rights index, or the composite index as well
as the political competition component of the index by Vanhanen and Lundell (2014). In
related studies, some scholars use a discrete democratic transition variable, which takes a
value of 1, if a country democratizes, and 0 otherwise, instead of a continuous measure
(see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2006, and Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). A
drawback of such a measure is that identification is based only on substantial changes in
political institutions that occur during the observation period, while many such changes and
transitions to democracy have already taken place before the time institutional indicators
are available. Moreover, constructing an appropriate reference group is non-trivial. With
reference to the motivating figures in the introduction, the first robustness check uses the
binary Democracy-Dictatorship indicator of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline results and reveal a
positive interaction term between democracy and equality.11 Regardless of the measure
of democracy used, the estimation results deliver a positive interaction effect between
democracy and inequality on the quality of institutions.12 Overall, these results also
indicate that the finding of a non-monotonic effect of democracy in relation to equality is
not sensitive to the particular democracy indicator that is used in the estimation.
10The results are reported in Panels (d) and (e) of Table F.5. Mixed findings are obtained for rule of
law (the Law and Order index) as dependent variable. Unreported estimates deliver mostly insignificant
coefficients for the interaction term, however, which also differ quantitatively across level and differences
models. This might have several reasons, including the fact that the construction of the rule of law index
is rather intransparent, as it is based on several subindices that do not necessarily reflect aspects of
economic institutions and that are not available independently. This has raised doubts about what is
actually measured with these indices (see, for example, Voigt, 2013, for a detailed discussion of this point).
11See Table F.6.
12The results for Economic Freedom as measure of institutional quality are contained in Table F.8,
whereas the results for the composite index of institutional quality are contained in Table F.9.
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Also the results for the static panel model replicate for diverse measures of political
institutions.13
Robustness with Respect to the Inequality Measure. The SWIID data set by
Solt (2009, 2016b) uses multiple imputation techniques in order to reduce the number of
missing values in the data set. To account for concerns about the quality of the inequality
measure, we conducted several robustness checks. In the main text, the results of these
checks obtained with the bias-corrected fixed effects estimator are contained in Table 6.
Table F.11 shows the respective results for the DGMM estimator.
First, in order to alleviate the concern that the results might be driven by the interpo-
lation procedure, which might add noise to the measure, we conducted a robustness check
using a binary measure of inequality in addition to using a binary measure of democracy.
The results are unaffected.14 In light of the multiple imputation, treating imputations
as regular data points disregards the uncertainty regarding the imputed value, which is
itself a random variable. Adjusting for this fact usually results in larger standard errors
and less significant findings. To account for this issue, we conduct robustness checks that
accommodate for imputation procedures. To enable corrections for multiple imputation,
from version 4.0 onward the SWIID data set provides 100 values for the Gini coefficient for
every country-year cell, instead of just a single value. These multiple observations for each
country-year cell can be used to estimate the coefficients up to 100 times, for every single
Gini realization, respectively. The final estimates for coefficients and standard errors are
obtained by taking the average over all estimated coefficients. This procedure adequately
reflects the underlying uncertainty in the equality measure that has been introduced by
the imputation procedure. For the problem at hand, all available 100 Gini realizations
are used, even though a smaller number is typically already sufficient. Intuitively, the
baseline regressions used the mean over all 100 realizations and estimated the respective
model. The alternative procedure estimates each model 100 times and takes the mean
over the estimated parameters thereafter.15 While accounting for multiple imputation
mainly affects standard errors, the parameter estimates can vary compared to the baseline,
because the estimated coefficient for the average reversed Gini need not be identical to
the mean over all 100 Gini data points. Nevertheless, the results regarding the interaction
effect between democracy and inequality are virtually unaffected.16 This suggests that the
main finding of non-monotonicity is not driven by neglecting the variation in the equality
13See, for instance, Table F.10 for results for the standard PolityIV composite index (for democracy
and autocracy).
14See Table F.12.
15In practice, this is done in STATA using the “mi estimate” prefix before running the desired regression
type. For a more technical discussion see Rubin (1996).
16The results for replicating the baseline regressions using the multiply-imputed reversed Gini data
are contained in Table F.13. The estimated autoregressive coefficients are very similar to the baseline
estimates from Table 1. The estimated parameters for the reversed Gini coefficients are somewhat closer
to zero than in the main specifications and become in some cases insignificant.
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time series due to multiple imputation.17 In particular, the respective threshold levels
of equality and democracy for a positive marginal effect the estimates are quantitatively
almost unaffected compared to the baseline results. Taken together, the results from this
analysis indicate that the estimated interaction effect does not hinge on standard error
corrections for the Gini time series.
Instead of measuring economic inequality using net incomes, one might argue that
it is more appropriate to use gross income inequality as proxy for the de facto political
power and, hence, the relevant determinants of economic institutions. Both measures,
the net and gross Gini indices, are highly correlated in the SWIID data set, however.18
Correspondingly, the estimation results are very similar when using a measure of equality
based on the reversed gross Gini coefficient.19
Economic inequality is also reflected by the distribution of skills that are available
for production. Therefore, an alternative measure of equality is provided by the reversed
human capital Gini coefficient described in Section 3.3 of the paper. As in the main results,
the effect of equality and democracy is negative once the model allows for heterogeneous
effects through an interaction term, while the interaction between democracy and equality
is positive throughout all specifications—even though not always significant. The esti-
mated parameters for the direct effects of democracy, equality, and the interaction are
quantitatively somewhat smaller than in the baseline.20
Alternatively, we estimated the empirical model separately on subsamples that were
split by the level of equality (into the lowest quintile, the three intermediate quintiles, and
the highest quintile) without an interaction term. Consistent with the earlier findings,
the effect of democracy on institutional quality is negative (although not significant) in
the subsample in which equality is lowest, whereas the effect gets more positive in the
subsamples reflecting intermediate inequality, and is most positive in the subsample where
equality is highest.21 The positive effect is largest and significant in the subsample that
exhibits the highest level of equality, providing additional evidence for the heterogeneous
effect of democracy.
A final set of robustness checks uses the (reversed) top-10-percent income shares
constructed by Piketty (2014) as measure for inequality. Again, the interaction between
17To the knowledge of the authors only few existing papers account for multiple imputation or interpo-
lation of inequality data. To the extent that the effect for many variables might be overstated without
accounting for the imputation noise, the analysis in this study also provides a contribution in this respect
by applying more extensive corrections for standard errors than what is standard in the literature. At the
same time, the analysis abstracts from the problem of sample selection that also arises from imputation
procedures, if the pattern of missing observations is not random and not adequately modeled in the
imputation procedure, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
18See Table 8 in the Appendix of the paper.
19See Table F.14.
20The results are contained in Table F.15. Interestingly, the findings are consistent with recent evidence
by Castelló-Climent and Doménech (2014), who find divergent trends in income inequality and education
inequality.
21See the results in Tables F.16 and F.17.
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democracy and equality is positive throughout but not always significant, probably partly
due to the small number of countries for which this information is available.22
Taken together, the results deliver a coherent pattern of heterogeneity in the effect of
democracy on institutional quality that is related to equality.
Robustness of GMM Results. A potential concern with the results from the GMM
estimators is that the findings might be influenced by the choice of the transformation
that removes the country fixed effect, or by the choice of the instrument set. Robustness
checks in this direction have been conducted with forward orthogonalized deviations
(FOD) and first differences (FD) as choices of the transformation matrix to remove the
unobserved fixed effect, and different specifications of lags that are used for identification.
The estimates appear not to be particularly sensitive to the use of alternative sets of
lags and vary in a very moderate range for the autoregressive parameter, the democracy
index as well as the interaction term. Consistent with the baseline results, there is a
positive interaction effect throughout all difference and system GMM specifications, which
is quantitatively similar to the baseline findings of Table 1 and significant in almost all
specifications.23
Another potential concern with the GMM estimates is weak identification of the
coefficients of interest due to the use of inflated instrument sets. Extensive robustness
checks with more parsimonious sets of instruments confirm the finding of a robust positive
interaction effect.24
Robustness to Alternative Estimation Methods. The estimation of linear models
might be overly restrictive in light of the fact that institutional quality is measured as
index on a discrete grid. Alternatively, we estimated the model using interval regression
techniques that account for the clustered measurement of a continuous latent variable in
discrete bins. The results are largely unaffected by these modifications.25
22The results are presented in Table F.18.
23An overview is contained in Table F.19. Detailed results are reported in Tables F.20 and F.21. Panel
(a) reports different specifications for DGMM, Panel (b) for SGMM. Columns (1) and (2) replicate the
results from the baseline specification; Columns (3) and (4) add one additional lag dimension compared
to the baseline; Columns (5) and (6) use one lag dimension less, respectively; and the instrument set
is collapsed in Columns (7) and (8). The AR(2), Hansen J-test statistics and the difference-in-Hansen
test indicate that endogeneity of instruments is not a threat for the consistency of the estimates except
potentially for the collapsed instrument set. This last finding may indicate that very far lags have little
explanatory power and thus render the instrument set weak or that the estimated variance-covariance
matrix becomes somewhat unstable due to the inclusion of many similar and strongly correlated (but
potentially uninformative) right-hand side variables.
24Table F.22 in the Appendix contains results for different minimalist sets of instruments for the lagged
dependent variable as well as for the explanatory variables, which contain substantially fewer instruments
than the rule of thumb of the number cross-sectional units in the sample suggested by Roodman (2009).
25See Tables F.23 and F.24 for details.
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Different Sets of Controls. Another dimension for robustness checks concerns the
specification of the estimation framework in terms of the included control variables. For
robustness, we estimated the empirical model model without any further controls except
country-fixed and time effects, or with additional controls. These specifications provide
robustness checks in two dimensions. The parsimonious specifications are likely to be
most affected by potential bias from relevant omitted variables. At the same time, these
specifications suffer least from problems of endogeneity induced by control variables (“bad
controls”). The reverse holds for the extensive specifications. Regardless, the specification
of the estimation framework in terms of controls does not appear to affect the results and
leaves the finding of a significant interaction effect unaltered.26
Given the emphasis on the distributive conflict in motivating the potential role of
economic equality (and its interaction with democracy), redistribution might be a potential
omitted factor that drives the estimation results. However, controlling for redistribution
(measured in terms of the difference between the gross and net Gini index, or the share of
central government revenues and expenditures including social security as percentage of
GDP) does not affect the findings.27
Similarly, accounting for income growth as additional control above and beyond income
levels leaves the results unaffected.28
Overidentification: Adding Interactions between Democracy and Other Vari-
ables. A final robustness check is to compare the results obtained with the baseline
specification to findings for specifications that include alternative interactions of democracy
with income as well as with human capital in addition to the interaction with equality.
The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, these estimates provide a sort of overidenti-
fication test to examine whether the interaction effects found so far potentially take up
heterogeneous effects of democracy in some other dimension than inequality. Second, the
specifications conduct a horse race between different channels that affect institutional
quality. This horse race is motivated by the arguments forwarded by Lipset (1959), who
suggested that a multitude of factors might be relevant for institutions to work successfully.
The estimates also account for other factors that have been identified in the previous
literature. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008, 2009) investigate
26Tables F.25 and F.26 report the respective findings. Panel (a) of the Tables shows estimated coefficients
of specifications without any further controls except country-fixed and time effects. Panel (b) includes the
same controls as the specifications in Table 1 (log income per capita, average years of schooling, as well as
oil producer and former socialism in the level equations) and adds log population size; a colonial history
dummy, which is unity, if the country was a former colony, and zero else, as well as ethnic polarization in
the level regressions; an inflation dummy that takes a value of 1 for price changes larger than 4 percent
and 0 otherwise; and a dummy for deflation, which is equal to unity whenever the inflation rate is negative,
and zero otherwise. The reason for using binary measures is the huge variation as some countries in
the sample experienced periods of extremely high inflation (for example, hyper-inflation in the case of
Argentina), while most of the countries had a moderate development of prices.
27Detailed results are available upon request.
28Respective estimation results are reported in Table F.27.
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the importance of income for political institutions, while Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) and
Fortunato and Panizza (2015) identify human capital as a central determinant of institu-
tional quality. Up to this point, in the literature, these channels have been investigated
in isolation but have not been compared to each other in terms of their relevance in the
same estimation framework. The results of this exercise indicate that including additional
sources of heterogeneity does not affect the point estimates, in particular those of the
interaction term between equality and democracy (Eq×Demo).29 Moreover, standard
errors remain almost unaffected when the additional interactions are added. In addition,
the results indicate no evidence for a heterogeneous effect of income and democracy, as
the respective interaction (GDP×Demo) is insignificant throughout all regressions and
does not affect the interaction of democracy and equality quantitatively. Similarly, the
heterogeneous effect for average years of schooling and democracy (HC×Demo) is not
significantly different from zero. The finding that democracy has a heterogeneous effect on
institutional quality conditional on the degree of economic equality is robust to accounting
for alternative sources of heterogeneity.
Additional Results: Redistribution, Stability of Democracy, and Effect Hetero-
geneity. According to several of the theories motivating the empirical analysis mentioned
in the Introduction, the findings might be interpreted as the consequence of an influen-
tial rich elite inducing lower institutional quality in democracy in order to protect itself
from excessive distributive pressure. If this is correct, one would expect the (seemingly
counterintuitive) result that tax revenues and redistribution is lower in democracies in
which inequality is high. In other words, in an estimation framework with redistribution
as dependent variable, one would expect a negative interaction effect between democracy
and equality. In fact, there is some tentative evidence pointing in this direction.30
A second set of additional results addresses the question of stability of democracy.
Ultimately, the arguments mentioned in the Introduction also imply that democracies
might become unstable, if inequality becomes too large, referring to a hypothesis that goes
29The results are reported in Table F.28. Columns (1)–(4) contain the results for bias-corrected fixed
effects Columns (5)–(8) those from DGMM estimators, and Columns (9)–(12) contain those from SGMM
estimators. The first column of each block replicates the baseline results. Subsequently, an interaction
with income or human capital is added, respectively, and in the last column of each block, all three
interactions are estimated jointly. For the sake of brevity, results for random or fixed effects are not
reported. The findings are similar and available upon request.
30Table F.29 presents the estimation results regarding this conjecture, using the the share of expenditures
on social security funds or the share on social spending as percentage of GDP as dependent variables.
This information is only available for a small sample of developed countries (data are from the OECD or
IMF data bases, respectively), which limits the usefulness in the estimation. Nevertheless, throughout
all specifications, the interaction term between democracy and equality has a negative sign; however,
with the exception of bias-corrected fixed effects, the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.
Additional unreported results using a relative political extraction indicator for industrial countries by
Hendrix (2010) and Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (2013) as measure for taxation and redistribution reveal a
positive interaction effect, but the coefficient is estimated with insufficient precision to deliver statistically
significant results.
288 APPENDIX F. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7
back to Lipset and that has been expressed in modified form more recently by Piketty
(2014).31 To investigate the role of inequality for the stability of democracy, we re-estimate
the empirical framework with an interaction between democracy and equality but with the
level of political institutions as dependent variable. Because political instability and major
changes in political institutions are infrequent, the estimation is conducted on baseline
sample 1970–2010 in five-year intervals, as well as for a longer period from 1870–2010 in
ten-year intervals. The results are indicative of a positive interaction effect of democracy
and equality on political stability, particularly over the longer horizon.32 We view this as
evidence that is suggestive, or at least not inconsistent, with the theories underlying the
main hypothesis of this paper, that democratic institutions are self-reinforcing, but that
this effect is stronger the greater the level of equality in society.
In an attempt to investigate the possibility of heterogeneity in the interaction effect, we
conducted the estimation separately for countries that democratized before and after 1974,
following the classification by Huntington (1993). While the interaction appears positive
throughout, the coefficient estimate is indeed somewhat larger and more significant for the
sample that democratized after 1974 (the “third wave” of democratization), indicating the
interaction between a democratic political regime and an equal distribution of income had a
particularly large impact on institutional quality in countries where the institution building
process was on the way or not yet finished.33 An alternative dimension for heterogeneous
effects is the distinction into OECD and non-OECD countries. Also here, the interaction
effect is positive throughout. The interaction appears to be somewhat larger and more
significant among the OECD countries for the Economic Freedom index, whereas the
interaction appears somewhat larger for non-OECD countries for the composite measure
as dependent variable.34
31In Lipset‘s words: “[f]rom Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy
society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the
population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid
succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished
mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy [...] or in tyranny” (Lipset, 1959, p.75).
32See Tables F.30 and F.31.
33Detailed results are reported in Tables F.32 and F.33.
34For detailed results see Tables F.34 and F.35.
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F.3 Additional Material: Tables and Figures
This section contains the following figures:
• Figure F.1 Marginal Effects Table 1(b)
• Figure F.2 Marginal Effects Across Estimators Table 1(b)
This section contains the following tables:
• Table F.1: Data Sources
• Table F.2: Descriptive Statistics
• Table F.3: Simple Correlations
• Table F.4: Robustness: Economic Institutions (DGMM)
• Table F.5: Robustness: Different Measures for Economic Institutions
• Table F.6: Robustness: Binary Democracy Indicator
• Table F.7: Robustness: Political Institutions (DGMM)
• Table F.8: Robustness: Different Measures for Political Institutions
• Table F.9: Robustness: Different Measures for Political Institutions II
• Table F.10: Robustness: Static Model – Effect of Democracy and Equality on
Institutional Quality
• Table F.11: Robustness: Economic (In-)Equality (DGMM)
• Table F.12: Robustness: Binary Democracy and Equality Indicators
• Table F.13: Robustness: Multiple Imputation
• Table F.14: Robustness: Gross Gini
• Table F.15: Robustness: Human Capital Equality
• Table F.16: Robustness: Different Equality Sub-Samples
• Table F.17: Robustness: Different Equality Sub-Samples II
• Table F.18: Robustness: Reversed Top-10-Percent Income Share as Equality Measure
• Table F.19: Robustness: GMM Specifications
• Table F.20: Robustness: Alternative Specification of GMM Estimators
• Table F.21: Robustness: Alternative Specification of GMM Estimators II
• Table F.22: Robustness: Parsimonious IV Sets
• Table F.23: Robustness: Interval Regressions
• Table F.24: Robustness: Interval Regressions II
• Table F.25: Robustness: Different Specification of Controls
• Table F.26: Robustness: Different Specification of Controls II
• Table F.27: Robustness: Controlling for Growth
• Table F.28: Robustness: Testing Inequality Interaction Against Other Interactions
• Table F.29: Effect of Democracy on Equality on Redistribution
• Table F.30: Robustness: Political Stability 1970–2010
• Table F.31: Robustness: Political Stability 1870–2010 (10-Year Intervals)
• Table F.32: Robustness: Third Wave of Democratization
• Table F.33: Robustness: Third Wave of Democratization II
• Table F.34: Robustness: OECD and Non-OECD Countries
• Table F.35: Robustness: OECD and Non-OECD Countries II
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Table F.1: Appendix: Data Sources
Economic Freedom in the World (EF): 1970–2010. Raw data range from 0 to 10, where higher scores represent better economic
institutions. Values are divided by the factor 10 to normalize the range from 0 to 1. The index is composed of 42 distinct variables
in five general categories: size of government and taxation; private property and the rule of law; soundness of money; trade regulation
and tariffs; regulation of business, labor, and capital markets. In the analysis we use the composite indicator and the subcomponents for
regulation of business, labor and capital markets, and private property and rule of law. Source: Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013), web link:
http://www.freetheworld.com/.
Civil Liberties (CL): 1972–2010. Raw data are coded as integer values from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). The ratings are based on the
evaluation of 15 questions with respect to four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of
law; and personal autonomy and individual rights. In particular, the last subcomponent encompasses aspects regarding choices of employment
and higher education, rights to own property and establish private business, and government influence by government officials. The scale is
reversed and normalized to range from 0 to 1 so that higher values indicate better economic institutions. The country-year observations of
1972 are used for the year 1970. Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.
Political Rights (PR): 1972–2010. Raw data are coded as integer values from 1 (wide range of political rights) to 7 (virtually
no political rights). The ratings are based on the evaluation of 10 questions with respect to three subcategories: electoral process,
political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. The scale is reversed and normalized to range from 0 to 1 so
that higher values indicate more democratic institutions. The country-year observations of 1972 are used for the year 1970. Source:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk Rating: 1984–2010. The rating takes integer values from 0 to 100 and is
aimed to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis. In the analysis, we use
the subcomponents investment profile, which measures the degree of property rights, profits repatriation and payment delays (takes values
0–12), protection against corruption (0–6), and the prevalence of law and order (0–6). The subcomponents are normalized to range from 0 to
1, where higher values indicate better economic institutions. Source: http://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/prs.
PolityIV Combined Democracy-Autocracy indicator: 1800–2010. The raw combined index is the sum of the Polity autocracy and the
democracy indicators, which take integer values from –10 to 0 and 0 to 10, respectively, and thus ranges from –10 to 10. The indicator is
normalized to range from 0 to 1 where higher values represent more democratic institutions. Source: Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2013), web
link: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
PolityIV Constraints on Executive indicator: 1800–2010. Raw data take integer values from 1 to 7, which refer to institutionalized
constraints on decision-making powers of chief executives. The scale is reversed and normalized to range from 0 to 1 so that higher values
indicate stronger constraints on the executive and, thus, more democratic institutions. Source: Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2013), web link:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
Vanhanen Democracy Index, v.2.0: 1810–2010. Raw data are based on two subcomponents, competition and participation, each ranging
from 0 to 100. The competition variable is defined as 100 minus the number of votes the largest party has won. Participation is defined as
the the share of total population that has participated in elections. As competition and participation are considered complementary, the
total index is calculated of the product of both measures. Indices are normalized to range from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more
democratic institutions. Source: Vanhanen and Lundell (2014), web link http://www.prio.org/Data/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/.
Democracy-Dictatorship Indicator: 1946–2008. Raw data are a dichotomous classification of political regimes according to whether the
leading government positions are filled by elections and to what extent these elections are contested. Democratic regimes are assigned value 1
and autocratic regimes, that is, governments that do not fulfill requirements for being listed as a democracy, assigned value 0. Source: Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), web link: http://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited.
SWIID (In-)Equality Measures, v.5.0: 1960–2010. Raw data are net and gross income Gini coefficients ranging from 0 to 100. For
low values of the Gini coefficient, income is spread relatively even across individuals in the population, while for higher values income is
concentrated in the hands of very few people. The scale is reverted and normalized to range from 0 to 1 so that higher score represent a
higher degree of income equality. The measure for absolute redistribution is defined as the difference between gross and net Gini coefficients.
The measure for relative redistribution corresponds to the absolute redistribution divided by the Gini coefficient. Source: Solt (2009, 2016b),
web link: http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html.
Log GDP per Capita: 1950–2010. Raw data are output-side real GDP at chained Purchasing Power Parities (in mil. 2005
US$) and population in millions constructed by Penn World Tables v.8.1. Source: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015), web link:
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.1.
Years of Schooling and Log Population: 1950–2010. Raw data are average years of schooling and population constructed by the
Educational Attainment data set v.1.3. Source: Barro and Lee (2013), web link: http://www.barrolee.com/.
Ethnic Polarization: Constant across time. Raw data range from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating ethnically more polarized societies.
Source: Reynal-Querol and Montalvo (2005).
Central Government Revenues, Expenditures, and Social Security Funds: 1970–2010 for central government statistics and 1990–2010
for social security funds. Raw data are the share of revenues and expenditures of the central government, and expenditures of social
security funds as percentage of GDP by the Government Finance Statistics Manuel (2014). Source: International Monetary Fund, web link:
http://data.imf.org/.
Social Expenditures: 1980–2010. Raw data are social expenditures as percentage of GDP constructed by the OECD So-
cial Expenditure Database (SOCX, 2014). Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), web link:
http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.
Colonial History: Constant across time. Raw data constructed by CEPII Geo data set contain information on the countries that have
colonized a specific other country. A dummy variable is constructed that takes a value of 1, if a country has been colonized by other countries,
and 0 otherwise. Source: Mayer and Zignago (2011), web link: http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp.
Inflation and Deflation: 1960–2010. Raw data on inflation rates are from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. Dummies
are constructed to take a value of 1, if inflation rates are higher than 4 percent or lower than 0 percent. Source: World Bank (2014) , web
link: http://data.worldbank.org/.
Socialist: Constant across time. A dummy is constructed that takes a value of 1, if the country was a member of the former Eastern Bloc
and 0 otherwise.
Oil Exporter: Constant across time. Raw data on annual crude oil exports measured in thousands of barrels per day from 1980 to 2010
are taken from the International Energy Statistics by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, web link: http://www.eia.gov/. In order to
compute the value of exports, crude oil exports are multiplied by the crude oil first purchase price in the U.S., provided by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, and adjusted by the annual implicit price deflator provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, web link:
http://www.bea.gov/. A dummy is constructed that takes a value of 1, if a country exports oil on average worth of 5 percent or more of its
GDP over the time from 1980 to 2010.
Relative Political Extraction: 1960–2010. The measure approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national
output to advance public goods. Values are normalized to range from 0 to 1. Source: Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Fisunoglu, Kugler, Abdollahian,
Johnson, Kang, and Yang (2013), web link: http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/rpc.
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Table F.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Economic Institutions
Economic Freedom 0.65 0.12 0.31 0.89 543
Civil Liberties 0.70 0.27 0 1 543
Composite Index (CL & EF) 0.62 0.21 0.06 1 543
Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (EF) 0.64 0.12 0.16 0.90 538
Soundness of Money (EF) 0.75 0.21 0 0.99 543
Investment Profile (ICRG) 0.65 0.20 0.15 1 460
Protection Against Corruption (ICRG) 0.56 0.23 0 1 460
Political Institutions
Constraints on Executive (XC) 0.73 0.34 0 1 543
PolityIV (PIV) 0.74 0.33 0 1 543
Political Rights (PR) 0.71 0.32 0 1 543
Vanhanen Index (VH) 0.19 0.14 0 0.47 543
Vanhanen Competition (VHC) 0.43 0.22 0 0.70 543
Composite Index (XC & VHC) 0.67 0.31 0 1 543
Composite Index (PIV & PR & VH) 0.60 0.29 0.02 1 543
(In-)Equality Measures
Reversed Gini (1 – Gini net) 0.62 0.11 0.24 0.84 543
Reversed Gini (1 – Gini market) 0.56 0.09 0.21 0.80 543
(1 – Human Capital Gini) 0.70 0.19 0.10 0.97 543
Other Variables
Log GDP 8.81 1.13 5.97 11.04 543
Log Population 9.25 1.51 5.71 13.85 543
Years of Schooling 7.24 2.80 0.90 12.91 543
Inflation 0.71 0.46 0 1 543
Deflation 0.04 0.20 0 1 543
Socialist 0.09 0.28 0 1 543
Oil Exporter 0.12 0.33 0 1 543
Table F.3: Simple Correlations
Economic Civil PC Executive Polity IV PC PC Gini Gini
Freedom Liberties EF & CL Constraints Index XC & VHC PR & PIV & VH Net Gross
Economic Freedom 1.00
Civil Liberties 0.58 1.00
PC EF & CL 0.89 0.89 1.00
Executive Constraints 0.50 0.80 0.73 1.00
PolityIV Index 0.51 0.82 0.75 0.96 1.00
PC XC & VHC 0.52 0.80 0.75 0.96 0.95 1.00
PC PR & PIV & VH 0.55 0.89 0.82 0.91 0.95 0.94 1.00
Net Gini 0.34 0.52 0.48 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.51 1.00
Gross Gini 0.18 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.84 1.00
Human Capital Gini 0.51 0.60 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.42 0.25
Notes: PC refers to the principal component extracted from the respective variables in parentheses by ways of a principal component analysis (see
main text for details). Democracy in the respective columns is proxied by Constraints on Executive; an artificial indicator based on the principal
component of Constraints and Executive and the Vanhanen Competition indicator; the combined PolityIV indicator; and an artificial indicator
based on the principal components of the combined PolityIV indicator, Political Rights, and the composite Vanhanen indicator.
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Table F.4: Robustness: Economic Institutions (DGMM)
Civil Regulation Soundness Investment Protection vs.
Liberties of Money Profile Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L.Inst. Quality 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.06 0.34***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
L.Equality -0.18 -0.11 -0.39* -0.54** 0.12
(0.16) (0.09) (0.21) (0.26) (0.25)
L.Democracy -0.30** -0.15** -0.23 -0.27 -0.12
(0.13) (0.07) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.47** 0.25** 0.50* 0.54 0.26
(0.21) (0.12) (0.30) (0.42) (0.33)
Controls X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.82 0.10 0.25 0.04 0.30
Hansen p–value 0.24 0.48 0.19 0.01 0.13
Instruments 82 82 82 49 49
Groups 112 96 96 90 90
Observations 498 443 461 317 317
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are
computed using the differences GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991). Dependent variables in the respective
columns are the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties; Civil Liberties; Regulation of Credit,
Labor, and Business; Soundness of Money; Investment Profile (Property Rights); and Protection against Corruption.
Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator. Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control
variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step
procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the
second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.5: Robustness: Different Measures for Economic Institutions
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Civil Liberties 1970–2010 (CL)
L.Equality 0.11* -0.18 -0.06 -0.34** -0.05 -0.27* 0.08 -0.18 0.17 -0.04
(0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.20*** 0.01 -0.31*** -0.05 -0.30** -0.06 -0.30** -0.06 -0.30**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.43*** 0.60*** 0.48** 0.47** 0.45*
(0.13) (0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23)
AR(2) p–value 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.78
Hansen p–value 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.16
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.35 0.34
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610 498 498 610 610
(b) Dependent Variable: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 1970–2010 (EF)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.23* 0.01 -0.14 0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.16
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11)
L.Democracy -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.24*** -0.01 -0.17** -0.01 -0.15** -0.01 -0.18**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.13 0.42** 0.29** 0.25** 0.32**
(0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
AR(2) p–value 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13
Hansen p–value 0.14 0.48 0.48 0.59
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.87 0.64
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 539 539 539 539 539 539 443 443 539 539
(c) Dependent Variable: Soundness Money 1970–2010 (EF)
L.Equality 0.16*** -0.05 0.05 -0.31* 0.05 -0.33* -0.13 -0.39* 0.05 -0.31*
(0.05) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.18)
L.Democracy 0.03 -0.13 0.06 -0.35** 0.05 -0.38** 0.04 -0.23 0.07* -0.34**
(0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (0.18) (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.15)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.29 0.74** 0.78*** 0.50* 0.72***
(0.23) (0.29) (0.26) (0.30) (0.27)
AR(2) p–value 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.18
Hansen p–value 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.22
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.61 0.79
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 557 557 557 557 557 557 461 461 557 557
(d) Dependent Variable: Property Rights, Profit Repatriation, Payment Delays 1985–2010 (ICRG)
L.Equality 0.02 -0.43** -0.13 -0.47** -0.19 -0.56** -0.15 -0.54** 0.00 -0.51
(0.08) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24) (0.31)
L.Democracy 0.03 -0.32** 0.07 -0.31* 0.05 -0.36* 0.03 -0.27 0.07 -0.48**
(0.03) (0.14) (0.05) (0.16) (0.04) (0.21) (0.07) (0.23) (0.07) (0.23)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.60** 0.65** 0.72** 0.54 0.93**
(0.24) (0.27) (0.35) (0.42) (0.41)
AR(2) p–value 0.03 0.04 0.51 0.33
Hansen p–value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.00 0.24
(e) Dependent Variable: Protection against Corruption 1985–2010 (ICRG)
L.Equality 0.31*** -0.11 0.27* 0.22 0.29* 0.21 0.31 0.12 0.36** 0.19
(0.06) (0.14) (0.15) (0.24) (0.16) (0.24) (0.20) (0.25) (0.15) (0.27)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.32*** 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.21
(0.02) (0.10) (0.04) (0.18) (0.03) (0.19) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.20)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.59*** 0.10 0.17 0.26 0.34
(0.19) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37)
AR(2) p–value 0.32 0.30 0.11 0.11
Hansen p–value 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.18
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.16 0.15
Instruments 37 49 43 56
Groups 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 317 317 407 407
Lagged Y X X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects, as well as the lagged dependent variable as control. Democracy
is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by the (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of
schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is
estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors
in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the
second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses
the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used
additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed
data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.6: Robustness: Binary Democracy Indicator
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.75*** 0.72***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.15
(0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.04 0.03** -0.11** 0.03** -0.10** 0.03* -0.09 0.02 -0.12*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.08 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.21** 0.25**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.96 0.85 0.92 0.80
Hansen p–value 0.15 0.25 0.06 0.17
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.60 0.85
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 546 546 546 546 546 546 450 450 546 546
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.83*** 0.81*** 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.77*** 0.72***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.06* -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.11 -0.09
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)
L.Democracy 0.02* -0.07 0.03** -0.09 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.10 -0.00 -0.18**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.15** 0.22** 0.14 0.19 0.33***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.20
Hansen p–value 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.34
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.91 1.00
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 546 546 546 546 546 546 450 450 546 546
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in
Panel (a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Democracy is
proxied by the Democracy-Dictatorship measure of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years
of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is
estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard
errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited
up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced
equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged
difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number
of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.7: Robustness: Political Institutions (DGMM)
Principal Comp. PolityIV Political Principal Comp. Democracy-
XC & VHC Index Rights PIV & PR & VH Dictatorship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L.Inst. Quality 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.66***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
L.Equality -0.17 -0.16 -0.21* -0.15 -0.11
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
L.Democracy -0.16 -0.09 -0.18* -0.14 -0.09
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.40** 0.27* 0.39** 0.37* 0.21**
(0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.11)
Controls X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.59 0.70 0.94 0.81 0.85
Hansen p–value 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.24 0.25
Instruments 82 82 82 82 82
Groups 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 447 454 454 454 450
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are computed
using the differences GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. The
democracy proxies in the respective columns are the principal component of Constraints on Executive and the Vanhanen
Competition indicator; the combined PolityIV indicator; Political Rights; the principal component of the combined PolityIV
indicator, Political Rights, and the composite Vanhanen Democracy indicator; and the dichotomous Democracy-Dictatorship
indicator. Equality is proxied by (1−Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Standard
errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005).
Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory
variables. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.8: Robustness: Different Measures for Political Institutions
Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Democracy Variable: Composite Index (PCA of Constraints on Executive & Vanhanen Competition Component)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.01 -0.15** 0.05 -0.17 0.02 -0.22**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.02* -0.05 0.06*** -0.15** 0.05*** -0.14** 0.06** -0.16 0.05** -0.20**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.13 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.40** 0.46***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.15)
AR(2) p–value 0.80 0.59 0.80 0.60
Hansen p–value 0.14 0.34 0.06 0.34
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.56 0.88
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Democracy Variable: PolityIV Composite Index
L.Equality 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 -0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.16 0.00 -0.14
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.03** -0.02 0.07*** -0.07 0.06*** -0.05 0.06*** -0.09 0.05*** -0.10
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.07 0.25** 0.20* 0.27* 0.25*
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
AR(2) p–value 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.72
Hansen p–value 0.12 0.30 0.10 0.37
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.84 0.97
(c) Democracy Variable: Political Rights
L.Equality 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.18* -0.01 -0.20** -0.01 -0.21* 0.03 -0.19
(0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12)
L.Democracy 0.03* -0.08 0.06*** -0.18** 0.06*** -0.18*** 0.05* -0.18* 0.03 -0.20**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.17 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.39** 0.41**
(0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18)
AR(2) p–value 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.98
Hansen p–value 0.16 0.33 0.06 0.19
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.76 0.72
(d) Democracy Variable: Composite Index (PCA of Political Rights & PolityIV & Vanhanen Index)
L.Equality 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 -0.00 -0.13 -0.02 -0.15 0.01 -0.17
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.03* -0.03 0.09*** -0.13 0.08*** -0.12 0.09*** -0.14 0.06** -0.19*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.11)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.10 0.38*** 0.34** 0.37* 0.42**
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17)
AR(2) p–value 0.89 0.81 0.88 0.82
Hansen p–value 0.08 0.24 0.06 0.27
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.63 0.74
(e) Democracy Variable: Vanhanen Composite Index
L.Equality 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.08
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
L.Democracy 0.05 -0.05 0.17*** -0.22 0.16*** -0.24 0.12* -0.27 0.10* -0.47
(0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.19) (0.05) (0.22) (0.07) (0.23) (0.06) (0.30)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.15 0.64** 0.64* 0.65* 0.97**
(0.20) (0.29) (0.35) (0.36) (0.45)
AR(2) p–value 0.94 0.81 0.92 0.71
Hansen p–value 0.20 0.37 0.08 0.28
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.52 0.64
(f) Democracy Variable: Vanhanen Competition Component
L.Equality 0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.11 0.04 -0.16*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
L.Democracy 0.03** -0.07 0.07*** -0.20** 0.06*** -0.20** 0.07** -0.21* 0.06** -0.28**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.13)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.18 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.52** 0.60***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22)
AR(2) p–value 0.95 0.72 0.94 0.68
Hansen p–value 0.13 0.38 0.11 0.39
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.68 0.94
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 454 454 550 550
Lagged Y X X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Table
F.8 and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Table F.9. Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are
log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries. The
variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter
are obtained from DGMM (continued on next page ...)
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Table F.9: Robustness: Different Measures for Political Institutions II
Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Democracy Variable: Combined Index: Constraints on Executive & Vanhanen Competition Component (PCA)
L.Equality 0.08** -0.05 0.00 -0.17 -0.03 -0.14 0.04 -0.18 0.11* -0.15
(0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.06) (0.13)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.09 0.05** -0.18** -0.00 -0.16* -0.00 -0.21** -0.01 -0.26***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.21** 0.41*** 0.31** 0.38** 0.47***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
AR(2) p–value 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.08
Hansen p–value 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.32
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.87 0.82
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Democracy Variable: PolityIV Composite Index
L.Equality 0.08** -0.02 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.14 0.10 -0.12
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.07) (0.14)
L.Democracy 0.03** -0.04 0.06*** -0.10 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.15 0.01 -0.22**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.14 0.28** 0.17 0.30 0.40***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15)
AR(2) p–value 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.20
Hansen p–value 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.22
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.76 0.87
(c) Democracy Variable: Political Rights
L.Equality 0.08** -0.08 0.01 -0.21* -0.01 -0.17 -0.00 -0.22 0.11 -0.12
(0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.16)
L.Democracy 0.04* -0.10 0.06** -0.21*** -0.00 -0.20** -0.00 -0.27*** -0.02 -0.29**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.12)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.23** 0.47*** 0.35** 0.48*** 0.51**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20)
AR(2) p–value 0.34 0.34 0.25 0.26
Hansen p–value 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.17
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.91 0.86
(d) Democracy Variable: Combined Index: Political Rights & PolityIV & Vanhanen Index (PCA)
L.Equality 0.07* -0.03 0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 -0.17 0.11 -0.13
(0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.07) (0.13)
L.Democracy 0.04** -0.06 0.08*** -0.16* 0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.25* -0.02 -0.33***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.10)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.17 0.41*** 0.31* 0.44* 0.56***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.23) (0.17)
AR(2) p–value 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.19
Hansen p–value 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.83 0.80
(e) Democracy Variable: Vanhanen Composite Index
L.Equality 0.06* 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.03
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
L.Democracy 0.05 -0.15 0.14** -0.28 0.02 -0.37 -0.12 -0.64* -0.07 -0.69***
(0.04) (0.16) (0.06) (0.23) (0.07) (0.30) (0.09) (0.33) (0.06) (0.23)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.31 0.68** 0.66 0.93* 1.07***
(0.25) (0.34) (0.47) (0.49) (0.37)
AR(2) p–value 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.16
Hansen p–value 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.42
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.87 0.84
(f) Democracy Variable: Vanhanen Competition Component
L.Equality 0.08** -0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.10 0.05 -0.12
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.03 -0.12 0.06* -0.19* 0.01 -0.18 -0.02 -0.28** -0.01 -0.31**
(0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.12)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.26* 0.43** 0.34 0.50** 0.57***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21)
AR(2) p–value 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.17
Hansen p–value 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.46
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.86 0.84
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 454 454 550 550
Lagged Y X X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
(... continuation from previous page) Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size
(Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for
differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In
the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both
equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.10: Robustness: Static Model – Effect of Democracy and Equality on Institutional Quality
Random Effects Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Equality 0.08 -0.08 0.06 -0.10 0.01 -0.18* 0.01 -0.18
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.14)
L.Democracy 0.06*** -0.09 0.07*** -0.12 0.06*** -0.12* 0.06*** -0.19**
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.27** 0.32** 0.32*** 0.44***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.29 0.23 0.30 0.23
Hansen p–value 0.27 0.30 0.46 0.24
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.76 0.57
Instruments 49 69 54 75
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 560 560 560 560 464 464 560 560
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Equality 0.15* -0.19 0.06 -0.22* -0.04 -0.37** 0.11 -0.22
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (0.15)
L.Democracy 0.21*** -0.12 0.18*** -0.14 0.12*** -0.25** 0.13*** -0.29***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.69*** 0.77***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.46 0.20 0.37 0.21
Hansen p–value 0.20 0.07 0.33 0.23
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.57 0.38
Instruments 49 69 54 75
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 560 560 560 560 464 464 560 560
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic
Freedom in Panel (a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the
combined PolityIV indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c., average years of schooling. Level
equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated
using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM.
Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005).
Instruments are limited up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the
first two lags of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used so that for the variables of
interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system
GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.11: Robustness: Economic (In-)Equality (DGMM)
Multiple Gross Binary Human Capital Lowest Second–Fourth Highest
Imputation Gini Indicator Gini Quintile Quintile Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.Inst. Quality 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.68***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
L.Equality -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 0.03
(0.11) (0.13) (0.02) (0.07)
L.Democracy -0.11 -0.10 0.03 -0.00 0.05 0.07** 0.14***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.29** 0.28* 0.07*** 0.07
(0.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.06)
Controls X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.56 0.82 0.99 0.84
Hansen p–value 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.14 0.50 0.13 0.32
Instruments 82 82 81 82 30 42 22
Groups 96 96 96 96 35 77 29
Observations 447 447 447 543 109 280 99
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are computed using the differences
GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on
Executive indicator. Equality measures in the respective columns are (1 − Net Gini); (1 − Gross Gini); a binary equality indicator which takes a
value of 1, if (1−Net Gini) is above the median of the respective distribution for a given year, and 0 else; (1−Human Capital Gini Gini). Columns
(5)–(7) split the sample with respect to quintiles of the distribution of (1 − Net Gini): results are shown for the lowest quintile in Column (5), the
second to fourth quintile in Column (6), and the highest quintile in Column (7). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling.
Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). For
Columns (1)–(4) and (6), instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory
variables. In Columns (5) and (7), instruments for models are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the first lag
of the explanatory variables. In Column (5), the second lag of the explanatory variables is used additionally for efficiency gains. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.12: Robustness: Binary Democracy and Equality Indicators
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.74*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.68***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Equality 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.00 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.02 0.03* 0.03** 0.02* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.02* 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.97 0.88 0.91 0.83
Hansen p–value 0.12 0.39 0.11 0.21
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.45 0.27
Instruments 61 79 67 84
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 546 546 546 546 546 546 450 450 546 546
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.76*** 0.68***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Democracy 0.02** 0.01 0.03** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.03** 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.29
Hansen p–value 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.30
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.31 0.97
Instruments 61 79 67 84
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 546 546 546 546 546 546 450 450 546 546
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Panel
(a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). The equality indicator is constructed to take a value of 1, if the
time average of (1−Net Gini) for a specific country is above the median of the time averaged overall distribution, and 0 otherwise. Democracy is proxied by
the Democracy-Dictatorship measure of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level
equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap
procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated
with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged
dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the
lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally
so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data
for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.13: Robustness: Multiple Imputation
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.83*** 0.81*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.68***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.12 -0.01 -0.14* 0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.18*
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.05 0.04*** -0.13* 0.04** -0.12* 0.04** -0.11 0.03 -0.14*
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.015) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.11 0.31** 0.29** 0.29** 0.32**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.80 0.71 0.87 0.68
Hansen p–value 0.15 0.39 0.10 0.28
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.63 0.86
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553 447 447 553 553
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.75*** 0.69*** 0.79*** 0.71***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Equality 0.07** -0.06 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 -0.14 0.05 -0.15 0.09 -0.11
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.12)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.09* 0.02 -0.18** -0.02 -0.16* -0.01 -0.17* -0.01 -0.20**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.19** 0.38*** 0.27* 0.31* 0.36**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10
Hansen p–value 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.20
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.87 0.73
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553 447 447 553 553
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in
Panel (a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive
indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally
employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100
repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step
procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent
variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged
dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so
that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for
system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.14: Robustness: Gross Gini
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.69***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.09 0.07 -0.11 0.03 -0.12
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.03 0.04** -0.10 0.04*** -0.09 0.04* -0.10 0.02 -0.11
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.09 0.26** 0.24** 0.28* 0.27**
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.87 0.74 0.88 0.71
Hansen p–value 0.21 0.39 0.07 0.19
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.46 0.80
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.88*** 0.84*** 0.75*** 0.71*** 0.78*** 0.75***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.07* -0.03 0.08 -0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.11 -0.07 0.15* -0.03
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.15** -0.02 -0.14* -0.02 -0.16* -0.02 -0.18**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.16* 0.34** 0.26* 0.30* 0.32**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.12
Hansen p–value 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.42
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.96 0.93
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Civil Liberties in Panel (a)
and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1−Gross Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies
for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions.
Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure
and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up
to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable
and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of
interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the
transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.15: Robustness: Human Capital Equality
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.85*** 0.83*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.73*** 0.71***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.01 0.00 0.10* 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
L.Democracy 0.02* 0.01 0.04** -0.03 0.04*** -0.01 0.04** -0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.02 0.12** 0.08 0.07 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.50
Hansen p–value 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.16
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.15 0.64
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 639 639 639 639 639 639 543 543 639 639
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.80***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Equality 0.05 0.05 0.19** 0.19** 0.16* 0.16 0.27*** 0.17* 0.23*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
L.Democracy 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.22
Hansen p–value 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.18
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.73 0.72
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 542 542 638 638
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Panel
(a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1−Human Capital Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ
dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions.
Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure
and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up
to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable
and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of
interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the
transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.16: Robustness: Different Equality Sub-Samples
Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Lowest Quintile
L.Inst. Quality 0.62*** 0.49*** 1.23** 0.68*** 0.72***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.53) (0.11) (0.08)
L.Democracy 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02)
AR(2) test 0.82 0.78
Hansen p–value 0.50 0.42
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.94
Instruments 30 39
Groups 38 38 38 35 38
Observations 126 126 126 109 126
(b) Second to Fourth Quintile
L.Inst. Quality 0.76*** 0.44*** 0.82*** 0.69*** 0.81***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) (0.08)
L.Democracy 0.02 0.06** 0.07** 0.07** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
AR(2) test 0.99 0.94
Hansen p–value 0.13 0.01
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.09
Instruments 42 47
Groups 80 80 80 77 80
Observations 324 324 324 280 324
(c) Highest Quintile
L.Inst. Quality 0.65*** 0.45*** 1.14 0.68*** 0.69***
(0.05) (0.07) (1.28) (0.10) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.09** 0.09* 0.10 0.14*** 0.10
(0.04) (0.05) (0.17) (0.04) (0.06)
AR(2) test 0.84 0.73
Hansen p–value 0.32 0.68
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.97
Instruments 22 36
Groups 29 29 29 29 29
Observations 114 114 114 99 114
Controls X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X
FE & TE X X X X X
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. The sample is split with respect to the distribution of income equality proxied by
(1 − Net Gini). All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. Democracy
is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator. Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level
equations additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of
CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are
obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-
sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). For Panel (b), the instrument set corresponds to the baseline specification. For Panels (a) and (c),
instruments for models are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the first lag of the explanatory
variables for both, differences and system GMM. In the levels equation of SGMM in Panels (a) and (c), the lagged difference of the
regressors are used. In Panel (a), the second lag of the explanatory variables is used additionally for efficiency gains. The number
of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.17: Robustness: Different Equality Sub-Samples II
Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Lowest Quintile
L.Inst. Quality 0.73*** 0.48*** 0.84*** 0.04 0.81***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.32) (0.25) (0.15)
L.Democracy -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08** -0.13**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
AR(2) test 0.96 0.59
Hansen p–value 0.36 0.30
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.90
Instruments 30 39
Groups 38 38 38 37 38
Observations 125 125 125 109 125
(b) Second to Fourth Quintile
L.Inst. Quality 0.77*** 0.47*** 0.82*** 0.45*** 0.62***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
L.Democracy 0.03 0.07** 0.03 -0.05** -0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
AR(2) test 0.01 0.00
Hansen p–value 0.13 0.08
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.04
Instruments 42 47
Groups 80 80 80 78 80
Observations 324 324 324 324
(c) Highest Quintile
L.Inst. Quality 0.66*** 0.53*** 1.00 0.25*** 0.47***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.63) (0.09) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.05 0.26** 0.16*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09)
AR(2) test 0.36 0.21
Hansen p–value 0.11 0.83
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 1.00
Instruments 21 36
Groups 29 29 29 28 29
Observations 114 114 114 101 114
Controls X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X
FE & TE X X X X X
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. The sample is split with respect to the distribution of income equality proxied by (1 −
Net Gini). All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is the principal component of Economic
Freedom and Civil Liberties. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator. Control variables are log GDP p.c.
and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries.
The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the
autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected
with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). For Panel (b), the instrument set corresponds to the baseline specification. For
Panels (a) and (c), instruments for models are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the first lag
of the explanatory variables for both, differences and system GMM. In the levels equation of SGMM in Panels (a) and (c), the lagged
difference of the regressors are used. In Panel (a), the second lag of the explanatory variables is used additionally for efficiency gains.
The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.18: Robustness: Reversed Top-10-Percent Income Share as Equality Measure
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.81*** 0.77*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 1.55** 1.56** 0.81*** 0.84*** 0.51** 0.74***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.68) (0.70) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22) (0.11)
L.Equality 0.06 -1.04** 0.02 -0.95** -0.22 0.65 -0.27 0.29 0.18* -0.83
(0.05) (0.41) (0.17) (0.38) (2.04) (6.30) (0.35) (1.83) (0.09) (0.69)
L.Democracy 0.00 -0.77*** 0.07* -0.70** 0.07 0.78 0.19* 0.74 0.08 -0.74*
(0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.29) (0.78) (5.38) (0.11) (1.31) (0.06) (0.42)
L.(Eq×Demo) 1.12*** 1.09** -1.02 -0.71 1.05*
(0.40) (0.42) (7.96) (1.76) (0.58)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.11 0.16 0.47 0.28
Hansen p–value 0.74 0.72 0.99 0.99
Explained variance 0.79 0.86 0.77 0.81
Sampling adequacy 0.74 0.76 0.84 0.78
Instruments 15 17 22 24
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 98 98 117 117
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.68*** 0.61*** 0.33*** 0.26** 0.75** 0.66** 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.32*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.34) (0.33) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
L.Equality 0.02 -1.93*** 0.06 -1.92*** -0.11 -1.37 -0.45 -4.74 0.14 -3.24
(0.09) (0.52) (0.23) (0.50) (0.34) (1.07) (0.42) (5.74) (0.21) (2.89)
L.Democracy 0.09** -1.25*** 0.21*** -1.35*** 0.07 -0.91 0.35 -2.82 0.04 -1.95
(0.04) (0.33) (0.06) (0.35) (0.20) (0.78) (0.24) (4.15) (0.12) (1.97)
L.(Eq×Demo) 1.98*** 2.24*** 1.42 4.01 3.19
(0.51) (0.48) (1.12) (5.27) (2.80)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.39 1.00 0.31 0.71
Hansen p–value 0.73 0.52 0.50 0.70
Explained variance 0.81 0.88 0.78 0.83
Sampling adequacy 0.77 0.77 0.85 0.79
Instruments 15 17 22 25
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 98 98 117 117
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Panel
(a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1 − Top-10% Income Share). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally
employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures
with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the
two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instrument sets are collapsed and principal component analysis
is used to choose the instruments that explain the largest share of the variation based on their eigenvalues. Explained variance reports the portion of the
variation the extracted components explain. Sampling adequacy refers to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. It ranges from 0 to 1
with small values indicating that variables have not enough correlation in common to warrant a PCA analysis. A widely accepted convention in judging
sampling adequacy is: 0.00–0.49 unacceptable; 0.50–0.59 miserable; 0.60–0.69 mediocre; 0.70–0.79 middling; 0.80–0.89 meritorious; 0.90–1.00 marvelous.
The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance
levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.19: Robustness: GMM Specifications
More Fewer Minimum Collapsed Minimum Collapsed
Lags Lags Y Y X & Y X & Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Inst. Quality 0.61*** 0.66*** 0.84*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.73***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05)
L.Equality -0.21* -0.21** -0.21* -0.16 -0.29 -0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10)
L.Democracy -0.17* -0.17** -0.17** -0.13* -0.26 -0.07
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.40** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.33** 0.59* 0.24*
(0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.31) (0.14)
Controls X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.60 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.55 0.70
Hansen p–value 0.42 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.30
Instruments 102 58 19 19 37 40
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 447 447 447 447 447 447
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Results are computed
using the differences GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom.
Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator. Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control
variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step
procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Relative to the baseline specification,
the specifications in Columns (1) and (2) add/subtract one lag period for the dependent and the explanatory variables.
Column (3) uses only the first lag of the lagged dependent variable as instrument. Column (4) collapses the instrument
set for the lagged dependent variable. In Column (5) only the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the
explanatory variables is used for instrumentation. Column (6) collapses the instrument set for all explanatory variables
including the lagged dependent variable. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.20: Robustness: Alternative Specification of GMM Estimators
Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Baseline More Lags Fewer Lags Collapsed
FOD FD FOD FD FOD FD FOD FD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Differences GMM
L.Inst. Quality 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.66*** 0.56*** 0.73*** 0.63***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
L.Equality -0.16 -0.20* -0.21* -0.20* -0.21** -0.23** -0.03 -0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
L.Democracy -0.14 -0.17** -0.17* -0.18** -0.17** -0.22*** -0.07 -0.14*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.32** 0.37** 0.40** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.24* 0.37**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist
FE & TE X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.71 0.71 0.60 0.62 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.68
Hansen p–value 0.39 0.25 0.42 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.30 0.13
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value
Instruments 82 82 102 102 58 58 40 40
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 447 435 447 435 447 435 447 435
(b) System GMM
L.Inst. Quality 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.76*** 0.71*** 0.72***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
L.Equality -0.21** -0.23 -0.19 -0.23* -0.37** -0.34* -0.13 -0.15
(0.10) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12)
L.Democracy -0.15* -0.18 -0.14* -0.20** -0.24** -0.26* -0.07 -0.07
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.35** 0.40* 0.32** 0.41** 0.51** 0.54** 0.22* 0.21
(0.13) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.27) (0.14) (0.15)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.61
Hansen p–value 0.28 0.24 0.99 1.00 0.31 0.09 0.71 0.36
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.83 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.63 0.91 0.66
Instruments 89 89 137 137 68 68 73 73
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic
Freedom. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1−Net Gini). Control variables
are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former
socialist countries. Panel (a) reports estimates for differences GMM and Panel (b) for system GMM. Specifications differ with respect
to the transformation matrix that removes the country-fixed effect, which is either forward orthogonalized deviations (FOD) or first
differences (FD). Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size
(Windmeijer, 2005). For the baseline models, instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to
the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM in. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged
dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used
additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. Models with more lags use
an additional lag (lagged difference) compared to the baseline, while models with fewer lags use the minimum specification of exactly
one lag (lagged difference) per variable. Collapsed specifications create instruments for each variable and lag distance rather than
for each time period. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for
difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.21: Robustness: Alternative Specification of GMM Estimators II
Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Baseline More Lags Fewer Lags Collapsed
FOD FD FOD FD FOD FD FOD FD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(a) Differences GMM
L.Inst. Quality 0.69*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 0.54*** 0.68*** 0.51*** 0.73*** 0.64***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
L.Equality -0.16 -0.38*** -0.20 -0.41*** -0.22 -0.33** 0.08 -0.21
(0.15) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23) (0.17)
L.Democracy -0.18* -0.39*** -0.20** -0.39*** -0.24** -0.34*** -0.13 -0.26**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.33* 0.67*** 0.36** 0.69*** 0.42** 0.58*** 0.22 0.42**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.24) (0.20)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist
FE & TE X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.16
Hansen p–value 0.13 0.11 0.43 0.43 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.01
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value
Instruments 82 82 102 102 58 58 40 40
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 447 435 447 435 447 435 447 435
(b) System GMM
L.Inst. Quality 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.78*** 0.79***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
L.Equality -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.19 0.15 -0.00
(0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.15)
L.Democracy -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.18** -0.31*** -0.20* -0.13 -0.03 -0.14
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.40*** 0.51*** 0.31** 0.54*** 0.49** 0.24 0.03 0.20
(0.14) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.17)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.12
Hansen p–value 0.23 0.26 0.99 1.00 0.25 0.22 0.02 0.03
Diff.–in–Hansen p–value 0.91 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.91 0.57 0.70
Instruments 89 89 137 137 68 68 73 73
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is the
principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally
employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries. Panel (a) reports estimates for differences GMM and Panel
(b) for system GMM. Specifications differ with respect to the transformation matrix that removes the country-fixed effect, which is
either forward orthogonalized deviations (FOD) or first differences (FD). Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step
procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). For the baseline models, instruments are limited up
to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM in. The
differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the
level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are
employed in both equations. Models with more lags use an additional lag (lagged difference) compared to the baseline while models with
fewer lags use the minimum specification of exactly one lag (lagged difference) per variable. Collapsed specifications create instruments
for each variable and lag distance rather than for each time period. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for
system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.22: Robustness: Parsimonious IV Sets
Minimum Y Y Collapsed Minimum X and Y X and Y Collapsed PCA–Selection
DGMM SGMM DGMM SGMM DGMM SGMM DGMM SGMM DGMM SGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 0.70***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
L.Equality -0.21* -0.11 -0.16 -0.05 -0.29 -0.22* -0.03 -0.11 -0.18 -0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11)
L.Democracy -0.17** -0.08 -0.13* -0.05 -0.26 -0.17* -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.40*** 0.19 0.33** 0.14 0.59* 0.37** 0.24* 0.21 0.32* 0.13
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.31) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.14)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.68 0.78 0.69 0.79 0.55 0.66 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.79
Hansen p–value 0.16 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.30 0.66 0.01 0.01
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.88 –
Explained variance 0.91 0.92
Sampling adequacy 0.86 0.86
Instruments 19 29 19 29 37 71 40 71 18 28
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 447 543 447 543 447 543 447 543 447 543
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.91*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.75*** 0.57*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.84*** 0.74***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
L.Equality -0.18 -0.12 -0.22 -0.05 -0.26 -0.01 0.08 0.27 -0.21 -0.05
(0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.32) (0.16) (0.23) (0.24) (0.14) (0.10)
L.Democracy -0.14* -0.12* -0.19** -0.14* -0.21 -0.20 -0.13 0.05 -0.16** -0.10
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.08) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.20 0.21* 0.32* 0.24* 0.61* 0.34 0.22 -0.09 0.24* 0.21*
(0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.33) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.15) (0.11)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.11
Hansen p–value 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.04 0.23 0.71 0.54 –
Explained variance 0.91 0.93
Sampling adequacy 0.87 0.87
Instruments 19 29 19 29 37 71 40 71 18 28
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 447 543 447 543 447 543 447 543 447 543
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Panel
(a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for
oil export and former socialist countries. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size
(Windmeijer, 2005). Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) employ the minimum instrument set with only one lag for the dependent and the explanatory variables,
respectively. Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) employ all possible lags as instruments but collapse the instrument set. In Columns (9) and (10), a principal
component analysis is used to choose the instruments that explain the largest share of the variation based on their eigenvalues. Explained variance reports
the portion of the variation the extracted components explain. Sampling adequacy refers to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. It ranges
from 0 to 1 with small values indicating that variables have not enough correlation in common to warrant a PCA analysis. A widely accepted convention
in judging sampling adequacy is: 0.00–0.49 unacceptable; 0.50–0.59 miserable; 0.60–0.69 mediocre; 0.70–0.79 middling; 0.80–0.89 meritorious; 0.90–1.00
marvelous. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.23: Robustness: Interval Regressions
(a) Democracy Indicator: Constraints on Executive
Economic PC Civil Regulation Soundness Investment Protection vs.
Freedom EF & CL Liberties of Money Profile Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.Inst. Quality 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.09* 0.17***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Equality -0.34** -0.20* -0.14 -0.23* -0.31* -0.47** 0.22
(0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.22) (0.24)
L.Democracy -0.31*** -0.20*** -0.15** -0.24*** -0.35** -0.31** -0.02
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.60*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.74** 0.65** 0.10
(0.20) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.29) (0.27) (0.33)
Controls X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X
Groups 96 96 112 96 96 90 90
Observations 543 543 610 539 557 407 407
(b) Democracy Indicator: Composite PolityIV Score
Economic PC Civil Regulation Soundness Investment Protection vs.
Freedom EF & CL Liberties of Money Profile Corruption
L.Inst. Quality 0.44*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.09 0.18***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Equality -0.31** -0.12 -0.10 -0.28** -0.20 -0.31 0.25
(0.16) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.19) (0.22) (0.24)
L.Democracy -0.25** -0.10 -0.07 -0.27*** -0.19 -0.12 0.01
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.56*** 0.28** 0.25** 0.49*** 0.49 0.37 0.02
(0.20) (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.31) (0.25) (0.31)
Controls X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X
Groups 96 96 112 96 96 90 90
Observations 550 550 618 555 564 410 410
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. Dependent variables in the respective columns
are Economic Freedom; the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties; Civil Liberties; Regulation of Credit, Labor, and
Business; Soundness of Money; Investment Profile (Property Rights); and Protection against Corruption. Column reports results for fixed effects
regressions. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator in Panel (a) and the Combined PolityIV indicator in Panel (b),
Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.24: Robustness: Interval Regressions II
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Executive PC PolityIV Political PC Vanhanen Vanhanen
Constraints XC & VHC Index Rights PIV & PR & VH Index Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L.Inst. Quality 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
L.Equality -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 -0.18* -0.11 -0.03 -0.09
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
L.Democracy -0.15** -0.15** -0.07 -0.18** -0.13* -0.22 -0.20**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.25** 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.64** 0.48***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.29) (0.15)
Controls X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 550 550 550 550 550
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Executive PC PolityIV Political PC Vanhanen Vanhanen
Constraints XC & VHC Index Rights PIV & PR & VH Index Competition
L.Inst. Quality 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.55*** 0.55***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
L.Equality -0.20* -0.17 -0.12 -0.21* -0.14 -0.05 -0.10
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
L.Democracy -0.20*** -0.18** -0.10 -0.21*** -0.16* -0.28 -0.19*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.23) (0.10)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.28** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.68** 0.43**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.33) (0.17)
Controls X X X X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom
in Panel (a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy in the respective columns is proxied
by Constraints on Executive; an artificial indicator based on the principal component of Constraints and Executive and the Vanhanen Competition
indicator; the combined PolityIV indicator; Political Rights; an artificial indicator based on the principal components of the combined PolityIV
indicator, Political Rights, and the composite Vanhanen Democracy indicator; the composite Vanhanen indicator; and the Vanhanen Competition
indicator. Columns report results for fixed effects regressions. Equality is proxied by (1−Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average
years of schooling. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
F.3. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL: TABLES AND FIGURES 315
Table F.25: Robustness: Different Specification of Controls
Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) No Controls
L.Inst. Quality 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.76*** 0.68***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.06*** -0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.11 0.06 -0.19**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.03*** -0.04 0.05*** -0.13* 0.04*** -0.11* 0.05** -0.13 0.04** -0.17**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.12 0.32** 0.27** 0.32** 0.38***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12)
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.72 0.62 0.77 0.59
Hansen p–value 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.23
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.60 0.70
Instruments 60 80 64 85
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Full Controls
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.70***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Equality 0.04* -0.01 0.03 -0.13 -0.00 -0.15** 0.02 -0.16 0.01 -0.14
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.03 0.05*** -0.14** 0.04*** -0.13** 0.05** -0.14 0.02 -0.09
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.08 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.33** 0.21*
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12)
Full Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
Colonial History X X X X
Ethnic Polarization X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.82 0.71 0.96 0.96
Hansen p–value 0.11 0.33 0.15 0.72
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.45 1.00
Instruments 65 85 73 94
Groups 83 83 96 96 96 96 96 96 83 83
Observations 502 502 543 543 543 543 447 447 502 502
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. Democracy
is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables in Panel (b) are log GDP p.c., average
years of schooling, log population size, an inflation dummy that takes a value of 1, if the rate exceeds a threshold of 4 percentage points, and a deflation
dummy that takes a value of 1, if prices decrease. Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil export, former socialist countries, colonial history
and ethnic polarization. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for
the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect
to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the
explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the
explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time
periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for
difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.26: Robustness: Different Specification of Controls II
Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) No Controls
L.Inst. Quality 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.92*** 0.86*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.81*** 0.74***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.17*** -0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.09 0.10 -0.10 0.18* -0.10
(0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13)
L.Democracy 0.04** -0.11* 0.03 -0.18** -0.02 -0.15* -0.01 -0.17 -0.00 -0.26***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.26* 0.31 0.47***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16)
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08
Hansen p–value 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.25
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.88 0.84
Instruments 60 80 64 85
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Full Controls
L.Inst. Quality 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.91*** 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.79*** 0.77***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
L.Equality 0.06 -0.07 -0.00 -0.22* -0.04 -0.20* 0.06 -0.18 0.09 -0.11
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.10* 0.02 -0.22*** -0.03 -0.20** -0.02 -0.22** -0.03 -0.18*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.21** 0.45*** 0.34** 0.37** 0.29*
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17)
Full Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
Colonial History X X X X
Ethnic Polarization X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.08
Hansen p–value 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.38
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.65 0.90
Instruments 65 85 73 94
Groups 83 83 96 96 96 96 96 96 83 83
Observations 502 502 543 543 543 543 447 447 502 502
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is the principal component of
Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control
variables in Panel (b) are log GDP p.c., average years of schooling, log population size, an inflation dummy that takes a value of 1, if the rate exceeds a
threshold of 4 percentage points, and a deflation dummy that takes a value of 1, if prices decrease. Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil
export, former socialist countries, colonial history and ethnic polarization. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures
with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the
two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent
variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent
variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables
of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the
transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.27: Robustness: Controlling for Growth
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.77*** 0.68***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.14 -0.00 -0.14** 0.03 -0.16 0.01 -0.21**
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.10)
L.Democracy 0.02 -0.05 0.04*** -0.15** 0.04*** -0.13** 0.04** -0.14 0.03 -0.16**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.11 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.33** 0.36***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13)
L.Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.04** -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
L.Growth -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.84 0.71 0.94 0.67
Hansen p–value 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.21
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.73 0.82
Instruments 63 83 69 90
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.80*** 0.71***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
L.Equality 0.08** -0.06 -0.00 -0.20* -0.02 -0.16 0.07 -0.16 0.13* -0.13
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.07) (0.12)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.09* 0.02 -0.20*** -0.02 -0.17** -0.01 -0.19* -0.01 -0.23***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.20** 0.42*** 0.29* 0.34* 0.42***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.14)
L.Income 0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04* -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
L.Growth -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.11
Hansen p–value 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.20
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.86 0.72
Instruments 63 83 69 90
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 447 447 543 543
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Panel
(a) and the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1−Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c., growth of GDP p.c., and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally
employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100
repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step
procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable
and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent
variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the
variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM
and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.28: Robustness: Testing Inequality Interaction Against Other Interactions
Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(a) Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
L.Inst. Quality 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.65*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.66***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Equality -0.15** -0.17** -0.17** -0.16** -0.16 -0.21** -0.22** -0.22* -0.21** -0.37** -0.36** -0.39***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
L.Democracy -0.13** -0.01 -0.13** 0.03 -0.14 0.01 -0.15** 0.09 -0.16** -0.07 -0.26** 0.10
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.21) (0.08) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15)
L.Income -0.04*** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.04** -0.03 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.01* 0.01 -0.02* 0.03*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
L.Human Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.37** 0.35*** 0.66*** 0.57*** 0.71***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
L.(GDP×Demo) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03* -0.07**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
L.(HC×Demo) -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AR(2) p–value 0.71 0.62 0.66 0.60 0.66 0.55 0.54 0.46
Hansen p–value 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.46 0.24 0.35 0.42 0.56
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.85 0.61 0.67 0.76
Instruments 82 78 78 92 89 82 82 96
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 447 447 447 447 543 543 543 543
(b) Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
L.Inst. Quality 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.67***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
L.Equality -0.16 -0.18* -0.20* -0.20* -0.16 -0.23 -0.29 -0.29* -0.12 -0.09 -0.15 -0.18
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.26) (0.14)
L.Democracy -0.17** -0.03 -0.15* -0.15 -0.18* -0.11 -0.18* -0.33 -0.22*** -0.25 -0.23 -0.40
(0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.20) (0.10) (0.18) (0.09) (0.24) (0.09) (0.26) (0.14) (0.28)
L.Income -0.05*** -0.04 -0.05*** -0.05* -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
L.Human Capital 0.01* 0.01* 0.02** 0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.02** 0.03** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.30* 0.32** 0.35** 0.35** 0.33* 0.41** 0.45** 0.47** 0.39** 0.43** 0.51* 0.54***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (0.21) (0.28) (0.19)
L.(GDP×Demo) -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
L.(HC×Demo) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AR(2) p–value 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08
Hansen p–value 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.42
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.73 0.79 0.75 0.71
Instruments 82 78 78 92 89 82 82 96
Groups 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Observations 543 543 543 543 447 447 447 447 543 543 543 543
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is Economic Freedom in Panel (a) and the
principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by
(1−Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist
countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter
are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005).
Instruments for models with one interaction are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for
differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level
equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. For
models with more than one interaction, instruments are limited to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the second lag of the explanatory variables
for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level
equation the lagged difference of the regressors is used. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for
difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.29: Effect of Democracy on Equality on Redistribution
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Dependent Variable: Expenditures of Social Security Funds (Percent of GDP)
L.Inst. Quality 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.01 0.05 0.81 0.73 0.06 0.08* 0.50** 0.35***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (2.18) (1.70) (0.05) (0.05) (0.24) (0.14)
L.Equality 0.10 0.51* -0.02 0.58 0.20 0.89 0.02 0.67* 0.12 0.54
(0.06) (0.31) (0.11) (0.41) (0.88) (1.17) (0.14) (0.37) (0.15) (0.34)
L.Democracy -0.03 0.25 -0.09 0.32 -0.12 0.39 -0.06 0.36* 0.00 0.26
(0.04) (0.18) (0.07) (0.20) (0.10) (0.38) (0.08) (0.21) (0.02) (0.19)
L.(Eq×Demo) -0.46 -0.70* -0.84 -0.78* -0.44
(0.33) (0.41) (0.69) (0.43) (0.34)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.94 0.88 0.16 0.50
Hansen p–value 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.13
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.38 0.42
Instruments 28 37 34 44
Groups 51 51 51 51 51 51 46 46 51 51
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 97 97 148 148
(b) Dependent Variable: Social Expenditures (Percent of GDP)
L.Inst. Quality 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.33* 0.33* 2.93*** 2.98*** 0.16 0.11 0.79*** 0.81***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.35) (0.17) (0.17)
L.Equality 0.12* 0.23* -0.00 0.10 0.20* 0.61*** -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.19
(0.07) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.19) (0.12) (0.16)
L.Democracy -0.00 0.07 0.01 0.09 -0.05** 0.24*** 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.04
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08)
L.(Eq×Demo) -0.13 -0.16 -0.56*** -0.16 -0.10
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.59 0.98 0.07 0.13
Hansen p–value 0.95 0.99 0.96 1.00
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 45 57 50 66
Groups 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 134 134 167 167
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is expenditures of
social security funds (in percent of GDP) in Panel (a) and social expenditures (in percent of GDP) in Panel (b). Democracy is measured by the
Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c., average years of schooling. Level
equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using
bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in
GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited
up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced
equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first two lags of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the
lagged difference of the regressors is used so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number
of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance
levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.30: Robustness: Political Stability 1970–2010
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L.Democracy 0.77*** 0.72*** 0.49*** 0.37* 0.69*** 0.37*** 0.73*** 0.58 0.78*** 1.02***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.40) (0.07) (0.38)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.27 0.07 -0.10 0.60
(0.07) (0.18) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.27) (0.20) (0.43) (0.21) (0.46)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.09 0.21 0.19 -0.37 -1.01
(0.19) (0.30) (0.15) (0.70) (0.69)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.63 0.86 0.58 0.80
Hansen p–value 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.01
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.09 0.03
Instruments 42 62 47 68
Groups 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Observations 618 618 618 618 618 618 506 506 618 618
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The dependent variable is the composite
PolityIV indicator. Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations
additionally employ dummies for existing oil reserves and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using
bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in
GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up
to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM in. The differenced
equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the
lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations.
The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.31: Robustness: Political Stability 1870–2010 (10-Year Intervals)
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L.Democracy 0.55** -1.85 -0.07 -1.31** 0.16 -0.18 0.09 -0.74 0.44 0.57
(0.23) (1.29) (0.14) (0.57) (0.14) (0.17) (0.32) (2.34) (0.96) (3.76)
L.Equality 0.23 -3.31* -0.13 -2.03** 0.64 -0.22 -0.10 -1.11 -1.15 -0.98
(0.19) (1.73) (0.23) (0.96) (0.74) (0.75) (0.43) (3.24) (2.83) (5.20)
L.(Eq×Demo) 3.52** 1.93** 0.71 0.87 0.02
(1.66) (0.92) (0.46) (3.62) (5.88)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.35 0.34 0.49 0.48
Hansen p–value 0.73 1.00 0.91 0.97
Explained variance 0.70 0.84 0.74 0.81
Sampling adequacy 0.80 0.67 0.86 0.80
Instruments 17 21 24 28
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 17 17 19 19
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 63 63 82 82
Notes: Time periods are ten-year intervals. The dependent variable is the composite PolityIV indicator. Equality is proxied by (1 −
Top-10% Income Share). All regressions include country-fixed and time effects and a control variable for log GDP p.c. The variance-covariance ma-
trix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from
DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005).
Instrument sets are collapsed and principal component analysis is used to choose the instruments that explain the largest share of the variation
based on their eigenvalues. Explained variance reports the portion of the variation the extracted components explain. Sampling adequacy refers to
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. It ranges from 0 to 1 with small values indicating that variables have not enough correlation
in common to warrant a PCA analysis. A widely accepted convention in judging sampling adequacy is: 0.00–0.49 unacceptable; 0.50–0.59 miserable;
0.60–0.69 mediocre; 0.70–0.79 middling; 0.80–0.89 meritorious; 0.90–1.00 marvelous. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data
for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.32: Robustness: Third Wave of Democratization
Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Countries that democratized after 1974
L.Inst. Quality 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.65*** 0.58***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.19) (0.19) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
L.Equality 0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.19 -0.07 -0.25* -0.07 -0.33 -0.02 -0.16
(0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.26) (0.09) (0.14)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.21** 0.01 -0.22* 0.02 -0.23 0.02 -0.12
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.11)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.17 0.41*** 0.42** 0.44* 0.23
(0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.27) (0.19)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.29 0.25 0.33 0.30
Hansen p–value 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 58 74 67 85
Groups 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 180 180 223 223
(b) Countries that did not democratize after 1974
L.Inst. Quality 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.75***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) (0.24) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 -0.21
(0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.18) (0.07) (0.23)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.02 0.10* -0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.03 -0.15
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.12)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.04 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.33
(0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.28) (0.25)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57
Hansen p–value 0.54 0.97 0.70 0.98
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 61 81 67 88
Groups 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 267 267 320 320
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The sample in Panel (a) includes countries that have
democratized after 1974 according to changes in the binary Democracy-Dictatorship indicator by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). All other
countries are included in Panel (b). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator,
Equality is proxied by (1−Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies
for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions.
Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure
and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and
up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent
variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the
variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system
GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.33: Robustness: Third Wave of Democratization II
Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) Countries that democratized after 1974
L.Inst. Quality 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.94*** 0.87*** 0.76*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.69***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
L.Equality 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.27 -0.13 -0.25 -0.01 -0.25 0.09 -0.14
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21)
L.Democracy -0.05** -0.17** -0.03 -0.27*** -0.08** -0.23 -0.06** -0.18 -0.06* -0.29
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.19)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.23* 0.45*** 0.30 0.23 0.41
(0.13) (0.15) (0.27) (0.23) (0.34)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.07
Hansen p–value 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.00
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 58 74 67 85
Groups 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 180 180 223 223
(b) Countries that did not democratize after 1974
L.Inst. Quality 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.86*** 0.81*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.82*** 0.75***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
L.Equality 0.07 -0.09 0.11 -0.14 0.07 -0.09 0.14 -0.10 0.06 -0.23
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.22) (0.11) (0.22)
L.Democracy 0.04* -0.07 0.04 -0.22 0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.22 0.03 -0.23
(0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.19) (0.04) (0.16)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.20 0.50** 0.36* 0.43 0.48*
(0.14) (0.24) (0.21) (0.33) (0.26)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.53 0.59 0.63 0.62
Hansen p–value 0.76 0.99 0.82 0.99
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 61 81 67 88
Groups 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 267 267 320 320
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The sample in Panel (a) includes countries that
have democratized after 1974 according to changes in the binary Democracy-Dictatorship indicator by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). All
other countries are included in Panel (b). The dependent variable is the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties. Democracy
is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years
of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is
estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard
errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited
up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced
equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged
difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number
of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.34: Robustness: OECD and Non-OECD Countries
Dependent Variable: Economic Freedom
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) OECD countries
L.Inst. Quality 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 1.31** 1.14** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.73***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.56) (0.53) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
L.Equality -0.03 -0.26*** 0.02 -0.27** 0.27 -0.07 0.05 -0.20 -0.04 -0.25*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.43) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
L.Democracy 0.04** -0.15*** 0.06* -0.25*** -0.03 -0.28* 0.04 -0.31 0.05* -0.24
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.03) (0.22) (0.03) (0.16)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.47** 0.58 0.47
(0.09) (0.11) (0.23) (0.37) (0.29)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.94 0.78 1.00 0.77
Hansen p–value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 59 75 64 85
Groups 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 176 176 208 208
(b) Non-OECD Countries
L.Inst. Quality 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.62*** 0.55*** 0.75*** 0.63***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
L.Equality 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 -0.23**
(0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.06) (0.11)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.03 0.04* -0.10 0.04** -0.07 0.04 -0.10 0.03 -0.16*
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.09)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.08 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.32**
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.76 0.68 0.79 0.66
Hansen p–value 0.39 0.96 0.55 0.99
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.88 1.00
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Observations 335 335 335 335 335 335 271 271 335 335
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The sample in Panel (a) includes OECD countries, all
non-OECD countries are included in Panel (b). The dependent variable is Economic Freedom. Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive
indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and average years of schooling. Level equations additionally
employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100
repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM. Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step
procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent
variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged
dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation, the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so
that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The number of observations refers to the untransformed data for
system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.35: Robustness: OECD and Non-OECD Countries II
Dependent Variable: Composite Index (Principal Component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties)
Random Effects Fixed Effects Corr. Fixed Effects Differences GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(a) OECD countries
L.Inst. Quality 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.64*** 0.59*** 1.09*** 1.00*** 0.66*** 0.59*** 0.69*** 0.72***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.26) (0.23) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
L.Equality 0.09 -0.03 0.08 -0.22 0.33 0.14 -0.06 -0.37 0.15 0.01
(0.06) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.22) (0.25) (0.33) (0.37) (0.14) (0.26)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.08 0.05 -0.23*** -0.08 -0.18 0.06 -0.24 0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.27) (0.04) (0.17)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.16 0.50*** 0.22 0.53 0.16
(0.13) (0.11) (0.24) (0.46) (0.30)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Hansen p–value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 1.00 1.00
Instruments 59 75 64 85
Groups 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 176 176 208 208
(b) Non-OECD Countries
L.Inst. Quality 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.89*** 0.85*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.67*** 0.64***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
L.Equality 0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -0.20 -0.09 -0.20 -0.03 -0.15 0.03 -0.23
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.08) (0.20)
L.Democracy 0.01 -0.13** 0.00 -0.21** -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 -0.18 -0.01 -0.30**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14)
L.(Eq×Demo) 0.27** 0.39** 0.30 0.29 0.55**
(0.11) (0.17) (0.22) (0.28) (0.24)
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Oil/Socialist X X X X
FE & TE X X X X X X X X X X
AR(2) p–value 0.74 0.65 0.67 0.56
Hansen p–value 0.27 0.82 0.49 0.95
Diff.–in–Hansen
p–value 0.90 1.00
Instruments 62 82 68 89
Groups 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Observations 335 335 335 335 335 335 271 271 335 335
Notes: Time periods are five-year intervals. All regressions include country-fixed and time effects. The sample in Panel (a) includes OECD countries,
all non-OECD countries are included in Panel (b). The dependent variable is the principal component of Economic Freedom and Civil Liberties.
Democracy is measured by the Constraints on Executive indicator, Equality is proxied by (1 − Net Gini). Control variables are log GDP p.c. and
average years of schooling. Level equations additionally employ dummies for oil export and former socialist countries. The variance-covariance matrix
of CFE is estimated using bootstrap procedures with 100 repetitions. Preliminary estimates for the autoregressive parameter are obtained from DGMM.
Standard errors in GMM are estimated with the two-step procedure and corrected with respect to finite-sample size (Windmeijer, 2005). Instruments
are limited up to the second lag of the lagged dependent variable and up to the third lag of the explanatory variables for differences GMM. The
differenced equation of SGMM uses the first lag of the lagged dependent variable and the first lag of the explanatory variables. In the level equation,
the lagged difference of the regressors is used additionally so that for the variables of interest the same time periods are employed in both equations. The
number of observations refers to the untransformed data for system GMM and the transformed data for difference GMM. Asterisks indicate significance
levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.36: Estimation Sample
ID Code Country EF CL ICRG ID Code Country EF CL ICRG
1 AGO Angola 0 0 0 75 KOR South Korea 1 1 1
2 ALB Albania 1 1 1 76 LAO Laos 0 1 0
3 ARG Argentina 1 1 1 77 LBN Lebanon 0 0 0
4 ARM Armenia 0 1 0 78 LCA Saint Lucia 0 0 0
5 AUS Australia 1 1 1 79 LKA Sri Lanka 1 1 1
6 AUT Austria 1 1 1 80 LSO Lesotho 0 1 0
7 AZE Azerbaijan 0 0 0 81 LTU Lithuania 1 1 0
8 BDI Burundi 1 1 0 82 LUX Luxembourg 1 1 1
9 BEL Belgium 1 1 1 83 LVA Latvia 1 1 0
10 BFA Burkina Faso 0 0 0 84 MAR Morocco 1 1 1
11 BGD Bangladesh 1 1 1 85 MDA Moldova 0 1 0
12 BGR Bulgaria 1 1 1 86 MDG Madagascar 0 0 0
13 BHS Bahamas 0 0 0 87 MDV Maldives 0 0 0
14 BIH Bosnia and Hercegovina 0 0 0 88 MEX Mexico 1 1 1
15 BLR Belarus 0 0 0 89 MKD Macedonia 0 0 0
16 BLZ Belize 0 0 0 90 MLI Mali 1 1 1
17 BOL Bolivia 1 1 1 91 MLT Malta 0 0 0
18 BRA Brazil 1 1 1 92 MNG Mongolia 0 1 1
19 BRB Barbados 0 0 0 93 MOZ Mozambique 0 1 1
20 BTN Bhutan 0 0 0 94 MRT Mauritania 0 1 0
21 BWA Botswana 1 1 1 95 MUS Mauritius 1 1 0
22 CAF Central African Republic 1 1 0 96 MWI Malawi 1 1 1
23 CAN Canada 1 1 1 97 MYS Malaysia 1 1 1
24 CHE Switzerland 1 1 1 98 NAM Namibia 1 1 1
25 CHL Chile 1 1 1 99 NER Niger 1 1 1
26 CHN China 1 1 1 100 NGA Nigeria 0 0 0
27 CIV Ivory Coast 1 1 1 101 NIC Nicaragua 0 0 0
28 CMR Cameroon 1 1 1 102 NLD Netherlands 1 1 1
29 COL Colombia 1 1 1 103 NOR Norway 1 1 1
30 CPV Cape Verde 1 1 0 104 NPL Nepal 1 1 0
31 CRI Costa Rica 1 1 1 105 NZL New Zealand 1 1 1
32 CYP Cyprus 1 1 1 106 PAK Pakistan 1 1 1
33 CZE Czech Republic 1 1 1 107 PAN Panama 1 1 1
34 DEU Germany 1 1 1 108 PER Peru 1 1 1
36 DJI Djibouti 0 0 0 109 PHL Philippines 1 1 1
37 DNK Denmark 1 1 1 110 PNG Papua New Guinea 0 0 0
38 DOM Dominican Republic 1 1 1 111 POL Poland 1 1 1
39 DZA Algeria 0 0 0 112 PRT Portugal 1 1 1
40 ECU Ecuador 1 1 1 113 PRY Paraguay 1 1 1
41 EGY Egypt 1 1 1 114 PUR Puerto Rico 0 0 0
42 ESP Spain 1 1 1 115 ROM Romania 1 1 1
43 EST Estonia 1 1 0 116 RUS Russia 1 1 1
44 ETH Ethiopia 0 0 0 117 RWA Rwanda 1 1 0
45 FIN Finland 1 1 1 118 SDN Sudan 0 0 0
46 FJI Fiji 1 1 0 119 SEN Senegal 1 1 1
47 FRA France 1 1 1 120 SGP Singapore 1 1 1
48 GBR United Kingdom 1 1 1 121 SLE Sierra Leone 1 1 1
49 GEO Georgia 0 0 0 122 SLV El Salvador 1 1 1
50 GHA Ghana 1 1 1 123 SRB Serbia 0 1 1
51 GIN Guinea 0 0 0 124 SUR Suriname 0 0 0
52 GMB Gambia 0 1 1 125 SVK Slovakia 1 1 1
53 GNB Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 126 SVN Slovenia 1 1 0
53 GRC Greece 1 1 1 127 SWE Sweden 1 1 1
54 GRD Grenada 0 0 0 128 SWZ Swaziland 0 1 0
55 GUY Guyana 0 0 0 129 SYC Seychelles 0 0 0
56 HKG Hong Kong 0 0 0 130 THA Thailand 1 1 1
57 HND Honduras 1 1 1 131 TJK Tajikistan 0 1 0
58 HRV Croatia 1 1 0 132 TKM Turkmenistan 0 0 0
59 HTI Haiti 0 0 0 133 TTO Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 1
60 HUN Hungary 1 1 1 134 TUN Tunisia 1 1 1
61 IDN Indonesia 1 1 1 135 TUR Turkey 1 1 1
62 IND India 1 1 1 136 TWN Taiwan 1 1 1
63 IRL Ireland 1 1 1 137 TZA Tanzania 1 1 1
64 IRN Iran 1 1 1 138 UGA Uganda 1 1 1
65 ISL Iceland 0 0 0 139 UKR Ukraine 1 1 0
66 ISR Israel 1 1 1 140 URY Uruguay 1 1 1
67 ITA Italy 1 1 1 141 USA United States 1 1 1
68 JAM Jamaica 1 1 1 142 UZB Uzbekistan 0 0 0
69 JOR Jordan 1 1 1 143 VEN Venezuela 1 1 1
70 JPN Japan 1 1 1 144 VNM Vietnam 0 1 1
71 KAZ Kazakhstan 0 1 0 145 YEM Yemen 0 1 1
72 KEN Kenya 1 1 1 146 ZAF South Africa 1 1 1
73 KGZ Kyrgyzstan 0 1 0 147 ZMB Zambia 1 1 1
74 KHM Cambodia 0 1 0 148 ZWE Zimbabwe 1 1 1
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2008): “Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies,” Journal of the European
Economic Association, 6(1), 1–44.
Acemoglu, D., and D. Autor (2011): “Skills, Tasks, and Technologies: Implications
for Employment and Earnings,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. by D. Card, and
O. Ashenfelter, vol. 4B, chap. 12, pp. 1043–1171. North Holland, Amsterdam.
Acemoglu, D., and S. Johnson (2005): “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of Political
Economy, 113(5), 949–995.
(2007): “Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic
Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 925–985.
(2014): “Disease and Development: A Reply to Bloom, Canning, and Fink,”
Journal of Political Economy, 122(6), 1367–1375.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001): “The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review,
91(5), 1369–1401.
(2005): “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” in Handbook
of Economic Growth, ed. by P. Aghion, and S. Durlauf, vol. 1A, chap. 6, pp. 385–472.
North Holland, Amsterdam.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, and P. Yared (2008): “Income and
Democracy,” American Economic Review, 98(3), 808–842.
(2009): “Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 56(8), 1043–1058.
Acemoglu, D., S. Naidu, P. Restrepo, and J. A. Robinson (2014): “Democracy,
Redistribution, and Inequality,” in Handbook of Income Distribution, ed. by A. Atkinson,
vol. 2B, chap. 21, pp. 1885–1966. North Holland, Amsterdam.
(2016): “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, forth-
coming.
327
328 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, D., and P. Restrepo (2017): “Secular Stagnation? The Effect of Aging
on Economic Growth in the Age of Automation,” American Economic Review: Papers
& Proceedings, 107(5), 174–179.
Acemoglu, D., and J. A. Robinson (2000): “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115(4), 1167–1199.
(2005): Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University
Press, New York, NY.
(2008): “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions,” American Economic
Review, 98(1), 267–293.
Acemoglu, D., J. A. Robinson, and R. Torvik (2013): “Why Do Voters Dismantle
Checks and Balances?,” Review of Economic Studies, 80(3), 845–875.
Ager, P., C. W. Hansen, and P. S. Jensen (2018): “Fertility and Early-Life Mortality:
Evidence from Smallpox Vaccination in Sweden,” Journal of the European Economic
Association, 16(2), 487–521.
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1992): “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction,”
Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351.
Aghion, P., P. Howitt, and F. Murtin (2011): “The Relationship Between Health
and Growth: When Lucas Meets Nelson-Phelps,” Review of Economics and Institutions,
2(1), 1–24.
Aidt, T. S., and R. Franck (2015): “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution:
Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832,” Econometrica, 83(2), 505–547.
Aiyar, S., C. Ebeke, and X. Shao (2016): “The Impact of Workforce Aging on
European Productivity,” IMF Working Paper, 16/238.
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg
(2003): “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155–194.
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